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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to respond to the limited stock of knowledge about military 
Knowledge Management (KM) and specifically South African Department of Defence (SA DOD) 
KM.  A world in the knowledge era, struggling with data/information saturation, requires KM as an 
advantage driver and multiplier.  The SA DOD is still entrenched in the information era, practising 
information management as a primary enabler for decision-making, action, effects and advantage.  
The SA DOD does not seem interested in KM as a primary advantage driver. 
The research problem and aim of this dissertation are to clarify the extent to which coherent 
and integrated KM will be beneficial to the SA DOD and what SA DOD KM fundamentals are.  
The research scope is inclusive of a broad literature review and documents analysis of both the 
published material on USA military KM and SA DOD legislation and policy, supplemented with 
questionnaires to a selected sample of SA DOD senior managers.    
The researcher has a relativist worldview (ontological assumption), calibrated with a 
constructivist paradigm, favouring a qualitative research methodology and case study research 
approach/design that will render the rich description of the phenomenon using techniques such as 
questionnaires and document analysis.  A deductive reasoning approach and case study research 
design was used to structure the research.  Document analysis was the primary research method.  
The secondary research method was questionnaire data collection and analysis to provide insight 
into the level of interest in KM by the SA DOD and possibly supporting evidence to the findings of 
the document analysis.  The combination of the research philosophy, methodology, design, and 
methods assisted the researcher in the quest to extract new meaning and propose new solutions for 
consideration by the SA DOD. 
A universal definition void for knowledge and KM remains a practical challenge for 
organisations and a major obstacle to coherence and integration. Literature and business recognise 
the importance of KM as an advantage multiplier. Even military organisations such as the United 
States of America (USA) military recognise the importance if KM. The USA military is currently a 
military KM leader. In contrast, the SA DOD does not recognise the advent of the knowledge era 
and the importance of KM yet.  The SA DOD’s disinterest in KM is based principally on the 
analysis of legislative, policy and doctrine voids; leadership aspects; information era entrenchment; 
various levels of misunderstanding; KM policy and doctrine vacuum; and extensive construct 
dissonance.  It is imperative that the SA DOD adopt knowledge era thinking and practice supporting 
survival and advantage.  As a lead department in RSA securing national security, the SA DOD 
should lead the RSA government in a transition to the knowledge era and KM. 
Knowledge and KM are fundamental to organisational survival, gaining and sustaining 
advantage and as enablers to decisions, actions and effects.  Public service organisations’, such as 
the SA DOD, KM motives are typically related to effectiveness and efficiency, economies and risk 
mitigation. 
To cope with a world saturated by ubiquitous knowledge continuum artefacts, complexity, 
and discontinuous change; and fundamental to the decision, action, effect enablers and advantage - 
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a KM Capability (KMC) and coherent and integrated KM are recommended by this dissertation for 
the SA DOD (and probably the entire SA government).   
SA DOD knowledge is defined by this dissertation as evolving meaning in the form of 
intellectual capital (IC) that capacitate understanding, decision-making, action, effect and 
advantage.  SA DOD KM is defined by this dissertation as the integrated process transforming 
organisational IC into evolving meaning to capacitate understanding, decision-making, action, 
effect and advantage.  These definitions are fundamental to a future SA DOD KMC and KM.  
The dissertation proposes the expansion of KM to Knowledge Continuum Management; 
within the framework of acknowledging knowledge as a continuum and supporting the continuous 
requirement for integrated management of divergent approaches, processes and enablers.  The 
dissertation argues for the review of current legislation and the Defence Review 2015 for alignment 
with the knowledge era.  The dissertation argues further for coherent use of constructs such as 
leadership, IC, capstone military knowledge categories, types of SA DOD knowledge, KM 
leadership philosophy, and a knowledge continuum (amongst others). Recognition is required for 
the time-value of the knowledge continuum artefacts, discrepancies in SA DOD policy, doctrine 
and existing military capability expressions and knowledge security (amongst several others).  This 
should illustrate the importance of knowledge and KM and to recommend possible solutions to a 
future SA DOD KMC and KM implementation.  
Keyword search:  Knowledge, knowledge management, military, South African Department 
of Defence, South African National Defence Force.  
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie navorsing reageer op die beperkte kennis oor militêre kennis bestuur (KB) en 
spesifiek SA Departement van Verdediging (DvV) KB. 'n Wêreld in die kennis-era, wat sukkel met 
data/inligting versadiging, vereis KB as 'n voorspong bestuurder en vermenigvuldiger. Die SA DvV 
is steeds in die inligtings-era vasgevang, en gebruik inligtingbestuur as die primêre grondslag vir 
besluitneming, aksie, effekte en voorspong. Dit will voorkom of die SA DvV nie geïnteresseerd is 
in KB as 'n primêre voorsprong drywer nie. Die doelwit van die verhandeling is om te verduidelik 
in watter mate samehangende en geïntegreerde KB voordelig sal wees vir die SA DvV en wat die 
SA DvV KB grondslae is. Kwalitatiewe navorsing en 'n induktiewe redenerings benadering, 
gevallestudies, dokument analise en vraelys metodes word saamgespan om nuwe betekenis te 
ontsluit. 
Die navorser het 'n relativistiese wêreldbeskouing (ontologiese aanname), gekalibreer met 'n 
konstruktiwistiese paradigma (epistemologiese aanname), bevoordeel 'n kwalitatiewe navorsings 
metodologie en gevallestudie navorsingsbenadering / ontwerp wat a diep beskrywing van die 
verskynsel sal maak deur tegnieke soos vraelyste en dokumentanalise te gebruik. 'n Deduktiewe 
redeneringsbenadering en gevallestudie navorsings ontwerp is gebruik om die navorsing te 
struktureer. Dokument analise was die primêre navorsings metode. Die sekondêre navorsings 
metode was die invordering en analise van vraelyste om the vlak van belangstelling in KB the 
ondersoek and moontlike ander ondersteundnend opinieis te kry vir the bevindinge van die 
dokument analise. Die kombinasie van die navorsings filosofie, metodologie, ontwerp en metodes  
het die navorser bygestaan in die strewe om nuwe betekenis te verkry. 
'n Universele definisie leemte vir kennis en KB bly 'n praktiese uitdaging vir organisasies en 
'n vername struikelblok vir koherensie en integrasie. Literatuur en besighede erken die 
belangrikheid van KB as 'n voorspong vermenigvuldiger. Die VSA weermag is tans 'n KB leier. Die 
SA DvV herken tot vandag toe nog nie die koms van die kennis-era en die belangrikheid van KB 
nie. Die SA DvV blyk nie geintereseerd te wees in KB; hoofsaaklik gebaseer op die analise van 
wetgewende, beleids- en doktriene, leierskap aspekte; inligting-era verskansing; verskillende vlakke 
van misverstand; KB beleid en leerstelling vakuum; en uitgebreide konstruk dissonansie. Dit is 
noodsaaklik dat die SA DvV oorskakel na die kennis-era denkrigting en praktyke om oorlewing en 
voorsprong te ondersteun. As 'n RSA departementele leier vir die versekering van nasionale 
veiligheid, moet die SA DvV leiding verskaf vir die regering in die oorgang na die kennis-era en 
KB. 
Kennis en KB is die grondslag vir organisatoriese oorlewing, die verkryging en handhawing 
van voorsprong en die grondslag vir besluite, aksies en effekte. Die motiewe vir KB deur openbare 
diens organisasies, soos die SA DvV, is tipies gerig op effektiwiteit, doeltreffendheid, 
bekostigbaarheid en risiko beperking.  Samehangende en geïntegreerde KB en 'n KB Vermoë 
(KBV) word aanbeveel deur hierdie verhandeling as n basis vir SA DvV (en waarskynlik die hele 
SA regering) besluitneming, aksie, effekte en voorsprong - om te oorleef in 'n wêreld versadig deur 
alomteenwoordige kennis kontinuum artefakte, kompleksiteit en nie-aanhoudende verandering. 
SA DvV kennis word deur hierdie verhandeling gedefinieer as evolueerende betekenis in die 
vorm van intellektuele kapitaal (IK) wat begrip, besluitneming, aksie, effek en voorsprong 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
v 
bevorder. SA DvV KB word deur hierdie verhandeling gedefinieer as die geïntegreerde proses wat 
organisatoriese IK omskep in evoleerende betekenis om begrip, besluitneming, aksie, effek en 
voorspong te bevorder. Hierdie definisies is die grondslag vir 'n toekomstige SA DOD KMV en 
KB. 
Hierdie verhandeling stel die uitbreiding van KB tot Kennis Kontinuum Bestuur voor; binne 
die raamwerk van die erkenning van kennis as 'n kontinuum en ondersteuning van die voortdurende 
vereiste vir geintegreerde bestuur van uiteenlopende benaderings, prosesse en enablers. Die 
verhandeling beredeneer vir die hersiening van huidige wetgewing en die Verdedigings Oorsig 
2015 om dit te rig op die kennis-era. Verder, die verhandeling beredeneer vir die samehangende 
gebruik van konstrukte soos leierskaps IK, hoeksteen-militêre kennis kategorieë, tipes SA DvV 
kennis, KB leierskap filosofie, en 'n kennis kontinuum; onder andere. Daar is ‘n vereiste vir die 
erkenning van die tydwaarde van kennis kontinuum artefakte, die teenstrydighede in SA DvV 
beleid, doktriene en bestaande militêre vermoë uitdrukkings, en kennis sekuriteit (onder verskeie 
ander) om die belangrikheid van kennis en KB te illustreer en moontlike oplossings aan te beveel 
vir 'n toekomstige SA DvV KBV en KB inwerkingstelling. 
Sleutelwoord soektog: Kennis, kennisbestuur, militêre, Suid-Afrikaanse Departement van 
Verdediging, Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
“Drowning in information [and data], but starved for knowledge” (Naisbitt, 1984: 17). 
Society is currently in the knowledge age or –era or –economy, sometimes also referred to as 
the knowledge-based economy
1
.  Knowledge is central to economies and to be able to survive and 
gain advantage with.  The knowledge era recognises knowledge as the fourth economic pillar 
(capital, labour and land being the other three pillars
2
).  Each of these pillars represents different 
sources of value or value creation capacity. 
“…, from an economic standpoint, traditional factors of production - land, labor, and capital - no 
longer occupy center stage as a means to leap forward. …, knowledge has become the key 
economic resource. …with everything else dropping out of the equation, knowledge has become 
the primary source of competitive advantage
3
. Competitive advantage depends on the smartness 
with which knowledge is used throughout the enterprise.” (Neilson, 2001: 318). 
A perspective on the importance of knowledge and the knowledge economy as an 
evolutionary state for society at large is as follows - 
“As we enter the 21st century we are moving into a new phase of economic and social 
development, which can usefully be referred to as a “knowledge economy” [phrase already 
coined in 1996], in which knowledge will be a key determining factor in organizational and 
economic success or failure. The most effective organizations in the knowledge economy will be 
those which recognize and best harness the crucial role that knowledge plays both inside and 
outside their organizations.” (Servin, 2005: 10 from the Knowledge Enhanced Government: A 
strategy for the UK Office of the e-Envoy, 2002). 
The peculiarity about this is that knowledge has always been an economic pillar.  Knowledge 
has always been an intrinsic part of capital and labour or people – yet, it has never been separately 
acknowledged as such.  Knowledge enjoys recognition for its centrality to economic development 
(OECD, 1996) and value creation capacity in the knowledge era. 
Another dimension of the knowledge era is Schwab’s (2016) suggestion that the world is in 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution, i.e. the Digital Revolution with accelerating the levels of 
complexity within business and militaries. This has vast implications for development – security 
nexus.  This is supported by Procházka (2017) in an article about the institutionalising analytical 
                                                 
1
 OECD, 1996; Standfield, 2002; Pérez-Montor, 2004; Servin, 2005; Wang & Gu, 2005; Halawi, Aronson & McCarthy, 
2005; La Grange, 2006; BenMoussa, 2009, Hassan & AL-Hakin, 2011; Tubigi, Alshawi & Alalwany, 2013; Zhang, 
2013; KMI
TM
, 2014; Zieba & Zieba, 2014. 
2
 Pérez-Montor, 2004; La Grange, 2006; Zaim, Tatoglu & Zaim, 2007; Ďurišová, 2011; Rašula, Vukšić & Štemberger, 
2012. 
3
 This view is now supported by several academics, as discussed throughout the dissertation.  Competitive advantage 
can be equated to military (strategic) advantage for militaries. 
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support functions to bolster defence management. Schwab (2016: online) states that the Digital 
Revolution - “… is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the 
physical, digital, and biological spheres.”.  The resulting complexity is described by Schwab (2016: 
online) as the result of the - “… velocity, scope and systems impact” of the Digital Revolution in 
society. Schwab (2016) describes the current developments as without previous precedent, 
unfolding at an exponential pace and being ubiquitous.  Access to knowledge is currently unlimited 
(Schwab, 2016), thus unlocking unlimited permutations thereof.  In other words, access to unlimited 
new knowledge.  Bontis (2001: 41) states that - “… codified knowledge will double every 11 
hours” by 2010.  This reality, according to Schwab (2016: online), will be driven by - 
“… emerging technology breakthroughs in fields such as artificial intelligence, robotics, the 
Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, 3-D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials 
science, energy storage, and quantum computing. Already, artificial intelligence is all around us 
… driven by exponential increases in computing power and by the availability of vast amounts 
of data [and information]”. 
The growing awareness of the critical importance of knowledge as part of the sustained drive 
towards business and military superiority and dominance is thus clear.  This results in an increasing 
requirement for knowledge to be managed (Halawi, Aronson & McCarthy, 2005; Manuri & 
Yaacob, 2011).  Knowledge management and information management (IM) have been at the 
receiving end of much debate for literally decades by strategists, management- and knowledge 
practitioners and academics
4
 alike.  This debate is informed by the recognition of the perceived 
value of knowledge as a change agent, advantage multiplier and contribution to strategic and 
military capability. However, knowledge and the management thereof remain very nebulous 
constructs due to philosophical disagreements on the schools-of-thought battlegrounds as well as a 
practical disagreement in the boardrooms of business and military organisations - 
“The concept of- knowledge management (KM) has been around for decades, but most 
organizations accept it only as theory and have not put it into practice. It has been difficult for 
many firms to evolve their organizational thinking from an information focus to a knowledge 
focus.”. (Cope, Cope & Hoatard, 2006: 41) 
Knowledge management also receives much academic attention because of the continuous 
organisational drive to implement KM initiatives and the difficulties to do so successfully (Arthur, 
2013; Črnjar & Dlačić, 2014).  Debates are, however, gradually maturing.  Debates are meandering 
away from arguments about what knowledge is, towards recognizing that knowledge exists as 
creations of individuals and organisations and thus requires management.  Neilson (2001: 334) aptly 
states the following -  
“In 1787, James Madison writing in the Federal Papers said “To give information to people is the 
most certain and legitimate engine of government”. Extending Madison’s notion, the time may 
have arrived where providing access to information and knowledge may be the most certain and 
legitimate functions of government”. 
                                                 
4
 Grant, 1996a & b; Uit Beijerse, 1999; Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000; Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Kouzmin, 2003; 
Cope, Cope & Hoatard, 2006; Hall, Dalmaris, Else, Martin, & Philp, 2007; Riempp & Smolnik, 2007; Guillou, Lazaric, 
Longhi & Rochhia, 2009; Ma & Yu, 2010; Xu, Housin, Caillaud & Gardoni, 2012, Črnjar & Dlačić, 2014 and many 
more. 
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In order to do this, knowledge needs to be managed.  BenMoussa (2009: 1491) writes that - 
“[KM] is a discipline that needs to be considered in any modern business strategy and planning”. 
Strategy and KM systems are typically employed to cope with future “… open-ended” challenges, 
increasing complexity and volatility currently experienced on an international scale (Shariq, 1997; 
Maule, Schacher, Gallup, Marashian & McClain, 2000; Lee & Hong, 2002; Zhang, 2013).  
Knowledge management is a dynamic environment and will remain so indefinitely.  From the 
vigorous debate on KM, much theory (what is KM) and models (how to manage it) have been 
constructed and proposed over the past 15 years, focussing on virtually all components of current 
business practices.  Interestingly, based on research by Ma and Yu (2010)
5
.  However, not much is 
published on the peculiarities of military KM.  Onyancha and Ocholla (2006) and Ma and Yu 
(2010) contributed an analysis of the intellectual structure of KM as a subject field.  Ma and Yu 
(2010) do not address any peculiarities of the public sector or military KM; but rather the business-
related themes.  Their research highlights the relatively low volume of published material 
addressing public- and military KM.  Arthur (2013) did an extensive qualitative meta-analysis on 
the barriers to the success of KM initiatives of public and private organisations.  Forty case studies 
where researched – the Departments of Defence (DOD) or militaries were not among them.  This is 
probably not due to oversight or preference but probably purely based on the availability of 
published material on military KM initiatives. 
Internationally, public sector (including the defence and security apparatus of governments) 
KM is gaining momentum due to a recognition of the vast benefits of having a coherent, integrated , 
enterprise-wide KM system that enables complexity management (McNabb, 2007; Rašula, Vukšić 
& Štemberger, 2012) and unlocking advantage.  The complexity stems from - “… rapid, radical, 
discontinuous or nonlinear” change in the macro environment (BenMoussa, 2009: 1492) combined 
with issues such as managing knowledge as a strategic resource; effective acquisition, management 
and dissemination of knowledge; complex decision-making; organisational knowledge drain; 
creating learning organisations; opportunity exploitation; threat analysis and risk management; and 
requirements for good governance (McNabb, 2007; Degen 2008).   
“Knowledge Management is one of the things that make warfare in the future different from 
warfare in the past.” (General Martin E. Dempsey, 2009 in Mortensen, 2014: 10). 
Defence (as an organ of State and primary public sector organisation) is a complex, 
knowledge-dependent, high consequence of error, capital-intensive and national security 
instrument.  Defence is confronted with ever-increasing complexity in every sphere of life and in a 
multitude of military environments in order to secure a perception of peace and security
6
 - 
“The Fourth Industrial Revolution [digital revolution and the consequential complexity] will also 
profoundly impact the nature of national and international security, affecting both the probability 
and the nature of conflict. The history of warfare and international security is the history of 
technological innovation, and today is no exception. Modern conflicts involving states are 
increasingly “hybrid” in nature, combining traditional battlefield techniques with elements 
previously associated with nonstate [sic] actors. The distinction between war and peace, 
                                                 
5
 Ma & Yu (2010: 179) researched what they call “field-defining titles” and authoritative authors on KM for the period 
1998-2007.  Military KM does not feature at all. 
6
 Bartczak, Boulton, Rainer, Oswald & O’Mally, 2010; Plant, 2000; Bower, 2001 and Cho, 2000.   
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combatant and noncombatant [sic], and even violence and nonviolence (think cyberwarfare [sic]) 
is becoming uncomfortably blurry.” (Schwab, 2016: online). 
“Leadership, sense-making, problem-solving and decision-making are more complex and 
more demanding in military situations …”, highlighting the growing requirement for knowledge 
superiority by militaries (Manuri & Yaacob, 2011: 73) to gain advantage and dominate.  Although 
much has been said and penned about KM, very little has been published, comparatively, about 
military KM (Bartczak, Boulton, Rainer, Oswald & O’Mally, 2010).  
Various authors propose that KM has become an absolute necessity for militaries, and 
consequentially important for defence and security
7
.  When considering that the core activity of any 
DOD is the acquisition, integration, maintenance and use of military capabilities to secure national 
interest; it makes sense that there should be the critical focus by DODs on military and other 
relevant knowledge in order to mitigate complexity and organically grow comparative or absolute 
military advantage.  Knowledge management is critical to such endeavours.  The USA and a 
handful of other developed nations recognised this requirement already at the beginning of the 
millennium. The USA is a leader in publishing on military KM, followed by the UK and Canada.   
More than a decade ago already, Bartczak, et al. (2002) identified (from a USA perspective) the 
need for research on military KM – 
“KM activities in military organizations must be deployed and conducted within a complex 
military culture, bureaucracy, and policy environment that have been well documented (Lehman 
and Sicherman 1999; CSIS 2001). Because of its unique structural and cultural attributes, the 
managerial, resource, and environmental factors that influence the military’s KM efforts need to 
be investigated” (Bartczak, et al., 2002: 2477). 
Degen (2008: 102) writes several years later that - “… the accelerated operational tempo of 
the War on Terrorism has forced [the USA military] to take an honest, in-depth look at how [the 
USA military] collect, analyse, debate, codify, write, and disseminate doctrine. …The current wars 
exacerbate the challenges of knowledge management”.  Other than USA military doctrine and 
military institutional documents and limited academic material on military KM, very little has been 
written and published about military KM.   
Military operations aimed at dealing with some or all of the negative products of the global 
future are posited to be increasingly hazardous, increasing in tempo and steeped in unpredictability 
(Degen, 2008; Martin, Philp & Hall, 2009).  This environmental complexity provides focus for 
management and operational processes on the criticality of organisational knowledge as the central 
source for advantage.  Rašula, et al. (2012: 147) states - “For many companies, the time of rapid 
technological change is also the time of incessant struggle for maintaining a competitive 
advantage.”.  Thus, knowledge is perceived today as the greatest source of strategic power – both 
by business and by militaries due to its impact on sustainable competitive and/or military 
advantage.  Comparatively, and having to factor in the knowledge era and associated complexity, 
there is silence with regard to the management of knowledge within the SA DOD. The researcher 
found no published material on South African DOD (SA DOD) KM. 
                                                 
7
 Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Shariq, 1997; Degen, 2008, Popa, 2010; Arora, 2011; Manuri & Yaacob, 2011 and Darby, 
2013. 
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 Large parts of the SA fiscus are dedicated to the generation of knowledge for the execution of 
the defence mandate.  This raises questions as to a perceived disinterest in KM by the SA DOD, and 
why?  Should the SA DOD be employing KM and why?  This research explores this perceived SA 
DOD disinterest in KM, possible reasons for SA DOD KM and how this could be accomplished. 
In terms of the larger stock of knowledge about KM, the research informs the subject community 
about certain peculiarities relating to military KM that is possibly also relevant to the business 
environment. 
1.2 CASE STUDY 
The study area of this research is the SA DOD.  The SA DOD is not monolithic, but functions 
within a social reality that is defined by the South African socio-economic context and legislated 
departmental mandates.  The SA DOD also functions within an international social reality defined 
by foreign policy, military and peacekeeping complexities.  National and international 
environments do not function in isolation but are informed and influenced by each other in a very 
complex manner defined by structured and unstructured processes and events.  The study area and 
unit of analysis are a public service organisation and State-funded function with a large asset 
portfolio providing defence and security capabilities, services and products. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) provides 
for a single South African National Defence Force (SANDF), a single police service and 
intelligence services, collectively known as the security services.  The security services of the 
Republic of South Africa (RSA) are mandated by its Constitution to guard the RSA’s national 
security as a national interest.  In order to secure RSA sovereignty, national security must reflect the 
resolve of its citizens, individually and collectively.  The citizens must live as equals.  Citizens must 
live in peace and harmony, and must be free from fear and have quality of life.  The national 
security requisite defines the primary objective of the SANDF as defending and protecting the RSA, 
- “… its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of 
international law regulating the use of force” (Constitution of South Africa, Chapter 11).  In 
addition to the employment of the SANDF by the RSA President as proposed in Section 201(2) of 
the Constitution, the President or the Minister of Defence (MOD) may authorise the employment of 
the SANDF for service within the RSA or in international waters, for the following purposes -  
 To preserve life, health or property in an emergency or humanitarian relief operation.
 To ensure the provision of essential services.
 To support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic
development.
 To effect national border control. (South African Defence Act: Section 18).
The Defence Review (DR) (2015: v) states it as follows – “South Africa’s national security is 
centered [sic] on the advancement of its sovereignty, democracy, national values and freedoms, and 
its political and economic independence”.  The SA DOD relies heavily on various forms of data, 
information, and knowledge to execute this mandate. To be successful in the execution of the said 
mandate in the knowledge era many resources are required of which knowledge is the primary 
resource.   The SA DOD requires a Knowledge Management Capability (KMC) to ensure 
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coherence and integration of knowledge to mitigate inefficiency and risk which is unacceptable 
from a governance perspective, i.e. accountability to the South African citizen and taxpayer to 
provide the best possible defence and security in order to remain sovereign and free from fear and 
want, at the best possible price.   The SA DOD, however, seems disinterested in KM and a KMC.  
This dissertation is positioned to address some of the fundamental knowledge gaps about KM 
within the SA DOD resource management approach. 
1.3 THE RESEARCHER 
The researcher is an appointed SA DOD Senior Staff Officer (SSO) working at the Defence 
Matériel Division within the Secretariat for Defence.  The researcher is involved with the 
management of SA DOD Intangible Assets (IA), more specifically Intellectual Property (IP).  It is 
within this context that the researcher discovered the resource management gap, i.e. coherent and 
integrated SA DOD KM.  Although much knowledge is generated within various SA DOD 
components; knowledge is seemingly managed in silos hampering decisions, actions (including no 
action), effects and advantage and thus the execution of the SA DOD legislated mandate.  There is 
thus an absence an integrated SA DOD KMC. 
The researcher adds 29 years of experiences as a soldier; trained as a Marine and in naval 
surface and sub-surface operations, intelligence, defence matériel acquisition and technology 
development as well as SA DOD IP and IA management and SA DOD policy writing; to the 
construction of this dissertation. The researcher is motivated by the fact that this is seminal research 
about a possible future for coherent and integrated SA DOD KM and a KMC that would positively 
impact SA DOD resource management with concomitant impact on SA DOD decision-making, 
actions, effects and advantage.    
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
In recent years there have been volumes of studies on the theory and application of knowledge 
and KM.  Both qualitative and quantitative or empirical research focussed on business-related issues 
of performance, competitive advantage, management models, strategy, critical success factors, best 
practice, etc.  Research addressing SA DOD KM are limited, if any. 
The absence of coherent and integrated KM in the SA DOD remains a challenge due to the 
impact of knowledge on decisions, actions, effects and advantage and the associated cost attached to 
these - stemming from the acquisition, technology development, intelligence products and 
operations.  It is expected of the SA DOD to approach the future with specific integrated attributes 
and capabilities.  The Defence Review 2015 summarises these requirements, complexity and 
challenges facing the SA DOD during the execution of its mandate in the following manner - 
“The [SA DOD] will be required to conduct a wide range of multi-dimensional military 
operations across a spectrum of complex, highly fluid and often lethal situations characterised by 
a wide variety of threats. Operations in the face of political, ethnic, cultural, tribal, linguistic and 
religious tensions will produce considerable human complexity. Future missions may range from 
non-combat operations (where the use of force will be absent or restricted to self-defence) to 
major combat operations with the application of potentially lethal force…The future force design 
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will pursue a balance of capabilities that adhere to the strategic concepts of rapid reaction 
operations for interventions, expeditionary operations to project forces for protracted periods, 
complex war fighting [sic] within the human and physical dimensions of the battle space [sic], 
interoperability of command and control capabilities, concurrency of operations in multiple 
theatres and joint, inter-agency, interdepartmental and multinational operations (JI2M) … The 
defence capability must be robust and flexible and able to project and sustain joint landward, air, 
maritime, Special Force and military health operations over extended distances for protracted 
periods on the continent. The military operating attributes of: command and control; movement 
and manoeuvre; firepower; intelligence; protection and survivability; and sustainment must be 
embedded in all capabilities.”(DR 2015, vii). 
The projection above incorporates a significant requirement for data, information and 
knowledge to support the decision, actions, effects and advantage when applying these capabilities 
in complex environments with flexibility and agility in mind.  In the quote above, the DR 2015 
makes only mention of intelligence as a type of knowledge that is considered a critical operating 
attribute.  The dissertation identifies several other types of knowledge that are considered critical 
for decisions, actions, effects and advantage. 
Based on the DR 2015 and current SA DOD policies there are conscious SA DOD efforts to 
manage data and information on an enterprise-wide scale.  The SA DOD utilises in parallel various 
platforms, systems, processes, strategies, leadership initiatives - all of which is calibrated and 
continuously augmented by organisational and individual cultures - to generate, create and manage 
data, information and knowledge.  The SA DOD conducts annual strategic planning as required by 
the RSA regulatory framework.  This strategic planning and hence the product thereof could be 
more effective and efficient if the sources of SA DOD data, information and knowledge were 
managed in a coherent and integrated manner.  The knowledge hierarchy (i.e. data, information and 
knowledge) is managed throughout the SA DOD at various levels of sophistication.  A key problem 
is still the incoherent and unintegrated (silo approach) manner in which the SA DOD conducts KM 
(if at all).  Because knowledge accounts for the greater part of military advantage; barriers to create 
coherence and integration of available knowledge will lead to the erosion of military advantage and 
organisational efficiency and effectiveness (decisions, actions and effects). This poses a risk that is 
unacceptable from both a governance and defence perspective. 
This predicament is evident from the noticeable void in SA DOD KM policy and doctrine.    
No mention and/or provision is made for KM in national legislation and the DR 2015, which is the 
capstone SA DOD Level 0 policy for the future.  In fact, the DR 2015 recognises information as a 
strategic SA DOD resource, entrenching the SA DOD in the information era and associated 
thinking.  The predicament is also prevalent in a vast number of SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine about information-, software-, financial-, information security-, personnel management and 
operational matters.  It is accepted that KM is an absolute necessity for an organ of State such as the 
SA DOD
8
.  Yet, there is very little published on the modalities of military KM.  Nothing (or very 
little) is published on SA DOD KM that could stimulate debate about whether to manage and how 
to manage SA DOD knowledge coherently and in an integrated manner. These issues (amongst 
                                                 
8
 Hamel and Prahalad, 1990); Popa, 2010; Bartzak & England, 2005; Bartczak, et al., 2010 and Arora, 2011). 
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others) will result in the deterioration of the national defence capability over time with 
commensurate wastage of funding and real or perceived national insecurity. 
1.5 AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is a response to the limited stock of knowledge about military KM and 
specifically SA DOD KM.  Based on the specific SA DOD contextual issues, the research aims at 
expnading the KM body of knowledge. The research thus purposefully drives towards the 
epistemological
9
 and ontological
10
 growth of KM theory.  Rather than to test specific KM theory; 
this seminal research aims at understanding to the extent of disinterest in, benefits and requirements 
for coherent and integrated KM in the SA DOD.   
The aim of the research has at least three levels.  It is to provide clarity on the assumption that 
the SA DOD is not interested in KM.  The second, providing motivation why KM is important for 
the SA DOD.  Lastly, to envision definitions for SA DOD knowledge and KM, distil the types of 
knowledge to be managed by the SA DOD and describing the fundamentals for SA DOD KM.  The 
third level conclude with a conceptual SA DOD KM model.  Resolving these questions and 
knowledge gaps will provide the foundation for future SA DOD KM as a response to the challenges 
posed by the complex defence and security environment and mandate. 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONCEPT 
The primary research questions (PRQ) is - What is the extent of disinterest in, benefits and 
requirements for coherent and integrated KM in the SA DOD?  Answers to these questions will 
achieve the research objective.  Secondary Research Questions (SRQ) are as follows:  
 Question 1: Why is the SA DOD perceived not to be interested in KM? This question is based on 
an assumption drawn from the lack of evidence of SA DOD KM. 
 Question 2: Should the SA DOD consider KM implementation and why? Following from the first 
question the researcher elaborates on the importance of SA DOD KM and why. 
 Question 3: What categories and types of SA DOD knowledge should be managed?  It is 
important to discover what categories and types (subject fields) of knowledge exist in the SA 
DOD and which of these should form part of SA DOD KM in support of coherence and 
integration.    
 Question 4: What are the fundamentals that the SA DOD must understand about managing 
military and related knowledge?  Important factors discussed relate to processes, security, 
coherence and integration, leadership, enabling systems, etc.  These fundamentals informed the 
construction of an SA DOD KM conceptual model.  The research concept is based on the 
combination of the constructs depicted in Figure 1.1. - 
                                                 
9
 “The theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between 
justified belief and opinion.” (Oxford Dictionaries.  Online.  http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ 
epistemology) 
10
 “The branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being” and/or “A set of concepts and categories in a subject 
area or domain that shows their properties and the relations between them”. (Ibid., Online. http://oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/english/ontology) 
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Figure 1.1: Outline of the Research Concept 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
1.7 ASSUMPTIONS 
The dissertation is informed by a number of assumptions.  The researcher assumes that the SA 
DOD has no or limited interest in KM. Based on the literature, the researcher assumes that KM has 
a positive impact on organisational performance, and hence the apprehension about the SA DOD’s 
perceived disinterest in KM.   
It is assumed (based on experience) that decision, actions, effects and advantage are primary 
outputs and requirements for any organisation to be successful or dominate the competition.  The 
SA DOD manages its knowledge incoherently and in an unintegrated manner which possibly 
negatively affects decisions, actions, effects and advantage.  It is assumed that the SA DOD has 
inherent organisational peculiarities that will require a specific KM model to institutionalise a 
coherent and integrated KMC.   
Based on findings discussed in the literature reviews of the dissertation, it is assumed that the 
SA DOD has policy and doctrine that spans decades; but policy and doctrine on SA DOD KM will 
in all possibility have been written and approved during and/or after 2005.  It is assumed that if no 
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strategic level KM policy or doctrine exists within the SA DOD; that there would not be coherent 
and integrated SA DOD KM structures and activities.  The researcher assumes that collectively the 
SA DOD members have knowledge on what knowledge, KM and related concepts are, especially at 
the executive (strategic leadership) level. 
1.8 LIMITATIONS 
The research will be limited to a singular area of study - the SA DOD.  This is a limitation in 
terms of scope.  By limiting the research to the SA DOD the rest of the SA Defence Sector is 
excluded, limiting possible insights that could be gained from knowledge managers in, for example, 
the defence industry and at the defence institutes.  A possible limitation is the inability to receive 
salient information from the SA DOD due to security reasons or due to the availability and/or 
willingness of respondents to complete the questionnaire.     
The dissertation will not attempt to develop taxonomies of SA DOD knowledge, but rather a 
definition for SA DOD knowledge within which each type of SA DOD knowledge is conceptually 
supported.  The dissertation will not attempt identifying all the relevant software currently being 
used to manage information and knowledge with.  These issues can be resolved during further 
research; possibly during a KM readiness assessment. 
The dissertation will prescribe definitions for knowledge and KM, a KM conceptual model 
and other KM fundamentals.  These will not be tested for effectiveness and efficiency (i.e. their 
impact on organisational performance and/or military advantage).  This can be the bedrock for 
future studies. 
1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Schurink (2005: 43) writes -“Ethical issues are the concerns and dilemmas that arise over the 
proper way to execute research, more specifically not to create harmful conditions for the subjects 
of inquiry, humans, in the research process”.  Streubert-Speziale and Carpenter (2003) and 
McMillan and Shumacher (2001) are some of the authors that write about the rights of participants, 
subjectivity during qualitative research approaches and other ethical dilemmas.  These issues 
calibrated the researcher’s ethical behaviour during the research.  
The research and dissertation comply with the University of Stellenbosch Ethical Code
11
 and 
processes and the Code of Conduct of the SANDF.  As a general principle, the researcher is 
respectful of the privacy and anonymity where required or insisted upon, confidentiality and related 
rights of all prospective research participants, in particular, their opinions and views.  Participation 
is completely voluntary. All participants were required to provide written consent (University of 
Stellenbosch consent form) to use their responses for the research.  All participants retained the 
right to withdraw from the research at any juncture.  Ethical approval for this research was granted 
by the University of Stellenbosch Research Ethics Committee for the period 15 February 2017 - 14 
February 2020. 
                                                 
11
 University of Stellenbosch comply with the Declaration of Helsinki and the Guidelines for Ethical Research: 
Principles Structures and Processes 2004 (Department of Health). 
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The researcher also obtained consent to conduct research on the SA DOD from principle 
officials within the SA DOD, i.e. the Secretary for Defence (Sec Def), the Chief of the South 
African National Defence Force (C SANDF), the Chief Human Resources and the Chief Defence 
Intelligence (C DI).  The documents are available on request.  Once completed, the dissemination of 
the research report might be classified to protect the interest of the SA DOD in terms of SA DOD 
security policy. 
1.10 DISSERTATION ROADMAP 
Chapter 1 (Introduction, Background and Objectives) introduces the context for the report, 
describing the problem statement, purpose statement and objectives of the report and outline the 
research questions, limitations and ethical considerations.  Chapter 2 (Literature Review: 
Knowledge Management Theory and Practice) provides a focussed literature review of the primary 
theory relevant to SRQs 2, 3 and 4, concluding with important factors for consideration in later 
chapters of the report.  Chapter 3 (Literature Review: Military Knowledge Management in Practice) 
focuses on analysing the USA military KM experience – providing possible answers to SRQs 2, 3 
and 4.  Chapter 4 (Research Design and Methodology) describes the research methodology used to 
compile the dissertation.  Chapter 5 (The Legislative Framework and Defence Review 2015: Impact 
on the SA DOD from the Perspective of Knowledge Management) and Chapter 6 (South African 
Department of Defence Knowledge Management Level 1 Policy and Doctrine) focus on the 
document analysis of relevant SA DOD policy and doctrine that would shed light on all the research 
questions, concluding with important factors for consideration in later chapters of the report.  
Chapter 7 (Attitudes and Views of Respondents about South African Department of Defence 
Knowledge Management) presents an analysis of the questionnaires and provides possible answers 
to all the questions. Chapter 8 (Conclusion, Contribution and Closure) crystallises the findings 
stemming from Chapters 2-3 and 5-7, concluding the research report with a statement on the 
contribution of the research and possible related questions for future research.  The next chapter of 
the dissertation is a literature review and focuses on pertinent knowledge and KM related academic 
material to provide supporting arguments for the answers to SRQs 2-4.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation surveys the literature and assists the researcher and reader of the 
dissertation in understanding the asset to be managed as well as how the academic and business 
community has conceptualised KM since its inception.  This is achieved with a documentary 
assessment of the general KM theory and practice.  Importantly also, this chapter will identify 
potential gaps in the literature that might impact the future implementation of KM in the SA DOD.   
The creation, sharing and use of knowledge have been and are central to private and the 
public sector (also, the military) and closely associated with the concept of advantage.  However, 
not much tailored military KM theory has been developed and published since the advent of KM.  
The military, in general, subscribes to theory and practice developed by academics and practitioners 
for business. As such, over the past decade, some countries started to develop and implement KM in 
their militaries.  However, it is the business community that remains at the forefront of KM theory 
and application. 
The aim of the literature review is to provide a concrete base to support arguments why the 
SA DOD should be interested in KM, why and how SA DOD should manage knowledge.  The 
literature review is exploratory in nature and endeavours to present the reader with theory, concepts, 
applied knowledge from the field, summaries and conclusions in an integrated narrative.  Definition 
of terms and concepts are part of the developing narrative creating inclusive arguments without the 
requirement to refer back to a particular section dealing with definitions of terms.  
Due to the cross-impact that both knowledge and management have on these various scientific 
research fields, the literature review will explore concepts and paradigms and their possible impact 
on KM with a wide angle lens (reasoning from a general perspective to a more specific perspective) 
to support deductive reasoning.   
2.2 THE DEBATE  
“[T]he only certainty is uncertainty, the only reliable source of lasting competitive advantage12 is 
knowledge” (Nonaka, 1995 in Ďurišová, 2011: 45). 
To construct an understanding of the importance of KM for the SA DOD the researcher 
introduces a brief overview of the history of KM.  Knowledge management, from a process 
perspective (create, capture, storage, retrieval, distribution, use, etc.) was possibly first practised by 
the Cuneiform language approximately 3000 BC.  The debate about KM did not necessarily start in 
3000 BC (Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Kouzmin, 2003); but KM was probably practised unknowingly 
                                                 
12
 “Competitive advantage is normally defined as the ability to earn returns on investment consistently above average 
for the industry (Porter, 1985)”  (Halawi, Aronson & McCarthy, 2005: 77) 
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(Cong & Pandya, 2003: 26 in Arthur, 2013: 1).  Definitions conceptualising both knowledge and 
KM as constructs are discussed later in this chapter and in chapter 3. 
Since 1986, what everybody has been doing unknowingly was named, Knowledge 
Management, coined by Wiig in 1986 at the United Nations.  Since then the debate went through 
various iterations of academic argument and critique to the point where, currently, KM has gained 
broad international acceptance.  The majority of KM material published up to present addresses 
mostly business related KM theory and application (Carrillo, 2002 & Noeth, 2004 in La Grange, 
2006).  Although there are still considerable differences or disagreement on what knowledge and 
KM are; several decades of research and debate have contributed significant understanding of these 
highly contested and congested fields of study. 
Although it is interesting to ponder the development of KM as a subject field as described by 
Zhang (2013) and other writers, it is more useful to consider the developed theory and how it can 
assist with creating and maintaining an advantage (competitive advantage and/or military 
advantage).  There are always challenges from all corners to an emerging field of study, questioning 
its raison d'être and its possible long-term impact on organisations and business.  One such question 
raised by academics and practitioners alike – is KM just a passing fad?   
KM was labelled as just a - “… passing fad” (Servin, 2005: 9) or a -“… management fad” (La 
Grange, 2006: 39) probably due to KM failures in certain business areas and/or because the KM 
discourse is so attenuated by the noise resulting from the IM, computer technology and software 
management discourse.   
 
Figure 2.1: Knowledge Management Development 
Source:  Riempp and Smolnik (2007: 3). 
Knowledge management as a field of study or management discipline has emerged and 
developed of the past ten to fifteen years (King, 2009: 3). Studies published by Onyancha and 
Ocholla (2006: 8) based on the density of KM publications (South African perspective) supports the 
research by Riempp and Smolnik (2007) displaying how KM rose, fell and stabilised. Riempp and 
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Smolnik (2007: 3) graphically summarise KM development into a recognised management science 
according to a six-phase or period - “… hype cycle” posited to enhance competitive advantage and 
increase productivity. 
The notion of KM being a ‘passing fad’ is visible as the KM development path slumped down 
into a ‘trough of disillusionment’ during the late 1990s to early 2000s based on the hype cycle 
above.  Several authors provide supporting arguments and labels for the various periods depicted in 
the hype cycle:  Trigger period (Snowden, 2002, Tuomi 2002, Anand & Singh, 2011); increased 
expectations from KM (Jacobs, 2004; Onyancha and Ocholla, 2006; Riempp and Smolnik, 2007, 
Zhang, 2013) and thus also an increase in publications (Bouthillier and Shearer, 2002; Onyancha 
and Ocholla, 2006); disillusionment (Zhang, 2013); slope of enlightenment (Kakabadse, et al., 
2003;  Zhang, 2013);  plateau of productivity and KM maturity (Bullinger, Spath, Warnecke and 
Westkämper, 2009 and Zhang, 2013).  Anand and Singh (2011: 926) categorise the development of 
KM into three generations as follows –  
“…the period 1990-1995 can be called as the first generation of KM. The initial work started 
with defining KM, investigating the potential benefits of KM for businesses, and designing 
specific KM projects (Senge, 1990; Nonaka, 1994; Quinn, 1992; and Wiig, 1993). Advancement 
on artificial intelligence influenced research on KM, mainly in the direction of knowledge 
representation and storing can be seen (Mui & Carthy, 1987; Levine & Pomerol, 1989; and 
Ignizo, 1991). KM practical application to organizations started around 1996, which can be 
stated as the second generation of KM. Many organization have started implementing KM 
during this generation, KM research issues focus was business development (Grant, 1997; 
Thierauf, 1999; and McAdam & Reid, 2001), organizations (Alavi & Leidner,1999; Hasan, & 
Gould,2003;and LanSia, & Al-Hawamdeh, 2003), frameworks (Holsapple & Joshi, 2002a; 
Rubenstein-Montano, B., et.al, 2001; Chua, 2003; and Maier & Remus, 2003), operations and 
processes(Rajan, Lank & Chapple, 1999; Pervan, & Ellison, 2003), techonigical advancement 
(Carneiro, 2001; Nemati, et.al., 2002; Liao, 2003; and Metaxiotis, & Psarras, 2003). Third 
generation emerged around 2002 where focus seems to be on result part [sic] such as the link 
between knowing and action (Paraponaris, 2003).All knowledge is inherently social, cultural and 
organizational knowledge can only be realized through change in organizational activity and 
practice.” 
The period labelled ‘peak of inflated expectations’ possibly gave rise to an increase in KM 
research and publications to substantiate perceptions.  Onyancha and Ocholla (2006: 8) published 
empirical research to illustrate such increase in publication activity during these cycles.  It probably 
also coincide with expressions and papers published by major organisations such as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) based in Europe, stating - “The 
term ‘knowledge-based economy’ stems from this fuller recognition of the place of knowledge and 
technology in modern OECD countries” (OECD, 1996: 3). 
Knowledge management gained more understanding with an increase in research and 
publications during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This also probably contributed to the 
introduction and shift of modern society toward the knowledge era.  The advent of the knowledge 
era contributed to the accelerated developed of KM as a management science. 
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The Riempp and Smolnik (2007) hype cycle (Figure 2.1) projected that KM should currently 
be in the maturity phase or Third Generation KM (Anand & Singh, 2011).  Focus has since shifted 
to knowledge assets (or Intellectual Capital (IC) – La Grange, 2006) inherent in people, business 
process, organisational culture and human behaviour. Kucza (2001: 16) states frankly - “… 
knowledge is mainly about humans and therefore the role of technology can only be of assisting 
nature [Davenport and Prusak 1998, McDermott 1999]”.  Thus, technology is still recognised as 
part of KM but somewhat relegated to a KM enabler role.   
Ramsay (1996) in McAdam and Reid (2000: 317) states that KM - “… has passed the fad 
level”.  Dayan (2006: 8-13) states that KM is “… now [2006] a recognized term; very much 
publicized, and increasingly accepted in the corporate community”.  The internationally recognised 
Knowledge Management Institute
TM
 is of the same opinion. Thus, the sceptics have been relegated 
to the shadows for now (Servin, 2005: 9).  KM is here to stay (Girard, 2004).  This is probably 
based on the benefits derived from KM; discussed later in the dissertation.  Mortensen (2014: 7) 
states it frankly – “Knowledge Management; It’s [sic] Not Just a Good Idea Anymore”. This is 
based on the adoption of KM by the USA military as a critical advantage multiplier and widely 
published as such. 
KM has been investigated and/or implemented by South African public service organisations 
for a number of years.  Onyancha and Ocholla (2006) write on trends of KM in the RSA using 
descriptive informetric analysis, combined with IM.  Onyancha and Ocholla (2006) found evidence 
that KM research only commenced in earnest in the mid-1990s, peaked during the 2000-2005 
period and then gradually decreased (see Figure 2.2).   The following graphic depicts the most 
active SA Universities on KM research: 
 
Figure 2.2: Institutions behind Information Management and Knowledge Management Post-
graduate Research in South Africa [up to 2011] 
Source: Onyancha (2011: 165). 
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The research by Onyancha and Ocholla (2006: 11) also summarises some of the key 
contributing fields of study by South African Universities on KM (IM was also considered), i.e. - 
“Information Studies …, Information Science … Business Administration, Economics, Information 
Technology and Communication Sciences, Business Management, Sociology, Computer science, 
Public administration/management, industrial and systems engineering, languages media and 
communication, nature conservation, Business information systems, Skills development and 
technology transfer, and business informatics”. The most prominent of these were Management, 
Information Science, Computer Science and Business Administration.  Over the period a total of 
101 researchers from various research disciplines, backgrounds and interests published on IM 
and/or KM.  This supports the view that KM is a multi-disciplinary field requiring an integrated 
approach. 
Notably, the field of military science
13
 did no studies on military KM during the period 
researched by Onyancha and Ocholla.  Follow-up research done by Onyancha (2011), adopting the 
same approach, reflected similar trends. The researcher could also not find any research subsequent 
on KM for the SA DOD.   
Concluding, KM is here to stay, not necessarily because of its perceived importance or 
dynamics of the process, but because of the importance of the asset which has a symbiotic 
relationship with survival and advantage.  Organisations embracing KM due to the realisation that 
the world is no longer in the information era but the knowledge era; that knowledge is a strategic 
asset and not information; and that the management of the asset is directly correlated with survival 
and advantage. 
Following from the above, the next section discusses the theory regarding knowledge in support of 
the crafting of SA DOD knowledge and KM definition proposals in later chapters.  Definitions for 
these constructs are fundamental to the creation and establishment of a future SA DOD KMC.   It is 
also part of the answer to SRQ 3 and 4. Theory will be followed by a practical discussion about KM 
in organisations.   
2.3 KNOWLEDGE - THE ASSET TO BE MANAGED 
“The study of human knowledge has been a central subject matter of philosophy and epistemology 
since the ancient Greeks.” (Kakabadse, et al., 2003: 75). 
Knowledge shapes every conceivable facet of the world as currently known, through the 
decisions and actions taken by people, driven by human safety and insecurity perceptions, the 
constant quest to survive, perpetual reach for progress and the need for success and to dominate.  
Thus, if humanity needs knowledge; what does knowledge consists of that makes it so 
irreplaceable?  This is an important question because it informs how knowledge should probably be 
managed.  Thus, in order to understand why it is important to manage knowledge and what type of 
knowledge; the researcher delved into the abyss called knowledge. 
                                                 
13
 Managed by the Military Academy – a faculty of the University of Stellenbosch, as well as other contributors to 
tertiary programmes for the SA DOD - University of the Witwatersrand and Tshwane University of Technology. 
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The discussion about knowledge should logically start with the question - why is there a need 
for knowledge?  Understanding the answer to this question should be the basis for each organisation 
to define knowledge purposefully for their business and service reality.  Also, this could provide 
insight into the need for and modalities of KM.  Uit Beijerse (1999) uses the opinion of Nietzsche 
(1882) positioning the need for knowledge firmly on the shoulders of the need to manage 
uncertainty and survival (supported by Probst, 1998 and Wiig, 1999b).  This is closely linked to the 
first and second levels of human need, which is biological- and safety needs, according to the 
Maslow hierarchy of human needs (Maslow, 1943).  Both these needs can be summarised as the 
need to survive. It could be argued that people need knowledge to survive the impact of the 
changing environment and/or to reduce the risk emanating from decisions required to take actions to 
survive.  In fact, arguments can be tabled for the need of knowledge at every level of the Maslow 
hierarchy to progress to the next level of the hierarchy. This seems all very medieval; or is it?  
In the contemporary and globalised world, the quest for survival is found at various levels in 
many social realities.  Knowledge is needed for the physical day-to-day survival of people 
sustainability of the environment (knowledge related too relative security, defence, medicine, food 
production, water harvesting and purification and energy production); for the survival of economies, 
i.e. how to make the production factors produce effectively and efficiently in support of human life, 
security and sustainable growth; for the survival of commercial businesses at the micro level 
(market niches, comparative and competitive advantage, business intelligence); for the management 
of military advantage (policy and doctrine development, defence research and technology 
development, defence intelligence, capability and competence development) – to name but a few.   
According to Bennet, Bennet and Lee (2010) knowledge generated by military organisations 
greatly benefit the wider society.  This is based on the fact that knowledge co-evolve with its 
environment to such an extent that it benefits the economy and society at large.  Military technology 
development is one such example.  To name but one such instance, the internet; developed by the 
USA military and a key contributor to the phenomenon called globalisation and a key contributor to 
the current ability of populations to coordinate action and mass very quickly in protest or support. 
Other writers skip the argument about survival and take the argument directly to the need for 
knowledge in decision-making and action (Emadzade, Mashayekhi, & Abdar, 2012 in Alrubaiee, 
Alzubi, Hanandeh, & Ali, 2015).  These are obvious precursors for survival and success.  These are 
very practical arguments and will be discussed and developed throughout the dissertation. 
Therefore, without further pondering the notion of whether knowledge exists from an 
ontological perspective; it does, and whether there is a need for it; there is, and it is considerable.  
Thus, if humanity needs knowledge; what is packed into knowledge that makes it so irreplaceable?  
The existence of knowledge, the need for it and the fact that it is perceived to be irreplaceable have 
not brought professionals or academics any closer in defining the construct.  This is probably 
because knowledge does not exist in a vacuum but is ubiquitous, context-bound and gets confused 
with other constructs such as information.  The researcher compiled a list of descriptors on what 
knowledge is perceived as in order to provide an overview of the level of diversity in understanding 
of this important construct.  The following represents an analysis of the considered knowledge 
definitions and descriptions published: 
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Table 2.1: Typologies of Knowledge – a Pluralist View 
Knowledge Descriptors Authors Practical Value 
“Justified true belief” 
 
 
 
“Justified personal belief” 
Plato in Zhang (2013: 11), 
Anand & Singh, 2011, 
927) and Kakabadse, et al. 
(2003: 86); Na, 2015: 12) 
King (2009: 3) 
Very little practical value due to the contentious 
nature of the constructs because of the divergent 
opinions about what is justified, what is true and 
whose beliefs are authoritative. 
 
Mythos   
“(in literature) a traditional or 
recurrent narrative theme or plot 
structure.”  Or “A set of beliefs 
or assumptions about 
something.” 
Logos 
In “Theology [-] 
The Word of God, or principle 
of divine reason and creative 
order, identified in the Gospel 
of John with the second person 
of the Trinity incarnate in Jesus 
Christ.” 
“(in Jungian psychology) the 
principle of reason and 
judgement, associated with the 
animus.” 
 
Socrates (Plato, 1953) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) 
Oxford Dictionary 
(Online) 
Very little practical value due to the contentious 
nature of the constructs.  Again the issue with the 
belief of who?  An assumption is also not 
necessarily knowledge.  In fact, it might be the 
opposite. 
With the current religious diversity in society, it 
will be very problematic to couple knowledge to a 
specific religion or any part thereof.  From a 
practical organisational perspective, such as the SA 
DOD that gives recognition to religious freedom 
based on the Constitution, describing knowledge as 
such is not practical.  The second version could 
have been useful if it only referred to ‘reason and 
judgement’.  However, these are contextualised 
with a psychological construct that is sexist 
(‘animus14’).  Again, the descriptor is not useful 
within the SA DOD organisational environment 
because the SA DOD subscribe to a non-sexist 
organisational environment. 
Pure knowledge of nature and 
universality 
Proud knowledge of good and 
evil 
Bacon (1605) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) 
The identification of scientific knowledge is useful 
and can be practically identified and managed.  
This could be practically managed and can 
contribute to organisational survival and/or 
advantage. 
Knowledge of the perception of good and evil is 
contentious. 
Tacit and Explicit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tacit, Implicit and Explicit 
Polanyi (1966a) and 
Nonaka (1991) in (Uit 
Beijerse, 1999: 100) 
Polanyi (1958, 1996) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) 
Nonaka (1994)  and 
Polanyi (1966)  in Arthur 
(2013: 1) 
 
Anand & Singh (2011: 
929-930. 
These descriptors have traditionally added 
practicality to the description of knowledge as a 
phenomenon.   These could be practically managed 
and contribute to organisational survival and/or 
advantage.  A discussion of these descriptors 
follows in this chapter below. 
Knowledge encoded structures 
in physical systems (e.g. genetic 
encoding in DNA) 
Subjective knowledge: beliefs 
which have survived our tests, 
evaluations and experiences 
Objective knowledge: 
knowledge claims that have 
survived testing and evaluation 
by agents  
Popper (1972) in Zhang 
(2013: 14) 
The identification of scientific knowledge is useful 
and can be practically identified and managed.   
The description of beliefs provided probably best 
describe conventional wisdom or good practice. 
Both of these could be practically managed and 
contribute to organisational survival and/or 
advantage. 
General, Specific and Expert Schank & Abelson (1977) 
in Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
These three descriptors do not describe what 
knowledge is but rather the level or domain of such 
                                                 
14
 Psychoanalysis [-] (in Jungian psychology) the masculine part of a woman's personality. (Oxford Dictionary, online) 
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Knowledge Descriptors Authors Practical Value 
80) knowledge.  They are practical because they can be 
calibrated and that calibration could be useful in 
organisations for decision-making and action.  In 
fact, organisations will typically strive towards 
owning or controlling specific and/or expert 
knowledge that would facilitate first mover 
advantage.  In other cases, such knowledge could 
just be applied to provide excellence in service or 
products.  General knowledge from an 
organisational perspective might be associated with 
the day-to-day business.  All three might be in tacit 
and/or explicit format.  All three descriptors could 
be practically managed and contribute to 
organisational survival and/or advantage. 
Resident and Access Frantzich (1983) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) 
These two descriptors do not describe knowledge 
but rather a location and a process associated with 
knowledge.  Both have practical implications for 
the management of knowledge.  Both impact the 
ability of organisations to achieve an advantage. 
Declarative or descriptive, 
Procedural and Causal 
Anderson (1985) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) 
These describe some of the attributes of knowledge. 
Knowledge attributes are discussed later in this 
chapter.  Procedural knowledge is a specific type of 
knowledge that has practical value within an 
organisation.  This is discussed later in this chapter 
and in Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
General competence,  
Pragmatic, Reflective or 
evaluative meta-analytical skills 
and abilities 
Holliday & Chandler 
(1986) in Kakabadse, et al. 
(2003: 80) 
These descriptors fall within the domain of tacit 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is closely associated 
with human abilities developed over time.  These 
are also recognised as being part of knowledge 
when considering the construct of IC as described 
later in this chapter and other chapters in the 
dissertation. 
Embrained, Embodied, 
Encultured, Embedded, 
Encoded 
Blacker et al. (1993) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) 
Wang (2008) in Zhang 
(2013: 15) 
These describe knowledge the location of 
knowledge more than what knowledge is.  Their 
practical value is in the recognition that they 
provide that people and culture are important in 
order to comprehend what knowledge is.  They 
provide an indication that knowledge is a construct 
that is contained within an entity (whether that is a 
human or technology).  These provide initial 
indications that knowledge might require a broader 
or different approach to management – other than a 
warehouse approach that is synonymous with data 
and information management.  Wang (2008) also 
add that knowledge, by nature, is not static.  This 
has a practical organisational value from a 
management perspective.  Although it does not 
describe knowledge, it does identify the evolving 
nature of knowledge.  These issues are discussed in 
this chapter below. 
Embeddedness (individual or 
organizational), a combination 
of object and process, diversity, 
ambiguity, and a dynamic 
nature 
Wang (2008) in Zhang 
(2013: 15) 
Technical, Cognitive, 
Sympathised, Conceptual, 
Operational system 
Nonaka & Takeuchi 
(1995) in Uit Beijerse 
(1999) and in Kakabadse, 
et al. (2003: 80) 
From these descriptors, only sympathises 
knowledge that presents little practical value. 
Cognitive and conceptual knowledge is closely 
associated with the human abilities, whereas 
technical knowledge and operational system 
knowledge can be found in most business and 
militaries. 
Propositional, Practical, 
Experiential, Presentational 
Heron (1996) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) 
These descriptors of knowledge have practical 
value and found in most business and militaries. 
Together they form a loop stretching from ideas to 
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Knowledge Descriptors Authors Practical Value 
execution with feedback to create new ideas as a 
result of experience gained.  These will impact the 
ability of organisations to achieve an advantage. 
Taxonomic  
 
Tsoukas (1996) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) 
Knowledge is probably more than just a 
classification regime of some sort that differentiates 
between tacit and explicit knowledge.   
Scientific, Social 
 
Alvesson & Willmott 
(1996), Scarborough 
(1996), Burgoyne & 
Reynolds (1997) in 
McAdam & Reid (2000) 
The identification of scientific knowledge is useful 
and can be practically identified and managed.  
Social knowledge might refer to social skills that 
are more tacit in nature, but knowledge nonetheless.  
Social knowledge could also refer to Relational 
Capital as contained in IC.  Both have practical 
implications for the management of knowledge.  
Both impact the ability of organisations to achieve 
an advantage. 
Personal, Proprietary, Public, 
Common sense 
Boiset (1998) in 
Bouthillier & Shearer 
(2002) 
These descriptors identify knowledge locations 
more than anything else, each of which might 
attract a different type of management style and 
processes.  It is thus important to note that 
knowledge is not just present in people but also in 
other forms with different levels of accessibility. 
Explicit, Tacit, Cultural Choo (1998) in Bouthillier 
& Shearer (2002) 
These descriptors have been discussed above 
already and will attract further discussion 
throughout this and chapters of the dissertation. 
Intellectual Capital (IC) Seemann, et al. (2000: 2 
and 3), La Grange (2006: 
6); OECD, 1996; Petrash, 
1996; Heron, 1996; 
Steward, 1997; Edvinsson 
& Malone, 1997 in 
Kakabadse, et al., 2003; 
Probst, 1998; Uit Beijerse, 
1999; Spender & Marr 
(2005); Riempp & 
Smolnik, 2007; Shariq, 
2007; Zhang, 2013 and 
others 
This descriptor is an inclusive categorisation of at 
least three categories assumed to be knowledge: 
Human Capital, Organisational Capital, and 
Relational Captial.  Intellectual capital is discussed 
in more detail below in this chapter and referred to 
in discussions throughout the dissertation.  It is a 
very practical method of identifying organisational 
knowledge to be managed. 
Information in action Kucza (2001: 15) This is not a plausible description.  There is a 
difference been information and knowledge.  These 
differences are discussed below in this chapter.  
Also, by acting on information doe not convert that 
information into knowledge.  There are several and 
varied processes to convert information into 
knowledge (also discussed below). 
Product, Routine, Process  Edvinsson & Malone 
(1997) in Kakabadse, et al. 
(2003: 80) 
These descriptors are included in the construct of 
IC as part of Organisational Captial.  From a 
practical perspective, they are important for 
organisations to function and as differentiators, also 
to gain an advantage. 
Theoretical know-how, Skills, 
T-shaped skills, Rules, 
Procedures 
Riempp & Smolnik (2007: 
4); Leonard-Barton 1995 
in Yadav & Singh, 2013: 
196) 
These descriptors fall within at least two groups 
described in the IC construct; Human Capital 
(know-how and skills) and Organisational Capital 
(rules and procedures).  IC as a construct is 
discussed further below in this chapter as well as 
some of the other chapters. 
Human capital, Technology Shariq (2007: 75) 
Uit Beijerse (1999: 95) 
Human Capital has already been identified as a type 
of knowledge contained in the IC construct.  
Technology as a form of knowledge is probably 
closely related to explicit knowledge or the product 
of explicit knowledge.   
Process template knowledge, Jung, Choi & Song (2007: These descriptors are practical organisational type 
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Knowledge Descriptors Authors Practical Value 
process instance knowledge, 
and process-related knowledge. 
22) knowledge which could typically be included (if 
not already) in the IC construct.  Excellence in 
these could possibly result in a position of 
advantage for the organisation.    Process instance 
knowledge could also be associated with learning 
and a learning organisation.   
Factual (data and scientific 
literature) 
Conceptual (perspectives and 
concepts) 
Expectational (judgements and 
hypothesis) 
Methodological (knowledge 
from reasoning and strategies) 
Wiig (1993: 153) in Lungu 
(2011: 17) 
Factual, conceptual and methodical are useful 
knowledge constructs from an organisational 
perspective.  Expectational are less useful because 
of the inherent uncertainty it produces when having 
to engage in decision-making and action.   
“Knowledge is experience” McDermott (1999) in 
Kucza (2001: 16) 
Knowledge cannot possibly be just ‘experience’.  
This would exclude scientific and other codified 
knowledge and other constructs contained in IC.  
Knowledge is probably gained from experience.  
Experience could thus be construed as an important 
activity to gain knowledge.  
Understanding “…gained from 
experience, analysis and 
sharing” 
Knowledge Management 
Institute 
This definition describes knowledge as 
understanding.  However, understanding is 
probably a state of mind that is reached once 
knowledge was gained processed with various 
processes.  The definition has practical value for 
organisations because it names various processes 
deemed important to be able to gain understanding.   
Adapted from Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 80) and expanded. 
The divergent views on what knowledge is, is very evident and would be a significant hurdle 
in the achievement of coherence with regards to KM in any organisation.  However, without 
agreeing with any of the abovementioned descriptions of knowledge at this point, let us continue the 
discussion about what constitute knowledge as a construct.  
There seems to be broad consensus on the knowledge hierarchy’s distinction between the 
three related, but discrete constructs, i.e. data, information, and knowledge
15
.  Another version of 
the hierarchy replaces ‘knowledge’ with “realization” (Kakabadse, et al., 2003: 77 and 78).  Some 
authors (Kakabadse, et al., 2003, Anand & Singh, 2011 and Ďurišová, 2011) include wisdom at the 
top of the knowledge hierarchy. Lastly, Anand & Singh (2011: 932) include “Enlightenment” at the 
top of the conceptual pyramid.    Bouthillier and Shearer (2002: online) write the following about 
these constructs - 
“Dictionaries define data as factual information (measurements or statistics) used as a basis for 
reasoning, discussion, or calculation; information as the communication or reception of 
knowledge or intelligence; knowledge as the condition of knowing something gained through 
experience or the condition of apprehending truth or fact through reasoning, and intelligence as 
the ability to understand and to apply knowledge. For Meadow, et al. (2000), data refer to a 
"string of elementary symbols, such as digits or letters" (p.35). As they point out, information 
"has no universally accepted meaning, but generally it carries the connotation of evaluated, 
validated or useful data" (p.35). Knowledge, on the other hand, involves "a higher degree of 
certainty or validity than information" and "has the characteristic of information shared and 
                                                 
15
 Wiig, 1993; Boisot, 1998; Uit Beijerse, 1999; Nissen, Kamel, Sengupta, 2000; Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Bouthillier & 
Shearer, 2002; Kakabadse, et al., 2003; Malhotra, 2003; Girard, 2004; Pérez-Montor, 2004; Spender & Marr, 2005; 
Jung, Choi & Song, 2006; Riempp & Smolnik, 2007, McNabb, 2007; Anand & Singh, 2011, Ďurišová, 2011; Zhang, 
2013 (not an exhaustive list). 
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agreed upon within a community" (Meadow, et al. 2000, p.38). Intelligence, for the previous 
authors, is a form of information but it is also "a measure of reasoning capacity" (p. 39). As we 
can see, many conceptual overlaps exist between all these terms.”. 
Let us have a closer look at the proposed components of the hierarchy.  Zack (1999) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 76) defines data as being a representation of observations and/or facts 
without context and not meaningful by itself.  Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 77) also add that data 
appears to be “context-free” and a “building block” of information and consequently knowledge.  
Davenport and Prusak (2000: 3) contrasts data and information to highlight the differences – 
“Unlike data, information has meaning … "relevance and purpose" ... Not only does it potentially 
shape the receiver, it has a shape: it is organized to some purpose. Data becomes information when 
its creator adds meaning. We transform data into information by adding value in various ways.”.  
Spender and Marr (2005) simply state that “… information is more than data”.  Bouthillier and 
Shearer (2002: online) state about information that - “… information merely is data in context”. 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 77) also add that information appears to be “context insensitive” and have 
utility in reducing uncertainty.  The writer agrees with this description and adopts this view for the 
purpose of this paper.  
Limited meaning can be created by adding various combinations of context (‘who, what, 
where, when, why, how, etc, etc) to data.  The limitation of information is that it does not have the 
same depth or density of context as that provided by knowledge.  Information is thus less complex 
and probably easier to communicate and thus used more widely and freely in organisations and 
possibly perceived as knowledge. 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) in Spender and Marr (2005: 7) and Na (2015: 16) separates 
knowledge from data and information by stating that - “… knowledge is neither data nor 
information”. Uit Beijerse (1999) explaining that - “… knowledge is something more than 
information”.  Boisot (1998: 12) in Malhotra (2003: 2) states simply – “Knowledge builds upon 
information that is extracted from data” – i.e. the ‘building block approach’ mentioned by 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 77). Later Davenport and Prusak (2000: 5) in Marshal (2007: 5) state – “… 
most people have an intuitive sense that knowledge is broader, deeper, and richer than data or 
information”. Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 77) states that knowledge is “context sensitive” and have 
utility in creating “new understanding”.  Thus, the difference between data, information and 
knowledge is the level of understanding, risk reduction and uncertainty alleviation that can be 
achieved.    
It is worth noting that none of these expressions provide insight into where exactly the cross-
over points are for or limit is data into information into knowledge.  This is possibly the cause of 
dissonance when it comes to the correct use of the constructs, both contextually and practically.  
This possibly also raises the question as to the hierarchical nature of knowledge vs. a knowledge 
continuum.  Wiig (1997) in Na (2015: 14) propose in this regard – “…whereas information consists 
of facts and data organised to describe a particular situation or condition …, the progression from 
signal, data, information, knowledge and wisdom may be a continuum with many grey area [sic] but 
these grey cases typically become clearer when considering how the “information/knowledge” will 
be used.” Riempp and Smolnik (2007: 4) describe the knowledge construction process (knowledge 
hierarchy) as the contextualisation of data that gives rise to information, which when contextualised 
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and personalised to the point of action, gives rise to knowledge.  These ideas highlight the role of 
context as a discriminator between the various constructs. The question remains, how much context 
is required to transit the divide?  A knowledge continuum provide more flexibility for organisations 
to manage these cross-over lines. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995: 58) conceptualise information as a “…flow of messages, while 
knowledge is created by that very flow of information anchored in the beliefs and commitments of 
its holder.”.  Kakabadse, et al. (2003) describe the knowledge hierarchy as knowledge flow, which 
points to a dynamic process of sharing and conversion.  This dynamic process is also referred to by 
Assudani, (2005: 34) in Dayan (2006: 3-3) as the “epistemology of action/process” of knowledge.  
These authors also refer to the “epistemology of possession”, i.e. that knowledge can be 
possessed/owned by an individual or organisation.  This epistemological description is clearly 
visible in conceptualising knowledge as IC. Another epistemological description not stated by these 
authors is that of knowledge control.  Possession and control are not mutually exclusive concepts.  
Organisational IC could be owned (possessed) and controlled or just controlled but not owned (i.e. 
tacit knowledge) or owned but not controlled (e.g. IP).   
McCann and Syke (2004) in BenMoussa (2009) state that this disagreement about what 
knowledge consists of creates barriers to the implementation of KM initiatives downstream when 
‘information’ is regarded as ‘knowledge’.  If knowledge is perceived as objects or just information, 
organisations typically resort to implementing IM rather than KM.  Construct dissonance can be 
construed as a primary culprit in the mismanagement of the knowledge hierarchy. 
The perception that knowledge is ‘more’ than the other parts of the hierarchy – broadly 
supported by academics (Boisot, 1998; Malhotra, 2003; BenMoussa, 2009) might lead to attempts 
to quantification.    Bouthillier and Shearer (2002: online) state that - “Knowledge differs [as 
opposed to being more] from information in that it is predictive and can be used to guide action 
while information merely is data in context”. This view is supported by the researcher; knowledge 
should thus be described as something other than information or data to eliminate the constant drive 
towards quantification (positivism and objectivist approach), placing more emphasis on 
understanding and meaning (interpretivist approach).   
A knowledge continuum, where data and information share cross-over space and information 
and knowledge share cross-over space, provides more space for the dynamic and evolving nature of 
knowledge.  This concept can be related to the opinions of Kucza (2001: 17) on the constructs of 
knowledge scope
16
 and knowledge depth
17
.  The dissonance and grey areas are clearly visible in the
various opinions above.  It is for this reason that the notion of a knowledge continuum is preferable 
than that of a knowledge hierarchy. 
16
 “…has vertical and horizontal differences. The vertical differences vary from less abstract to more abstract...” (Kucza 
2001: 17)  The horizontal differences in scope relate to the contextual knowledge differences between organisational 
functions and applications.  
17
 “…initial awareness of facts and the ability to apply data to certain situations and act appropriately is the basic level 
of knowledge, which equals an understanding of one's own role in an organisation. Knowledge then tends to specialise. 
This signifies a higher level of knowledge … The requirements on the knowledge depth depend on the knowledge 
scope…” (Ibid., 17) 
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Military doctrine of developed nations recognises four elements in military knowledge: data, 
information, knowledge, and wisdom. (Kendall and McHale, 2003)  Defence departments also 
typically have organisational components that manage intelligence (business organisations in some 
cases have the same). Chuter (2007: 14) is of the opinion that “…intelligence is a subset of 
information”.   Chuter (2007: 14-16) express a further opinion on what intelligence is and basically 
reduce intelligence to the information that is collected covertly. In the researcher’s view, this is a 
very simplistic view of intelligence as a construct and product of the intelligence process.   It begs 
the question – where does military intelligence fit in the knowledge hierarchy? Is military 
intelligence a form of data, information, knowledge (tacit or explicit) or is it wisdom based?  While 
business intelligence is more than often reduced to market statistics; there are very few authors 
expressing views on the location of military intelligence in the knowledge hierarchy.  This is 
problematic for military KM due to the fact that military decision-makers base decisions, actions 
and desired effects on military policy, doctrine, intelligence and strategy.  Thus, a poor 
understanding of what intelligence is might lead to it being confused with data and information. 
Military intelligence is, in essence, knowledge about own and opposing forces as well as 
geographic, socio-economic, cyber and other factors.  Intelligence is also very contextual and time-
dependent.  The researcher is of the opinion that intelligence is just a specific type of knowledge 
and can contribute to wisdom.  Kakabadse, et al. (2003) states that action and reflection may lead to 
wisdom, but also new knowledge.  Na (2015: 15-16) describe wisdom as – “…the addition of 
experience. Experience is a cumulative matter; it may refer to an individual’s own experience or to 
the collective experience of more than one individual information-processing perspective”.   
Wisdom is an integral part of being human.  People are considered to be wise when reaching 
certain age categories, hence the saying ‘the wise old man or woman’.  However, the construct of 
wisdom is nothing else than the product of years of accumulated data, information, intelligence, 
knowledge, experience, skills and intuitive abilities.  When articulated or manifesting in certain 
actions it becomes explicit and might be labelled as ‘wise’.  Agger (1991: 117) states that -“… 
every knowledge is contextualized by its historical and cultural nature”, which might give rise to 
new knowledge and/or wisdom.  So wisdom, following the reasoning above, is just a particular 
quality of knowledge and in the researcher’s opinion, an above average quality level of tacit 
knowledge.  Therefore, the quality of data, information and knowledge is critical if wisdom is 
claimed to be the product.   
This said; wisdom in one social reality might be data, information or knowledge to another 
based on the knowledge continuum concept.  Hence, wisdom is nothing other than a particular form 
of knowledge.  The researcher’s view corresponds with the post-modernist school to a large extent, 
supporting the notion that context remains the key with which any data, information, knowledge 
and so-called wisdom must be calibrated.  History, as a calibration factor, also alludes to the time 
value of these constructs.  In the contemporary globalised rush to get things done and to gain and 
maintain the advantage, near-real-time and real-time knowledge are critical for survival and/or 
advantage.  The time value of knowledge will be discussed later. 
In all probability, wisdom is the actual source of meaning, very difficult to separate from the 
knower (approaching knowledge as meaning – interpretivism) and thus difficult to codify explicitly 
(make an object or fact – objectivism).  Military intelligence is usually the product of much 
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research, evidence gathering by humans and sensors, interpretation and report writing, etc.  From 
this objectivist perspective, military intelligence is just explicit knowledge artefacts produced by 
general or tailored KM processes – mostly referred to as the intelligence cycle. 
In order to take the discussion full circle, let’s consider the ‘chicken-and-egg predicament’.  
Alavi and Leider (2001) and Anand and Singh (2011) discuss the conception articulated by Tuomi 
(1999) that knowledge commonly constructed from data as the entry point (data › information › 
knowledge) should actually be constructed with knowledge as the entry point (knowledge › 
information › data).  Tuomi (1999) argues that no data and/or information are created before some 
form of tacit human knowledge was subjected to a ‘dynamic human process’ [interpretivism], 
generating explicit knowledge, information and/or data [objectivism].  What Tuomi (1999) is 
possibly missing is that all the data and/or information inherent in nature are generated by 
technology (information technology (IT), software and sensors such as video links, radar, sonar, 
cameras and other technology-based sensors).  Human ingenuity creates technological enablers, but 
once created, they generate volumes of data and information based on their use and settings 
(frequency, resolution, bandwidth, etc.).  Thus, Tuomi’s argument might have had relevance in 
prehistoric times, but today, the cycle of knowledge generation has a multiplicity of configurations 
and is not just a simple linear or binary configuration.  Anand and Singh (2011) briefly state a 
theory of Nissen (2002) that a dual approach might be considered - 
“… making a distinction between knowledge seekers and knowledge creators. From the seeker 
point of view, data is put into context to create information, and information that is actionable 
becomes knowledge. From the creator perspective, knowledge is needed to create information, 
which is in turn needed to create data. Therefore, it seems sensible that a general hierarchy of 
data, information, knowledge, and wisdom should permit transition in both directions – a notion 
supported by Williams (2006).”. 
This is probably another reason why a knowledge continuum is possibly more preferable to a 
knowledge hierarchy.  No matter from which end you construct the knowledge hierarchy or 
continuum, the fact of the matter is that today there is an unquantifiable amount of data, information 
and knowledge (and some wisdom) in circulation.  This needs to be managed in the best possible 
way to get to the best possible solution to ensure survival or advantage and everything in between.   
There are, however, no empirical guidelines on the exact configuration and character 
differences between data, information and knowledge, stemming from the philosophical 
disagreement.  One can, however, safely say that knowledge contains information and data and will 
lead to different decisions and actions when context change.  For that, KM is needed to optimise the 
desired effects and to obtain and maintain an advantage in the interest of survival and/or domination 
stemming from advantage.   
Thus, if knowledge is more than its cumulative components - what is it then?  Kakabadse, et 
al. (2003: 80) and several other authors have tackled this question.  Divergent perspectives about 
the typology of knowledge often arise from philosophical and/or organisational views.  
Organisational views are often more practical and understandable and more directed towards 
business objectives, results and advantage.  One very useful typology of knowledge assisting with 
the distinction of types of knowledge to be managed is the explicitness or tacitness of knowledge, a 
notion introduced by Polanyi (1966a and b) and supported by Anand and Singh (2011: 929-30) and 
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several other academics
18
.  Anand and Singh (2011: 930) add implicit knowledge to the already
well known tacit-explicit categorisation – “This is the kind of knowledge that can often be teased 
out of a competent performer by a task analyst, knowledge engineer or other person skilled in 
identifying the kind of knowledge that can be articulated but hasn’t.”  This is, in essence, tacit 
knowledge that could be converted into explicit knowledge if required. 
Zhang (2013: 15) states - “Knowledge is not merely 
an object [explicit knowledge] that can be “placed,” nor 
should it be confused with representations of knowledge in 
documents, databases, etc. [explicit knowledge], but it can 
be seen as a collection of processes that allow learning 
[tacit knowledge] to occur and knowing [tacit knowledge] 
to be internalized.”.  
Figure 2.3: Tacit/Explicit Knowledge Dimensions 
Adapted from Weeks (2016: slide 7).  A similar depiction is found 
in Uit Beijerse (1999: 100) and Na (2015: 18). 
Yadav and Singh (2013: 196) state very frankly that 
knowledge is in people. Tacit knowledge is considered to be 
personal in nature, based on individual experience, beliefs, 
perspectives and values (Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi & Rotstein, 1991; Tiwana, 2000; BenMoussa, 
2009; Polanyi, 2009; Ďurišová, 2011; Zhang, 2013). Tacit knowledge is likely to be context-
specific (BenMoussa, 2009).  Tacit knowledge is also considered inseparable from people.  Explicit 
knowledge can be articulated in language, transmitted among individuals by sound and can be 
documented. (Ďurišová, 2011; Bouthillier & Shearer, 2002).  Weeks (2016: slide 7) graphically 
illustrate this separation in Figure 2.3. Several other writers
19
 are of the opinion that tacit and
explicit knowledge are complementary, which if true, points to the requirement for integrated when 
organisations attempt to manage knowledge.  Bouthillier & Shearer (2002) contend that explicit 
knowledge is often equated to information, resulting in dissonance and management tension 
between KM and IM schools of thought and methods.  
Tacit knowledge is also being considered inseparable from people, which makes tacit 
knowledge more suitable to be managed with KM methods than IM methods.  Spender and Marr 
(2005: 7) and Zhang (2013: 11) write – based on the work of Davenport and Prusak (1998), that -
“… In organizations, [knowledge] often becomes embedded not only in documents or similar 
inorganic forms and repositories but also in human forms such as organizational routines, processes, 
practices, and norms”  – all forms of explicit knowledge and part of what is considered IC. 
The symbiotic nature of explicit and tacit knowledge is probably a derivative of the SECI 
model approach, where it is posited that tacit and explicit knowledge can be transformed through a 
cyclical process (the SECI model is discussed later in the dissertation).  The researcher supports 
these views. 
18
 Nonaka, 1991; Uit Beijerse, 1999; BenMoussa, 2009; Ďurišová, 2011; Arthur, 2013; Zhang, 2013; and many more. 
19
 Polanyi, 2009 and Nonaka, 1994 in Zhang, 2013 and Hlupic, Pouloudi & Rzevski, 2002 in Bouthillier & Shearer, 
2002. 
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Spender and Marr (2005) articulate a possible distinct link between tacit knowledge and 
action - based on the fact that knowledge is associated with among other things; skills, competence 
and know-how.  Polanyi (1966 and 2009) in Zhang (2013: 12) states that knowledge can be 
perceived as action based on the processes associated with knowing.  Thus, for specific action to 
take place specific tacit knowledge (or know-how) must be present without which the action might 
not produce the required or predicted results.  This is also true for explicit knowledge. This 
categorisation is important due to the difference in processes and enablers to manage these and the 
challenges to integrate the sources and processes. 
BenMoussa (2009) highlights the problem of the commoditisation of knowledge as distinctly 
linked to the misperceptions about managing tacit and/or explicit knowledge with IT solutions.  
These issues are closely related to the discussion above about knowledge as an object (objectivism) 
or as meaning (interpretivism).  Polanyi’s (1966a) categorisation (i.e. explicit/tacit) highlights the 
importance of people (tacit knowledge – interpretivist and organic approach to knowledge) and 
science, technology and organisations (explicit knowledge – positivist and objectivist approach to 
knowledge) in any attempts to understand and manage knowledge.  Darby (2013: 527) writes that - 
“Harnessing both explicit and tacit knowledge is an increasing and necessary challenge to 
support organisational knowledge creation for it is suggested that when explicit and tacit 
knowledge interact innovation occurs.  This in turn prompts the view that organisational 
knowledge creation requires first, an acknowledgement of the importance and necessity for KM 
and second, understanding and managing the cyclical process…”. 
The distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is thus important to understand what 
type of knowledge should be managed in the SA DOD.  Another particular useful typology of 
knowledge, from an organisational perspective, is the construct of IC.   Categorising knowledge as 
IC is supported by several writers
20
.  Intellectual capital is the “… sum of a firm’s skills, knowledge 
and experience are critical to sustaining competitiveness, performance, and shareholder value”  
(Seemann, De Long, Stucky, & Guthrie, 2000: 2)
21
.  The longevity of this is stated by Litvaj and 
Stancekova (2015: 834) that the effective use of IC is crucial for competitive advantage in the 21
st
 
century.   
“[IC] includes the intangibles such as information, knowledge, and skills that can be leveraged by 
an organization to produce an asset of equal or greater importance than land, labor and capital.” 
(Neilson, 2001: 334).  He states further that -  
“Human capital is all individual capabilities, the knowledge, skill, and experience of the 
organization's employees and managers. … Structural capital is the processes, structures, and 
systems that a firm owns less its people. Social capital is the goodwill resulting from physical 
and virtual interchanges between people with like interests and who are willing to share ideas 
within groups who share their interests.”. 
Shariq (1997: 75) writes that knowledge is - “… the embodiment of human [IC] and 
technology”.   Some academics consider IC to be assets that organisations own and control from a 
knowledge economy perspective (Seemann, et al., 2000 and La Grange, 2006). It also objectifies 
                                                 
20
 Probst, 1998; Wiig, 1999b; Seemann, et al., 2000; Malhotra, 2003; Spender & Marr, 2005; La Grange, 2006. 
21
 Recognised by Probst, 1998; Bontis, 2001, Spender & Marr, 2005; Halawi, Aronson & McCarthy, 2005. 
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knowledge.  Accordingly, IC can be subdivided into human-, relational- and structural capital
22
 - 
pointing to where one would find knowledge or ‘ba23’ as well as the explicitness or tacitness of the 
knowledge.  These are as follows in Table 2.1: 
Table 2.2: Intellectual Capital 
IC Component Description Academic Support 
Human Capital  
The correct talent at the right time. 
Individual capabilities, -
knowledge, -skills and - the 
experience of employees.  This 
is mostly tacit knowledge. 
 
OECD, 1996; Petrash, 1996; 
Steward, 1997; Heron, 1996; 
Uit Beijerse, 1999; Seemann, 
et al., 2000; Neilson, 2001; 
Riempp and Smolnik, 2007; 
Shariq, 2007; Zhang, 2013 and 
others 
Relational Capital or Social Capital  
The goodwill resulting from physical 
and virtual exchanges and interaction 
between like-minded people, willing 
to share ideas, creating trust and 
quality knowledge to drive enhanced 
decision-making and action.  This is 
also a strong source of advantage due 
to niches. 
Organisational external 
relationships with customers, 
suppliers, partners, 
stakeholders and their 
perceptions of the organisation 
and abilities to collaborate and 
resulting goodwill.  This is 
mostly tacit knowledge. 
Petrash, 1996; Seemann, et al., 
2000; Zhang, 2013 and others 
Structural Capital 
The residual knowledge when people 
are removed from the organisation. 
Organisational routines, 
policies, doctrine, structures, 
processes, procedures, systems, 
databases, culture and IP 
(patents, trademarks, 
copyright).  This is mostly 
explicit knowledge. 
OECD, 1996; Petrash, 1996; 
Steward, 1997; Edvinsson & 
Malone, 1997 in Kakabadse, 
et al., 2003; Seemann, et al., 
2000; Neilson, 2001; Zhang, 
2013 and others 
Adapted from Seemann, et al. (2000: 2 and 3) and La Grange (2006: 6).  See also Malhotra (2003) to acquire 
a national/country perspective. 
Without labelling it IC, Davenport and Prusak (1998: 5) in Marshal (2007: 4-5) stated – 
“Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight 
[human capital] that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and 
information. [Also in De Nadae & Monteiro de Carvalho (2017: 351)]  It originates and is applied in the 
minds of knowers [human capital]. In organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in 
documents or repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms 
[structural capital].”. 
Zaim, Tatoglu and Zaim (2007: 55) state along the line of IC - “It is because knowledge is a 
context-dependent social concept (Lang, 2001 [and BenMoussa, 2009]) and a large part of 
organizational knowledge is embodied in social processes, institutional practices, traditions and 
values (Fayard, 2003; Boisot, 1998).”. 
                                                 
22
 Seemann, et al., 2000; Spender and Marr, 2005; La Grange, 2006; Zhang, 2013. 
23
 Nonaka, Toyama and Konno (2000: 19) defined ‘ba’ as …”the context shared by those who interact with each other, 
and through such interactions, those who participate in ba and the context itself evolve through [sic] self transcendence 
to create knowledge. Participants of ba cannot be mere onlookers. Instead, they are committed to ba through action and 
interaction”.  Baqir and Kathawala (2004) states that ‘ba’ is the Japanese word for place or platform. 
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Skills referred to as part of human capital should be clarified further. Adam Smith in ‘The 
Wealth of Nations’ reiterated the criticality of employee skills as a multiplier for growth (OECD, 
1999).  Since then academics postulated that it is T-shaped skills that are most valuable to 
organisations (Berraies, Chaher & Ben Yahia, 2014). T-shaped skills are defined as - “… skills 
[that] enable their possessors to explore the interfaces between their particular knowledge domain 
and various applications of that knowledge in particular products” (Leonard-Barton, 1995 in Yadav 
& Singh, 2013: 196). Thus, T-shaped skills require appropriate organisational culture, leadership, 
structure and IT to facilitate knowledge creation, flow and sharing to enhance knowledge interfaces 
between domain- and application knowledge.  This introduces KM Critical Success Factors (CSF) 
that are discussed later in the dissertation.   
Petrash (1996) posits that interaction delivers financial value and expanded space for value-
creation (Holsapple & Joshi, 1999: 3).  Increased integration; more value.  This is a typical business 
perspective.  The value creation space corresponds well with the notion of ‘ba’ of Nonaka. In the 
public sector, the value might be in terms of service delivery satisfaction or from a military 
perspective – such as deterrence, safety and security.  Value can also be exchanged with advantage 
which, in turn, will result in greater value as an effect. These are important aspects for consideration 
when defining knowledge as a construct for the SA DOD.  Petrash
24
 (1996) depicts the interaction 
of the various streams of IC in the following manner: 
 
Figure 2.4: Intellectual Capital Model 
Source: Petrash (1996) in Holsapple and Joshi (1999: 11). 
Most importantly, there is a dynamic process of interaction between the three IC elements, 
which is congruent to the dynamic nature of knowledge and a response to competitiveness and 
organisational priorities, resulting in an - “… evolving mix of knowledge assets” (Seemann, et al., 
2000: 7).  Variations in combinations of IC elements will result in different knowledge attributes – 
                                                 
24
 “This framework has been collectively developed by Leif Edvinsson, Skandia; Hubert Saint Onge, Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce; Patrick Sullivan, Intellectual Capital Management; and Gordon Petrash, Dow Chemicals.” 
(Holsapple and Joshi, 1999: 3) 
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discussed below.  The introduction of the evolving nature of knowledge is very important 
considering the complex and dynamic nature of the environment.   
From a military perspective, the only aspect that is possibly different is the KM processes, 
organisational objectives and external impact resulting from the use of IC.  The conceptual links 
between the different IC components in the Intellectual Capital Statement Structural Model (see 
Figure 2.20) are generic enough for application in the military environment. 
Seemann, et al. (2000: 5) is of the opinion that IC and KM are not interchangeable constructs.  
Knowledge management is posited as being more operational in nature, following –“… strategic 
decisions about which elements of [IC] to invest in.”. The researcher agrees.  IC in all its 
complexity is the organisational resource central to KM.  It consists of evolving meaning and 
understanding in both tacit and explicit formats. Relational capital is possibly better explained by its 
intangibility than tacitness. 
Sveiby (1997) in Holsapple and Joshi (1999: 11) equates IA to knowledge. Quintas (2002) in 
Alrubaiee, et al. (2015: 991) states that knowledge is possibly the most important form of IA.  
Business organisations lead the advance in recognising the importance of IA management (Halawi, 
Aronson and McCarthy, 2005).  The Intangible Asset Framework (Sveiby, 1997) elaborates on what 
is regarded as IA, noting that the External Structure closely resembles Relational IC, Internal 
Structures resemble Organisational IC and Employee Competence that of Human IC - 
 
Figure 2.5: Intangible Asset Framework 
Source: Sveiby (1997) in Holsapple and Joshi (1999: 11). 
Chong, Holden, Wilhelmij and Schmidt (2000) in Halawi, Aronson and McCarthy (2005: 75) 
state that - “The development of brands, stakeholder relationships, reputation and the culture of the 
organization is readily viewed as providing sustainable sources of business advantage”.  These 
aspects are associated with IC and thus knowledge.  IC thus has strong links with the construct of 
advantage.  Andriessen (2004: 63) in La Grange (2006: 6) describes the IA typology from an 
accounting perspective as - “… a subset of [IC]” and defined as an - “… identifiable non-monetary 
asset without physical substance held for use in the production of supply of goods or services, for 
rental to others or for administrative purposes”.  This definition identifies ‘the right to use’ certain 
knowledge assets, for example, software or a patent and trademark.  Intangible assets as a construct 
were created for organisations to be able to attribute an accounting value to assets that do not have 
physical substance, following an objectivist approach whereas the IC construct incorporates both 
objectivism and relativism. 
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Boisot (1998: 3) in Malhotra (2003: 2) offers another objectivist-type definition of knowledge 
assets – “… stocks of knowledge from which services are expected to flow for a period of time that 
may be hard to specify in advance.”. This definition is also closely related to IA.  The definition is 
very relevant to public service because it is coupled to services rather than products; services being 
the primary deliverable of public service.  For the military that service would typically be defence 
and security and other related activities. 
Therefore, knowledge can be understood as being tacit, explicit and intangible all of which 
are integrated into the IC construct, which, from an organisational perspective aims at value 
creation and advantage.  Another very simple and useful classification of knowledge was adopted 
by the OECD in 1996. The classification corresponds closely with the notion of getting the correct 
knowledge to the correct people at the correct time.  The OECD (1996: 12) articulated their views 
of knowledge as follows - 
“In order to facilitate economic analysis, distinctions can be made between different kinds of 
knowledge which are important in the knowledge-based economy: know-what, know-why, 
know-how and know-who. Knowledge is a much broader concept than information, which is 
generally the “know-what” and “know-why” components of knowledge. These are also the types 
of knowledge which come closest to being market commodities or economic resources to be 
fitted into economic production functions. Other types of knowledge, particularly know-how and 
know-who, are more “tacit knowledge” and are more difficult to codify and measure (Lundvall 
and Johnson, 1994).”. 
Kipling first used these six factors for analysis in a poem and called them “six honest men” – 
 “I keep six honest serving-men (They taught me all I knew); 
 Their names are What and Why and When 
  And How and Where and Who.” (Kipling, 2005 and Clayton, 2006) 
These factors are posited to be, originally, - “… a medieval Latin epigram in the Register of 
Daniel Rough, Clerk of Romney (Kent) in the 14th century: 
Si sapiens fore vis sex servus qui tibi mando 
Quid dicas et ubi, de quo, cur, quomodo, quando. 
(If you wish to be wise I commend to you six servants, 
Ask what, where, about what, why, how, when.)” (Lewis, 2005: 226) 
The ‘who-what-why-where-when-how’ and now also, what thereafter method of analysis and 
supporting decisions, actions and effects (as was used as early as the 14
th
 century) are well known
by militaries worldwide.  Savage (1996) and Foray and Lundvall (1997) in Zhang (2013: 14) state 
these as follows - “… know-what (knowledge about truth), know-why (scientific theory of principal 
and regular pattern), know-how (skills and capabilities for doing something), know-who (who 
knows and who has what kind of knowledge) [Foray & Lundvall, 1997 and King, 2009] … know-
where (right place) and know-when (right time) [Savage, 1996]”.  Categorising types of knowledge 
in this way is very close to methods used to give orders and describe situations within militaries.  
Militaries worldwide use the ‘who-what-where-when-how-what thereafter’-rhyme to ensure proper 
description of the situation and possible action to be taken.   The ‘what thereafter’ is added due to 
its predictive value and/or providing a feedback loop to learn from which informs the next cycle of 
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activity. Another ‘w’ that should be added to the rhyme is ‘which effect’ is sought.  The construct of 
‘which effect’ then links the various elements of knowledge to the military construct of ‘effect’ as 
described by Effects-Based Operations.   “[T]heories of effects-based operations share some 
common ground. Each starts with an emphasis on the importance of knowledge, knowledge of the 
enemy, viewed as a complex adaptive system, and knowledge of self.” (Batschelet, 2002: 3).  
Knowledge is considered to be a primary driver in the military Effects-Based Operations cycle 
below - 
 
Figure 2.6: Effects-Based Operations Cycle 
Source:  Deptula (2001) in Batschelet (2002: 3). 
Davis (2001: 17) provides the following elementary description of what military effects can 
constitute: 
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Figure 2.7: A Simple Taxonomy and Some Examples of Effects-Based Operations25 
Source:  Davis (2001: 17). 
This is obviously a non-exhaustive list in figure 2.7 above.  Other military effects are freedom 
of decision and action.  Need it be said that these effects are very different from those that business 
seeks to achieve with the application of knowledge; but necessary nonetheless to achieve national 
security and other operational objectives.  For businesses effects could be for example - dominate, 
block, capture, disrupt, flood markets, fix prices, slow down growth, etc. 
Each fragment of data/information describing each component of the rhyme (‘who, what, 
where, when, why, how, which effect and what thereafter’) builds towards decision-quality and 
actionable pieces of knowledge about the past, current and future - enabling decisions, actions, 
effects and possibly unlocking advantage.  Each fragment provides more context to the other 
available fragments of information, which, as a whole constitute knowledge.   Davenport and 
Prusak (2000: 5) state frankly regarding the relationship between decisions, actions and knowledge 
– “One of the reasons that we find knowledge valuable is that it is close - and closer than data or
information - to action. Knowledge can and should be evaluated by the decisions or actions to 
which it leads.”.  This is a critical statement for consideration in the definitions of knowledge and 
KM and a future SA DOD KMC.  In other words, the definitions should express on what these 
constructs are useful for. 
Then there are the three-way categorisation by Sandkuhl, Smirnov and Henoch (2005) in 
Zhang (2013: 16) dividing organisational knowledge into - 
“… competencies of employees (e.g. personal skill profiles), 2) externalized knowledge (explicit 
knowledge stored electronically in documents, databases or information systems, e.g. office 
documents, or formal requirement specifications from the customer), 3) corporate knowledge 
(tacit knowledge represented in work processes, organizational structures, standard operating 
procedures, or best practices) [Billig & Nentwig (2003) and Lang & Pigneur (1999)].”. 
These categories outlined above and conceptualised by various authors are very similar to IC 
in Seemann, et al. (2000) and La Grange (2006) – table 2.1 above.   It contributes to a very useful 
and simplistic structure to describe what types of knowledge should be managed by the SA DOD 
and also suggest a requirement for different management initiatives.   
Knowledge has several attributes with which it can be calibrated/organised/sorted.  The 
training material of 2014 (module 5, slide 8) of the Knowledge Management Institute
TM
 (KMI)
26
list what it considers knowledge attributes.  When considering the nebulous conceptual and 
definitional aspects attributed to knowledge as a construct, there is a requirement for more practical 
25 “[Effects-based operations] are defined here as operations conceived and planned in a systems framework that 
considers the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects - effects that may, with different degrees of probability, 
be achieved by the application of military, diplomatic, psychological, and economic instruments.” (Davis, 2001: xiii) 
For example, “During the war some Iraqi power plant managers shut down their electric plants to avoid targeting 
thereby creating our desired effect without exposing Coalition members to danger, and freeing up air resources for 
another task—Sun Tzu’s dictum fulfilled.” (Deptula, 2001: 12) 
26
 The Knowledge Management Institute 
TM
 (KMI) based in the USA is a globally recognised training institute.  What 
makes KMI particularly relevant to this research is the fact that the USA military makes extensive use of the KMI to 
train its personnel on KM.  The KMI also recognise some of the USA military’s KM principles in the training material.  
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understanding. This requires discussion about knowledge attributes to understand what types of 
knowledge to be managed.  The KMI list the following knowledge attributes – “… age, 
applicability [why], actionability [what], clarity [who, -what,- where, -when, how, what thereafter], 
domain [what], flows [where], importance [why], location [where], meaningfulness [why], 
measurability, modes (explicit or tacit) [where], perishability, practicality, proficiency, relevance 
[why], stocks, states, source [who or where], types [what], usability, utility, validity (empirical or 
not), velocity (of the information-knowledge conversion process), viscosity (the density) and 
volatility (in dispute or not).”.   
Table 2.3 is an adaptation of Table 2.2 above with a juxtaposition of the ‘who, what, where, when, 
why, how, which effect and what thereafter’ approach to knowledge and related questions generated 
by the researcher for illustrative purposes and a short conclusion on each component of IC.  Let us 
juxtapose IC and the who, what, where, when, why, how, which effect and what thereafter way of 
thinking about knowledge –  
Table 2.3: Intellectual Capital and the Who, What, Where, When, Why, How, Which Effect 
and What Thereafter Rhyme 
IC Component Who, What, Where, When, Why, How, Which 
Effect and What Thereafter  
Human Capital  
The correct talent at the right time. Individual 
capabilities, -knowledge, -skills and - the 
experience of employees.  This is mostly tacit 
knowledge. 
 
 Who has the talent, capabilities, knowledge, 
skills and/or experience? 
 What talents, capabilities, knowledge, skills 
and/or experience are required? 
 What talents, capabilities, knowledge, skills 
and/or experience are available? 
 Where must these talents, capabilities, 
knowledge, skills and/or experience be 
available and applied? 
 When are the talents, capabilities, knowledge, 
skills and/or experience required? 
 How can these talents, capabilities, knowledge, 
skills and/or experience be applied? 
 Which effect will these talents, capabilities, 
knowledge, skills and/or experience enable? 
 What will happen or is required after the talent 
was used? 
 
Knowledge about the individual or group of individuals and their knowledge, both human- and 
relational capital. 
 
Relational Capital or Social Capital  
The goodwill resulting from physical and virtual 
exchanges and interaction between like-minded 
people, willing to share ideas within groups with 
shared interests. Creating trust and quality 
knowledge to drive enhanced decision-making and 
action.  This is also a strong source of advantage 
due to niches.  
Organisational external relationships with 
customers, suppliers, partners, stakeholders and 
their perceptions of the organisation and abilities to 
collaborate.  This is mostly tacit knowledge. 
 Who has the right relationships? 
 What relationships are available and/or 
required? 
 Where must these relationships be available and 
applied? 
 When are the relationships required? 
 How can these relationships be applied? 
 Which effect will relationships enable? 
 What will happen or is required after the 
relationships were used? 
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IC Component Who, What, Where, When, Why, How, Which 
Effect and What Thereafter  
 
Knowledge about relevant and available relationships and networks that could possibly unlock more 
human capital. 
 
Structural Capital 
The residual knowledge when people are removed 
from the organisation. Organisational routines, 
policies, doctrine, structures, processes, procedures, 
systems, databases, culture and IP (patents, 
trademarks, copyright).  This is mostly explicit 
knowledge. 
 Who has access to or manages organisational 
knowledge? 
 What organisational knowledge is available 
and/or required? 
 Where can this organisational knowledge be 
found and where must it be applied? 
 When must the organisational knowledge be 
available and applied? 
 How can the organisational knowledge be 
applied? 
 Which effect will the application/non-
application of the organisational knowledge 
bring about? 
 What will happen after the application/non-
application of the organisational knowledge? 
 
Knowledge about the organisational (routines, policies, doctrine, structures, processes, procedures, 
systems, databases, culture and IP) required to manage operations, human- and relational capital. 
 
Table 2.3 above illustrates the usefulness of both these constructs as well as their 
complementarity in the quest of finding the components of knowledge as a construct.  It goes well 
with the statement of Davenport and Prusak (2000: 7) –  
“Knowledge is not a rigid structure that excludes what doesn't fit; it can deal with complexity in 
a complex way. This is one essential source of its value. Although it is tempting to look for 
simple answers to complex problems and deal with uncertainties by pretending they don't exist, 
knowing more usually leads to better decisions than knowing less, even if the "less" seems 
clearer and more definite [such as data and information]. Certainty and clarity often come at the 
price of ignoring essential factors.”. 
Changes that occur in each knowledge attribute due to changes in the environment drives the 
dynamic nature of knowledge, resulting in constantly evolving meaning and understanding, or new 
knowledge.  Seemann, et al. (2000: 5) describes knowledge as being - “… continually in motion, 
being enhanced, shared, sold, or used, and that they generate superior business results.”. 
With the need for-, types of-, time value of- and attributes of knowledge in mind, let us 
supplement the definitions in Table 2.1 with some more practical definitions for knowledge as a 
construct in order to progress towards the construction or adoption of a proposed SA DOD 
knowledge definition and eventually KM.   Kuhn (1970) in Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 79) states that - 
”Human knowledge is subjectively determined by a multitude of factors, exemplified by 
pedagogical, socio-economic, cultural and psychological issues as well as language and context – 
most of these operating unconsciously” – ipso facto resulting in diverse collections of knowledge 
definitions.  This predicament makes KM very nebulous. In agreement with Mortensen (2014: 7), 
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there are probably as many definitions of knowledge as there are academics, philosophers, 
practitioners and organisations. 
Pérez-Montoro (2004: 2) proposed that a definition of knowledge should be - “… 
conceptually consistent and pragmatically useful”.  The definition should be focussed on the 
identification of real knowledge assets; enable easy application and make an unambiguous 
distinction between data, information and knowledge.  This recognises the predicament earlier 
mentioned that the knowledge hierarchy construct has cross-over spaces between the constructs that 
are undefined.  Pérez-Montoro (2004: 2-4) provides the following criticism, some of which are also 
found in Bouthillier and Shearer (2002) - 
“From the perspective of [KM] and Information Science, for instance, some authors (Nonaka, 
1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Davenport, 1997; Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Boisot, 1998; 
Devlin, 2001; Sveiby, 1999; or von Krogh, Ichijo, and Nonaka, 2000; among others) have dealt 
with this problem [i.e. defining knowledge], but producing no clear results … in [KM] there is a 
peculiar conceptual sloppiness in the treatment of a basic distinction that sustains the conceptual 
structure of the discipline, namely, the distinction between such concepts as Data, Information 
and Knowledge.”. 
Because this distinction is extremely subjective, the researcher is proposing a knowledge 
continuum rather than a knowledge hierarchy, based on the Wiig (1997) definition of knowledge 
used earlier in the dissertation.  The researcher reviewed a number of definitions in order to propose 
a definition for this dissertation. Based on the Pérez-Montoro (2004) requirement for ‘consistency 
and utility’, the KMI definition of knowledge (2014, module 5, slide 20) is a good starting point.  
KMI defines knowledge as - “… understanding gained from experience, analysis and sharing”.  
This definition points to useful core processes required to gain knowledge, i.e. ‘understand, 
experience, analysis and sharing’.  The definition essentially equates knowledge to understanding. 
Understanding implies that it is more than data and information, however, the definition does not 
elaborate on why this is necessary and also not to the dynamic nature of knowledge as discussed 
earlier in the paper. 
Van Der Spek and Spijkervet (1996) in Uit Beijerse (1999: 102) define knowledge as a - ” ... 
dynamic human process in which ‘truth’ is created”.  This definition acknowledges elements of the 
philosophy of Plato.  Plato described knowledge as “justified true belief”; a definition that evolved 
into an authoritative position amongst western philosophers
27
.  However, speaking of ‘truth’ and 
what it exactly is, now and in the future and in different social and cultural settings is not very 
helpful.  Organisations do not manage ‘truth’ but rather IC – which possibly contain truth.  In the 
military (and probably also business), certain knowledge is created that holds no truth and are 
designed to deceive the opponent.  It is knowledge nonetheless.  Therefore, the researcher does not 
believe that knowledge has to be true for it to be known. 
Pérez-Montoro (2004) criticises the usefulness of Plato’s definition from various perspectives, 
concluding that it offers limited knowledge identification power or ecological value (i.e. construct 
differentiation). The researcher agrees.  A ‘dynamic human process’ implies that knowledge is in 
                                                 
27
 Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Von Krogh, Ichijo and Nonaka, 2000; Sveiby, 2001; Kakabadse, et al., 2003; Zhang, 
2013. 
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constant flux due to certain processes and changing attributes as well as that people are the foci.  
This conceptualisation is useful in determining KM requirements. It is also useful from a 
definitional perspective pointing to the evolutionary nature of knowledge as a requirement for the 
complex nature of the contemporary world.  
Knowledge management requires both process and people.  The ‘human’ part of knowledge 
also points to an important aspect of the being of knowledge – that it remains inherently in people 
or tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) - “… defined as action-based, entrained in practice, and 
therefore cannot be easily explained or described, but is considered to be the fundamental type of 
knowledge on which organizational knowledge is built (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Choo, 1998a)” 
(Bouthillier & Shearer, 2002: online).  This statement acknowledges the fundamental nature of 
knowledge and states a critical attribute of knowledge, namely action (acknowledged by the KMI 
knowledge attributes above). 
Based on the conception of Polanyi (1958) and Wittgenstein (1995) in Sveiby (2001: 2), 
knowledge is the - “… capacity to act”. Sveiby (2001: 2) states that - “Knowledge defined as 
"capacity to act" is dynamic, personal and distinctly different from data (discrete, unstructured 
symbols) and information (a medium for explicit communication).”.  Bennet, Bennet and Lee 
(2010: 316) support the idea of knowledge being an enabler to act within contextual space. 
Wiig (1993) in McNabb (2007: 45), supported by Malhotra (2000) and Allee (2003) in 
Musimwa-Makani (2012: 25) produced an explanation rather than a concise definition – including 
whispers of the Plato definition (‘truths and beliefs’), acknowledging that knowledge is more than 
information and data - 
“Knowledge consists of facts, truths, and beliefs, perspectives and concepts, judgments and 
expectations, methodologies and know-how [this conforms to what ‘meaning’ is according to 
Sveiby (2001)].  Knowledge is accumulated and integrated and held over long periods to be 
available to be applied to handle specific situations and problems …”. 
The Wiig-definition above unpacks some of the ‘dynamic human process’ proposed by Van 
Der Spek and Spijkervet (1996) and ‘knowledge flow’ proposed by Kakabadse, et al. (2003).  These 
are all elements required to create ‘meaning,’ as suggested by Sveiby (2001).  Defining knowledge 
in this manner is perilous because the question always lingers whether it is a finite list of 
descriptors.  From a practical perspective, the definition does not state what the knowledge is for.  
Certainly, knowledge is not just there for ‘specific situations and problems’ but surely to enable all 
decisions and actions of the organisation in order to manage all situations, risks, problems and 
advantage.  More discussion on the required elements for KM follows later in the chapter. 
Davenport and Prusak (1998: 5) define knowledge as - “… a fluid mix of framed experience, 
values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and 
incorporating new experiences and information". This is closely related to the Wiig-definition in the 
spirit of interpretivism, touching on tacit knowledge elements ala Polanyi but also eludes to the 
dynamic nature of knowledge ala Van Der Spek and Spijkervet (1996) in Uit Beijerse (1999: 102). 
Seemann, et al. (2000: 7) states - “Executives must view [KM] as a dynamic process where 
priorities will change in response to the demands of the competitive environment and to the 
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organization’s evolving mix of knowledge assets”.  Various writers28 support the idea of knowledge
as a ‘dynamic human process’.  Knowledge as a ‘dynamic human process’, as identified above, 
provides a possible explanation to the notion of ‘more than information’ by coupling it to people 
attributes (e.g. truths, and beliefs, perspectives, judgments and expectations and know-how) that 
will first generate tacit knowledge before KM processes will construct explicit knowledge in the 
form of structural capital.  It also refers to the changing nature of knowledge, i.e. a possible 
evolutionary process. Thus, where information is perceived as a static construct, knowledge is 
perceived as a moving or perhaps evolving construct, as stated earlier.  Note also that for this reason 
KM is also perceived as dynamic and evolving.   
The construct of ‘meaning’ described by the Wiig-definition earlier is supported by academics 
such as Sveiby (2001) and Spender and Marr (2005) and is in contrast to knowledge perceived as an 
object (objectivism) as described in Spender and Marr (2005).  Knowledge as an object proposes 
that knowledge can be separated from the knower and then treated as artefacts of economic assets 
such as IC.  In the objectivist’s view, knowledge as an object equates knowledge to facts (Spender 
& Marr, 2005) making it very static - ”… in the objectivist framework the knower adds nothing to 
the data, which can, therefore, be known ‘objectively’ without considering the knowing subject” 
(Spender & Marr, 2005: 5).  This is typically a second generation KM perspective and closely 
conforms to positivism (Spender & Marr, 2005: 8) in the sense that an economic value for 
knowledge could be calculated because of the objective approach to identifying and/or defining the 
asset.  These perspectives only address knowledge as an economic object and possibly ignoring 
intangible values such as the military value of knowledge. 
The knowledge that cannot be separated from the knower (i.e. tacit knowledge, human 
faculties or intelligence and wisdom) will pose a variety of management challenges to the 
organisation that sets out to manage knowledge. Knowledge as an object is really reduced to 
explicit KM.  If the organisation also aims to manage the knowledge still not codified or 
‘objectified’; it will possibly result in human resource management-, organisational culture- and 
leadership challenges because the individuals with the knowledge might feel that the organisation 
view its employees as objects and not as unique individuals. 
Knowledge as ‘meaning’- based on the construct of understanding29- presumes that the
knowledge cannot, in essence, be separated from the knower but that meaning will evolve over time 
as new data, information and other knowledge becomes available and are internalised. This constant 
input of new data, information and other knowledge creates new understanding (based on the 
Weber-notion of “verstehen” - German for ‘understanding’), thus allowing the meaning or tacit 
knowledge to evolve, broadening the portfolio of required or optional decisions to be taken, and 
constantly opening up new options for action.  This is largely an interpretivist approach to 
knowledge (Spender & Marr, 2005: 9), i.e. - “Knowledge assets are seen as data [and information] 
combined with the meaning that would allow organizations to use it as a factor of production [or for 
military purposes]”.  This approach has its own challenges from a KM perspective.  However, the 
approach at least acknowledges that tacit knowledge also needs managing following the 
Interpretivism school of thought, Interpretivism being a third generation KM perspective.   
28
 Polanyi, 1966 & 2009; Nonaka et al., 2000; McInerney, 2002; Wang, 2008; Zhang, 2013. 
29
 Sveiby, 2001; Spender & Marr, 2005; and Bennet, Bennet and Lee, 2010. 
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Wittgenstein in Spender and Marr (2005: 5) – 
 “… argues that it is not possible to write explanations that do not ultimately depend on some 
sources of meaning lying [sic] beyond the reach of such explanation. In the same way we see 
communication always requires the receiving person to have some prior knowledge (absorptive 
capacity) that cannot be made part of the signal sent.”.    
Also –  
“… in the interpretivist frame, knowledge is determined by some combination or melding of the 
phenomena to be known and the knower. Typically the knower is described in terms of the 
source/s of meaning that individuals attach to the phenomena since such meaning is under-
determined by the phenomenon itself. Thus some writers speak of the ‘lenses’ through which 
people view events, data, and other phenomena.” (Spender & Marr, 2005: 5).   
These ‘lenses’ can be construed as the processes involved to create meaning or knowledge 
and with which that knowledge is then managed to create new meaning, understanding and upon 
which decision and actions are based. 
Then Spender and Marr (2005: 9) also suggest the existence of an organic approach to 
understanding knowledge owned by organisations; i.e. - “... a dynamic and tentative combination of 
data, meaning, and the ability to generate proficient practice”.  Again, acknowledging knowledge to 
be managed; this view closely relates to the view that knowledge is a ‘dynamic human process’, 
keeping knowledge in constant flux.
30
 The construct of knowledge as IC is also easily identifiable.  
The researcher is of the opinion that meaning can also evolve in explicit knowledge based on the 
updating of organisational IC as new data/information/knowledge becomes available.  Such 
evolution is based on tacit knowledge evolution and inevitably will be more iterative and slow.  
This will then assist with understanding the new set of circumstances and requirements and 
subsequent decisions and actions.  Still considering definitions for knowledge; Riempp and Smolnik 
(2007: 4) contribute a shorter version of a combination of the same elements -  
“Knowledge is the entire body of know-how and skills which people apply to solve problems.  
This includes theoretical know-how as well as practical everyday rules and procedures.  
Knowledge is based on data and information but, unlike them, is always person-specific.  
Knowledge is created as an individual process within a specific context and manifests itself in 
actions.”.     
This definition acknowledges elements of previously stated definitions; also points to the fact 
that knowledge is more than just an object (i.e. know-how and skill) and aims at facilitating 
decisions, actions and an effect (i.e. problem solved).  There are also murmurs of IC in the 
definition.  This definition combines elements of the interpretivist and organic approach to 
knowledge. 
Shariq (1997: 75) defines knowledge as - “… the embodiment of human intellectual capital 
and technology”.  This raises the question about the other forms of IC (relational and 
organisational).  Shariq does not state the role of technology.  In the writer’s opinion certain parts of 
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technology may well be knowledge (such as designs and software for example).  However, not 
every part of technology equates to knowledge.  Technology as knowledge seems to be in line with 
the objectivist approach.  Shariq does not hint at the possibility that knowledge could be in a 
constant state of flux, which both human IC and technology invariably are. Shariq also doesn not 
state the purpose of the knowledge in the definition. 
From a more practical perspective, Mertins and Seidel (2009) in Zhang (2013: 13) classify 
knowledge into domains - “… knowledge of markets and competitors, knowledge about norms, 
standards, & rules, knowledge about products, knowledge about customers, knowledge about one’s 
own organization, knowledge about a partner, knowledge about patents, and knowledge about 
profession & methods”.  Based on these domains there is also a two-dimensional approach, i.e. 
personal or organisational knowledge (Zhang, 2013).  These definitions seem to aim at the source of 
knowledge.  These domains or sources of knowledge are based on a typical business view of an 
organisation, but can also be very useful to deconstruct the knowledge domains for military 
organisations.   The domains also display certain elements of IC as discussed above. This is 
discussed later in the dissertation in order to contribute to the question; what type of knowledge 
should the SA DOD be managing? The discussion above contributes to the crafting of a definition 
for SA DOD knowledge in order to clearly understand the asset to be managed and SA DOD KM.   
The definitions discussed in this section thus far support the view that knowledge is 
inseparable (interpretivist and organic approaches) from people and organisations as embodied by 
the IC construct.  This is also the distinct view of Habermas, 1972 and Lytras and Poudouli, 2006 
and others.  Another dimension acknowledges the presence of knowledge in technology and science 
(objectivist approach) (Shariq (1997, McAdam & Reid, 2000 and others).  The behaviour and 
unique challenges coupled to people, organisations and technology can be controlled and managed 
within reason. However, to accomplish this, a dedicated management paradigm must be in place.  
For this KM is proposed by several academics and practitioners alike.     
Organisational knowledge creation requires creative, evolving and integrated processes for 
organisations to remain relevant or competitive.  Knowledge in itself does not require decision or 
action.  However, decision and actions require knowledge in order to progress in a particular 
direction, to deliver specific effects or to create and sustain advantage.  Organisations need to 
continuously establish new meaning to understanding the complex and dynamic worlds they find 
themselves in.  This can be facilitated through KM, its processes and enablers.  Following from the 
above, the next section discusses KM theory in support of the crafting of SA DOD knowledge and 
KM definition proposals in later chapters.  Let us now consider the theory and practice supporting 
KM.     
2.4 THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE: AN INTRODUCTION 
There is a considerable divergence on the perspectives of what constitutes KM (Halawi, et al., 
2005 and Shajera & Ahmed, 2015) – stemming from the antediluvian debate about the nature of 
knowledge.  However, the coining of the phrase ‘knowledge management’ by Wiig in 1986 at the 
United Nations provided some focus.  This was followed by the first handbook on KM published by 
Wiig in 1993 (Bouthillier & Shearer, 2002).  Knowledge management did not evolve in a criticism 
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vacuum.  Knowledge management critics (Sutton, 2007 in Onyancha and Ocholla, 2009: 1) states 
that - 
“KM does not appear to possess the qualities of a discipline.  If anything, KM qualifies as an 
emerging field of study.  Those involved in the emerging field of KM are still vexed today by the 
lack of a single, comprehensive definition, an authoritative body of knowledge, proven theories, 
and generalized conceptual framework.  Academics and practitioners have not been able to 
stabilize the phenomenon of KM enough to make sense of what it is and what it comprises.”. 
Another very radical stance is that of Stacey (2001: 220) in La Grange (2006: 22) – “… 
knowledge cannot be grasped, owned by anyone or traded in any market … it is not only impossible 
to manage knowledge, even the question makes no sense.”.  Stacey was clearly not thinking when 
he wrote this.  If knowledge cannot be grasped then surely not much progress would have been 
possible.  Every individual and organisation own knowledge to some degree, the more secret the 
knowledge the more secure the ownership (or control); the formula for Coke is a case in point.  
Knowledge is traded every day in the marketplace when considering what is included in IC.  
Riempp and Smolnik (2007: 4) state that knowledge, being perceived as specific to and 
embedded in people, are “… partly conscious … invisible and not directly transferable”.  This 
might be true at a subconscious level but not at the explicit level where knowledge can be imparted 
in voice message communication, typed or written format.   
Streatfield and Wilson (1999) in Bouthillier & Shearer (2002) are of the opinion, based on an 
over-simplification of the nature of knowledge, that the management of knowledge inherent in 
human minds (tacit knowledge) is questionable.  It is, of course, a general statement referring to 
other people or organisations managing tacit knowledge.  The individual himself manages that 
knowledge.  Other individuals and organisations do not have to manage the knowledge itself but 
just needs to manage the individual that is perceived to have that knowledge in such a manner that 
this knowledge becomes available (explicit) in a desired form or format.  That is KM.  
In the researcher’s opinion and the academic work of a myriad of other authors, these authors 
possibly oversimplified the criticism.  For example, if there is disagreement by thousands of people 
on the exact shade of a red car, it does not mean that the car is not red.  The real asset, i.e. the car, is 
also not diminished in terms of capability or value by the fact that there is disagreement on the exact 
shade of the colour.  Therefore, to state that the car does not possess the qualities of a car is absurd 
and that the car cannot be grasped, owned by anyone or traded in any market or that the car is 
impossible to be managed based on disagreement about the shade of the colour reflect possibly a 
poor understanding of the phenomenon.    
The poor understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge and its management is exacerbated 
by its intangibility and ability to evolve.  Thus academics and practitioners alike that requires 
quantification of a phenomenon to be able to understand them and manage them will have great 
difficulty with KM.  Also lacking is the capacity to understand that the management of intangible 
phenomenon invariably requires the management of the host or the surrounding environment to 
exploit its advantages and to apply and benefit from them.  For example - oxygen is a case in point.   
The mere fact that scientist could not see, grasp, own or manage oxygen did not prevent them from 
managing possible originators of oxygen and capturing the oxygen for later use.  That is oxygen 
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management, currently at the international strategic level of management, i.e. global warming and 
greenhouse gasses.  Knowledge is very similar.  It exists, evolves, can be grasped, owned and 
leveraged in the marketplace and if not managed and secured carefully can result in a catastrophic 
disaster (enrichment of radioactive material as an example).  From a positive perspective, it can lead 
to cataclysmic benefits (a cure for HIV/AIDS or cancer as examples).  Knowledge security in this 
sense covers both explicit knowledge and those individuals with tacit knowledge not yet imparted.  
Thus, let us get back to arguments and evidence on how to manage knowledge because of the 
evident reliance by society, business and militaries on it.  Popa (2010: 57) states –  
“Since our society relies so much on knowledge a new type of management appeared: 
knowledge management [coined by Wiig in 1986].  There’s no universal definition of knowledge 
management, just as there’s no agreement as to what constitutes knowledge in the first place, this 
is why the best way is to look at knowledge management in the broadest context.  Succinctly put, 
knowledge management is the process through which organizations generate value from their 
intellectual and knowledge-based assets.”. 
2.4.1 Multi-disciplinary by Nature 
Knowledge management as a management science is influenced by and constructed from 
various academic disciplines – and thus correctly considered to be an integrated multi- and 
interdisciplinary field of study and application.  This gives rise to as many theories and models as 
there are theorists and practitioners
31
.  The conceptual and terminological confusion is compounded
by the variety of - “paradigmatic approaches” to KM (Hall, et al., 2007: 2), which can be based on 
technological designs (typically in the spirit of information technology management) and/or non-
technological designs (Mertins, et al., 2001 in Zhang, 2013).  
Onyancha and Ocholla (2009: 2) assist with understanding why KM is considered a multi-
disciplinary field of study by listing some of the most prominent disciplines contributing to KM 
theories and models - “… computer science; business; management; library and information 
science; engineering; psychology; multidisciplinary science; energy and fuels; social sciences; 
operation research and management science; and planning and development.”.  Their view is based 
on the work of several writers
32
.  There are numerous academic philosophies that influence KM
(Kakabadse, et al., 2003) - consider the following table - 
Table 2.4: Academic Philosophies that Influences Knowledge Management 
Discipline Contribution 
Philosophy Defining knowledge 
Cognitive Science Understanding knowledge workers 
Social Science Understanding motivation, people, interactions, culture, environment 
Management Science Optimisation of operations and integrating them into the enterprise 
Information Science Building knowledge-related capabilities 
Knowledge Engineering Eliciting and codifying knowledge 
31
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Discipline Contribution 
Artificial Intelligence Automating routine and knowledge-intensive work 
Economics Determining priorities 
Adapted from Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 79). 
The scope of these highlights the requirement for coherence and integration in KM.  Zhang 
(2013) is of the opinion that the current, primary KM theory development focus is in IT and people, 
which is a combination of the technology (computer science, library and information science) and 
behaviour schools of thought (social science, management science and psychology).  This probably 
exacerbates the understanding by people and within organisations that KM is the equivalent of IM 
and/or the management of IT.   
Then there is the integration of KM and strategic management, based on strategic thinking 
and the Resource-Based View of the organisation (management sciences and social sciences); 
positing KM as the ultimate strategy to unlock or enhance organisational competitive advantage.  
This thinking is widely supported and discussed earlier in the dissertation. 
BenMoussa (2009: 1491) states very aptly that the scope of and the sheer volume of KM 
material, conferences and seminars are evidence that KM is no longer just a buzzword or passing 
fad but a -“… discipline that needs to be considered in any modern strategy and planning.”.  This 
perspective is carved in reality by Onyancha and Ocholla (2009) with an article that analyses KM 
from a perspective of generally co-occurring terms in KM, contributing a list of terms that 
commonly recur with the term KM.  These are - “… information resources management, which 
recorded a frequency count of 555, followed by information science (417), information technology 
(385), information services (200), information retrieval (170), library science (131), management 
information systems (124), libraries (113), management (111) and information resources (100)” just 
to name the top ten.  (Onyancha & Ocholla, 2009: 5)   
Onyancha and Ocholla (2009: 5) also classified several terms and categories describing KM - 
“… information resources management; management; industrial management; records 
management; information services management; database management; personnel management; 
document management; resource management; and library administration. The list of terms also 
comprises activities or processes associated with KM as perceived by LIS [Library Information 
Systems] professionals, e.g. information retrieval, organisational learning, data mining, 
electronic data processing, database searching, knowledge acquisition (expert systems), 
information organisation, documentation, knowledge representation (information theory), 
libraries – automation, information sharing, library cooperation, classification, and Website 
development.”.   
Their analysis points to a predicament that does not assist with the construction of a 
universally accepted definition and conceptual framework for KM because of the clear confusion 
with an attachment to IM, IT and related constructs.  What remains contentious still is the 
differentiation between KM and IM, primarily due to the preoccupation of KM initiatives with the 
management of explicit forms of knowledge which have been done by IM initiatives all along 
(Bouthillier and Shearer, 2002).   Because knowledge is understood to be more than information 
then KM should encompass more than just IM.  This ‘more’ is evident in the definition of IC as 
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discussed earlier.  It is typically linked to the intangible dimensions of knowledge and its ability to 
unlock advantage when managed innovatively. 
It is thus understandable that there is a myriad of attempts to define KM, providing several 
KM definitions without authoritative and universal acceptance or conceptual clarity.
33
  The 
divergent KM conceptualisations are compounded by the lack of consensus on the definition of 
knowledge as stated previously.    
2.4.2 Knowledge Management by Definition 
From the discussion above and the indications of chaos and confusion; defining KM is 
difficult; is organisation and/or discipline-specific because knowledge is prone to be context 
specific.  A large number of KM definitions elucidated on in the published academic literature 
provide arguments for the inclusion of business/management processes, IT, IM, knowledge 
repositories and individual behavioural aspects.  These technological and behavioural constructs 
enable organisations too - “… methodically acquire, store, access, maintain and re-use knowledge” 
from divergent sources (Eschenfelder, Heckman & Sawyer, 1998 in Kakabadse, et al., 2003: 79).   
This management quandary invites some analysis of definitions, concepts and processes in 
existence and attributed to KM.  The following table provides an overview of KM definitions (by 
no means exhaustive) - 
Table 2.5: List of KM Definitions and Analysis 
‘ba’ Concepts Activities/ 
Processes 
Focus Type of 
Knowledge 
Motive 
“…the ability to acquire, create, organize, share, and transfer knowledge.”.  (Wiig (1993) in Zhang, 
2013: 18) 
Not stated Ability Acquire, Create, 
Organise, Share and 
Transfer 
Process Not stated Not stated 
“…the systematic, explicit and deliberate building, renewal and application of knowledge to maximise an 
enterprise's knowledge-related effectiveness and returns from its knowledge assets.”.  Wiig (1999a) in 
Onyancha & Ocholla (2009: 2) 
Enterprise Systematic, 
Explicit, 
Deliberate 
Building, 
Renewal and  
Application 
 
Quality, 
Process and 
Objectives 
 
Not stated To enhance 
effectiveness 
and returns 
“…involves the introduction of an organizational learning process through four management practices: 
• identifying the end result of organizational knowledge (planning) 
• establishing structures that facilitate learning (organization) 
• establishing frameworks for eliciting and developing knowledge (management/ coordination) 
• developing a feedback mechanism (control).”. Gorey & Dobat (1996: 1-4) in Godhout (1998: 12) 
Organisation Learning Planning, Organising, 
Controlling, 
Coordinating, 
Identifying, Eliciting, 
Developing and  
Feedback 
Architecture Not stated Not stated 
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‘ba’ Concepts Activities/ 
Processes 
Focus Type of 
Knowledge 
Motive 
“…formalization of, and access to, experience, knowledge and expertise that create new capabilities, 
enable superior performance, encourage innovation and enhance customer value.”.  Beckman (1997: 1-6) 
Not stated Enabling, 
Encouraging, 
Enhancing, 
Innovation 
Formalisation, Access Process, 
Types of 
knowledge 
and Quality 
Experience, 
Knowledge 
and Expertise 
To enhance 
performance, 
development, 
innovation and 
value. 
“…the systematic underpinning, observation, instrumentation, and optimization of a firm’s KM knowledge 
economies [i.e. construction, dissemination, embodiment, and use].”.  Demarest (1997) in Holsapple & 
Joshi (1999: 5) 
Firm Systematic Construction, 
Dissemination, 
Embodiment, Use 
Process Not stated Not stated 
“…collection of processes that govern the creation, dissemination and utilization of knowledge to fulfil 
organizational objectives.”.  Murray & Myers (1997: 29) 
Organisation  Creation, 
Dissemination, 
Utilisation (including a 
‘collection of 
processes’ that govern 
these).  This provides a 
distinction between 
core and other 
processes. 
Process Not stated Objective 
achievement 
“…involves establishing a set of operational processes intended to subject knowledge resources to a 
management cycle that includes planning, organizing, decision making, controlling and coordinating.”.  
Godhout (1998: 12) 
Not stated Management 
cycle 
Planning, Organising, 
Decision-making,  
Controlling, 
Coordinating 
Process Resources Not stated 
“…achieving organizational goals through the strategy-driven motivation and facilitation of (knowledge-) 
workers to develop, enhance and use their capability to interpret data and information (by using available 
sources of information, experience, skills, culture, character, personality, feelings, etc.) through a process 
of giving meaning to these data and information.”.  Uit Beijerse (1999:  102) 
Knowledge 
workers 
Strategy-
driven 
Develop, Enhance, 
Use, interpret and 
Giving meaning 
Process, 
Types of 
knowledge 
and 
information 
Experience 
and Skill 
Goal 
achievement 
“…the deliberate design of processes, tools, structures, etc. with the intent to increase, renew, share, or 
improve the use of knowledge represented in any of the three elements of intellectual capital.”.  
Seemann, et al. (2000: 5) 
Organisation Deliberate renew, share, or 
improve the use of 
knowledge 
Architecture 
and Type of 
knowledge 
IC Enhanced 
performance in 
knowledge 
processes 
 “…describes management’s efforts to ensure that these assets are continually in motion, being enhanced, 
shared, sold, or used, and that they generate superior business results.”. Seemann, et al. (2000: 5) 
Business Management 
effort 
and  
Continuous 
motion  
Increase, Renew, 
Share, Improve, Use  
Enhanced, Sold 
 
Process Assets Enhanced 
performance in 
knowledge 
processes and 
superior 
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‘ba’ Concepts Activities/ 
Processes 
Focus Type of 
Knowledge 
Motive 
business 
results 
“… to make the right knowledge available to the right people at the right time.”.  Kidwell, Vander & 
Johnson (2000) in Manuri & Yaacob (2011: 77) 
People None Availability Process and 
Quality 
Not stated Not stated 
“…conscious strategy of getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time and helping 
people share and put information into action in ways that strive to improve organizational performance.”.  
O’Dell & Jackson  (1998: 4) 
People and 
organisation 
Conscious 
strategy 
Sharing, Action Process and 
Quality 
Not stated Improved 
organisational 
performance 
“…a field concerned with the exploitation and development of the knowledge assets of an organization 
with a view to furthering the organization's objectives.”.  Rowley (2000: 9) in Onyancha & Ocholla (2009: 
2) 
Organisation Field Exploitation, 
Development 
Assets Not stated Furthering 
organisational 
objectives 
“… a discipline that promotes an integrated approach to identifying, managing and sharing all of an 
organization's knowledge assets including unarticulated expertise and experience resident in individual 
workers … it involves the identification and analysis of available and required knowledge, and the 
subsequent planning and control of actions to develop knowledge assets so as to fulfil organizational 
objectives.”.  Kim (2000: 3) in Onyancha & Ocholla (2009: 2) 
Individuals, 
Organisation 
Discipline 
and 
Integration 
Identifying, Managing, 
Sharing, Analysis, 
Planning, Control, 
Development 
 
Process Assets, 
unarticulated 
expertise,  
Fulfil 
organisational 
objectives 
“…embodies organizational processes that seek a synergistic combination of data and information 
processing capacity within information technologies, and the creative and innovative capacity of human 
beings.”.  Malhotra (2001) and [Malhotra (1998)] in Zhang (2013: 18) 
People and 
Organisation 
Synergistic Combination,  Process and 
IT 
Not stated Not stated 
“…the overall task of managing the processes of knowledge creation, storage and sharing, as well as the 
related activities.”.   Kucza (2001: 16) 
Not stated None Creation, storage 
sharing, related 
activities 
Process Not stated Not stated 
“…the processes and procedures that govern the creation, dissemination and utilization of knowledge by 
merging organizational structures and people with technology.”.  Bhatt (2001) in Zhang  (2013: 18) 
 People, 
Organisation 
Merging 
organisationa
l structures 
Creation, 
Dissemination, 
Utilization,  
Merging 
Process and 
Organisation
al 
Architecture 
Not stated Not stated 
“an interdisciplinary field that is concerned with systematic, effective management and utilization of an 
organization’s knowledge resources ... it encompasses creation, storage, retrieval, and distribution of an 
organization’s knowledge – similar to records and information management.”.   Read-Smith, Ginn, & 
Kallaus, et al. (2002: 317) in Onyancha & Ocholla (2006: 3) 
 Organisation Inter-
disciplinary 
field, 
Systematic 
and effective, 
Similar to 
Creation, Storage, 
Retrieval, 
Distribution, 
utilisation 
Process and 
records and 
IM focus 
Not stated Not stated 
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‘ba’ Concepts Activities/ 
Processes 
Focus Type of 
Knowledge 
Motive 
records- and 
IM 
“…the organisational capability which identifies, locates, creates or acquires, transfers, converts and 
distributes knowledge for competitive advantage.”.  Walters (2002) in Shajera & Ahmed (2015: 89) 
Organisation Capability Identifies, Locates, 
Creates or Acquires, 
Transfers, Converts 
and Distributes 
Process Note state Competitive  
advantage 
“… the combination of cultural and technological processes of an organisation.”. 
Barth (2002) in Manuri & Yaacob (2011: 77) 
Organisation Combination Cultural processes, 
Technological 
processes 
Aspects of 
organisationa
l architecture 
Not stated Not stated 
“… military KM as ‘a strategic approach to achieving defense [sic] objectives by leveraging the value of 
collective knowledge through the processes of creating, gathering, organising, sharing and transferring 
knowledge into action.”.  McIntyre, Gauvin & Waruszynski (2003) in Manuri & Yaacob (2011: 77) 
Military 
organisations 
Strategic 
approach of 
leveraging 
collective 
knowledge 
value  
through 
processes 
into action 
Creating, gathering, 
Organising, Sharing 
Transferring 
Process Not stated Achieving 
defence 
objectives 
“An environment that facilitates knowledge discovery, creation and innovation, and which fosters the 
development of a learning organization.”.  Girard (2004, online) 
Organisation Learning Discovery, Creation, 
Innovation 
Process and 
Learning 
Organisation 
Not stated Development 
“…as a socio-technical phenomenon where the basic social constructs such as person, team and 
organization require support from ICT applications.”.  Lytras  & Pouloudi (2006: 64) 
Person, 
Team and 
Organisation 
Socio-
technical 
phenomenon 
Not stated ICT Not stated Not stated 
“…addresses the generation, representation, storage, transfer, transformation and application of 
organizational knowledge.”.  Hedlund (2007) in Zhang  (2013: 18) 
Organisation
al 
None Generation, 
Representation, 
Storage, Transfer, 
Transformation, 
Application 
Process Not stated Not stated 
“…an organisation’s systematic endeavours to achieve organisational goals (such as the contribution to 
public welfare, profit maximisation, cost reduction or the satisfaction of customer needs) by optimising the 
use of knowledge.”. Riempp & Smolnik (2007: 4) 
Organisation Systematic 
endeavours 
Use Performance 
and service 
delivery 
Not stated To achieve 
organisational 
goals (such as 
the 
contribution to 
public welfare, 
profit 
maximisation, 
cost reduction 
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‘ba’ Concepts Activities/ 
Processes 
Focus Type of 
Knowledge 
Motive 
or the 
satisfaction of 
customer 
needs) by 
optimising the 
use of 
knowledge 
“…a discipline that promotes an integrated approach to identifying, retrieving, evaluating, and sharing an 
enterprise’s tacit and explicit knowledge assets to meet mission objectives.”.  AKM (2008) in Manuri & 
Yaacob (2011: 77) 
Enterprise Discipline 
and 
Integration 
Identifying, 
Retrieving, Evaluating, 
Sharing 
Process Tacit and 
Explicit 
knowledge 
assets 
Meet mission 
objectives 
“…a strategy that assists organisations to use knowledge to envisage, make and control the whole 
decision-making process.”.  Kongpichayanond (2009) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 2) 
Organisation Strategy Use Strategy and 
decision-
making 
process 
Not stated Envisage, 
make and 
control the 
entire 
decision-
making 
process 
“…the process through which organizations generate value from their intellectual and knowledge-based 
assets.”.  Popa (2010: 57) 
Organisation None None stated Process Intellectual 
and knowledge 
assets 
Process, 
Value, 
Intellectual 
assets, 
Knowledge-
based assets 
“…the discipline of enabling individuals, teams and entire organisations to collectively and systematically 
capture, store, create, share and apply knowledge, to better achieve their objectives.”.  Young (2008) in 
Manuri & Yaacob (2011: 77) 
Individuals, 
Teams Entire 
organisations 
Enabling, 
discipline, 
collectively 
and 
systematicall
y, 
 
Capture, Store, Create, 
Share and Apply 
 
Process Not stated Better achieve 
objectives 
“…that process established to capture and use knowledge in an organisation for the purpose of improving 
organisation performance.”.  Lungu (2011: 117) 
Organisation None Capture, Use Process Not stated Improved 
performance 
 “… a process that through creating, accumulating, organising and utilising knowledge helps achieve 
objectives and enhance organisational performance. KM also consists of strategy, cultural values and 
workflow.”.  Rašula, Vukšić & Štemberger (2012: 147) 
Organisation Strategy, 
cultural 
values and 
workflow 
creating, 
accumulating, 
organising and 
utilising 
Process  Not stated Achieve 
objectives and 
Enhance 
performance 
“... a process that transforms individual knowledge into organisational knowledge.”.  Rašula, Vukšić & 
Štemberger (2012: 147) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
‘ba’ Concepts Activities/ 
Processes 
Focus Type of 
Knowledge 
Motive 
Individual 
and 
Organisation 
None transforms Process Not stated Not stated 
“…the key objective of management is to improve the processes of acquisition, integration and usage of 
knowledge, which is exactly what knowledge management (KM) is about.”.  Rašula, Vukšić & Štemberger 
(2012: 147) 
Not stated Integration Acquisition, 
Integration Use, 
Creating, 
accumulating, 
organising, utilising, 
Usage 
Process Not stated Process 
improvement 
“...We manage Knowledge Processes. There are many K processes which can be aggregated into three: 1) 
Acquire (from external sources), 2) Produce or Create new K, and 3) Integrate or put to use.”. KMITM 
Not stated Integrate Acquire, 
Produce/Create, 
Integrate/use 
Process Not stated Not stated 
“KM = (P + K)s”.  P is for people, the addition sign is for technology and K is knowledge.  S is for 
sharing.”.   Zhang (2013: 18) 
People Combination 
and 
multiplicatio
n through 
technology 
Sharing Process and 
Technology 
Not stated Not stated 
Shajera and Ahmed (2015: 89) state that - “A consistent theme in all supported definitions of 
KM is that it consists of processes or a set of actions for creating and using knowledge to achieve or 
enhance different outcomes, such as organisational performance, organisational goals, competitive 
advantage, or overall success.”.  This is a practical approach to defining KM. 
There is overwhelming support for KM to be located (or ’ba’) in and for organisations 
(including derivatives such as firms, business and enterprises).  It can be assumed that 
‘organisation’ includes every element of such entity (people, physical spaces, technology, etc).  
Bhatt (2001) in Zhang (2013: 18) specifically stated “… by merging organizational structures and 
people with technology” knowledge can be managed.  This provides recognition for the existence of 
knowledge in organisations, people and technology.  Merging possibly alludes to the requirement 
for integration.  In fact, there are several authors from the list above that includes ‘integration’ as a 
concept in their definitions.  This is important for KM due to the dynamic nature of knowledge; 
without integration of various knowledge sources the evolution of knowledge will be slower and 
one dimensional.  Other authors include ‘systematic’ as a concept for KM.  Systematic KM possibly 
refers to the processes followed.  However, note must be taken that knowledge creation or 
development might follow an un-systematic path due to the innovative nature of people and the 
ubiquitous nature of knowledge and virtually unlimited access.  Thus, knowledge development 
might be in leaps-and-bounds rather than step by step.  Once created though, the continued 
management thereof should be integrated and systematic.   
Some authors specifically state that KM is important to and practised by people (individuals, 
knowledge workers), teams and the organisation.  This provides acknowledgement of the levels of 
KM activities in organisations and also that both tacit and explicit knowledge needs management.  
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No specific spaces where mentioned such as data-, information-, and/or knowledge bases or 
warehouses.  ”.  Read-Smith, Ginn, & Kallaus, et al. (2002: 317) in Onyancha & Ocholla (2006: 3) 
mention of “records and information management” came the closest to the warehousing concept. 
Most of the definitions state that knowledge must be managed, but does not elaborate on what 
that knowledge possibly consist of.  This is quite possibly the result of the divergence in definitions 
for knowledge as a construct.  The definitions listed above are very cryptic in their mention of types 
of knowledge.  Some authors classified knowledge as explicit and tacit (or at least inferences to 
these as inherent in organisations and people).  A number of authors classified knowledge as skills, 
experience and expertise, which is closely associated with tacit knowledge.  One author included IC 
as the knowledge to be managed, which from the discussion above, includes both tacit and explicit 
knowledge.  The researcher supports IC as a construct to describe organisational knowledge 
because of the inclusivity of the construct. Other authors classify knowledge as assets.  This has a 
practical implication for organisations when considering asset management.  Assets are also closely 
linked to advantage and will thus attract specific management attention. 
Rašula, Vukšić and Štemberger (2012: 147) and the KMI definitions are very similar, concise, 
practical, as well as easy to use and remember.  These constitute the basis for all knowledge-
intensive activities (KMI, module 8, slide 3).   Notwithstanding the practical nature of these 
definitions, they offer little more than a short summary of KM processes distilled from layers of 
semantics.  Limited expression is given in variations of combinations in these definitions about 
‘who, what (types of knowledge), where (‘ba’), when, how (process and/or approach), which effects 
(performance, objectives, goals, service delivery, etc) and what thereafter (survival, advantage, 
etc)’.  The definitions mostly express on ‘how’ or approach/process.  The researcher is not in favour 
of a process-based KM definition.  A definition for the SA DOD should encompass more than just 
‘how’, possibly expressing on what type of knowledge should be managed, how, why and to what 
effect. 
The KM definitions mostly focus on what is perceived as KM processes.  Authors specifically 
state the processes regarded as defining to the type of management.  There is a tendency to define 
KM for the sake of expressing on a number of processes with no clear or no expression on why KM 
is necessary.  This is defining for the sake of defining a phenomenon resulting in management 
activities and processes for the sake of having them.   
Most of these processes are also endemic to data management and IM.  Specifically stating 
the processes in the KM definition could possibly limit the evolution and potential of the KM 
‘discipline’.  The researcher supports a process approach to KM, however, this process should be 
calibrated with concepts such as integration and the processes should not be listed in the definition 
of KM. 
Other focus provided by the definitions are regarding quality (meeting objectives, enhanced results 
or returns, superior performance, etc).  The stated processes are thus positioned to assist in 
achieving these goals.  The goals stated in some of the listed definitions position KM to provide 
improved performance from a process perspective or from an organisational performance 
perspective.  This performance is linked to other statements to e.g. enhanced returns and value, 
service delivery, innovation, objective achievement, and enhanced decision-making process.   At 
least one author stated competitive advantage as the goal of KM. 
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Knowledge management as a construct and field of study approach tangibility, usefulness and 
practicality when considering the KM enabling processes listed discussed above in brief and later in 
this Chapter of the dissertation combined with KM being directed towards managing IC (as a 
practical solution to identify knowledge in organisations).  “The goal of knowledge management is 
a practical one …” (Probst, 1998: 17); “… (KM) involves all practices of an organization to create, 
store, use and share knowledge” (Probst, Büchel, & Raub, 1998) in Lindner and Wald (2010: 888). 
It is important to simplify the philosophical debate surrounding the KM body of knowledge – 
driving the quest towards the construction of practical solutions to organisational challenges.  The 
KMI voice this in their training material, proposing that KM is about knowledge processes (acquire, 
create and integrate) and the management of these processes.  However, just using processes to 
define KM will possibly result in organisations not understanding why they are doing KM.  Thus, 
the researcher is of the opinion that a KM definition should provide more comprehensive definition 
comprising more management facets to guide the organisation towards success or advantage.  Such 
a definition is proposed by the researcher in chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
This said, there is also no universally accepted implementation programme for KM (Litvaj & 
Stancekova (2015: 834).  The KMI programmes have come a long way towards filling this gap.  
Although the definitions and implementation approach differ among businesses and organisations; 
there seems to be an agreement to some extent at a process level.  Let us consider the ‘why’ of KM 
from an organisational perspective. 
Questions could also be raised regarding the necessity for KM in an already congested 
management space where constructs such as strategic management and operational project 
management are well recognised.  Let us briefly consider some convergence and divergence 
between these constructs. 
2.4.3 Strategic Management, Project Management and Information Management  
“What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy (Sun Tzu 1971)”   
(Snyman & Kryger, 2004: 8) 
Conceptually, strategy as a construct has been evolving over many centuries.  Strategy has 
remained a very important enabler to organisational success in business and/or on the battlefield.  
The expression of strategy in terms of competitive forces, or from a resource-based perspective, or 
in terms of organisational complexity all basically leads to the same conclusion - strategy is about 
positive or negative choice.  Choice is invariably expressed in the form of strategic intent that 
expresses the organisation's position regarding competitiveness.  Competitiveness is based on the 
economics involved in being a market leader or market follower.  The adaptiveness of the 
organisation also plays a key role in any organisations endeavour to compete.  Being the master of 
the organisation’s knowledge is paramount to both setting and executing strategy.  Strategic 
management is the vehicle for strategy execution.    
 
“… knowledge drives strategy and strategy drives knowledge management”  (Tiwana, 2000: 103) 
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David (2009) defines strategic management as - “The art and science of formulating, 
implementing, and evaluating cross-functional decisions that enable an organization to achieve its 
objectives.” (David, 2009: 36-37, 40, 48)   This definition seems to be quite authoritative and 
widely used (Nábrádi, date unknown, slide 9, Kretovics, 2011; Hamilton & Kwon, 2016 and many 
others).  Both art and science have strong connotations to knowledge.  This does not mean that 
strategic management equates to KM.   
French (2009) in Jofre (2011: 49) defines strategic management as - “…A process that deals 
with the entrepreneurial work of the organisation, with organisational renewal and growth, and 
more particularly, with developing and utilising strategy, which is a guide to the organisation’s 
operations.” Again, the links with knowledge and knowledge development are visible in 
“entrepreneurial work … organisational renewal and growth”.  However, strategic management is 
suggested as an enabler to growth and operations.  Jofre (2011: 49) states that since the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century - “… strategy management has broadly focused on the advent of a ― new 
economy, supported by the increasing role of knowledge and communications (technology) in 
businesses, and therefore it has focused on issues such as innovation and technology change”.    
The term strategic management and strategic planning are used interchangeably.  However, 
David (2009) points out that strategic management refers to strategy formulation, implementation, 
and evaluation – exploiting and creating new opportunities for the future.  Strategic planning is 
more related to strategy formulation – setting the organisational game plan – optimising for the 
future the current trends.  Strategic management wants the organisation to continually scan the 
internal organisational- and external environment for both positive and negative change.  Successful 
strategy aims at creating a fit between the organisation’s business platform and the external 
environment within which the organisation operates as well as with the organisation's internal 
environment i.e. it’s business processes as regulated by the drive towards attaining the 
organisational vision. (Grant, 2005: 14) 
Such change will present opportunity or threat which in turn will require new knowledge, 
decisions and actions.  Without a dedicated KM capability (KMC), organisations will attempt 
strategic management based on the results or products of data- and information management.  This 
is less than ideal for competitiveness in the knowledge era.  The requirement for knowledge is fairly 
evident in the brief discussion above as an enabler to cope with the competitive challenges ahead.  
The management of knowledge is posited by this dissertation as the vehicle to provide knowledge 
that will enable strategising, strategic management and competitiveness.  
Strategy, therefore, aims at aligning the answers to the strategic management questions of 
who, why, what, where, when and how and what thereafter (or the organisational objectives, 
resources and methods) with and within the internal and external environment in an endeavour to 
create balance, integration, synergy, complementarities and leverage – i.e. strategic fit.  The 
importance of strategic fit amongst all the components of the business environment is in the 
relationships that are created by creative planning and innovative thought.  The ultimate goal of 
creating a strategic fit and ultimately of strategy as a concept is to create competitive advantage.  
Knowledge and the management thereof is a critical resource and process that enables the quest for 
a strategic fit. 
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Strategy also enables the corporate and functional levels of organisations to ensure that 
resource management is aligned with the objectives of organisations.   Thus, the strategic intent on 
organisational knowledge should be found in corporate strategy.  This should result in an 
organisational mandate to establish a KMC and to execute KM.  The KMC will craft a lower level 
(functional strategy) to direct KM related operations.  At both levels of the organisation (corporate 
and functional) strategic management processes are employed to ensure that the ‘art and science of 
formulating, implementing, and evaluating cross-functional decisions that enable an organization to 
achieve its objectives’ takes place.  Another enabler at the disposal of organisational is project 
management.   
Knowledge management theory and practice have made its debut in project management 
literature only recently.  (Horstein, 2014 and De Nadae & Monteiro de Carvalho, 2017) Project 
management literature exploring KM mostly – “highlight the key role of the project management 
office (PMO) for storing and disseminating knowledge (Aubry & Hobbs, 2011; Müller, Glückler, 
Aubry & Shao, 2013 and Pemsel & Wiewiora, 2013 in De Nadae & Monteiro de Carvalho, 2017: 
351).  De Nadae & Monteiro de Carvalho (2017: 351) list a number of studies since 2007 that 
explored KM in project management.  These are –  
 Bower and Walker (2007) - planning knowledge management and their phases in projects. 
 Ajmal and Koskinen (2008) - analysing knowledge transfer in the projects and the influence of 
organizational culture.  
 Reich, Gemino and Sauer (2008) - knowledge management in IT projects.  
 Gladden (2009) and Alkhuraiji, Liu, Oderanti and Megicks (2016) - how to manage and apply 
knowledge in organizations.  
 Petter and Randolph (2009) - the processes of reusing knowledge among projects.  
 Tukel, Kremic, Rom and Miller (2010) - knowledge and practice’s salvages. 
 Johansson, Hicks, Larsson and Bertoni (2011) - the importance of knowledge maturity to 
development projects. 
 Aubry, et al. (2011) - the relationship between organisational performance and the knowledge of 
the project being managed. 
 Alin, Taylor and Smeds (2011) - knowledge transformation in projects. 
 Gasik (2011) - show a model of project knowledge management.  
 Koskinen (2012) - knowledge management as a factor that can improve project implementation.  
 Müller, et al. (2013) - project management knowledge in project management offices.  
 Horstein (2014) - knowledge as a factor of integration of projects.  
Cicmil & Hodgson (2006: 113) state that since the 1990s literature emphasized - 
“… the centrality of project-based organizing and project working in the processes of 
information sharing and knowledge management in organizations (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; 
De Fillipi, 2001; Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999; Silver, 2000; Wiig, 1997). … Projects 
supposedly provide, according to Cleland [1997], a central point where new knowledge, skills, 
and attitudes can be developed. …Not only are projects considered suitable ways to control 
endeavours in a turbulent environment (Ekstedt, Lundin, Soderholm, & Wirdenius, 1999) but 
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also, more importantly, they are regarded as the appropriate way to stimulate a learning 
environment and enhance creativity so as to deliver complex products (Hobday, 2000).”   
This acknowledges the importance of knowledge in and to project management and that new 
knowledge emerges from project management.  This, however, does not equate KM to project 
management.  So what is a project and project management?  A project is defined as “… a complex, 
non-routine, one-time effort limited by time, budget, resources and performance specifications 
[uniqueness and non-routine] designed to meet customer needs”. (Gray & Larson, 2008 in Na, 
2015: 45; also in Cope, Cope & Hotard, 2006).  This seems to be an authoritative definition amongst 
academics and practitioners.  The PMBOK® Guide (2013: 5) defines project management as “… the 
application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project activities to meet the project 
requirements” (also in Burke, 2013, Bodicha, 2015 and others).  In plain language; project 
management enables organisations to execute designated projects effectively and efficiently 
(Bodicha, 2015). 
Projects are unique initiatives aiming at delivering specific products and/or services (or 
tangible results).  Projects might also be undertaken to deliver a specific result (this might be more 
intangible).  Projects are characterised by the fact that they have a distinct start and end time, thus 
making scheduling very important.  Projects are thus temporary management initiatives. “Although 
repetitive elements may be present in some project deliverables and activities, this repetition does 
not change the fundamental, unique characteristics of the project work.” (PMBOK® Guide, 2013: 
3) 
This is summarised as follows – “… the four major characteristics of projects: the uniqueness 
and temporariness; discontinuous working and teams; lack of a natural mechanism of learning; and 
short-term orientation”. (Linder & Wald, 2010: 888) in Na (2015: 45) It is these characteristics that 
are obstacles to KM within projects.  Lindner and Wald (2011: 877) citing several authors in their 
statement – 
 “Due to their uniqueness and short-term orientation temporary organizations face particular 
obstacles in their KM. After a project is finished the constellation of people working together is 
resolved, fragmenting the project knowledge. In contrast to permanent organizations where 
departments and divisions act as knowledge silos, in temporary organizations routines and 
organizational memory hardly emerge. There is a lack of mechanisms for knowledge capturing, 
storing and disseminating and for organizational learning”. 
Projects follow a life cycle that is divided into four sequential phases:  definition, planning, 
implementation and delivery phases – illustrating the limitation in lifespan and that there are 
predictable changes in the level of effort and focus over the life of the project. These fluctuations 
have an impact on KM for the project and for the organisation.  Bocij, Chaffey, Greasley and Hicke 
(2006) summarise the three key project management elements  
For projects to be successful (create value) they have to be selected, prioritised and aligned 
with the organisation’s business strategy. Project management can be found in the “how to 
compete” strategy domain.  Project management creates capabilities (facilities, technology, and 
machinery) within a set period of time and within budget constraints to support the execution of the 
business strategy. 
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Figure 2.8: Project 
Management Key Elements by 
Bocij, Chaffey, Greasley and 
Hicke (2006) 
Source: Adapted from Bocij, et al. 
(2006: 384).  This triangle is 
generally accepted project 
management practice - Cope, Cope 
& Hotard (2006) and Bodicha, 
(2015). 
 
Project management can thus 
also be employed to create 
products/services/effects for the organisational KMC.  Rwelamila (2007: Slide 16)
34
 proposes the 
following graphic to depict the relationship of inputs and output of a project: 
 
Figure 2.9: Project 
Management Key Elements by 
Rwelamila (2007) 
Source: Adapted from Rwelamila 
(2007: Slide 16). 
If these elements are 
managed effectively (excellently) 
the project will be delivered on 
time, within budget and at the 
correct level of quality relating to 
the requirements of the customer 
(utility) and constrained by the schedule and budget.  Note that the sides of the diagram are even.  
This translates into equal management effort in all directions.  If one element of the triangle is 
neglected the other elements will be negatively affected.   Graham and Englund (2004) state that 
with accurate and comprehensive planning time and cost can be reduced with a commensurate 
increase in quality.  The ‘cost’ factor in projects can be expanded to include all required project 
resources.  This would include the availability of knowledge to the project.  The organisational 
KMC should make such knowledge available to the project team.  Commensurately, the project 
team should make all knowledge developed during the project life cycle available to the 
organisational KMC to ensure future availability.  Where this is not managed in an integrated 
manner, organisations lose their knowledge once projects are closed for various reasons. 
These elements can also be linked to strategy from the perspective that time can be linked to first-
to-market principles (market leaders), the cost can be linked to affordability (economies of scale 
and cost leadership) and quality and features can be linked to niche products (a product 
differentiation strategy).  All of these elements, in turn, are linked to knowledge; if knowledge is 
                                                 
34
 Prof P.D. Rwelamila, PhD, PrCPM; used this graphic in a lecture to the Masters in Businees Leadership Project 
Management class during the study school in 2007. 
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considered to be the asset that unlocks competitive advantage.  Milosevic, & Srivannaboon (2006: 
9) states that project management is a “…specialized form of management, similar to other
functional strategies, that is used to accomplish a series of business goals, strategies, and work tasks 
within a well-defined schedule and budget”.  The relationship can thus be construed to be 
symbiotic. 
Projects are needs based.  Projects are terminated when the need for the product/service/result 
lapse or the project goal was achieved. The temporary nature of projects does not impact on the 
longevity of the project.  Projects may extend over several years or only over a number of days.  
Projects are also not limited to a specific level within organisations. “Projects are undertaken at all 
organizational levels. A project can involve a single individual or multiple individuals, a single 
organizational unit, or multiple organizational units from multiple organizations.” (PMBOK® 
Guide, 2013: 3) Projects and their management are thus quite universal.  Operations management, 
on the other hand, is - 
 “… a subject area that is outside the scope of formal project management … an area of 
management concerned with ongoing production of goods and/or services. It involves ensuring 
that business operations continue efficiently by using the optimum resources needed and meeting 
customer demands. It is concerned with managing processes that transform inputs (e.g., 
materials, components, energy, and labor) into outputs (e.g., products, goods, and/or services).” 
(PMBOK® Guide, 2013: 13)   
The similarity between operations management and project management is simply one of 
process.  Both use distinct processes to deliver products/services/results.  However, projects are 
temporary in nature and operations are permanent.  Milosevic, & Srivannaboon (2006: 9) bring the 
theory closer to practice – 
 “The essence of project management is to support the execution of an organization’s 
competitive strategy to deliver a desired outcome (i.e., fast time-to-market, high quality, low-cost 
products) (Milosevic, 2003). As opposed to the traditional stereotype, the recent literature 
recognizes project management as a key business process (Jamieson & Morris, 2004). This view 
defines an organization as the process rather than the traditional functional or matrix form and 
describes project management as one of the key business processes that enable companies to 
implement value delivery systems. Therefore, when organizations link their projects to their 
business strategy, they are better able to accomplish their organizational goals.”   
Crawford (2006: 82) states that - “Organizational learning comprises both knowledge 
management and lessons learned. It is also associated with project management community.” 
Crawfort (2006) states further that project management benefits to the organisation include - “… 
greater entrepreneurship, more client satisfaction, more effective communication, more knowledge 
management and know-how transfer, improved project control, better multiprojec coordination, 
greater project transparency, and better project performance.” (Crawford, 2006:82)  Na (2015) 
capture all these elements by stating that KM is beneficial to successful project execution.  Cope, 
Cope & Hotard (2006) add other benefits of KM to project management; such as risk management 
and learning curve acceleration. De Nadae & Monteiro de Carvalho (2017) add knowledge creation 
using the SECI knowledge transformation model (discussed in more detail later in the chapter) and 
overcoming the knowledge related mechanisms of organisations and projects to the list.  That said, 
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organisational culture impacting knowledge sharing was one of the greatest influencers of the 
interaction between project management and KM according to De Nadae & Monteiro de Carvalho 
(2017). 
Thus, the link between project management and KM can be expressed in terms of the 
functional toolset project management offers to KM practitioners within which to implement KM 
initiatives.  Project management is thus an enabler to successful KM.  From a different perspective; 
project management has a role to play in organisational learning because of the nature of the 
processes.  Thus project management is also a KM process enabler from a knowledge sharing and 
using perspective.  Strategic management facilitates the balancing of the organisation's resources, 
methods and goals by strategizing at various levels within the organisation on how, where, when, 
why, who, what thereafter and with what effect to use organisational capabilities such a KM and 
organisational methods and expertise such as project management. 
Much information is also managed by organisations, in general, and within projects.  It is thus 
apt to consider briefly what is the difference between KM and IM – with due regard for definitions 
of knowledge and information discussed earlier in this chapter.  Mosha (2017: 8) summarises the 
differences between IM and KM as follows – 
“IM deals exclusively with explicit representations and guarantees access, security, delivery, and 
storage. In this case efficiency, timeliness, accuracy, completeness, speed, the cost of storage and 
recoveries are the main concerns. On the other side, KM values originality, innovation, agility, 
adaptability, intelligence and organisational learning. Therefore, KM focuses on people and is 
more concerned with critical thinking, innovation, relationships, exposition of ideas, standards, 
skills and encouraging learning and sharing of experiences.” 
Figure 2.10 provides some comparative differences between the two constructs - 
 
Figure 2.10: At-a-Glance Differences between Information Management and Knowledge 
Management 
Source: Na (2015: 20). 
Although both the constructs have ‘management’ in common; the real differences are in 
‘what’ is to be management.  Information management focuses on explicitness and warehousing.  
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Knowledge management focuses on generating wealth or advantage with a combination of tacit and 
explicit knowledge that can be shared and processed in more ways than just through technology 
enablers.  When considering that information is considered building blocks of knowledge then it 
would be reasonable to state that IM is an enabler to KM.  Both IM and KM should be addressed in 
organisational strategy and should be managed strategically.  Both IM and KM can be enabled with 
project management and through various projects.  Both KM and projects can deliver knowledge 
assets.  Only KM has as its raison d’etre the management of such assets in order to provide the 
organisation with the knowledge required to secure an advantage.  Let us now consider the question 
‘why KM?’, from an organisational perspective. 
2.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT TO ORGANISATIONS 
“In 50 years’ time, we will be designing products we don’t know, incorporating materials which 
haven’t been invented, made in processes yet to be defined, by people we have not yet recruited. 
Under these circumstances, all we can carry forward is our knowledge, and our knowledge of how 
to improve our knowledge.’’  (Siemieniuch & Sinclair, 1997 in Ďurišová, 2011: 45). 
In order to improve organisational knowledge to the point where it is the source of advantage 
is to manage the knowledge in an integrated manner with other assets and sources of organisational 
advantage.  Why should the SA DOD be interested in KM?  This question is raised by SRQ2 of the 
dissertation.  The question is based on the assumption that knowledge and its management are 
important -   
“Whereas at one time the decisive factor of production was the land, and later capital — 
understood as a total complex of the instruments of production — today the decisive factor is 
increasingly man himself, that is, his knowledge, especially his scientific knowledge, his 
capacity for interrelated and compact organization, as well as his ability to perceive the needs of 
others and to satisfy them.” (Pope John Paul II, 1991). 
This fourth element of production, knowledge, was introduced as such in Chapter 1 of the 
dissertation.   Internationally, governments and businesses alike are subscribing to the importance 
of knowledge as an asset to ensure sustainable development, innovation, service delivery and 
advantage in the knowledge era.  From the World Development Report (1998) quoted by Malhotra 
(2003: 1) in La Grange (2006: 33) - 
“For countries in the vanguard of the world economy, the balance between knowledge and 
resources has shifted so far towards the former that knowledge has become perhaps the most 
important factor determining the standard of living – more than land, than tools, than labour. … 
It is generally understood that countries that are rich in knowledge assets and intellectual capital 
fare better in terms of higher levels of growth and development … knowledge assets represent 
the fount of a nation’s competencies and capabilities that are deemed essential for economic 
growth, human development and quality of life.”. 
Interestingly, the quote above distinguishes between ‘knowledge assets’ and IC.  This could 
fuel construct dissonance within organisations without detailed calibration.  Nevertheless, Arora 
(2011: 165) echoes the quote above, stating that - “knowledge is increasingly recognized as an 
important, strategic resource by all types of organizations and institutions, whether private or 
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public, service oriented [sic] or production oriented [sic].”. The importance of KM for public 
service organisations are supported by an extended list of authors
35
, and ipso facto, for DODs of 
governments (La Grange, 2006).   
Choo (1998: 2) in Bouthillier and Shearer (2002) states that knowledge is - “… the only 
meaningful economic resource”. This expression not only supports the importance of knowledge for 
organisations but also support the symbiotic relationship between knowledge and meaning.  Stated 
slightly differently – knowledge is full of meaning.  Glaser (1998) in Ďurišová (2011: 45) is of the 
opinion that - “… [knowledge] is the only resource, whose value does not decrease, but increases 
with usage, a factor that ensures stable growth performance and competitive advantage”.  Hofer-
Alfeis (2003) in Halawi, Aronson and McCarthy (2005: 75) states that there is an acceleration in the 
pace with which knowledge is used to secure an advantage.  Importantly, these authors reiterate the 
linkage between knowledge or meaning and advantage.  Coherent and integrated KM is positioned 
to achieve this.  
Seemann, et al. (2000: 2) states that - “… market value [stems] from the knowledge assets, or 
[IC], that underlie a firm’s performance”.  In contrast with the World Development Report (1998) 
quote above, the researcher supports the opinion of Seemann, et al. (2000: 2); that is, knowledge 
assets and IC are similar constructs.  Years later, AL-Hakim & Hassan (2011: 948) stated (based on 
the opinion of several other authors) that - 
“In the knowledge-based economy era, superior organizations depend more on their knowledge-
based resources to survive (Choi et al., 2008; Ho, 2008; Kim & Gong; 2009; Yang et al., 2009a) 
and to improve [organizational performance] (Haas & Hansn, 2005; Liao & Wu, 2009; Safa et 
al., 2006). Therefore, the [KM] implementation has become increasingly as a main power to 
improve [organizational performance] for various organizations (Haas & Hansn, 2005; Liao & 
Wu, 2009; Safa et al., 2006)”. 
Davenport and Prusak (2000: 13) state –  
“Knowledge, by contrast, can provide a sustainable advantage. Eventually, competitors can 
almost always match the quality and price of a market leader's current product or service. By the 
time that happens, though, the knowledge-rich, knowledge-managing company will have moved 
on to a new level of quality, creativity, or efficiency [evolving nature of knowledge]. The 
knowledge advantage is sustainable because it generates increasing returns and continuing 
advantages. Unlike material assets, which decrease as they are used, knowledge assets increase 
with use: Ideas breed new ideas, and shared knowledge stays with the giver while it enriches the 
receiver. The potential for new ideas arising from the stock of knowledge in any firm is 
practically limitless - particularly if the people in the firm are given opportunities to think, to 
learn, and to talk with one another.”. 
Onyancha and Ocholla (2006: 4) state from an organisational perspective that KM is 
important based on the importance attached to people’s knowledge, skills and experience when 
properly managed.  Schwab (2016: online) equates talent with knowledge and that talent will, 
progressively, in the future outpace capital as an important production factor. From an interpretivist 
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 Wiig, 2000; Motseniqos and Young, 2002; Halawi, Aronson and McCarthy, 2005; La Grange, 2006; Riege and 
Lindsay, 2006; Girard and McIntyre, 2010; Arora, 2011; Yadav and Singh, 2013. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 
perspective, these writers thus reiterate the importance of tacit knowledge and hints of specific 
management practices required to extract the best possible sustained levels of performance and 
advantage.  
Considering Malhotra’s (2003) opinion that knowledge assets have an infinite life expectancy, 
it would be very important to manage these assets in order to extract potential value when required.  
However, knowledge life expectancy is linked to advantage, not existence; with changes in the 
environment and innovation ‘old’ knowledge might become very relevant again.  Knowledge does 
not cease to exist but continuously evolve into new meaning or knowledge. 
Knowledge assets are - “… non-linear with respect to the effects they deliver” (Malhotra, 
2003: 2).  This opinion is based on the assumption that knowledge is continuously transferred or 
codified (explicit knowledge), exponentially, before people (tacit knowledge) die.  Therefore, the 
inherent longevity of knowledge makes the asset valuable because it provides the continuous 
baseline for the creation of new knowledge based on the characteristic of knowledge explained as ‘a 
dynamic human process’.  Also not to be missed is the linkage between knowledge and effects.  Of 
course, knowledge itself does not deliver ‘effects’ but the actions of people deliver effects.  These 
effects might be more accurately delivered if it is based on knowledge rather than information or 
data.  The accuracy improves when knowledge is understood to be evolving and managed as such. 
At a more operational level, Du Plessis (2005) and Ndedla and Du Toit (2001) in BenMoussa 
(2009: 1491) - supported by views of Spender and Marr (2005), La Grange (2006) and Anand and 
Singh (2011), list a number of reasons why KM is important to organisations – some of these are:  
 Creating and maintaining a competitive advantage – which is directly related to the survival
and/or the profitability of an organisation. Some of these issues have been discussed above.
 Enhanced responsiveness and innovation36, again linked to survival and advantage.
 Cost saving or increased financial performance (also Yadav & Singh, 2013).
 Enhanced employees’ productivity (also Bouthillier & Shearer, 2002, Anand & Singh, 2011).
 Enhanced organisational productivity37.
 Reducing negative effects associated with knowledge attrition (i.e. knowledge loss due to
employees exiting the organisation) (also Anand & Singh, 2011).
 Enhanced decision-making, communication and collaboration, learning, skill levels, employee
satisfaction, best practices, customer satisfaction, organisational continuity, loyalty, sales,
revenue and/or profits, new product development, business opportunities, flexibility, quality,
innovation and re-use of knowledge (Anand & Singh, 2011: 936 listing several authors).
 Reduced risk and cycle time (Anand & Singh, 2011: 936).
 Development of core competencies (Beijerse (1999) in Anand & Singh, 2011: 936).
36
 Also Holsapple and Joshi, 2000; Bouthillier and Shearer, 2002; Zieba and Zieba, 2014; Alrubaiee, Alzubi, Hanandeh 
and Ali, 2015. 
37
 Also Chadha and Kapoor, 2010; Fugate, Stank and Mentzer., 2009; Ibrahim, Edgar and Reid, 2009; Zack, Mckeen 
and Singh, 2009; Kasim, 2008; Boumarafi and Jabnoun, 2008; several authors in Anand & Singh, 2011; Kharabsheh, 
Magableh and Sawadha, 2012 in Yadav and Singh (2013); several authors in Berraies, Chaher and Ben Yahia, 2014; 
Alrubaiee, Alzubi, Hanandeh and Ali, 2015. 
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Based on the strong business interest in KM (Holsapple & Joshi, 1999; Bouthillier & Shearer, 
2002, Halawi, Aronson & McCarthy, 2005; Zieba & Zieba, 2014), mostly linked to realising 
competitive advantage (business niches and unique products and services) stemming from 
innovation (Zieba & Zieba, 2014) - most of the KM models and theory originate in the business 
environment for business. McNabb (2007) writes on public sector KM as a blueprint for innovation 
in government, concluding that KM is critical for public sector innovation. KPMG
38
 research 
(1997) supports this opinion.  BenMoussa (2009) illustrates this with statistics on how much was 
spent on KM software - $73 billion in 2007 and growing.  From a public organisational perspective, 
Schwab (2016: online) states that - 
“Ultimately, the ability of government systems and public authorities to adapt will determine 
their survival.  If they prove capable of embracing a world of disruptive change, subjecting their 
structures to the levels of transparency and efficiency that will enable them to maintain their 
competitive edge, they will endure.  If they cannot evolve, they will face increasing trouble.”. 
The statement by Schwab above cannot be highlighted enough for modern militaries.  Cost 
curbing corporate and military innovation is imperative to maintain, affordable, advantage.  
Knowledge and its management are an essential ingredient. 
Public administration is the heart of the public service business model.  Its primary output is 
products and services that are important for the survival and functioning of modern society and 
government.  La Grange (2006) states that the focus in public administration has over years, shifted 
to being more citizen-centric, responsive and flexible.  This requirement can be linked distinctively 
to the complexity brought about by globalisation and the ubiquitous availability of new meaning 
driving continuous evolution of most scientific and social paradigms.  Knowledge management is 
positioned and employed by a business to provide and sustain competitive advantage under these 
market conditions.  Knowledge management is positioned and employed by public service 
organisations to provide an advantage in support of affordable, quality, innovative and timely 
services and products.  For public service, the motive is not profit but service and is important for 
societies to function. For this reason, KM has been at the receiving end of much attention for its 
potential application in public sector organisations (McAdam & Reid, 2000; La Grange, 2006). 
This said, BenMoussa (2009: 1491), referring to several writers, claims that KM initiatives 
fail (“84% of KM projects”) to be implemented and thus fail to deliver on the promise of 
competitive advantage.  This might be so, but the failure rate due to implementation issues does not 
detract from the fact that knowledge exists and will provide an advantage if harnessed successfully.  
This makes KM a very important part of organisational strategy and processes if organisations 
strive to be world class in delivering products and/or services.  Thus, in the researcher’s opinion, 
KM implementation failure has nothing to do with the importance of KM but rather failures in e.g. 
organisational leadership, -culture and/or -strategic processes.   
Most KM theories/models and software applications are directed at organisational survival in 
complex business environments and how to increase organisational competitive advantage and/or 
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 In 1997 research was done by KPMG (KPMG, 2000 in Bouthillier & Shearer, 2002) based on a sample of 200 large 
American businesses, revealing that at least 80% of the sample had knowledge management initiatives.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 62 
 
organisational performance.  This conforms to a Knowledge-Based View
39
 of the organisation 
(Spender & Marr, 2005 and Lindner & Wald, 2010) that posits the symbiotic relationship between 
knowledge, organisational survival and competitive advantage.  A Knowledge-Base View is 
described as follows - 
 “This base increasingly consists of knowledge based [sic] assets (Stewart, 1997; Roos, et al., 
1997; Lev, 2001; Sveiby, 2001, 1997; Marr & Schiuma, 2001). The knowledge of a firm should 
be the central consideration on which to ground the organization’s strategy and the primary basis 
on which a firm can establish its identity and frame its strategy, as well as one of the primary 
sources of the firm's profitability (Grant, 1991). Therefore, firms need to identify and develop 
their intellectual resources in order to establish and maintain a competitive advantage and to 
increase their performance (Petergraf, 1993; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Teece et al., 1997). This 
has led to the development of the knowledge-based view of the firm that considers knowledge as 
the principal source of economic rent (Grant, 1991; Grant & Spender, 1996; Spender, 1994).” 
(Spender and Marr, 2005: 3).  
This is possibly the most important realisation, now well published.
40
  Competitive advantage 
is very similar to military advantage – striving to have the winning edge, to establish market 
leadership or to dominate the battlefield or having effective deterrence.   What should be noted from 
the array of above-mentioned references is the time period the opinion is supported and the different 
number of aspects studied that supports this view.  Henceforth, competitive advantage and military 
advantage will only be referred to as advantage. 
Still considering why knowledge and KM are important.  The Knowledge-Based View, 
briefly mentioned above, contrasts with the Resource-Based View of the organisation.  The 
Resource-Based View positions internal organisational resources (e.g. niche resources and 
capabilities and differences in size or scale) as the primary source for advantage.  Na (2015: 25) is 
of the opinion that –  
“While the resource based [sic] view proposes that an organisation’s competitive advantage is 
derived from those valuable and unique resources that are costly for competitors to imitate, the 
knowledge based [sic] view focused on knowledge-related resources such as distinctive skills 
and routines as the most significant resource for establishing a dynamic capability or a 
competence. Thus, within this perspective emphasis is placed on internal processes and 
production arrangements. Researchers within knowledge-based view assume that the firm’s 
ability to make the best use of dispersed and tacit knowledge relies on organisational capabilities, 
routines and firm-specific repository of resources.” 
An organisational Knowledge-Based View (as opposed to Resource-Based View theory) 
changes the organisational competitive focus from internal resources as the primary source of 
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 See Spender and Marr (2005: 3). 
40
 Winter, 1987; Wiig, 1999; Drucker, 1991 and 1993; Kougot and Zander, 1992, Grant, 1996a; Liebowitz and 
Beckman, 1998; Godhout, 1998; Uit Beijerse, 1999; Bennett and Gabriel, 1999; Davenport, 1999; Holsapple and Joshi, 
2000; Seemann, et al., 2000; Choi, 2000; Nonaka, et al., 2000; Bartczak, 2002; La Grange, 2006; Spender and Marr, 
2005; Halawi, et al., 2005; Liang, Ouyang and Power, 2007; Hall, et al., 2007; Waddel and Steward, 2008; Werr, 
Blomberg, and Lowstedt, 2009; Zack, Mckeen and Singh, 2009 and Kamya, Ntayi and Ahiauzu, 2010; Manuri and 
Yaacob, 2011; Barquin, 2011,  Yadav and Sing, 2013; Zhang, 2013; Tubigi, et al., 2013; Al Ghamd, 2013; Zieba and 
Zieba, 2014 and many more).  
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advantage to knowledge as the core of advantage.  The theory developed for business provides 
valuable meaning for military KM based on the construct of advantage. 
Riege and Lindsay (2006: 24) write from an Australian public sector perspective on matters 
pertaining to KM and stakeholder partnerships.  Stakeholder relationships are considered a key 
source of IC (as discussed earlier – considered to be part of relational capital). They proceed to 
identify key governmental challenges to public policy delivery, dealing with community 
expectations and challenges highlighting the - “… importance of developing public policy via 
knowledge-based partnerships with its stakeholders”.  Militaries have numerous stakeholder 
relationships.  The SA DOD has many knowledge stakeholders.  Amongst these are the defence 
industry, aerospace sector, and the wider peace operations community – providing another reason 
why the SA DOD should consider comprehensive KM. 
Other KM benefits are mentioned in Bouthillier and Shearer (2002) as improved decision-
making and customer service.  Schwab (2016: online) states  - “Today’s decision-makers, however, 
are too often trapped in traditional, linear thinking, or too absorbed by the multiple crises 
demanding their attention, to think strategically about the forces of disruption and innovation 
shaping our future.”.  To cope with this predicament there should be a concerted effort by 
organisations to base their decisions and actions on integrated knowledge as found in organisational 
IC.  Knowledge management is proposed as a mitigating strategy and an enabler in the struggle 
against data/information overload
41
 and paralysis.   Based on the work of Taylor (2004); McKinnon 
(2005) and Moore (2005) - La Grange (2006) summarises a number of enablers and advantages that 
KM provides to public service - 
 Increased accountability and access to information (through transparency brought about by the 
information age technology and legislation). 
 National security (increased importance of intelligence operations (IntOps), typically after the 
9/11 terrorist activities – spearheaded by the USA). 
 Operational – and cost-efficiency; seamless service delivery as well as performance management 
and measurement (epitomised by e-government initiatives, balance scorecard approaches to 
management and strategy, total quality management and other adopted business best practice). 
 Knowledge intensity of many government products and services (made possible by stakeholder 
collaboration resulting from public service complexity but also possibly as a requirement for 
governments to interact with stakeholders within the context of the knowledge economy/era). 
 Security and privacy (found in new legislation). 
Malhotra (2000) suggests that rapid advances and change in business environments, requiring 
flexible responses and organisational adaptability, are exposing inadequacies of the current 
processing power of IM systems/architecture to cope with KM requirements of new business 
organisations.  Ramirez, Morales & Boliver-Ramos (2011) reference several authors that support a 
positive correlation between KM and the flexibility with which organisations can respond. This 
highlights the fact that IM is not KM and that IM is a KM enabler. 
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 Mortensen (2014: 9) acknowledges this problem within the context of USA military KM and the impact thereof on 
decision-making. 
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Decision-makers understand that the value of knowledge should be maximised; which is only 
possible when knowledge is managed (Uziene, 2010 in Ramirez, Morales & Boliver-Ramos, 2011).  
This begs the question; what value?  Is it monetary value or time value or taxpayer/shareholder 
value?  For militaries all these values are important.  Military knowledge needs to stay relevant as 
long as possible because the acquisition thereof might be very expensive and the taxpayer needs to 
be assured that the required knowledge is acquired or created at the best possible price before it is 
needed or just-in-time.  The military practitioner needs to know that the knowledge acquired or 
created is relevant for the longest possible time in operational and corporate management 
environments in support of the planned and expected effects and to provide a sustained advantage.    
World class, advantage, survival, cost-benefit, effects or any other business/military related 
concept are based on or created by ‘knowing’ in advance or be the first to ‘understand’ the 
‘meaning’ locked-in by context - thus being able to take decisions first that will result in first mover 
(action) advantage or the ability to dictate the shape of the new reality in your favour.   
In military terms, this ability is called - ‘being inside the opponent’s OODA loop’.  It is 
directly related to survival and advantage.  The 2008 Strategy for United States Air Force 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (2008 USAF ISR Strategy) summarises a description 
of what they regard as knowledge and its relationship with advantage (albeit from a knowledge 
superiority argument perspective) as follows –  
“No military organization can survive for long in the face of enemy knowledge superiority. 
When the information age makes unprecedented quantities of data available to practically any 
group, knowledge superiority depends on qualitative differentials: identifying the specific target 
and directing the right matter to the right space at the right time within the opponent‘s observe-
orient-decide-act (OODA) loop.” (USA, 2008: 17). 
The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy states the following about the relationship between meaning, 
understanding and intelligence –  
“How well disparate data can be synthesized to provide understanding which creates knowledge. 
The entire system, human and machine, needs the ability to combine seemingly unrelated data to 
create understanding. Superior training in the art of intelligence can greatly increase the ability to 
synthesize data and find meaning.” (USA, 2008: 17). 
Thus, the creation of new meaning is critical for continued understanding and knowing which 
enables control over decision-action cycles and the commensurate effects that are critical for 
survival and/or advantage.  This is true for market conditions and military operations. This is why 
knowledge and the management thereof are important in the knowledge era. 
La Grange (2006) raises questions by juxtaposing the private sectors’ value proposition for 
knowledge with that of the public sector.  The La Grange (2006) study is set against an economic 
value motive stemming from the advantage motive for private sector players. By exploring the 
relevant issues of governmental mandates, two levels of KM enablers from a South African 
perspective are proposed; that of organisational or departmental imperatives and those of national 
imperatives.  La Grange (2006) concludes that the relevance of KM for public sector organisations 
is closely coupled to governmental objectives which in broad can be summarised as service 
delivery, security, prosperity and stability both internally and from a foreign relations perspective.  
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These objectives are typically derived from the “freedoms” articulated by the late President 
Mandela as reflected in the NPI (2004: 24).  Of particular relevance is “freedom from suppression 
and freedom from fear” (NPI, 2004: 24 in La Grange, 2006: 32), which is, of course, a national 
(governmental) imperative - providing a distinctive mandate for the SA DOD.   
La Grange (2006) provides a concise overview of why KM is important for economic 
development by providing arguments for people development, knowledge flow between scientific 
endeavours and industry, required regulatory reforms, increased attractiveness for foreign direct 
investment, etc.  However, nothing is said about the link between security and development (some 
refer to this as a nexus) and the importance of military KM in support of these development 
agendas.  For example, the SA DOD has a research and development budget in excess of Rm500 
annually, supporting innovation activities at national scientific institutes (i.e. the CSIR) and within 
the defence industry (i.e. Denel SOC Limited).  In parallel, the SA DOD has a very large defence 
matériel acquisition footprint within the South African defence industry, the primary agent for 
innovation uptake and further development and manufacturing initiates.  The SA DOD is thus a key 
role-player in national innovation activities.  Yet, defence as a national imperative and/or the SA 
DOD as a national department does not engage in coherent and integrated KM as an advantage 
multiplier. 
That said, governments have a responsibility to manage nationally owned knowledge (as one 
of the resources at its disposal) to ensure internal/organisational effectiveness and efficiency, 
national security as well as national competitiveness from an economic perspective.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the researcher is particularly interested in the national security 
dimension – with specific reference to the role of the SA DOD.   
The SA DOD has a responsibility to the public and government to manage its resources 
effectively, efficiently, economically (PFMA, 1999).  One of the key resources for the SA DOD to 
manage in the knowledge era - is knowledge.  This is a prerequisite to remain relevant to the South 
African security and defence establishment and useful to the SA government in matters of security, 
defence and foreign policy initiatives.  This answers the question – should the SA DOD be 
interested in KM?  This critical question is not just answered positively from the perspective of 
public interest and the legislative framework, but also earlier in the dissertation the importance of 
knowledge and the management thereof were articulated in terms of its importance for adaptability, 
flexibility, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, innovation, knowledge retention, survival and 
sustainable advantage for the SA DOD.  It is for this reason that the researcher posed the question – 
why the perceived disinterest in KM by the SA DOD?  This question is addressed in the document 
analysis chapters (dissertation Chapters 5 and 6) and questionnaire (dissertation Chapter 7). 
The discussion above informs the argument why the SA DOD should consider implementing 
KM (SRQ 2).  The next section addresses important issues to be considered when attempting KM.  
The issues discussed in the following section informed the proposed SA DOD KM model (part of 
SRQ 4).  Thus, understanding that KM is important from several perspectives with the nuances, 
types and ‘ba’ of knowledge in mind – let us now consider what is required from a management 
perspective for it to have a positive, sustainable impact on organisational survival and advantage. 
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2.6 AN ORGANISATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
“Firms are increasingly investing in [IC], but the process of deciding where and how to invest 
remains relatively undisciplined, resulting in disappointing returns and wasted resources.”  
(Seemann, et al., 2000: 9). 
The quote from Seemann above reflects the disillusionment phase through which KM had to 
thrust in order to grow into a recognised management discipline.  Practised widely by progressive 
business organisations, governments and leading militaries; the primary differences between 
business KM and public sector KM are arguably motive (profit vs. service delivery) and possibly 
the suite of KM processes that different government functions employ to deliver on their required 
service delivery objectives and products.  Typically also, KM models used by different 
governmental functions will vary for the same reason.  Militaries, being a critical component of 
public service due to their defence and national security mandate, will arguably have the most 
complex requirement for KM due to their mandate and organisational complexity.  In order to 
understand how KM fit into organisational strategy, the following KM characteristics shape its 
implementation success: 
 “Knowledge management is part of a long-term strategy and not a short-term solution; 
 knowledge management can be expensive; 
 part of the benefits created by knowledge management initiatives can be seen much later and is 
difficult to measure and thus justify the funds allocated to them;  
 [requires] strong support from top management [also Seemann, et al., 2000: 14]; 
 [must] contributes to achieving the goal of the organization; 
 … requires hybrid solutions that include people, business culture and technology; 
 … is a continuous process; and  
 knowledge is never managed fully, and sharing and using knowledge is not a natural activity in 
humans.” (Črnjar & Dlačić, 2014: 978-979). 
Yadav & Singh (2013) and several other writers are of the opinion that KM processes and 
infrastructure are also critical variables to KM success.  These will be discussed next in order to 
understand which of these are important from a KM model perspective. 
2.6.1 Leadership and Management  
“Leadership plays a key role in ensuring success in almost any initiative within an organization.” 
(Hasanali, 2002: 1). 
Management theory development focussed for decades on effective and efficient business 
process development (La Grange, 2006).  Changes in the current economic realities are challenging 
the status quo of several of the management theories.  KM, as a distinct management science, 
responds directly to changes in the economic realities, focussing on the management of knowledge 
as the primary resource for the establishment and maintenance of organisational survival and 
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advantage.  The successful implementation of KM initiatives is, however, contingent on clear 
leadership (Holsapple & Joshi, 2000b, Hasanali, 2002 and several authors in Berraies, et al., (2014).  
Management must be clearly separated from leadership as a construct.  Management is 
important from a process execution perspective whereas leadership is important to direct 
management efforts but also from an innovation perspective (i.e. first mover advantage).  Yadav 
and Singh (2013: 196-197) states that - 
“Managing people who are willing to create and share knowledge is [sic] crucial task and finding 
new sources of motivation to increase people participation in knowledge sharing is a real 
challenge for organizations (O'Dell & Grayson 1999; Migdadi 2005). … However, people will 
attempt to create new knowledge only if their organization has an environment that encourages 
forming T-shaped skills and provides a systematic management of these skills (Lee & Choi 2003; 
Migdadi, 2005)”. 
T-shaped skills are vital to knowledge creation and refer to - “… the degree of understanding 
by employees their own and others’ task areas … combine theoretical and practical knowledge and 
enlarge their ability by integrating varied knowledge assets, across numerous areas and therefore 
create new knowledge” (Lee & Choi, 2003 in Berraies, et al., 2014: 10).  These ideas are supported 
by several authors such as Shajera and Ahmed (2015). 
Management as a social construct is just as nebulous from a definitional perspective as is 
knowledge (Uit Beijerse, 1999).  In order to understand and apply KM, one needs to do the same 
for management.  Management is defined as - “… strategy-driven motivation and facilitation of 
people, aimed at reaching the organisational goals” (Uit Beijerse, 1999: 99).  The definition clearly 
identifies the requirement of HRM as well as planning.  It includes activities such as coordination 
and control as mentioned by Holsapple and Joshi (2000: 239).  Thus, when management as a 
construct is applied to knowledge as a construct then it translates into ‘strategy-driven motivation 
and facilitation of IC, to reach organisational goals’.  These goals are typically linked to effects 
and advantage in the broadest sense.   
Other tangible organisational resources do not manage or lead but are managed by people.  
For example, software and IT does not manage, but enable people to manage more efficiently and 
with enhanced sophistication, enabling decision-making, action, effects and advantage at all levels 
of the organisation.  Knowledge in itself does not manage or lead but is utilised by people to 
manage and lead.   
Nonaka, Toyama and Konno (2000) in Berraies, et al., (2014: 9) state that leadership - “… 
provide the knowledge vision, develop and promote sharing of knowledge assets, create and 
energise ‘ba’ and enable and promote the continuous spiral of knowledge creation”.  Thus, whereas 
management has an optimisation and performance focus; leadership has a development and 
innovation focus and is more dynamic- corresponding to the dynamic nature of knowledge.  The 
ultimate goal is to lead excellence in management. 
Marshal (2007) dedicates an entire study to state the important linkages between leadership, 
knowledge and KM.  Calabrese (2000: 37) in Marshal (2007: 11-12) states - “People want their 
leaders to set the tone, and create the management practices and organizational structures and 
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policies that will form a culture receptive to knowledge sharing and facilitated through technology 
tools and networks to achieve a learning-enabled enterprise.”.  Calabrese (2000) links several KM 
CSFs in the quote above – people management, leadership, organisational structures, policy, 
culture, technology and learning. 
Key leadership elements in the definition of management are “motivation” and “facilitation” 
(Uit Beijerse, 1999: 99). When considering Yukl’s (2006) definition of leadership, there is a 
common denominator in management (when defining management as above), leadership and KM; 
that is ‘people’.  
Holsapple and Joshi (2000: 241) state that - “This distinguishing characteristic of leadership is 
that of being a catalyst through such traits as inspiring, mentoring, setting examples, engendering 
trust and respect, instilling a cohesive and creative culture, listening, learning, teaching (e.g. 
through story-telling), and knowledge sharing.”.  Berraies, et al., (2014) provides empirical support 
for this statement.  The statement identifies clearly the relationship between organisational culture 
and learning organisations.  The statement also insinuates a particular leadership style.  
Politis (2001), Crawford (2005) and Migdadi (2005) in Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011); and 
Crawford (2005), Migdadi (2005), AL-Hakim and Hassan (2012) in Berraies, et al., (2014: 20) 
propose a distinct type of leadership – i.e. transformational leadership42 – as a CSF and enabler for
KM implementation.  Crawford (2005) in Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011: 96) states - 
“…transformational leadership styles leads to the creation of knowledge culture in the organization, 
which leads to successful implementation of KM processes and to more innovation”.  These 
elements are considered KM CSFs.  However, Berraies, et al., (2014: 20) found, contrary to the 
research done by AL-Hakim & Hassan (2012) and Kumar, Jain and Rajiv (2013), that 
transformational leadership only positively affect part of the knowledge creation process (i.e. 
socialisation and externalisation from SECI).  Bryant (2003) in Berraies, et al., (2014: 20) proposes 
transactional leadership
43
 to be appropriate for knowledge exploitation by organisations.   Thus,
KM champions within organisations will have to have a diverse set of leadership skills to cope. 
People lead, are lead, manage and are managed, and it is people that create and acquire 
knowledge and knowledge reside in people.  This makes leadership, management and HRM critical 
for KM success, based on the complex relationships between these activities.  Leadership is not just 
a case of personal style (transformational, transactional, etc.) but also one of organisational 
performance, for example, process leadership.  Singh (2008) propose arguments for a positive 
relationship between leadership style and advantage.  Trust and leadership are two concepts that are 
inseparable (Cloete, 2007) and are intrinsic elements of organisational culture, all posited as KM 
42
 “Transformational leadership can be seen when “leaders and followers make each other to advance to a higher level 
of moral and motivation” (Burns, 1978). Bass (1985) built on Burns (1978) work and described transformational 
leadership as a style of leadership that transforms followers to rise above their self-interest by altering their morale, 
ideals, interests, and values, motivating them to perform better than initially expected.”  (Keskes, 2014: online)  This is 
the type of leadership where leaders want to achive 1+1= 3 or more; or a total benefit greater than the sum of the 
contribution. 
43
 “Transactional leadership (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978) refers to a dynamic exchange between leaders and their 
subordinates, in which the leader establishes specific goals, monitors progress, and identifies rewards that can be 
expected upon goal achievement. It involves an exchange process between the leader and the followers, intended to 
increase followers’ compliance to the leader and to the organizational rules (Yukl, 1998).” (Ibid., online)  This type of 
leadership wants to achieve 1+1=2 or compliance. 
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CSF.  Cloete (2007) addresses the symbiotic KM-trust relationship in government.  Cloete (2007) 
posits (South Africa perspective) that KM will increase trust in government.   
Cloete (2007) proposes communication (by means of electronic media and IT) as the most 
appropriate means to manage this trust relationship, pointing to ICT as another important 
component of KM – discussed extensively later in the dissertation. Abdullah and Date (2009) 
reviewed the KM body of knowledge (from definitions to perspectives), after which they suggested 
a public sector KM model.  These writers draw heavily on authors such a Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(KM spiral), Drucker (management sciences) and even reach back to Plato.  One of these is the 
appointment of a Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO) and employing an integrated ICT 
infrastructure/architecture as KM enablers. 
Who leads KM then?  La Grange (2006) states that KM is perceived as a leadership 
responsibility and not everybody’s responsibility.  KM leadership and management best practices 
are the establishment and appointment of a CKO (King, Marks, & McCoy, 2002; Dayan, 2006 and 
King 2009), KM steering committees and change agents.  A CKO is essentially a product of the 
knowledge era (Webb, 2006).  A CKO has been appointed in many business organisations since the 
1990s’ to drive KM initiatives (Holsapple & Joshi, 1999 and Webb, 2006).  Holsapple and Joshi 
(2000: 236) state - “… more than 40% of Fortune 500 companies have chief knowledge officers 
[circa 1996]”. 
The position commonly known as CKO goes by various other names such as KM Champion, 
Director of Knowledge Networking and Futurist-in-Chief, pointing to the contextual nature of KM 
and how it should be lead.  It is critical for organisations to have a central position that is 
responsible for the successful implementation of KM initiatives (DeTienne, Dyer, Hoopes, & 
Harris, 2004: 36).  CKOs have the responsibility to convert - “KM theories into practice and 
delivering bottom line [sic] benefits from knowledge initiatives” (Webb, 2006: 268). Several 
articles have been published on the importance of a CKO in originations, stating their responsibility 
for KM strategy and implementation.   
A critical skill CKOs must possess is a clear understanding of ICT systems as KM enablers 
(Webb, 2006).  Most of all, and based on the understanding articulated by numerous writers that 
KM is about people, technology, processes and intangible issues such as organisational culture and 
leadership (DeTienne, et al., 2004); Webb, 2006), CKOs must be integrators of organisational IC 
distinctly aimed at enhancing the quality of decisions, action, effects and advantage.   For this, a 
hybrid transformational-transactional leadership style is proposed. 
More than often CKOs will have to drive organisational change programmes in order to 
change organisational culture, training regimes, leadership and management styles and possibly 
organisational structures in order to unlock the organisational knowledge potential. 
2.6.2 Knowledge Management Processes/Activities 
KM can only be implemented with action (activities or processes).  Implementation of KM 
processes as an organisational strategy is very important for organisational performance 
improvement (Tubigi, et al., 2013).  Most KM models focus on processes in a hierarchical format 
(Ďurišová, 2011).  Processes are action and effect based, i.e. processes cannot occur without some 
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sort of action, initiated by cycles of decision-making and action but with the desired effect in mind.  
Yadav and Singh (2013: 196) posit KM processes as a mechanism for -  
“… collecting and identifying useful information (i.e. knowledge acquisition), transferring tacit 
knowledge to explicit knowledge (i.e. knowledge creation or transfer), storing the knowledge in 
the repository (i.e. organizational memory), disseminating it through the whole organization (i.e. 
knowledge sharing), enabling employees to easily retrieve it (i.e. knowledge retrieval) and 
exploiting and usefully applying knowledge (i.e. knowledge leverage).”. 
“[K]nowledge is viewed as a process, then the implied KM focus is on the knowledge flow 
and the processes of creating, sharing, and distributing knowledge, if knowledge is viewed as an 
object, then KM should focus on the building and managing of knowledge stocks” (Alavi and 
Leidner (2001) in Tubigi, et al., 2013: 3).  Managing knowledge as a stock possibly defeat the 
purpose of KM.  Knowledge management seeks to leverage knowledge and gain an advantage, not 
merely hoarding or warehousing it.  Knowledge stocks can only be built and managed by means of 
KM processes, i.e. creating, sharing and using knowledge.  Thus, this dissertation approaches 
knowledge and KM with a process-view.   
Third generation KM (i.e. KM from the perspective of 2005 and beyond) focuses on KM 
processes as the keys to unlock the inherent potential of the management science (Tuomi (2002: 79 
in La Grange, 2006).  Currently, the KMI underwrites this approach, taught by the Institute 
internationally.  Of course, KM processes and activities are not automatically correlated with 
success and advantage.  KM processes and activities require leadership and specific culture to be 
effective (Alrubaiee, et al., 2015) – to be discussed later on in the dissertation. 
Malhotra (2003) brings the importance of action and processes closer to practice.  Malhotra 
(2003) states that knowledge has to be present for any form of value creation.  However, the mere 
presence of knowledge or existence of knowledge does not generate or guarantee value creation.  
Value can only be generated when there is some form of action (uni- or multilateral).  These actions 
need to be integrated into processes.   
This should not be confused with the work done by Jung, Choi and Song (2006: 21) 
describing - “… process-orientated” KM.  Jung, Choi and Song (2006) and various other writers 
support the importance of processes in order to manage knowledge; however, process-orientated 
KM refers to the knowledge inherent and/or generated by business processes.   As such, Jung, Choi 
and Song (2006) suggest an integrated architecture for process-orientated KM systems (KMS)
44
 and 
business process management systems that are important for the following discussions about KM 
enablers. 
There exists no finite list of KM processes and there is variation in agreement on core KM 
processes (Holsapple & Joshi, 2002b in Arthur, 2013: 3-4).  Since 2002, the level of agreement has 
                                                 
44
 “KM System: A KM system is the overall product produced when the KM process model is applied. It consists of a 
number of KM domains and according, defined KM processes that are linked with other organisational processes, and it 
incorporates tools and techniques to be used in these. This includes co-ordination processes for the tracking and 
possible modification of the operational processes. Thus, a KM system is a complex unit of different layers (co-
ordination processes and operational processes for each KM domain) dealing with the different aspects of KM: 
influencing culture, facilitating creation and sharing of knowledge, providing tools and methods, and monitoring KM 
processes.” (Kucza, 2001: 18-19) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 71 
 
improved.  Refer to Appendix B of the dissertation for a comprehensive (possibly not finite) table 
on KM processes.  As business and military operations grow, adapt and evolve – so do the 
processes that shape the collective actions that make operations possible.  KM processes are subject 
to this state of flux.  That said, several academics and writers agree on a number of KM processes.  
The researcher lists several authors and their predisposition towards certain perceived KM 
processes in Table 2.6.  Agreement on certain processes is quite evident.  Semantics and synonyms 
form a large part of the list.  The following is a compendium of KM processes and the authors that 
support them -  
Table 2.6: Knowledge Processes/Activities 
Activities/Processes Agreement Semantics/Synonyms 
Procure, organize, store, maintain, analyze, create, 
present, distribute and apply.  
Holsapple & Whinston (1987) in Arthur (2013: 3-4) 
Create, Organise Acquire.  Associated 
activities – procurement, 
importing and 
absorbing. 
Create.  Associated 
activities – 
development, 
synthesize, adapt, 
construction, combine, 
establishing, generate, 
socialise, internalise, 
combine, externalise, 
prototyping, 
embodiment. 
Secure.  Associated 
activity – protect. 
Organising.  Associated 
activities –  identifying, 
collect, capture, 
mobilization, diffusion, 
commoditization, 
codification, sense-
making, indexing, 
filtering, linking, 
screening, classification, 
cataloguing, 
interconnecting internal 
and external sources, 
inventories, hold, store, 
retrieve, evaluate, 
compare, process, 
consolidating, 
preservation, retention, 
integration, maintaining, 
archiving, 
translating/repurposing, 
access, refining, validate 
and disposal. 
Share.  Associated 
activities – distributing, 
Combining, distribution, generating and developing 
Wiig (1991) in Zhang (2013: 24) 
 
Survey, categorize, analyse, elicit, codify, organize, 
appraise, evaluate, value, synthesize, handle, use, 
control, leverage, distribute, automate, create, 
manifestation, and transfer.  
Wiig (1993) in Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 8 and 13) 
Create, Organise, 
Use 
Shared and creative problem solving.  
Importing and absorbing technological knowledge from 
the outside of the firm.  
Experimenting prototyping.  
Implementing and integrating new methodologies and 
tools.  
Leonard-Barton (1995) in Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 13) 
and Arthur (2013: 3-4) 
 
Sense-making (includes ‘‘information interpretation’’).  
Creation (includes ‘‘information transformation’’).  
Decision making (includes ‘‘information processing’’).  
Choo (1996) in Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 13) and Arthur 
(2013: 3-4) 
Create 
Share, create, identify, collect, adapt, organize and 
apply.  
Andersen & APQC (1996) in Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 
13) and Arthur (2013: 3-4) 
Share, Create, 
Organise 
Initiation (recognize knowledge need and satisfy that 
need).  
Implementation (knowledge transfer takes place).  
Ramp-up (use the transferred knowledge).  
Integration (internalize the knowledge).  
Szulanski (1996) in Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 13) and 
Arthur (2013: 3-4)  
Use 
Development (conceptualization, review, internalization, 
sharing). 
Use (storing, distributing, applying, reviewing). Taylor 
(1996) in Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 5) 
Share, Use 
Codify and measure  
Lundvall & Johnson (1994) in OECD (1996: 12) 
Measure 
Construction, embodiment, dissemination, use, retention 
and refinement.  
Use 
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Activities/Processes Agreement Semantics/Synonyms 
De Jarnett (1996) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) disseminating, transfer. 
Use.  Associated 
activities – apply, 
application, ramp-up, 
integration, applying, 
act, leverage. 
Measure. Associated 
activities – Evaluate, 
compare, assessing, 
appraise, auditing,   
 
Acquisition (knowledge creation and content 
development).  
Indexing, Filtering, Linking (screening, classification, 
cataloguing, integrating, and interconnecting internal 
and external sources), Distributing (packaging and 
delivery of knowledge in form of Web pages), 
Application (using knowledge). Alavi (1997) in 
Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 11) and Arthur (2013: 3-4) 
Acquire, Create, 
Use 
Knowledge economies (Construction, Dissemination, 
Embodiment, Use). (Demarest (1997) in Holsapple & 
Joshi, 1999: 5) 
Use 
Inventorise, analyse, plan, process, develop, distribute, 
combine, hold, evaluate, compare.  
Van der Spek and Spijkervet (1997) in Holsapple & 
Joshi (1999: 10 and 13) and Arthur (2013: 3-4) 
 
Review, conceptualise, reflect and act (act consist of 
acquisition, learning, distributing, combining, 
consolidating).  
Wiig (1997) in Ďurišová (2011: 48) 
Acquire 
Process or practice of creating, acquiring, capturing, 
sharing and use.  
Quintas et al. (1997) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Acquire, Create, 
Share, Use 
Creation, manifestation, use and transfer.  
Wiig (1998) in Arthur (2013: 3-4) 
Create, Use 
Generating, organizing, developing and distribution. 
Apostolou & Mentzas (1999) in Ďurišová (2011: 48) 
Organise 
Acquiring, selecting, generating, internalizing and 
externalizing.  
Holsapple & Joshi (2000: 237) 
Acquire 
Enhancement, share, sold, used, renew and productivity 
(generate superior business results). Seemann, et al. 
(2000: 5) 
Share, Use 
Generate, store, distribute and apply.  
Mertins, Heisig & Vorbeck (2001) in Zhang (2013: 24) 
 
Creation, integration and dissemination.  
Fischer & Ostwald (2001) in Ďurišová, (2011: 48) 
Create 
Creation, storage and sharing, as well as the related 
activities.  
Kucza, 2001: 16) 
Create, Share 
Creation, storage/retrieval, transfer and application. 
Alavi & Leidner (2001) in Ďurišová (2011: 48) 
Create 
Creation, sharing and distribution (process focus). Alavi 
& Leidner (2001) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Create, Share 
Building and managing of knowledge stock (object 
focus).  
Alavi & Leidner (2001) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
 
Creation, codification, transfer and application.  
Alavi & Leidner (2001) and Schwen, et al. (1998) in 
Zhang (2013: 25) 
Create 
Identifies, locates, creates or acquires, transfers, converts 
and distributes.  
Walters, 2002 in Shajera & Ahmed (2015: 89) 
Acquire, Create 
Creation/acquisition, modification, immediate use, 
archiving, transfer, translation/repurposing, user access, 
Acquire, Create, 
Use 
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Activities/Processes Agreement Semantics/Synonyms 
and disposal.  
Bergeron (2003) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 4) 
Acquiring, creating, sharing, capturing and using. 
Jashapara (2004) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Acquire, Create, 
Share, Use 
Acquisition.  
Yang & Wang (2004) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Acquire 
Storage, retrieval, diffusion and presentation, application 
and creation.  
Lettieri, et al. (2004) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Create, Organise 
Capturing (data entry, scanning, voice input, 
interviewing, brainstorming), organizing (cataloguing, 
indexing, filtering, linking, codifying), refining 
(contextualizing, collaborating, compacting, projecting, 
mining) and transfer (flow, sharing, alert, push).  
Awad & Ghaziri (2004) in Ďurišová (2011: 48) 
Organise, Share 
Creating, sharing, structuring, using, and auditing. 
Sağsan (2006) in Ďurišová (2011: 48) 
Create, Share, Use 
Generation, development, codification, storage, 
transferring, sharing and utilisation.  
Zaim (2006: 3) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Share, Use 
Capture, transfer, use, acquire, collaborate, integrate, 
experiment, create, generating, assessing, assemble, 
storage, facilitating, representing, embedding, 
application, conversion, exploit, measuring and 
protecting.  
Lee & Lee (2007: 23) (referencing several authors) 
Acquire, Create, 
Measure  
Creation, development, codification, storage, 
distribution, sharing and utilisation.   
Zaim, Tatoglu & Zaim (2007: 54) 
Create, Share  
Generation, development; codification, storage; transfer, 
sharing and utilization.  
Zaim, et al. (2007) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3)  
Share 
Create, share and utilise.  
Wu & Lee (2007) in Ďurišová  (2011: 45) 
Share, Create 
Creation, integration, accumulation, utilization, learning 
and sharing.  
Shieh-Cheih, Fu-Sheng, & Kuo-Chien, (2005) in Yadav 
& Singh (2013: 195) 
Create, Share 
Creation, codification, transfer and use.  
Draghici & Draghici (2008) in Ďurišová (2011: 48) 
Create, Use 
Creation (discovery, capture), storage (retention, 
organization), transfer (sharing, distribution), and 
use/maintenance.  
Ribière (2008) in Ďurišová (2011: 48) 
Create, Organise, 
Share, Use 
Creation, acquisition, refinement, storage, transfer, 
sharing and re-use 
Create, acquire, 
share 
Location, sharing, experiment and creation.  
Zack, et al. (2009) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Create, Share 
Acquisition, creation, storage, distribution, use and 
maintaining.  
Fong and Choi (2009) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Acquire, Create, 
Use 
Creation, use and transfer.  
Singh & Soltani (2010) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Use, Create 
Creating, organising, storing, sharing and utilising. AL-
Hakin & Hassan (2011: 953-954) 
Organise, Create, 
Share 
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Activities/Processes Agreement Semantics/Synonyms 
Capture, create, refinement, validate, codification, 
store/retrieve, access, distribution, sustain, update, 
application, organisation, retention, dissemination, 
utilisation and disposal  
Anand & Singh (2011: 935) 
Create, Organise, 
Creation and acquisition.  
Mills & Smith (2011) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Acquire, Create 
Creation.  
Mishra & Bhaskar (2011) in Tubigi, et al. (2013: 3) 
Create 
Identification, acquisition, transferring, storage, sharing 
and application.  
Zwain, Teong, & Othman, (2012) in Alrubaiee, Alzubi, 
Hanandeh & Ali (2015: 991) 
Acquire, Sharing 
Acquisition (collecting and identifying useful 
information). 
Creation or transfer (transferring tacit knowledge to 
explicit knowledge). 
Organisational memory (storing the knowledge in the 
repository). 
Sharing (disseminating it through the whole 
organization). 
Retrieval (enabling employees to easily retrieve it). 
Leverage (exploiting and usefully applying knowledge).  
Yadav & Singh (2013: 196) 
Acquire, Creation, 
Sharing,  
Creation, acquisition, modification, use, transfer, 
archiving, translating/repurposing, access and disposal. 
Yadav & Singh (2013: 199) 
Acquire, Creation, 
Use 
Creation, acquisition, modification, use, archiving, 
transfer, translation, user, access and disposal. Tubigi, et 
al. (2013: 2) 
Acquire, Creation, 
Use 
Acquisition, conversion, application, protection, storing. 
Shajera & Ahmed (2015: 90) 
Acquire 
Identification, acquisition, transfer, storage, sharing and 
application.  
Alrubaiee, Alzubi, Hanandeh, & Ali (2015: 992) 
Acquire, Sharing 
Adapted from Holsapple & Joshi (2002b) in Arthur (2013: 3-4) and expanded with views of several other 
writers. 
The mere listing of these processes does not provide insight into the complex interactions 
between these in order to achieve coherence and integrated KM.  However, flexibility in organising 
these processes are important to be able to cope with dynamic operational environments and the 
dynamic nature of knowledge.  Some authors also combine KM processes into so-called KM 
Lifecycle models.  Nissen, Kamel and Sengupta (2000: online) on the left and an adapted version by 
Jung, Choi and Song (2006: 23) on the right are two such models.  The cycles listed in Figure 2.11 
suggest all the processes involved in KM.  When considering the list in Table 2.6 this is clearly not 
the case.  The KM lifecycles are also prescriptive and lack flexibility.  For example, knowledge 
could be acquired, used immediately to create new knowledge and then only shared to be leveraged 
in an attempt to achieve an advantage.  Again, the semantics are clearly visible in Figure 2.11 below 
- 
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Figure 2.11: Knowledge Management Life Cycle 
Source:  Nissen, Kamel and Sengupta (2000: online) and Jung, Choi and Song (2006: 23).   
There are several other Knowledge Life Cycle models as discussed by Ďurišová (2011).  
Apart from the semantics inherent in the various proposed Knowledge Life Cycle elements, not all 
organisations will agree to a singular KM lifecycle.  It is the researcher’s view that core, 
organisation specific, KM processes should be identified that supports IC development and 
sustainment within each organisation and operational environments.  Core, organisation specific 
KM processes could then be supported with a portfolio of secondary KM processes as required and 
dictated by the complexity of evolving internal and external environments.  Some of the core, 
academically recognised, KM processes (keeping semantics in mind) are knowledge creation, - 
acquisition, - organising, - sharing and – use, derived from the list above.  These are not to be seen 
as a life cycle or hierarchy.  Knowledge and the management thereof are dynamic and require 
considerable flexibility and adaptability to facilitate space to leverage organisational IC in the quest 
for a desired effect and advantage.   
Based on earlier views as to the importance of knowledge vis-à-vis advantage, it would have 
been expected that the security (protection as a process) of knowledge would have been a recurring 
requirement.  This might be the case in reality, but not much is published about this.  Security 
and/or protection are only mentioned by a very limited number of academics and writers as a 
distinct process consideration.  This could possibly be a result of an IT/IM mindset assuming 
data/information/knowledge security or protection to be implicit in IT enablers, and/or other 
organisational policies or inherent in every KM process.  However, it is the contention of the 
researcher that without identifying knowledge protection as a distinct, core KM process - 
competitive advantage might be lost due to organisational knowledge vulnerabilities resulting from 
negligence and/or oversight.  The very recent events surrounding Wiki Leaks and Edward 
Snowden, widely published, are cases in point.  Consider the following list by Ďurišová (2011: 49) - 
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Table 2.7: Knowledge Life Cycles 
 
Source:  Ďurišová (2011: 49). 
For the purposes of this dissertation the following core KM processes, as distilled from 
discussion and assessment thus far in the dissertation are as follows -     
 Acquisition – focussed buying of IC at the right time, available to the right ‘ba’, in the most 
advantageous manner. 
 Creation – focussed development of IC at the right time, available to the right ‘ba’, in the most 
advantageous manner. 
 Organising – collective and focussed KM-related activities that ensure the sense-making, 
enhance understanding and new meaning based on available IC at the right time, available to the 
right ‘ba’, in the most advantageous manner.  
 Securing – collective and focussed KM-related activities that protect IC in the interest of gaining 
and sustaining advantage and delivering desired effects with due consideration for all other core 
KM processes.  
 Sharing – collective and focussed KM-related activities that ensure the transfer of IC at the right 
time, available to the right ‘ba’, in the most advantageous manner.  
 Use – collective and focussed KM-related activities, IC application and leveraging at the right 
time, available to the right ‘ba’, in the most advantageous manner.  
 Measure – collective and focused action through KM-related activities that seek to identify the 
level of impact of IC during the quest for desired effects and advantage. 
These will inform the construction of a conceptual SA DOD KM model.  Knowledge 
management architecture and CSF are important aspects for inclusion in a conceptual SA DOD KM 
model and will be discussed henceforth.   
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2.6.3 Knowledge Management Architecture, Infrastructure and Enablers 
Knowledge management infrastructure is proposed to be the spine of KM and an 
organisational mechanism for knowledge processes (Yadav & Singh, 2013).  KM architecture and 
infrastructure enables KM processes.  KM infrastructure consists of leadership, IC, organisational 
culture, organisational structure and technology (mostly IT) (Davenport & Völpel, 2001 in Zaim, 
Tatoglu & Zaim, 2007; Tiwana, 2000; Halawi, et al., 2005; Yadav & Singh, 2013).  The 
infrastructure components are visible in the discussion on IC earlier in the dissertation, the KM 
characteristics alluded to above and the KM CSF discussed hereafter.   
Berraies, et al. (2014) describes KM infrastructure elements as KM enablers.  Based on 
empirical research, Berraies, et al. (2014: 12) proposes a KM enablers theoretical model that 
includes organisational culture (trust, collaboration, learning and incentive or rewards), 
transformational leadership, organisational structure (decentralised and low formality), IT support 
and T-shaped skills.  These KM enablers are then distinctly linked to the SECI knowledge creation 
processes and posited to enhance organisational innovation capabilities.  The KM infrastructural 
components or KM enablers only really become functional when activities and processes are 
designed and implemented in support of organisational strategy execution.   
A very apt way to approach a more detailed discussion on the KM infrastructure is to consider 
KM CSFs because they involve consideration of both the KM infrastructure, a KM enabler’s 
perspective, activities and processes as well as allude to best practices.  Incidentally, there are 
uncanny similarities between KM CSFs, KM infrastructure and KM enablers.  In the researcher’s 
opinion, these are the fundamentals to successful KM. 
2.6.4 Knowledge Management Critical Success Factors & Related Best Practices 
During the past 15 years (at least) – KM CSF and best practices for successful KM 
implementation have been identified.  Knowledge management CSFs reveal the critical 
organisational components requiring closer investigation due to their perceived impact on 
organisational performance.  Closely related to KM CSFs and stemming from these factors are KM 
best practices.  This section touch on some of these CSF and best practices in support of SRQ 4 - 
How should the SA DOD manage its knowledge?   
In contrast, some academia tackles such a discussion from a KM barriers perspective (e.g. 
BenMoussa, 2009 and Črnjar & Dlačić, 2014).  This dissertation will consider KM barriers from a 
positive perspective, i.e. if an aspect is considered a KM barrier then from the opposite perspective 
it becomes a KM CSF.  For example, if a lack of IT infrastructure is a barrier to KM, then relevant 
IT infrastructure becomes a CSF.  The barriers to KM will thus not be discussed separately.   
Focussing the discussion on KM CSFs, Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011) and AL-Hakim and 
Hassan (2011) propose a number of KM CSFs in their studies based on the relationship between 
KM, innovation and organisational performance.  They identified seven commonly accepted KM 
CSFs as human resource management (HRM), IT, leadership, organisational learning, - strategy, - 
structure and - culture (Holsapple & Joshi (2000), Hassan & AL-Hakim, 2011: 95 and AL-Hakim & 
Hassan, 2011: 88). Alazmi and Zairi (2003) in Dayan (2006: 3-35) prioritise the KM CSF as 
sharing, technology infrastructure, top management support, knowledge strategy, training, culture, 
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transferring knowledge, creating knowledge and knowledge infrastructure.  The overlap is quite 
evident. 
AL-Hakim and Hassan (2011: 953-954) provide a tabulated academic framework to reinforce 
their opinion (refer to Appendix B to the dissertation).  Appendix B provides a summary of the 
fundamentals for successful KM implementation, combining those regarded as KM influencers, 
KM CSFs, KM enablers and best practices.  The researcher expands the table with the inclusion of 
several other academic references. 
Črnjar and Dlačić (2014), based on Holsapple and Joshi (2000), conducted empirical research 
on KM implementation barriers in the Croatian hospitality industry.  Črnjar and Dlačić (2014) state 
that most of the above-mentioned CSFs can be structured more concisely into categories of 
managerial-, resource - and environmental influence [Holsapple & Joshi, 2000: 239]; and that the 
most critical KM implementation barriers are found within “… methodology, technology, 
organization [also in  BenMoussa, 2009: 1492], and human capital [also in BenMoussa, 2009: 
1492]” and organisational culture (also Sveiby & Simmons, 2002 in Zaim, Tatoglu & Zaim, 2007).   
La Grange (2006) identified organisational culture (e.g. rule-based, knowledge-is-power, little 
or no incentives for knowledge sharing) as a key public sector KM inhibitor, especially when the 
culture hampers knowledge sharing.  Other factors identified by La Grange (2006) are –  
 confusion as to who is responsible for KM; 
 the bureaucratic and hierarchical structure of government departments slowing down 
communication and knowledge sharing/transfer;  
 complexity as a result of the governments’ large footprint exacerbating knowledge 
transfer/sharing challenges; 
 challenges regarding knowledge retention due to staff turn-over, churn and/or natural attrition;  
 funding models that affect initiatives such a KM; 
 information securitisation;  
 measurement of KM initiatives; and 
 confusing KM with ICT management or other forms of IM and technology implementation.   
Arora (2011: 165) identifies a number of challenges facing public sector KM, notably - “… 
driving efficiencies across all public services; improving accountability; making informed 
decisions; enhancing partnerships with stakeholders; capturing the knowledge of an ageing 
workforce, and; improving overall performance.”. These perceived challenges to KM closely match 
KM CSF.  Appendix B provides substantive support for the stated KM CSFs grouped according to 
their influence (i.e. managerial, resource and environmental in Holsapple and Joshi, 2000: 238).  A 
graphical display of how the perceived KM CSFs and their influences interact to produce 
organisational learning and projections of the future is depicted in Figure 2.12. 
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Figure 2.12: Knowledge Management Influencers 
Source:  Holsapple and Joshi (2000: 238). 
A government department or business embarking on the implementation of KM should be 
well versed in the impact of these CSFs.   It simplifies and structures the understanding of where 
KM affects organisations.  KM CSFs cannot be separated into silos and managed as such because 
they influence each other significantly and differently depending on the organisation type, i.e. 
structured for innovation or bureaucracy.  This brings complexity theory into the discussion, which 
influences how leadership will be attempted and what culture should be established to execute the 
organisational strategy successfully.  Integration is pivotal to these processes.   With leadership and 
management as constructs discussed already in section 2.1 above, let us delve into other CSF and 
best practices for KM.     
2.6.4.1 Organisational Culture 
Several authors
45
 position organisational culture vital to successful KM.  Zaim, Tatoglu and 
Zaim (2007: 55) make the point that - “One of the most important and challenging aspects of KM is 
to enhance the development of a collaborative, trustworthy, emphatic and helpful organizational 
                                                 
45
 Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Skyrme, 1999 and Hauschild et al., 2002 in Zaim, Tatoglu & Zaim, 2007; Hassan & AL-
Hakim, 2011; Yadav & Singh, 2013; Berraies, et al., 2014 and De Nadae & Monteiro de Carvalho, 2017; and several 
others. 
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culture”.  Hasanali (2002: 2) defines culture as - “… the combination of shared history, 
expectations, unwritten rules, and social customs that compel behaviors.  It is the set of underlying 
beliefs that, while rarely exactly articulated, are always there to influence the perception of actions 
and communications of all employees”. Park, Ribière, and Schulte (2004) in Hassan and AL-Hakim 
(2011: 96) include - “… share basic assumptions” and the fact that organisational culture is used as 
an enabler to resolve challenges resulting from initiatives to integrate with external and internal 
business environments.  
Human factors are pivotal to both KM and the establishment and maintenance of 
organisational culture
 46
.  BenMoussa (2009: 1493) states that the - “… fundamental barrier to
motivating people to participate in KM efforts is corporate culture”.  Berraies, et al. (2014: 6-7), 
based on several authors, adds collaboration, learning and incentives or rewards as critical enablers 
within the organisational culture.  Leadership style has a large impact on how this is achieved, 
which will be briefly discussed later.  Hasanali (2002) is of the opinion that organisational culture 
will hamper KM initiatives due to the perception of a time constraints to do work as well as KM; 
organisational reward systems that are not aligned with KM CSF; lack of a common organisational 
vision and KM vision; and a lack of communicating organisational KM vision, what is being 
implemented and success stories. 
For some academics, the question of the importance of organisational culture is directly 
linked to the strategic question of how to make culture work for KM and its implementation 
(Hassan & AL-Hakim, 2011).  Zaim, Tatoglu and Zaim (2007: 55) contextualise the importance of 
organisational culture with the following statement - 
“It is because knowledge is a context-dependent social concept (Lang, 2001 [and BenMoussa, 
2009]) and a large part of organizational knowledge is embodied in social processes, institutional 
practices, traditions and values (Fayard, 2003; Boisot, 1998).  Therefore, no matter how 
powerful the tools and functions of KM are, it is of no use without willing participants and a 
supportive social and cultural environment (Koulopoulos and Frappaolo, 1999, [BenMoussa, 
2009]).”. 
Let us now consider the relationship between organisational learning and KM; as a KM 
enabler within the context of organisational culture. 
2.6.4.2 Organisational Learning 
There is a dependence of KM on learning, management, IC and strategy.  Seemann, et al. (2000: 9) 
is of the opinion that – “… effective organizational learning is the result of explicit management 
efforts to build [IC] in support of the firm’s strategy. Learning must be aligned with the current 
business strategy to ensure that knowledge being acquired supports future needs, instead of simply 
building on historical practices and strengths.”.  Lytras and Pouloudi (2006) concluded that the ability 
of organisations to learn is directly related to KM effectiveness.  Thus, KM infrastructure must be 
integrated with learning infrastructure and ICT applications to facilitate knowledge performance.  
Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011) found wide recognition for the linkage between organisational 
learning and enhanced organisational performance.  The Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011) study also 
46
 Park, et al., 2004 and Al-Alawi, Al-Marzooqi & Mohammed, 2007. 
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found a positive correlation in the relationship between KM, innovation and organisational 
performance.  This positive correlation is important for any organisation that bases its advantage 
and growth on innovation.  Lόpez-Cabrales, Pérez-Luño and Cabrera (2009) in Hassan and AL-
Hakim (2011) and López, Peón and Ordás (2004) in Berraies, et al. (2014) believe that there is a 
positive linkage between organisational learning and KM and that organisational performance will 
be further enhanced if there is integration between the organisational culture, -learning and KM.  It 
can thus be safely assumed that there will also be some linkages between learning, organisational 
performance, organisational culture, innovation and KM. 
The link between learning and practice is illustrated by Hill (2005) who explores some 
interesting concepts relevant to the international business environment.  One of the concepts is 
labelled, learning curve effects of organisational learning.  This proposes that learn-by-doing will 
influence productivity or performance.  Learning curve effects result in enhanced performance and 
productivity due to skill and know-how (sub-sets of IC) development through repetition.    
To learn, information and knowledge must be present.  The ‘ba’ relevant to each cluster of 
information and/or knowledge that impact organisational performance must, therefore, be known 
and structurally mapped.  A primary organisational learning best practice is a construct named, 
communities of practice.  Hasanali (2002) states that the President of the World Bank was 
instrumental in the establishment of communities of practice throughout the World Bank.  The 
technique is also widely used by the USA military as best practice.  
Hasanali (2002) states that best practice organisations have responsible steering committees 
that provide the strategic guidance and direction of KM initiatives.  Hasanali (2002) states that best 
practice organisations have knowledge owners or functionaries that act as change agents to drive the 
acceptance, training, KM vocabulary sharing and implementation of KM initiatives.  They typically 
spearhead integrative approaches to KM.  However, organisations can employ as many best 
practices as possible; without a learning culture, the efforts to grow the organisational knowledge 
will be less than optimal.  The same can be said of leadership. Let us now consider the impact of 
organisational leadership and management on the implementation of KM. 
2.6.4.3 Ethics, Legal and Security Considerations 
An aspect highlighted by Webb (2006) that is missing from most narratives about KM is legal 
and ethical considerations.  Holsapple and Joshi (2000: 254) asked questions about KM and ethics 
in a 2000 study.  Webb (2006: 269) states that CKOs - “… need to have an understanding of the 
legal and ethical environment within which KM must operate.  Issues such as data protection, 
corporate governance, freedom of information, confidentiality and privacy need to be borne in 
mind”.  Webb (2006) thus link KM ethics to the knowledge protection or security.  This aspect of 
KM receives very little attention in KM literature.  Holsapple and Joshi (2000: 240) state in this 
regard, with emphasis on knowledge security and protection as part of knowledge control - 
“Control is concerned with ensuring that needed knowledge resources and processors are 
available in sufficient quality and quantity, subject to required security.  Two critical issues here 
are protection of and quality of knowledge resources.  Protecting knowledge resources from loss, 
obsolescence, unauthorized exposure, unauthorized modification, and erroneous assimilation is 
crucial for the effective management of knowledge.  Approaches include legal protection (e.g. 
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patents, copyrights), social protection (e.g. hiring people who can blend with the current culture 
and help sustain current values and norms), and technological protection (e.g. security 
safeguards).”. 
This quote from Holsapple and Joshi (2000) above is one of the very few that expresses the 
criticality of knowledge security/protection.  From the ethics discussion above, a question is raised; 
is ethics another key component in KM so often missed because of knowledge commoditisation?  
Should ethics be a key component of an SA DOD KM model and/or should it be linked to the 
security component of KM for militaries?  
2.6.4.4 Organisational Strategy  
There are as many writers on strategy as there are strategies and strategists.  Strategy refers to 
the Greek word ‘strategia’, meaning ‘generalship’.  The origin is from the Greek words ‘stratos’ 
meaning army - and ‘ag’ meaning to lead.  David (2007: 26) refers to the “strategos”, which 
Melvin (2010: 6) describes as Greek for ‘general’ – the person that would execute strategy.  This is 
just the early verbalisation of the construct of strategy.  However, strategy formulation and 
application can be traced as far back as Sun Tzu in his work - The Art of War – 500BC (Grant, 
2005: 14 and Melvin, 2010: 6).   
Melvin (2010: 5) quotes Sullivan and Harper stating that strategy is essentially an intellectual 
construct providing linkages between current and future dispositions in substantive ways.  In other 
words, a strategy is a plan to unlock the desired future and measured for impact.  If that desired 
future is some form of an advantage then a strategy is a means to achieve competitive advantage or 
military advantage with. Strategy is also perceived as a KM resource (Holsapple & Joshi, 2000). 
Knowledge management must be integrated into an organisational strategy for successful 
results.  Knowledge management is not an island in an organisation, but a method to achieve an 
advantage with (BenMoussa, 2009: 1495).  Supporting the view of BenMoussa - Tubigi, et al. 
(2013) states -“… enhancing and cultivating the individual knowledge of members of an 
organisation is a clear strategy for developing a continuous organisational learning that can lead to 
better performance (Nonaka, 1998; O’Dell and Grayson, 1998).”.   From a strategy perspective, KM 
is positioned to enable or enhance innovation, product and service improvement, decision-making 
and organisational flexibility and adaptability (Earl, 2001 in Zhang, 2013) and exploits 
organisational IA (Lytras & Poudouli (2006).  These are all key elements of organisational strategy. 
Organisational knowledge (structural capital) and knowledge inherent in its people (human 
capital) is critical for organisational survival and advantage.  This makes KM strategy a necessity 
for the organisation.  This view has broad academic support (refer to Appendix B of the 
dissertation.  Seemann, et al. (2000: 9) states that KM strategy may include for example – “… 
hiring new talent, designing joint projects, implementing job rotations, and altering organizational 
structures to facilitate the flow of the new knowledge between existing and new businesses.”.  
These activities are easily linked to organisational survival or advantage.  Strategy also has strong 
links with other KM CSFs such as organisational leadership and culture.  
Hall, et al. (2007) uses a very sophisticated philosophical argument to link knowledge to time 
(or the time value of knowledge).  What these authors essentially say is that knowledge for 
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decision-making becomes increasingly irrelevant or useless as time passes beyond a certain 
decision-making point.  This view is supported by Alrubaiee, et al. (2015) and other writers that 
support the requirement for knowledge ‘at the right time’ (Savage, 1996), discussed earlier in the 
dissertation.   
This perceived depreciation of knowledge value relative to a particular situation and/or 
decisions negatively affect the ability of strategy crafting and/or execution and will invariably 
hamper leadership and management.  The same argument can be cascaded down to operational and 
tactical levels of decision-making – which incidentally is the foundation for strategy execution.   
 
Figure 2.13: Level and Relationships of Policy and Strategy 
Source:  Melvin (2010: 11). 
Knowledge time value is therefore very relevant to advantage and survival and highlight the 
requirement for integrated KM and KM being integrated into organisational strategic management, 
planning and execution to ensure available knowledge is exploited optimally at the most opportune 
time. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
There is a difference between business and the military in at least the motive for crafting and 
applying the strategy.  Business strategy drives enhanced profitability, market penetration, increased 
market segment, market domination, exploitation of competitive advantage, etc. (Grant, 2005). 
Military strategy drives the achievement of governmental policy goals, which is set at the national 
strategic level (Melvin, 2010: 7) and departmental goals set at the strategic level. The relationship 
between the different levels of strategy from the perspective of national security, the military being 
an important contributor, is depicted in Figure 2.13 above, adapted from Melvin (2010).  Policy 
typically follows the same logic.  Liddell Hart’s understanding of military strategy is that it is the art 
of military distribution and application to attain policy objectives (Melvin, 2010: 6). 
To practice this art successfully the strategist requires much knowledge (or IC) as well as 
have access to relevant knowledge (time value of knowledge argument), with a high refresh rate 
(constant new knowledge that informs new meaning and understanding).  This underlines the 
importance of KM and for most, a clear understanding of organisational specific knowledge (i.e. 
organisations should clearly define what is understood as knowledge or coherence).  For this reason, 
the researcher delved into SA DOD policy to ascertain what is understood as knowledge and how 
this is managed by the SA DOD (dissertation Chapters 5 and 6). 
The KM strategist, embodied in the CKO, is instrumental to establish coherence and 
integration of organisational knowledge and KM both in KM and organisational strategy.  This can 
only be achieved with a vivid understanding of the strategic environment and the organisational IC 
available.  If achieved, strategic fit is the result; with advantage for the taking.  Depending on the 
requirement that is dictated by both internal and external environmental factors, strategies can be 
static or very flexible.  The researcher supports KM strategies that are flexible and adaptive 
conforming to the dynamic nature of knowledge and the complexity of business and military 
environments.  Beinhocker (1999) provides views on robust adaptive strategies, drawing on 
arguments raised by Brown and Eisenhardt (1998).  These writers regard flexibility and 
adaptiveness as very important to strategy execution in complex environments.  Therefore, with 
complexity in mind, KM strategies for militaries should be flexible and adaptive.   
Musimwa-Makani (2012: 25) citing Malhotra (2000) and Allee (2003) – the conversion of 
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge seems to be very complex and ipso facto the understanding 
of complexity theory being a requirement.  Axelrod and Cohen (2000) and Caldart and Ricart 
(2004) write on the impact of complexity on organisations.  Complexity is typically a by-product of 
huge volumes of data, information and knowledge or results in the enormous volumes of data, 
information and knowledge requiring further processing to enable decisions, actions, effects and 
advantage.  Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) argue that there is a fine line between chaos and 
bureaucracy and that this line can be managed with the right amount of organisational complexity. 
In order to compete, organisations must adopt the appropriate level of adaptiveness within 
organisational structure and process to eliminate organisational paralysis due to excessive- or 
inadequate structuring, that is, choose the right amount of complexity that facilitate knowledge 
flow.  Complexity plays an important part in structuring the organisation correctly to have 
knowledge flow to improve productivity, performance, advantage and overall synergy. Strategy in 
all business/military areas is the vehicle with which to attain flexibility and adaptiveness.  Let us 
now consider the impact of organisation structure on the implementation of KM. 
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2.6.4.5 Organisational Structure 
Strategy execution is dependent on an organisational structure. An organisational structure is 
essentially the architecture of organisations designed around vision, strategy, leadership, control, 
functionality and the environment.  It should be constructed to unlock advantage.  
Organisational structure characteristics that facilitate or enhance KM are those that -“… 
encourage team spirit at work and increase exchange of the ideas with low degree of formalization 
and a decentralization of the decision making process” according to Zheng, Yang and McLean 
(2010) and Gold, Malhotra and Segars (2001) in Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011: 96) and several 
references cited in Yadav and Singh (2013).  Yadav and Singh (2013) and Claver-Cortés, Zaragoza-
Sáez and Ortega (2007) in Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011) support the view that KM initiatives 
require flexible organisational structuring.  This follows the logic discussed above on the 
management of complexity and knowledge flow.  This points to why KM is difficult to implement 
in bureaucratic organisations. 
Hasanali (2002), Chen and Huang (2007) and Yadav and Singh (2013) support the division of 
organisational structure into elements that reinforce formalisation, those that reinforce 
decentralisation and yet others that enhance integration.  They conclude that KM processes greatly 
enhance total organisational integration (or at least strive to achieve this).  Also, bureaucratic 
characteristics such as centralisation and formalisation (typically found in public service 
organisations) do not enhance KM processes such as knowledge creation and flow. Thus, the 
organisational structure must support all KM CSFs in an integrated manner. 
Structure implies a degree of integration amongst the structural components.  Integrated KM 
(i.e. integrating knowledge processes and business processes) is identified as a key driver of 
innovation, sustainability and efficiency.
47
  Grant (1996a) is of the opinion that competitive 
advantage is unlocked through integrated KM and not just the presence of knowledge.  Grant 
(1996a) proposes a Knowledge-based Theory of an organisation (discussed later in the dissertation).  
This is grounded in the idea of knowledge integration as the centre of organisational capability 
building.  Seemann, et al. (2000: 6) proposes that IC integration (i.e. human-, structural- and 
social/relational capital) is fundamental to knowledge creation and KM.   
Riempp and Smolnik (2007: 4) state that KM integration stems from the activities or levers 
used to achieve required solutions.  One of the most important KM levers is exchange or transfer of 
knowledge between individuals (this process is also central to the SECI model for knowledge 
creation).  This exchange of information has a direct impact on what Riempp and Smolnik (2007) 
proposed as the primary levers for integrated KM, which in their opinion are content, competence, 
collaboration and culture.  The dissertation discusses this model later.  The model highlights the 
importance of integration. 
Al-Alawi, Al-Marzooqi and Mohammed (2007) in Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011: 96) state 
that an -“… organizational structure characterized by participative decision making, ease of 
information flow and cross-functional teams contribute positively to support knowledge sharing.”.  
These characteristics all point to a particular style of leadership as well as business process 
                                                 
47
 Grant, 1996a; Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Riempp and Smolnik, 2007; Lee, Tsai and Amjadi, 2012. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 86 
 
integration.  These characteristics should be incorporated into organisational structure design in 
order to facilitate and/or enhance KM performance.  They also require a certain organisational 
culture without which the structural design will probably follow mechanistic design principles 
resulting in bureaucracies with low levels of flexibility, adaptability, responsiveness that will 
hamper the ability to innovate (or generate new knowledge).  Let us now consider measurement as a 
KM CSF.  
2.6.4.6 Measurement 
To measure is to know.  This statement is based on the opinion of Lord Kelvin (1883) – 
 “I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, 
you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in 
numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of 
knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of Science, whatever 
the matter may be.” (Wood, 2015: online). 
Measuring knowledge is close to the objectivist approach to KM.  To be frank, to measure 
knowledge is very difficult, especially if it is tacit.  However, from an organisational performance 
perspective, two dimensions (at least) need measuring, namely how KM affects organisational 
performance and how KM is performing (Holsapple & Joshi, 2000 and Hasanali, 2002) within the 
context of knowledge resources valuation (human, knowledge, material and finance) and processors 
(human and technological) (Holsapple & Joshi, 2000).  Črnjar and Dlačić (2014) also identified a 
requirement for KM success measurement indicators.  Thus, measurement will assist the 
organisation to plot the course, monitor, adjust or initiate action in each KM CSF to attain better 
KM effects and overall organisational performance. 
Some KM models include measurement as a distinct part.  The Inukshuk KM model (Girard, 
2004) is one such model (see KM models later in the dissertation).  In the following section 
resource influences on the successful implementation of KM in organisations are discussed.  Human 
resources and IT are two distinct resources that enable KM. 
2.6.4.7 Human Resource Management  
Črnjar and Dlačić (2014) view HRM as the most important KM CSF.  Why?  Knowledge is 
about people. Yadav and Singh (2013: 196) referencing a number of writers - summarise their 
opinion as - “People are at the core of creating organizational knowledge”.  Because knowledge is 
inherent in people, the management of people and KM are Siamese twins. Teece (2000) in 
Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 87) states that “Managing knowledge is not the same as managing human 
resources – it is more multi-faceted than simply managing people; it also involves managing 
intellectual property rights and the development and transfer of individual and organizational know-
how”. 
People are also the leaders of KM.  In fact, every part of IC is created, influenced or used by people.  
Even KM enablers such as IT is created and used by people. 
Tiwana (2000) in Zaim, Tatoglu and Zaim (2007) and several other writers recognise people 
as human capital (as part of the IC construct).  Hassan and AL-Hakim (2011: 95) refer to an article 
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written by Chen and Huang (2009) stating - “HRM practices are essential to capture and support 
employee’s knowledge and skills [human capital] that an organisation needs”.  HRM is a strategic 
organisational activity to harness human capacity (Svetlik & Stravrou-Costea, 2007 and Hassan & 
AL-Hakim, 2011).  This is in agreement with the earlier conclusion in the dissertation, that people 
are a critical (if not pivotal) component in understanding both knowledge and the management 
thereof.   
Wiig (1999b) is of the opinion that KM is important to be able to deal with how people in the 
organisation think.  BenMoussa (2009) states that the motivation of people to participate in KM 
activities (such as sharing knowledge) is critical, but challenging (Yadav & Sing, 2013), before 
even considering IT solutions.  It is for this reason that particular styles of leadership (as discussed 
above) are KM CSF. 
A barrier to KM when considering the management of people is that of knowledge sharing – 
without which knowledge conversion and generation are inhibited (Hassan & AL-Hakim, 2011).  
Knowledge usually starts with individuals and after a conversion process (suggested by the SECI 
knowledge conversion model) ends with individuals before a new conversion cycle begins. The 
availability and use of IT, organisational culture, leadership, strategy and structure play an 
important part in this conversion process, ipso facto, the requirement for coherent and integrated 
KM.  Let us now consider the relationship between finance and KM. 
2.6.4.8 Knowledge Management and Finance 
As with any other business requirement, funding is always required.  From a KM perspective 
- “Firms are increasingly investing in [IC], but the process of deciding where and how to invest 
remains relatively undisciplined, resulting in disappointing returns and wasted resources.” 
Seemann, et al. (2000: 9).  This was probably one of the situations during the period of ‘peak of 
inflated expectations (mid- to late 1990s) and trough of disillusionment (early 2000s) as posited by 
Riempp and Smolnik (2007: 3) 
Thus, funding the correct initiatives is paramount for KM success.  Such funding needs 
careful management to ensure no leakages occur to the broader organisation when financial 
resources become constricted.    KM funding can be managed centralised by the CKO or distributed 
by various business component managers.  Centralised funding of a KMC is the preferred option to 
ensure no syphoning occurs.  Also, to ensure KM funding does not become the organisational purse 
for IT requirements. 
2.6.4.9 Knowledge Management Systems and Information Technology 
Based on the discussion earlier outlining the definitional issues differentiating information 
and knowledge and the fact that these two concepts are used interchangeably; thát disagreement 
permeates the development and application of what is known as KMS and IT.  KMS are posited as 
IT that is employed to - “… systematize, enhance and expedite intra and inter firm [sic] knowledge 
management (Alavi and Leidner, 1999)” (Halawi, et al., 2005: 77). 
Knowledge management systems refer to a class of information systems applied to managing 
organizational knowledge. Knowledge management systems are invariably IT-based systems 
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developed to support and enhance the organizational processes of knowledge creation, 
storage/retrieval, transfer and application (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). Knowledge management 
systems address both the past and the future since they focus on problem-solving, they support both 
tacit and explicit knowledge, they should support both objective and subjective aspects, they are 
highly dependent on Internet-based technologies, and they enable the sharing of knowledge 
throughout the organization (Wickramasinghe, 2003). 
Knowledge management systems are categorised as integrative instruments, interactive 
instruments, integrative systems and interactive systems (Zhang, 2013: 24), explained as follows 
based on the work of Maier and Remus (2002) - 
Table 2.8: Knowledge Management System and Information Technology 
Integrative instruments Best practices, lessons learned, and content management, etc. 
Interactive instruments Yellow pages, expert networks, skills directories, and communities, etc. 
Integrative systems  Knowledge repositories, meta-search systems, knowledge discovery and 
mapping, etc. 
Interactive systems Collaboration, knowledge transfer and e-learning push-oriented systems, 
community builders, etc. 
Adapted from Zhang (2013: 24). 
“Advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) allow knowledge-based 
systems to utilize the tacit and explicit knowledge within an organization and afford greater 
possibilities for individuals and organizations to create and to share that knowledge [Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001 and Schwen, et al., 1998)].” (Zhang, 2013: 24).  It is widely recognised48 that IT 
enables IM and subsequently KM, primarily through the use of computing applications, databases, 
decision-support systems, information security and other instruments, applied in a balanced manner 
(Zhang, 2013; Yadav & Singh, 2013; Črnjar & Dlačić, 2014) to make explicit knowledge 
accessible.  These are typically integrative systems with interaction in mind.  Many authors
49
 
support the position that the use of IT enables KM primarily because of its integrative and 
interactive (e.g. facilitating SECI) capabilities mentioned above.  Many organisations, however, 
place too much emphasis on IT, to the point that IT is professed to be KM. Schwab (2016: online) 
states -  
“… governments will gain new technological powers to increase their control over populations, 
based on pervasive surveillance systems and the ability to control digital infrastructure. On the 
whole, however, governments will increasingly face pressure to change their current approach to 
public engagement and policymaking, as their central role of conducting policy diminishes 
owing to new sources of competition and the redistribution and decentralization of power that 
new technologies make possible.”. 
Thus, although new technology, typically in the form of IT, enables control – these 
technologies also erodes interaction with people which is central to KM.  Mortensen (2014: 3) states 
                                                 
48
 Thierauf, 1999; Hasanali, 2002; La Grange, 2006; Lytras & Pouloudi, 2006; Onyancha & Ochola, 2006; Raghu & 
Vinze, 2007; Zaim, Tatoglu & Zaim, 2007; BenMoussa, 2009; Hassan & AL-Hakim, 2011, Zhang, 2013. 
49
 Davenport and Prusak, 1998 and Binney, 2001 in Zaim, Tatoglu & Zaim, 2007; BenMoussa, 2009; Črnjar & Dlačić, 
2014. 
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– “Knowledge Management is a people-centric process; the technical systems enable the 
Knowledge Management process, but cannot be the focus of it”. 
Seemann, et al. (2000: 5 and 9) states that management invests vigorously in IT in the hope 
that it will result in enhanced structural capital and knowledge sharing, and thus sell IT as KM.  
“[O]ur research has shown that executives often invest in information technology hoping that by 
creating structural capital people will share knowledge. But the only result is many databases that 
no one uses.”  Seemann, et al., (2000: 9). A common example of this is the misguided assumption 
that merely implementing shared databases or document repositories will enhance the creation 
and/or use of knowledge. A clear failure of the objectivist approach to KM. 
In fact, BenMoussa (2009) is of the opinion that the over-emphasis of IT usage makes IT a 
barrier to an effective KMS.  Hasanali (2002: 3) summarises this misperception very eloquently – 
“A KM initiative is not a software application; having a platform to share information and to 
communicate is only part of a KM initiative.”.  BenMoussa (2009) articulates this CSF further by 
stating that KMS must be integrated with every aspect of the organisation (especially across all IC 
components – Seemann, et al., 2000) in order to be effective. 
No matter what your particular disposition is towards the use of IT – IT and the use thereof is 
not KM.  Information technology is, however, a critical KM enabler in the current business 
environment, enabling decision-making, knowledge conversion and sharing.  In the military, IT 
accelerate the application of what is known as Boyd’s OODA loop (Figure 2.14 and 6.4) - thus 
providing decision-makers (corporate and operations) with first mover advantage.  Modern-day 
computing and related technology greatly enhance the reaction and decision cycles.  Several 
references are made to the OODA loop throughout this dissertation and are developed into further 
graphics that integrate the knowledge continuum, the OODA loop and time. 
 
Figure 2.14: Boyd’s OODA Loop 
Source:  Tremblay (2015: 7). 
Hasanali (2002: 3) lists common IT platforms (which support process integration), simple 
technology (in order to make the use of enablers less complex) and adequate training (supporting 
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knowledge sharing and the construction of vocabularies and networks) as some of the critical 
elements to the success of IT enablers.   
The use of the label ‘KM system’ (also defined earlier in the dissertation based on the work of 
Kucza (2001) is the stumbling block.  As soon as the word ‘system’ comes into play organisations 
tend to think and understand ‘IT’ or ‘ICT’.    Thus, the researcher proposes that organisations 
should rather use the label ‘knowledge management capability’ (or KMC) when referring to a 
KMS.  This construct is much broader in its application and not just technology based.  Information 
technology and related systems will always be a part of the organisational architecture and are 
designed for a specific purpose – to process and manage data, information and knowledge.  To try 
and distinguish between IT and KMS is perilous because of the nature of the constructs 
(information and knowledge) and because knowledge is dynamic and the product of a continuum 
rather than a hierarchy.  A KMC includes all the aspects discussed above as KM CSFs in an 
integrated manner.  The researcher is for this reason in favour of the establishment of an SA DOD 
KMC rather than a KMS. 
From a military perspective – the USA Army states as a priority task related to their KM 
initiatives – “Capitalize on Knowledge Management capability to generate collaboration and 
teamwork that promotes shared understanding of Commander intent, reduces decision making 
complexity and provides best in class customer service.” (Weeks, 2016: slide 4).  This confirms the 
contention by the researcher that the preferred way forward is a KMC.  Appendix A provides an 
extended list of academic support for the various KM infrastructure CSF.  These are considered 
fundamentals for successful KM.  
The following sections will take a closer look at KM models that incorporate many of the 
aspects discussed above.  The discussion on KM models provides the constructs that inform the 
proposed KM model for the SA DOD.  With respect to SRQ 4 – a KM model for the SA DOD; the 
KM model proposed by the researcher in chapter 8 of the dissertation is a descriptive model (i.e. 
describing the broad framework applicable to KM for the SA DOD) but specifically designed for 
the SA DOD environment.  A broader application could possibly be achieved through adaptation of 
the model to include, for example, specific external stakeholders. 
2.7 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT MODELS 
There are several existing KM models, described by or summarised by as many writers.  
Some of these are: Knowledge Management Pillars (Wiig, 1993); Socialisation, Externalisation, 
Combination and Internalisation model for knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994; and Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995); Core Capabilities and Knowledge Building (Leonard-Barton, 1995); Model of 
Organizational Knowledge Management (Andersen (1995); Model of Knowledge Transfer 
(Szulanski, 1996); Model of Intellectual Capital (Petrash, 1996); Framework of the Knowing 
Organization (Choo, 1996); Framework of Intangible Assets (Sveiby, 1997); Knowledge Value 
Chain (Weggeman, 1997); Model of Knowledge Management Process (KPMG Peat Marwick, 
1997); Framework of Knowledge Management Stages (Van der Spek & Spijkervet (1997); ‘ba’ 
concept (Nonaka and Konno, 1998); Knowledge Management Strategy Focus Areas (Wiig, 1999b); 
Conceptual Knowledge Management Model (Uit Beijerse, 1999); KM Lifecycle (Nissen, Kamel & 
Sengupta, 2000: online) and adapted by Jung, Choi and Song (2006); Philosophy-based model, 
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Cognitive model, Network model, Community model and Quantum model - meta-models for KM 
(Kakabadse, et al., 2003: 80-85); Inukshuk Knowledge Management Model (Girard, 2004); 
Intellectual Capital Structural Model (Alwert, Bornemann,& Kivikas, 2004); Knowledge 
Management Solution Model (Becerra-Fernandez, Gonzales & Sabherwal, 2004); Time value of 
knowledge (Hall, et al., 2007) and KM Architecture (Riempp & Smolnik, 2007). 
General application and/or specific application inform KM models/frameworks development.  
Widely acknowledged KM theories/models relate to knowledge creation, the management of 
knowledge, the integration of knowledge, the time value of knowledge and others.  Knowledge 
management models could be divided into typically descriptive models (broadly or specifically) and 
prescriptive models – according to Holsapple and Joshi (1999: 1).  These very broad categories can 
be further subdivided into - “… intellectual capital models, knowledge category models and socially 
constructed models for the KM process” (McAdam & McCreedy, 1999 in McAdam & Reid, 2000: 
317).  It is quite evident how an understanding of the requirements of KM expanded over time when 
reviewing the models.   
The aim of this dissertation is not to review every possible KM model in detail because the 
models are context driven.  Let us consider some of the KM models and frameworks proposed by 
various academics and writers.  These models are widely cited in academic research and thus most 
likely influence organisational thinking about KM more often than not.  They also provide a wide 
variety of perspectives of what a KM model is considered to be, covering models that were 
designed for both the private and the public sector and models that are very simplistic in their 
approach to KM to models that are providing some form of integration with other organisational 
components.  
2.7.1 Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination and Internalisation Model for Knowledge 
Creation 
A discussion about KM will probably not be complete without considering the Socialisation, 
Externalisation, Combination and Internalisation (SECI) model, in short, SECI.  SECI is about the 
creation of knowledge.  It is thus about possibly the most important process in any organisation, 
private or public.  The SECI knowledge creation model is based on the dichotomy between explicit 
and tacit types of knowledge (Holsapple & Joshi, 1999).  SECI is the brainchild of Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) and is accepted KM theory
50
.  SECI forms part of the - “… socially constructed 
models for the KM process” (McAdam and Reid, 2000: 317).  SECI postulates knowledge creation 
as a dynamic process that leads to innovation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).   
Table 2.9:  SECI Knowledge Creation Model 
Component Process Examples 
Socialisation 
“… a process of creating 
knowledge by converting tacit 
knowledge from one entity 
 
 
 
 
- Conversation (social and purposeful) 
- Relationship forming (social, mentorship, 
supervisory) 
- Imitating people 
                                                 
50
 Polanyi, 1966a; Uit Beijerse, 1999; Kucza, 2001; McIntyre, Gauvin & Waruszynski, 2003; Baqir & Kathawala, 
2004; Girard, 2004; Riempp & Smolnik, 2007; Girard & McIntyre, 2010, De Nadae & Monteiro de Carvalho, 2017 - 
and many more. 
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(individual, group, or 
organization) to another entity.”. 
 
 
 
Human (technology 
and media enabled) 
interaction, the 
willingness to share, 
the ability to learn 
and the drive to 
innovate. 
- Practising 
- Training 
Externalisation  
“…conversion of tacit knowledge 
into explicit knowledge”. 
Through the type of conversation and the 
choice of language (metaphors, analogies, 
hypotheses and models). 
Combination 
“…a process of creating new 
explicit knowledge from existing 
explicit knowledge.”. 
Manifested in the documentation, recordings, 
video, software, social media, meetings, 
telephone, etc. after the restructuring of 
existing data and information through 
processes of categorisation, addition, 
combination and synthesis.  
Internalisation 
“…conversion of explicit 
knowledge into tacit knowledge”. 
Understanding and learning. 
 
Adapted from Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Uit Beijerse (1999) and Holsapple and Joshi (1999: 3). 
SECI proposes that tacit and explicit knowledge (both of scientific- and social origin - 
McAdam & Reid, 2000: 317) interact as facilitated by social processes such as verbal 
communication and writing to create new understanding and ipso facto new knowledge in a cyclical 
and dynamic manner.  Three different representations of the SECI model are depicted in Figure 
2.15.  The components of the SECI model, described briefly, are as follows by the depictions of 
various academics – 
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Figure 2.15: The SECI Knowledge Creation Model (three different graphic depictions) 
Source:  Girard & McIntyre (2010: 75) and McIntyre, Gauvin, Waruszynski (2003: 36) and Holsapple & 
Joshi (1999: 11). 
SECI is not KM.  SECI is a collection of knowledge processes that need consideration when 
constructing a KMC.  More specifically, SECI allows understanding of the underlying processes 
that facilitate knowledge flow and sharing in organisations.  The dynamic nature of knowledge, as 
discussed earlier in the dissertation, directly influences knowledge sharing and the ability to 
dynamically transform knowledge.  SECI distinctly recognises people (processes of the human 
mind and actions by people to create explicit knowledge) as well as technology (artefacts, enabling 
tools, processes and spaces or ‘ba’) in the creation of knowledge and also hint at possible avenues 
for KM.  SECI requires appropriate organisational leadership, structures, culture and IT to facilitate 
knowledge processes such as flow and access.  The knowledge creation process, whether it is SECI 
or any other, in the researcher’s opinion is not KM but an important KM process(es) to be 
considered when constructing a KMC.  Organisations have to understand who the primary 
knowledge creation agents are and which knowledge processes are available for the construction of 
knowledge ‘ba’ and KMCs.  Organisations are in danger of not harnessing possibly the most 
important part of their knowledge portfolio with which to assure survival/relevance/competitiveness 
if they do not recognise the importance of people as the ultimate repository of knowledge.  SECI 
does exactly this.  SECI is a simple model that describes the dynamics of normal social and 
organisational reality for the creation of organisational knowledge.  It is important for this research 
due to its general acceptance as a knowledge creation model from a processes perspective and 
because the SA DOD employ both people and technology and function in a complex and dynamic 
environment that requires all four SECI process components. Even the USA Army subscribe to 
SECI, see Figure 2.16 –  
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Figure 2.16: The SECI knowledge Creation Model (USA Army) 
Source: Weeks (2016: slide 14). 
Human (media enabled) interaction and communication are essential for military command 
and control (C2) and organisational learning;   the willingness to share knowledge is vital for 
learning and continuity of capabilities; the ability to learn and the drive to innovate are crucial for 
the SA DOD in order not to stagnate in a very complex and ever-changing globalised world. 
However, SECI cannot be accepted (wholesale) as an organisational KMC because it does not 
address IC integration, organisational structure, culture, security and measurement, KM strategy, 
finance and IT.  It is just a process model for consideration in organisational KMC.   
Central to knowledge creation is space or location within which it is achieved.  The ‘ba’ 
construct, proposed by Nonaka and Konno (1998) is important due to the fact that the SA DOD 
creates and manages knowledge in specifically mandated spaces.  It is these spaces that Nonaka and 
Konno (1998) conceptualise as ‘ba’.  It basically provides the element of context to information that 
facilitates conversion to knowledge (Nonaka, Toyama & Konno, 2000 and Baqir & Kathawala, 
2004).  For the SA DOD, these spaces enable specific military-related contextualisation and ipso 
facto military knowledge creation ala SECI.  The spaces also facilitate a particular type of 
leadership as proposed by the Inukshuk KM model discussed later.  Nonaka, et al. (2000) clearly 
links SECI, ‘ba’ and leadership as KM CSF.  In the Riempp and Smolnik (2007) model (discussed 
later in the dissertation) these are addressed in the strategy and management layer, structure/layout 
layer, and KM processes layer of their KM model.  
Contextualising information also relates to the notion proposed by Polanyi (1966b) that 
knowledge becomes personalised or in the case of the SA DOD – departmentalised or 
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institutionalised. Thus, SECI differs from 
organisation to organisation because of the 
organisational and environmental dynamics 
stemming from its reason for existence, 
funding model, organisational culture, the 
involvement of leadership, strategic nature of 
the organisational knowledge, complexity 
and many more variables.   
‘Ba’ can also be further extended into 
the virtual realm where cyberspace provides 
some unique and very useful spaces to create 
knowledge (Baqir & Kathawala, 2004).  This 
is addressed in the Riempp and Smolnic 
(2007) model in the application layer.  ‘Ba’ 
has a distinct impact on the integration of 
KM due to the information systems requirements (enablers), geography and organisational 
architecture (location and space) and personal willingness to share (work ethic and culture).  A clear 
understanding of the spaces to be integrated is thus critical for KM.  The SA DOD, in many 
instances, is hampered by the sheer variety of spaces that have to be integrated and security 
requirements, resulting in dislocation rather than integration.  The establishment of an SA DOD 
KMC reaches far into the abyss to resolve some of these issues.   
2.7.2 Knowledge Management Strategy Focus Areas 
The graphical depiction of the KM strategy focus areas by Wiig (1999b: 4) is not a KM model 
per se but does assist with identifying the key elements for KM success.   Wiig separates people and 
intellectual assets, which are in line with tacit and explicit knowledge and human capital and 
structural capital of IC (refer to earlier discussions about IC and Figure 2.17 below).  Other models 
that provide this focus is the Riempp and Smolnik (2007) and Girard and McIntyre (2010) KM 
models.   
The pyramid form of the Wiig-model is specifically useful construct because it depicts 
building towards a possible future or vision or goal.  Considering the Wiig (1993) KM Pillar model, 
Wiig published the KM Strategic Focus Areas model a number of years later, as depicted in Figure 
2.17. 
Figure 2.17: Knowledge Management Strategy Focus Areas 
                    Source:  Wiig (1999b: 4). 
However, the KM Strategy Focus Areas model is not descriptive enough to be used as a 
management tool without a detailed explanatory narrative or strategy document at hand.  The void 
space at the top of the pyramid can be filled in with the other KM CSFs.  From Alwert, Bornemann 
and Kivikas (2004) in Zhang (2013: 23) the intellectual asset focus area can be expanded to view 
how it interacts with organisational strategy. 
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2.7.3 KPMG Knowledge Management Process Model 
The KM Process model provides a description of what is perceived primary KM processes 
(acquisition, indexing, filtering, linking, distribution, and application) which are posited as 
sequential with no feedback loops for correction and adaptation to remain relevant in complex and 
changing environments.  This is depicted in Figure 2.18. 
Figure 2.18: The KPMG Knowledge Management Process Model 
Source:  Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 11). 
This makes the model very inflexible.  Also, the model does not provide for knowledge 
creation (semantically probably included in knowledge acquisition) or security and measurement.  
The following description of the model is provided by Holsapple and Joshi (1999: 4) - 
“Acquisition refers to knowledge creation and content development.  This is accomplished by 
distilling experiences and lessons learned from client engagement projects, by collecting, 
synthesizing, and interpreting a variety of information.  The next three phases (indexing, 
filtering, and linking) are referred to as library management activities and include the screening, 
classification, cataloging [sic], integrating, and interconnecting of content from both internal and 
external sources.  The distribution phase includes packaging and delivery of knowledge in the 
form of Web pages (e.g., designing knowledge displays, templates, and graphics; creation of 
multimedia formats).  Application refers to using the knowledge that has been collected, 
captured, and delivered to produce products and services.”.  
The distribution phase is very restrictive if it is just web-based. The language used to describe 
the distribution also reeks of objectivism. Any form of communication is a form of knowledge 
distribution or sharing.  Also, knowledge security is not mentioned.  It is also very disappointing to 
have the application of knowledge only linked to services and products rather than effects and 
advantage.   
2.7.4 The Inukshuk Knowledge Management Model 
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The Inukshuk KM model remains important for this research because of its empirical 
relevance to public organisations.  The Inukshuk KM model is depicted in Figure 2.19.   The 
Inukshuk KM model
51
 integrates concepts of technology, culture, leadership, knowledge creation 
(based on Nonaka’s Socialization, Externalisation, Combination and Internalization [SECI] model) 
and measurement (Girard, 2004 and 2005). This model showed some initial usefulness to apply to 
the SA DOD environment, primarily because of the recognition of measurement (relating directly to 
good governance and transparency within public service) and culture (not just organisation culture 
but different cultures in general, of which South Africa has a rich endowment). Many of the aspects 
named above have been tested in research by Kruger and Johnson (2009) specifically for the South 
African environment.  The model succeeds in combining some KM CSFs and processes.  However, 
an immediate criticism of the model is that several KM CSFs (e.g. strategy, structure, HRM) are not 
mentioned. No mention is made of security, a critical factor for militaries.Other criticism is the 
depiction of technology as one of the legs of the Inukshuk, which might give the impression that 
technology (or typically IT) is the foundation of KM.  Information technology is, as discussed 
earlier, just an enabler for KM. Also, the graphic representation provides no clues as to how 
integration will be achieved between these 
elements.   A better depiction would have 
to change technology and leadership 
around. 
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Source: Girard & McIntyre (2010: 73). 
                                                 
51
 Girard and McIntyre (2010) write about KM modelling in public sector organisations.  They use a case study 
methodology, building on the theoretical base of previous writers and researchers, endeavouring to demonstrates the 
value of KM modelling in a Canadian public service science-based initiative.  It is posited as a holistic approach to KM 
in the public sector.   
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2.7.5 Intellectual Capital Statement Structure Model 
As discussed earlier in the dissertation, the Intellectual Capital Statement Structural Model 
provides a glimpse of the importance of IC as an organisational resource as well as conceptualises 
IC interaction with both business and KM processes in order to reach business objectives.    There is 
also feedback loops for correction, adaptation and learning. 
 
Figure 2.20: Intellectual Capital Statement Structural Model 
Source:  Alwert, et al. (2004) in Zhang (2013: 23). 
The IC Statement Structural Model for KM in figure 4 is a practical example of how IC could 
be incorporated into organisational processes, depicting the perpetual influence of IC on business 
and knowledge processes.  What is also important is that the model recognises the importance of 
strategy in the management of knowledge.  From a military perspective, the only aspect that is 
really different is the organisational objectives and external impact due to the use of different IC 
and possibly different business and KM processes.  The conceptual links between the different 
components of the model are generic enough to be applied to or adapted for the military 
environment, as depicted in Figure 2.20. 
2.7.6 Organisational Knowledge Management Model  
A key contribution of the Andersen and APQC
52
 (1996) model labels KM CSFs (leadership, 
culture, technology and measurement) as enablers, which is not the same as organisational factors 
critical to the success of organisations.  The theory and application thus far discussed identify these 
as KM CSFs.  It also does not provide a sense of required integration between these CSFs.  The 
                                                 
52
 American Productivity and Quality Center. 
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Organisational Knowledge Management model only name a number of KM processes (share, 
create, identify, collect, adapt, organise and apply), much the same as the KPMG model above.  No 
mention is made of a KM vision, strategy, knowledge security and measurement.  The model is 
very ‘flat’ in the sense that it does not provide an indication of the relative importance or sequence 
of the various components or a sense dynamics, as depicted in Figure 2.21.  It is, in essence, a one 
dimensional Inuckshuk KM model.   The Organisational KM model is very similar to the Inukshuk 
model in Figure 2.19.  However, the Inukshuk model only focuses on SECI with the Organisational 
KM model expanding on possible KM processes. 
Figure 2.21: The Organisational Knowledge Management Model 
Source:  Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 9). 
2.7.7 Building Blocks of Knowledge Management 
The KM Building Blocks model (Probst, 1998) is essentially a KM process model with very 
little reference to the rest of the organisation, as depicted in Figure 2.22.  The model does, however, 
mention objectives (input) and measurement (output) as two distinct factors outside of the KM 
processes and mentioned by some of the models discussed above.  The model does provide some 
indication that the KM processes do not necessarily follow a sequence but influence each other in a 
random manner.  It thus has more utility than the KPMG KM model which is completely linear.  No 
mention is made of the requirement for security. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 100 
 
Figure 2.22: The Building Blocks of Knowledge Management 
Source: Probst (1998:2) 
2.7.8   Knowledge Management Pillars 
Wiig (1993) in Holsapple and Joshi (1999: 2) describes KM as three functions, conceptualised 
as pillars.  The KM Pillars model, in essence, is a synthesis of KM processes.  The model identifies 
knowledge creation, manifestation, use, and transfer as the primary KM processes and then 
elaborates on these by identifying a number of other processes as part of the pillars, as depicted in 
Figure 2.23. 
The model does however not make mention of the importance of leadership, strategy, 
structure, culture, resource management and security.  The model also does not provide insight on 
issues of integration.  This said the model provides a firm baseline in terms of KM processes to 
build on.   A more comprehensive model would be achieved if the KM Strategy Focus Areas model 
of Wiig (Figure 2.17) was integrated into this model. 
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Figure 2.23: Knowledge Management Pillars 
Source:  Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 8). 
2.7.9 Model of the Knowing Organisation 
Choo (1996) posits that organisations apply information strategically to facilitate sense-
making, knowledge creation, decision-making and action.  Sense-making, knowledge creation, and 
decision making are - “… linked as a continuum of nested information activities that define an 
organization which possesses the information and knowledge to act intelligently” (Holsapple & 
Joshi, 1999: 2).   
This corresponds very well to the elements of the OODA loop. Information and knowledge 
are also not delineated and defined by Choo (1996) according to Holsapple and Joshi, (1999).  
However, this is typically an information era approach – where IM is recognised as the strategic 
process and not the product of KM.   Decisions and actions are an integral part of organisational 
activities without which the organisation cannot survive and/or compete.  From the earlier 
discussion in the dissertation, KM enables the creation of new meaning through sense-making and 
enhanced understanding, decision-making and action.   
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These elements underpin this model and are important for a proposed SA DOD KMC. The 
model also, in a sense, supports the notion of a knowledge continuum rather than that of a 
hierarchy. The Knowing Organisation model is depicted in Figure 2.24. 
Figure 2.24: Model of the Knowing Organisation 
Source:  Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 9). 
2.7.10 A Framework of Knowledge Management 
Van der Spek and Spijkervet (1997) in Holsapple and Joshi (1999: 10) propose a cyclical 
approach to KM involving four phases - “… conceptualize, reflect, act, and retrospect”, moving 
clearly away from IM towards KM.  Again these correspond with the OODA loop activities – “The 
configuration of KM stages is oriented toward a problem-solving cycle” Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 
3).  
Conceptualise probably closely conform to current practices of knowledge audits before 
setting out to construct a KMC.  Added is a function to evaluate decisions and actions after the fact, 
thus facilitating learning.  In fact, KM processes are recognised as part of a strategic or planning 
cycle within the constraints of the internal and external environmental dynamics.  Learning is 
important for corrections and best practice formulation.  Retrospect also implies some form of 
learning and measurement.  Another important aspect identified by the model is the recognition of 
influences from both the internal (“culture, motivation of employees, organization, management, 
and information technology” (Holsapple & Joshi, 1999: 3) and external environment – agreeing 
with the notions of relational IC and those posited by Sveiby (1997) as IA (customer and supplier 
relationships).  The model is depicted in Figure 2.25. 
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Figure 2.25: A Framework of Knowledge Management 
Source:  Holsapple & Joshi (1999: 10). 
2.7.11 Knowledge Management Solution Model 
The Knowledge Management Solution model (Becerra-Fernandez, Gonzales & Sabherwal, 
2004) is an important model to consider because it identifies key KM processes, KMS, KM best 
practice techniques (or ‘mechanisms’) and IT as well as KM architecture.  There are also elements 
of IC (routines and common knowledge) but mostly IC is not addressed.  Rather, mention is made 
of “common knowledge” – probably closely related to explicit knowledge. The model is depicted in 
Figure 2.26. 
The model also moves clearly away from IM towards KM.  The SECI model is very evident 
in the model as the preferred knowledge creation processes, confirming again its significance in 
terms of knowledge processes.  However, the model does not express a vision for KM.  Also, some 
of the KM CSFs are missing from the model – a primary CSF being leadership, people and 
measurement.  Another concern is the absence of clear linkages to strategy (possibly inherent in 
‘direction’ under knowledge application.  That said, there is no linkage to organisational 
(business/corporate) strategy.  Another concern for the researcher is that there is no mention of KM 
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security/protection.  From the model below it is clear that KM theory has developed considerably 
up to 2004.   
Figure 2.26: Knowledge Management Solution Model 
Source:  Arthur (2013: 7). 
2.7.12 Architecture Model for Integrated Knowledge Management 
The Architecture Model for Integrated KM (Figure 2.28) synthesises most of the KM CSF 
and processes discussed earlier in the dissertation and in the KM models briefly discussed above. 
Riempp and Smolnik (2007) propose an integrated KM Architecture Model based on what they 
propose as key levers, superimposed over a systems-processes-strategy architecture with 
organisational culture providing the base upon which the organisation is constructed.   
The Architecture Model for Integrated KM proposes to integrate KM and organisational 
strategy in both a horizontal and vertical plane.  This architecture provides a graphic explanation of 
organisational strategy, process and system interaction to be achieved at a glance.  This is lacking in 
other models. This proposed architecture provides a more understandable depiction of the role of 
organisational strategy, process and systems interaction than that of the Inukshuk KM model.   
Knowledge Management Solution model (Figure 2.26) of Becerra-Fernandez, Gonzales and 
Sabherwal (2004), the Uit Beijerse (1999) KM model (Figure 2.27), and Architecture Model for 
Integrated KM (Figure 2.28) of Riempp and Smolnik (2007) were developed for business 
organisations; featuring several similarities that can be adapted for public organisations such as the 
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SA DOD, because it has been established above that there are clear coincidences between the 
Inukshuk KM model and these models.   
Briefly considering the Uit Beijerse KM model (1999), depicted in Figure 2.27.  The model is 
structured around primary components already discussed thus far.  These are a requirement for 
advantage, elements of organisational strategy and structure, the direction of KM (policy), KM 
processes and organisational culture. 
 
Figure 2.27: Uit Beijerse Knowledge Management Model 
Source:  Uit Beijerse (1999: 104). 
SECI is acknowledged as a central feature to transform knowledge.  Acknowledgement is also 
given to the ability to acquire knowledge.  Another important feature is a knowledge audit to do 
knowledge gap analysis, which is distinctly linked to competitive advantage.  Distinctly missing 
from the model is an indication of KM leadership.  However, there is mention of ‘style of 
management’ which could be linked to the style of leadership in the absence of leadership being 
mentioned distinctly.  This style is important to processes such as knowledge sharing and 
knowledge security (which is not mentioned distinctly). 
The four levers in the Architecture Model for Integrated KM (Figure 2.28 below) of Riempp 
and Smolnik (2007) have a strong coincidence with the model proposed by Girard (2004) – the 
Inukshuk KM model.  There is also a coincidence between the proposed Uit Beijerse (1999: 104) 
KM model and those of Girard (2004) and Riempp and Smolnik (2007).  Hassan and AL-Hakim 
(2011) incorporate many of the elements of the Inukshuk KM model and the work of Uit Beijerse 
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(1999) and Riempp and Smolnik (2007) – and label them as CSF for KM.  Interestingly, Hassan 
and AL-Hakim (2011) do not cite Uit Beijerse (1999), Girard (2004) or Riempp and Smolnik 
(2007) in their work. 
Shariq (1997: 76) states three activities inherent in knowledge processes, i.e. knowledge 
creation, -transfer and – deployment.  Henderson (1995: 3) in Grant (1996a) makes a case for the 
architecture of knowledge based on the - “… integration of knowledge across disciplinary and 
organisational boundaries”.  Girard (2004), Uit Beijerse (1999) and Riempp and Smolnik (2007) 
therefore build on this earlier understanding of the activities within KM.  Riempp and Smolnik 
(2007) build on the understanding of several writers by acknowledging business processes and KM 
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processes as a distinct layer, implying integration. 
Figure 2.28:  Architecture for Integrated Knowledge Management 
Source:  Riempp & Smolnik (2007: 9). 
In order to conclude section 2.7 dealing and discussing several KM models, the researcher 
does not adopt any of these models as an appropriate model for SA DOD KM.  However, the varied 
and various components constituting these models will be considered in the construction of an SA 
DOD KM model in chapter 6 of the thesis. 
2.8 THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE 
When considering the research problem and questions; there are only a handful of studies 
addressing KM in the SA public sector, e.g. Noeth (2004), La Grange (2006), Onyancha and 
Ocholla (2006), Cloete (2007), Onyancha and Ocholla (2009). Kruger and Johnson (2009), 
Onyancha (2011) and Arthur. (2013), amongst possible others.  The mentioned studies do not 
include research on SA DOD KM specifically.  There is no distinct academic research on SA DOD 
KM.  Thus, no knowledge and KM definitions and theory/practice on SA DOD KM exists.  This 
could be due to a lack of interest in this particular type of management; it could be that the SA DOD 
is not aware of this type of management; and/or it could be that the security regime within the SA 
DOD hampers such endeavours? 
There also seem to be a gap in the literature reviewed addressing KM security requirements.  
The document analysis and subsequent questionnaire research within the SA DOD might shed light 
on these and other questions regarding the perceived absence of KM within the SA DOD. 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
The fact that there is still no agreement on the definition of knowledge hampers the 
development of KM as a management discipline.  Knowledge remains an extremely contextual 
phenomenon resulting in academics, businesses and militaries defining knowledge such that it 
makes sense for their particular working environments. 
In general, knowledge is more than information and information are more than data.  For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the researcher regards data as a representation of observations and/or 
facts without context, i.e. not meaningful by itself.  Data is the least complex form of explicit 
content.   
For the purpose of this dissertation the researcher regards information as data in context and 
can combine various sets of data into limited meaning and understanding. The researcher agrees 
with this description and adopts this view for the purpose of this dissertation. 
Knowledge is considered information in context, combining various sets of information to 
provide the clearest (or dense) meaning and understanding.  There is broad consensus that 
knowledge exists in people, technology and organisations; in tacit or explicit forms.  Knowledge is 
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dynamic and evolves, continuously resulting in new understanding and meaning.  There is also 
broad agreement on the fact that knowledge is critical to survival and advantage. 
A very large and expanding body of knowledge about KM in general, including some key 
management concepts, theory and models that are conceptually useful exists.  However, it is when 
drilling down to more complex and specific management environments such as the military that the 
body of knowledge is spread across greater intervals; becomes very organisational and country-
specific; deals with specific operational challenges; and more than often deals with IT, IM, 
communication and technology issues. 
A key issue hampering the development of KM as an academic and scientific discipline is the 
lack of agreement on definitions for knowledge and KM.  Hence, academics must formulate 
definitions of these to support their research and application in the workplace.  For this dissertation 
- definitions for knowledge and KM are proposed at the end of Chapter 3 of the dissertation once 
KM in the military have been discussed and considered.  However, at this point the researcher is of 
the opinion that knowledge is meaning based on the construct of IC that should contribute to 
decision-making, actions carried out, effects to be achieved as well as advantage.  Data and 
information also facilitate this, however, basing decision, actions, effects and advantage on an 
incomplete or sparsely populated operational or business picture would undermine the quest for 
advantage and might well affect the ability to survive.  
It is very evident from the literature that organisational performance can be enhanced by KM 
initiatives.  A logical (and widely acknowledged) deduction is that KM is important to any 
organisation in order to improve the ability of the organisation to survive, compete and build 
inimitable capabilities to sustain their advantage, whether in the private or public sector.   
There is unambiguous and empirical support for several core components to be incorporated 
in KM policy, strategy and KM models.  These are typically, as discussed above - leadership, a KM 
culture or organisational culture that facilitate KM, a learning organisational culture, a good balance 
for the requirement of security vs. knowledge sharing or access to knowledge, a KM strategy that 
provides for KM related organisational structure, people and processes that manage knowledge, IT 
and other communication technologies that enable KM strategy execution.  Issues of a KM vision, 
mission and objectives, resource management, funding, monitoring and evaluation, etc is included 
in organisational strategy and KM strategy.  The application, combination and focus of these will 
vary between organisations due to environmental and organisational complexities, requirements, 
resources, visions and goals.  
Knowledge management CSFs inform the argument why the SA DOD should be interested in 
KM (SRQ 2).  In the SA DOD context, these CSFs should inform and calibrate a proposed KMC 
(SRQ 4) which will be discussed when the findings of the literature review, document review and 
interview material are integrated into findings and possible answers to the research questions (see 
dissertation Chapter 8). 
Knowledge management CSF and best practice should form the bedrock of organisational 
performance, the crafting of KM policy, strategy and KM models for any organisation.  
Organisations should thus have KM policy and strategy and embed them into organisational 
architecture.  The question is - Does the SA DOD have policy and strategy on KM that integrates 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 109 
 
knowledge resources and organisational architecture into a KM capability in order to unlock 
optimal KM benefits?  These issues will be explored next from a military perspective in Chapter 3 
of the dissertation and SA DOD perspective in Chapters 5 and 6 of the dissertation.  The discussion 
above contributes to the crafting of a definition for KM in the SA DOD at the end of Chapter 3 of 
the dissertation. 
There are several studies that explore South African interest in KM as a field of study. The 
published material on South African public sector KM does not address the SA DOD and military 
(as an SA government department).   
There is well-documented support for the following:  
 KM will enhance the organisations’ ability to cope with complex business/operational 
environments.  
 KM enhances competitive advantage and is a requirement to attain military advantage. 
 That knowledge is not information and information is not data, but that these concepts interact in 
a hierarchical manner, but probably more as a continuum – each having different management 
requirements. 
 KM requires an integrated approach and must be integrated into the organisational architecture. 
 KM is not IT management or IM.  These are enablers to KM. 
 Organisations require a KM strategy that is informed by the business strategy. 
 Critical success factors for KM are leadership, organisational strategy, organisational structure, 
organisational culture, HRM, IT, KM impact measurement, security and a learning organisation.  
All of these must be aligned and integrated into a strategy to facilitate effective knowledge 
processes and to enhance decision-making, actions, effects and advantage. 
 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation focuses on a case study of military KM with a distinct focus on 
the USA military KM initiatives.  Hampering the case severely is the fact that, comparatively, very 
little military KM publications exist; also, access to all or very specific military organisational 
documentation is restricted and thus limits the analysis. Based on the availability of USA military 
organisational KM related documents, these will be analysed and supplemented by thinking on 
military KM from around the world where available. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW: MILITARY KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
“In 50 years’ time, we will be [preparing for and fight wars] we don’t know, [using knowledge, 
technology and] materials which haven’t been invented, made in processes [and with knowledge] 
yet to be defined, [at processing speeds that increase exponentially], [in countries that might not 
exist currently], [with soldiers and leaders] we have not yet recruited. Under these circumstances, 
all we can carry forward is our knowledge, and our knowledge of how to improve our knowledge.’’ 
(Adapted from Siemieniuch, 1997 in Ďurišová, 2011: 45) 
The chapter moves away from general and business related KM theory and introduces 
military KM as practised by a number of militaries.  The chapter can be considered as part 2 of the 
dissertation literature review, also following a document analysis approach.   
The USA military publishes on its KM practices and experiences in the public domain.  This 
chapter seeks to create a top-down view based on the USA military, (arguably) the leading military 
knowledge manager.   
To establish context, the chapter provides background on KM in militaries and possible 
arguments for its necessity.  The chapter then introduces USA KM and how it has evolved to the 
point where KM is accepted by the USA military as being vital.  The USA military is used as a case 
study purely because of the availability of published documents.  It would be impossible to explore 
KM in the military without any published material or access to military personnel.  The US military 
makes it possible due to the availability of published material.  No correlation between the USA 
military and the SA DOD is insinuated.   
The chapter extracted (where possible) applied examples of definitions, types of military 
knowledge, and how it should be managed in order to assist with search criteria for the writing of 
Chapters 5 and 6 and to support findings. 
3.2 CONTEXT 
“If you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.  If 
you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.  If you 
know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle” (Giles, 1910, Chapter 3, 
Paragraph 18 [online]). 
Sun Tzu’s wisdom quoted by Giles above is possibly the most fundamental truth about 
military knowledge.  It also reveals the longevity of military KM and the importance of ‘knowing’ 
for militaries.  Centuries later the USA military reiterates the wisdom of Sun Tzu with the following 
–  
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“It is telling that joint doctrine53 defines “data” and “information”, but not knowledge. Data and 
information, however, are objects to discover and manipulate. They are important to offensive 
operations, but not sufficient. To get ahead of our enemies, we must know their goals, understand 
their strategies, anticipate their maneuvers, and then force our enemies to change their behavior 
consistent with our national security objectives. This level of knowledge is central to the art of 
modern war.”  (USA, 2008: 8). 
The quote above resonates the wisdom of Sun Tzu about ‘knowing’.  Just being informed is 
not good enough.  Knowledge management has been an integral part of militaries for millennia as is 
evident in the quote above but also evident in military intelligence
54
 practices (Manuri & Yaacob, 
2011).    “KM, intelligence applications, and decision-making skills have been at the forefront of 
military doctrine over the past decades.” (Lambe, 2003 in Manuri & Yaacob, 2011: 77).  This quote 
highlights several key components to military KM – e.g. intelligence and doctrine as capstone 
military knowledge and their link with decision-making as a critical organisational activity. 
Debates on knowledge and KM are often philosophical in nature (Kruger & Johnson, 2009).  
The development of KM theory has a philosophical path as well as an organisational demand path 
(mostly discussed in the latter part of Chapter 2 of this dissertation) for practical KM infusion in the 
work environment (Zhang, 2013: 18).   This is not different for militaries. “KM application within 
[the] military environment requires knowledge processes that are robust and reliable within 
operational contexts and the knowledge creation and conversion processes must match the pace of 
the military operations.” (Manuri & Yaacob, 2011: 77).  The quote highlights aspects that were 
discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation, such as the criticality of KM processes tailored for both 
environment and organisation and the time value of knowledge. 
Considering the opening remarks on complexity associated with military environments and 
operations articulated in Chapter 1 of the dissertation and Manuri and Yaacob’s (2011) opinion 
above; the fact is highlighted that KM is a reality for military organisations and not just a 
philosophical phenomenon or exercise.  However, military KM is grounded in the philosophical 
debate about knowledge and KM.  To place perspective on the scope of military KM; Maule (2006: 
627) writes - 
“The military is extremely diverse in its knowledge systems and practices. In the collective, the 
military would be the equivalent of many large corporate conglomerates, each with multiple 
research and development [research and development] branches. Adding to the complexity is the 
secrecy of many of the systems. To attempt to summarize military knowledge management in its 
entirety would be presumptuous, if not impossible.”. 
Yet, the availability of published military KM material pales in comparison with publications 
on business orientated KM.  To place this in perspective, the Encyclopaedia of Knowledge 
Management (2
nd
 edition) is a 1560+ page book that includes only one 11 page article by William 
                                                 
53
 Incidentally, the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2017 (US, 2017) does not provide a definition 
for doctrine.  This definition can be obtained in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2001 version 
(page 165), also known as USA Joint Publication 1-02. 
54
 “The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of 
available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or 
potential operations.” (US, 2017: 116) 
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Maule on military KM and reveals a USA military perspective (the Naval Post Graduate School, 
Monterey).   
The leader in contemporary military KM (based on the available academic material and other 
published and online documentation) is the USA.  As such, the 2008 USAF ISR Strategy states - 
“No military has ever fielded the knowledge capabilities we intend to deploy.” (USA, 2008: 8).  
Capabilities indicate the integration of various systems and sub-systems.  Other militaries that 
published KM material are the UK, Canada, Germany, Australia, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea and 
Singapore (Manuri & Yaacob, 2011).  The USA military was selected for the case study, not due to 
its size or military leadership position or any other bias, but purely due to the availability of 
organisational documents in the public domain that could be used to compare with the discussion in 
Chapter 2.   Thus, the researcher uses the USA KM experience as a small case study using 
documents in the public domain with supplementing opinions from academic material emanating 
from other countries where available.  The following section focus on military KM – a more 
practical, military demand perspective. 
3.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FOR MILITARIES 
It can be safely assumed that KM is important to militaries due to the fact that militaries, 
internationally, subscribe to most business (best) practices in order to provide effective and efficient 
defence and security services and related products. Based on this assumption, the question is raised 
why only a handful of militaries – arguably international military leaders from typically the 
developed world – are actively developing KM initiatives.  This relates to the second research 
question of this dissertation.   To explore the posited importance of military KM consideration 
should be afforded to views of the few writers on military KM.  The importance of military KM has 
been thematically grouped by the researcher below. 
3.3.1 Survival, Advantage and Superiority 
From the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) it is abundantly clear that knowledge and 
KM are critical for organisations to survive, compete and gain/maintain the advantage.  Degen 
(2008) states that KM is of utmost importance to cope with the complexities of the military tasks 
and environments (a USA perspective) – thus clearly relates KM to survivability and advantage. 
Not disagreeing, Manuri and Yaacob (2011: 75) state - “Knowledge has been identified as the 
ultimate competitive advantage for the modern organisation and therefore should be well managed”.  
Sometimes missed - “The contributions of military organizations to societal knowledge touch 
nearly every aspect of human endeavours” (Bennet, Bennet & Lee, 2010: 316).  This quote signifies 
the importance of knowledge and KM for military organisations.  Military organisations are the 
product of the societal need for security – with society directly benefitting from knowledge 
generated by militaries in its quest to provide such security.  This knowledge requires management 
to render the best possible military and social benefits and advantage.  
Militaries seek advantage, based on military capabilities, to be able to compete in operational 
environments (both physical- and cyberspace) and/or provide deterrence to prevent confrontation, 
thus making survival a more achievable outcome.   From a deterrent (defensive) perspective the 
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2008 USAF ISR Strategy states it quaintly – “[USAF ISR] intend to produce thorough knowledge 
of every enemy that they will know – or immediately realize – that any conflict will be fought on 
our terms, to their detriment.” (USA, 2008: 5).  From an offensive perspective, Boothby (2012: 
506) writes - “…the decision-maker, having considered the scientific data [information and 
knowledge] as to the relationship between the planned military action and the desired effect, 
assesses that the intended military advantage
55
 is definite,…, the attack may proceed”.  Ignoring the 
possible construct dissonance; Boothby clearly links decisions based on knowledge to the success 
of actions, desired effects and advantage. Thus, knowledge provides militaries with military 
advantage as a deterrent but also as a success driver in battle. 
KM is a CSF for USA military advantage and documented as such in several strategy 
documents (Marshal, 2007: 12).  2008 USAF ISR Strategy states - “Knowledge is now the ‘fuel’, 
the fundamental prerequisite for success” (USA, 2008: 8).  Success is being driven by advantage; 
the advantage is being driven by knowledge; thus knowledge is driving success.   
The USA DOD Joint Vision 2020 focuses on achieving information and knowledge 
superiority – states that - “…information superiority provides the joint force a competitive 
advantage only when [information] is effectively translated into superior knowledge and decisions” 
(USA DOD, 2000: 11 in Marshall, 2007: 12 and in USA, 2008).  Manuri and Yaacob (2011: 73) - 
writing from a Malaysian Air Force perspective - echoes the USA requirement for information and 
knowledge superiority as key to future military advantage.  Therefore, information superiority does 
not enable advantage.  The prerequisite for advantage is knowledge superiority. 
The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy summarises a description of what they regard as knowledge 
and its relationship with advantage (albeit from a knowledge superiority argument perspective) as 
follows – “No military organization can survive for long in the face of enemy knowledge 
superiority.” (USA, 2008: 17).  Thus, the creation of new meaning is critical for continued 
understanding and knowing which enables control over decision-action cycles and the 
commensurate effects that are critical for survival and/or advantage.  This is true for market 
conditions and military operations. This is why knowledge and the management thereof are 
important in the knowledge era. 
3.3.2 Enhanced Decisions, Actions, Flexibility, Adaptiveness and Responsiveness  
Taking into consideration the discussion above expressing on decisions, action and effect; 
Lungu (2011: 16) writes from a Romanian military perspective that KM - “…contributes to the 
organisational effectiveness of logistics structures… by enhancing timely and effective decision-
making processes, responsiveness and adaptiveness to changes through effective assessment of 
operational requirements based on complete knowledge”.   
USA military KM doctrine states the importance of KM as follows – “KM is more than 
improved information technology and communications systems. It supports all elements of the 
                                                 
55
 The definition of military advantage is a contested discussion in International Humanitarian Law – linking it to clear 
military objectives, attack and destruction of the objectives.  From a more practical perspective, military advantage is 
more than just destruction, it is about winning the battle either before the battle starts, based on deterrence, or by 
decisively destroying the opposing force in battle.  Offensive military goals are not only to destroy. They can include 
protecting, capturing and defending resources also. 
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operations and decisionmaking [sic] processes … Creating mission-specific knowledge by 
integrating contextualized information supports effective decisionmaking [sic], providing the basis 
for action.” (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-1 and 1-2).  KM is important for militaries from a process 
perspective to enable the leveraging of knowledge as well as knowledge conversion in support of 
military action. (Manuri & Yaacob, 2011).  The USA military (Army) KM perspective is as follows 
based on USA Army doctrine (ADP 5-0) – 
 “Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based upon applying judgment to 
available information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and 
maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding 
is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the 
relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decision-making.” 
(Mortensen, 2014: 8). 
Thus, military KM is critically linked to decisions and the time value of knowledge that 
affects the ability to be responsive, flexible and adapt to operational requirements and complexity. 
The USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-1) states that KM enables – “Leader and Soldier agility and 
adaptability during operations.” and Mortensen (2014: 9) states – “Knowledge Management enables 
commanders to make informed, timely decisions despite the uncertainty of operations or the type of 
operations, and is becoming an inherent part of joint and combined operations, making KM a 
primary enabler of Mission Command.”.  The USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-2) states that KM enables 
the sharing of relevant information –  
“… as the commander transitions through understanding and visualizing the end state and 
operational approach, through the decisionmaking [sic] process, and ultimately to action. It 
provides critical insight for assessment, enhancing rapid adaptation during dynamic operations. 
While not all knowledge provides an operational advantage, an operational advantage can only 
be achieved through the effective and timely transfer of knowledge to commanders and other 
decisionmakers [sic].”. 
Successful military KM is measured -“…through the contribution to the capacity of forces to 
sustain operations, coherence in defence and operational planning, development and use of new 
capabilities, improvement of working and operating methods” (Lungu 2011: 115). These are 
important principles to be considered because all logistics and sustainment are military operational 
functions without which defence mandates are arguably not achievable.  The OODA loop construct 
(Figure 3.5) is critical to military flexibility, adaptiveness and responsiveness in operations, but also 
in the corporate environment.  KM enabled flexibility, adaptiveness and responsiveness are also a 
CSF in complex environments such as those militaries find themselves in, almost without 
exception.  These aspects are illustrated by Figure 3.7 dealing with KM and enhanced decision-
making.  
The USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-8) states – “Conducting KM helps to create shared 
understanding, which is considered a mission command principle. The USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-5) 
states the following about understanding as a principle of KM -  
“Shared understanding across, between, and through commanders, subordinate leaders, Soldiers, 
and organizations underpins mission command and the operations process (or the conduct of 
operations). … Through collaboration and dialogue, knowledge sharing enables an 
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understanding of the operational environment, problems to be solved, and approaches to solving 
them. Effective KM practices enable commanders, subordinate leaders, Soldiers, and 
organizations to work together to achieve operational goals. KM facilitates the transfer of the 
“how” in the form of knowledge (tacit and explicit). Understanding is primarily an individual 
process; therefore its domain is the tacit knowledge that resides in individuals.”.   
Mortensen (2014) states –  
“Knowledge Management (KM) supports the commander by providing the bridging focus 
between the art and science of command. … Knowledge Management helps the Commander 
focus these processes by enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, 
and decision-making. KM balances people, process, tools, and organization, in order to create a 
shared understanding through the alignment of people, processes, and tools within the 
organizational structure and culture, in order to increase collaboration and understanding. The 
resulting improved knowledge flow and shared understanding, results in better decisions, 
resulting in improved flexibility, adaptability, integration, and synchronization.” (Mortensen, 
2014: 9). 
As a staff task under the science of control, conducting KM is key to integrating the 
operations process.  Thus, the symbiotic relationships between the military construct of mission 
command and the construct of KM spawn the ability of militaries to Command and Control (C2) 
their capabilities, actions and effects and enhance decision-making, flexibility, adaptiveness and 
responsiveness – all critical to creating effects and advantage.  
3.3.3 Actionable, Decision-quality Intelligence and Knowledge 
The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy clearly states the requirement for - “…actionable”, 
“…decision-quality” intelligence and knowledge (USA: 2008: 4, 8, 9 & 16) as products of 
persistent surveillance (data, information and knowledge collection), intelligence (data, information 
and knowledge collection, processing, collation, analysis and distribution) and reconnaissance (data, 
information and knowledge collection) activities.  These are, incidentally, three key military KM 
processes with which to dominate the opponent’s OODA loop, enhancing decisions, actions, effects 
and unlocking advantage.  The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy labels these effects – “…tailored effects” 
(USA, 2008: 4), thus alluding to quality and accuracy possible when having access to actionable 
and decision-quality intelligence and knowledge. 
‘Decision-quality’ provides the link between knowledge and enhanced decisions – 
presupposing a particular quality of knowledge in order to arrive at better decisions in terms of the 
time it takes to arrive at decisions for action and the tailored effects they would achieve. 
The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy summarises a description of what they regard as knowledge 
and its relationship with advantage (albeit from a knowledge superiority argument perspective) as 
follows -“When the information age makes unprecedented quantities of data available to practically 
any group, knowledge superiority depends on qualitative differentials: identifying the specific target 
[who/what] and directing the right matter [what] to the right space [where] at the right time [when] 
within the opponent‘s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop.” (USA, 2008: 17).  This requires an 
integrated KM and intelligence capability.  The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy states the following about 
the relationship between meaning, understanding and intelligence –  
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“… disparate data can be synthesized to provide understanding which creates knowledge. The 
entire system, human and machine, needs the ability to combine seemingly unrelated data to 
create understanding. Superior training in the art of intelligence can greatly increase the ability to 
synthesize data and find meaning.” (USA, 2008: 17). 
This statement refer to intelligence as a process and clearly differentiate between data, 
intelligence.  The USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-2) states the following about KM’s role in relevant, 
decision-quality knowledge –  
“Commander’s critical information requirements focus knowledge product development. 
Leaders acquire knowledge by understanding the processes, activities, and systems available to 
share information.  Commanders and staffs evaluate KM effectiveness by determining whether it 
reduces the fog of war. KM narrows the gap between relevant information commanders require 
and that which they have. The staff organizes knowledge for the commander through KM.”. 
This is reiterated further by – “The KM process also seeks to ensure that knowledge products 
and services are relevant, accurate, timely, and usable to commanders and decisionmakers [sic].”.  
These are all qualitative attributes of knowledge required for actionable, decision-quality 
intelligence and military knowledge. (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-4). This again refer to a tailored 
product other than volumes of data and information. 
3.3.4 Risk Mitigation  
Lungu (2011: 16) explains that KM is critical to mitigating the negative effects stemming 
from the complexity and continuous evolution of security and military environments, rapid progress 
in technology developments and increased demand for flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness, 
amongst others.  This mitigating effect is brought about through the creation of new meaning and 
understanding which becomes available to decision-makers. 
3.3.5 Enabling Strategies 
Knowledge management strategy is positioned as pivotal to the military information 
revolution as well as a critical enabler for military operations, knowledge generation, information 
sharing and technological innovation (Browning, 2002 in Manuri & Yaacob, 2011: 74). The USA 
Army Knowledge Management is positioned as the transformative strategy to achieve network 
centricity and a knowledge-based force (Santamaria, 2002 in Manuri & Yaacob, 2011).  The USA 
FM6-01.1. (2012) elaborates extensively on the use of KM strategies and their importance.  These 
are just some instances that express the importance of KM strategy to military organisations and 
operational aspects. 
3.3.6 KM Processes and Efficiency 
The USA military KM doctrine posits that KM enhances collaboration between USA military 
and other relevant people in any given location.  This enables rapid knowledge sharing and transfer 
which are critical KM processes to decision-making and action.  (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-1)  
Mortensen (2014: 9), based on ADP 6-0, states that one of the principles of mission command is the 
creation of shared understanding.  Mortenson (2014) states further – “One of these specified tasks – 
creating a shared understanding – is an important objective of a knowledge management program. 
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This doctrinal link between the principals of Mission Command and Knowledge Management 
makes KM an essential enabler of Mission Command.” (Mortensen, 2014: 9). 
Mortensen (2014) is of the opinion that KM enhances the effectiveness of employees.  He 
states - “If the KM team gets it right, the Commander spends his time making critical decisions, and 
not trying to find documents.” (Mortensen, 2014: 10).  Knowledge management is also posited as 
an enabler for doctrine development; doctrine being considered capstone
56 
military knowledge.  
Knowledge management enhances the learning qualities of the organisation through knowledge 
development and methods such as lessons learned programmes.  In general, KM assists the 
organisation to use the available knowledge effectively and efficiently. (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-
1). 
A practical example of illustrating effectiveness and efficiency achieved during a real military 
operation by the USA in Afghanistan during 2006 is depicted in Figure 3.1 - 
 
Figure 3.1: USA Military – An Example of Real KM Effect 
Source: USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 3-18). 
Knowledge management is thus an important capability required by the military to enhance 
decisions, actions, effects and advantage. 
3.4 USA PERSPECTIVE ON MILITARY KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
A short case study is based on the use of KM by the USA military.  This is not based on its 
relative position of military power, complexity and size, but purely on the availability of published 
material. The case study material is supplemented, where available, with published literature 
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 “capstone publication — The top joint doctrine publication in the hierarchy of joint publications that links joint 
doctrine to national strategy and the contributions of other government departments and agencies, multinational 
partners, and reinforces policy for command and control.” (US, 2017: 31) 
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elaborating on the military KM perspectives from other countries.  Due to the scant availability of 
published military KM material, supporting views from other published military KM material will 
be based on the availability of and not on any systematic methodology.   
Military KM is a continuation of the discourse about organisational KM demand due to the 
perceived impact of KM on organisational survival, competitiveness and advantage.  A discussion 
on the USA military KM aims at demystifying why the SA DOD should be interested in KM (SRQ 
2), what military knowledge categories and types should be management (SRQ 3) and contribute to 
the construction of an SA DOD KM model (SRQ 4).  The discussion will not attempt to analyse all 
the available USA military policy and doctrine on KM but will focus the analysis and discussion on 
answering the research questions.  The focus of the analysis will also hover at the strategic level 
rather than drilling down into tactical solutions which will be highly contextual.  Let us first 
consider how the USA military KMC came into being. 
3.4.1 USA Military Knowledge Management Development: A Historical Overview 
Mortensen (2014: 7) states an example of very early origins of USA military KM – 
“The concept of collecting, analyzing, and distributing knowledge is not new to the U. S. Army. 
From the inception of the Continental Army in 1775, General George Washington developed 
organizations and processes designed to collect and disseminate information about British and 
American forces. Which means, the basic concepts of knowledge management are not new to the 
American Army; what is new is how we think of about the management of that knowledge.”. 
Bartczak and England (2005) write a brief history on the origins of USA military KM and the 
challenges faced initially. The USA Air Force Material Command 
57
 is the origin for USA military
KM, which commenced with the recognition of the requirement in the early 1990s, labelling it USA 
Air Force Knowledge Management.  Bartczak and England (2005) thus place the start of USA 
military KM in the corresponding period that contemporary KM started as discussed earlier in 
chapter 2 of the dissertation.  Since then the USA Army launched an initiative named the Army 
Knowledge Online which evolved into Defence Knowledge Online (Barquin, 2011: online).  In 
2008 the USAF published the 2008 USAF ISR Strategy which institutionalises KM further in the 
USAF. 
The USA military thus recognised the importance of KM for military requirements from 
virtually the very beginning of contemporary KM (the USA military started in the early 1990s with 
the USAF the first to implement KM, the USA Army started implementing circa 2003).  By 2014, 
Mortensen (2014: 7) was of the opinion that USA military KM doctrine was still emerging.  
Currently (2017), the USA FM6-01.1. (2012) is USA military KM doctrine as implemented and 
practised. 
What the USA military also recognised was the criticality of KM strategy for KM initiatives 
success (Bartczak & England, 2005: 107 and later the USA Field Manual 6-01.1., 2012).  In fact, 
the USA DOD Joint Vision 2020 focuses on achieving information and knowledge superiority, 
stating that - “…information superiority provides the joint force a competitive advantage only when 
57
 USA Air Force Material Command employs approximately 85 000 military and civilian personnel (this is roughly the 
entire SA DOD permanent force strength). 
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[information] is effectively translated into superior knowledge and decisions.” (USA DOD, 2000: 
11 in Marshall, 2007: 12).  This vision of information and/or knowledge superiority as a 
prerequisite for military advantage is also articulated in the 2008 USAF ISR strategy (USA, 2008) 
and by Manuri and Yaacob (2011).   “[K]nowledge superiority depends on qualitative differentials: 
identifying the specific target and directing the right matter to the right space at the right time 
within the opponent’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop” (USA, 2008: 17).  This statement 
links knowledge superiority to the ‘who-what-where-when-how-which effects–what thereafter’ 
characterisations of knowledge and the importance of the OODA loop as a knowledge process.  
What is noticeable in the 2008 USAF ISR Strategy is the constant reference to the 
information age and not the knowledge era – “We now live in the information age.”  (USA, 2008: 
7).  Yet, with the acknowledgement that knowledge is the fourth pillar and the driver of advantage, 
the world crossed over into the knowledge era.  A key expression driving KM in the USA military 
is found in the 2008 USAF ISR Strategy - 
“Knowledge is now the “fuel”, the fundamental prerequisite for success.” (USA, 2008: 8). 
The USA Air Force Material Command initial KM effort was based on commercial KM 
processes and understanding, consisting of a number of smaller applications that provided access to 
Defence Acquisition related knowledge, a lesson learned programme, a Community of Practice 
(CoP) programme and some online training and education facilities.   What is critical to note from 
the early experiences of initiating a USA military KM programme (circa 1998) are that the 
programme had an appointed champion (leadership) and it was funded (resourced) for development 
– two KM CSF identified in chapter 2 of the dissertation.  The very early USA KM programme
definition was – “…to enhance organizational performance by explicitly designing and 
implementing tools, processes, system, structures, and cultures to improve the creation, sharing, and 
use of knowledge that was critical for decision-making”.  The focus was on knowledge 
identification, capturing and leveraging as core KM processes. (Bartczak & England, 2005: 107).  
Key issues that hampered KM success were associated with different levels of commitment to 
KM by the leadership echelon; friction due to organisational mandates for the management of 
certain IT and application between the IT organisation and the USA Air Force Knowledge 
Management component; competition for funding; a requirement for performance measurement to 
support bids for continued and more funding; a poor understanding of KM and its potential and 
benefits by the organisation (the Malaysia Air Force grappled with the same problem - Manuri and 
Yaacob, 2011); what would be the optimum branding of the initiative so as to support status, 
leadership and funding requirements (Bartczak, 2002; Bartczak & England, 2005 and Marshal, 
2007).  These issues closely correspond to discussions about KM CSF in Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation.  Other issues voiced as barriers to KM initiatives from other foreign militaries are 
knowledge being managed in silos and lack of KM awareness and understanding (Malaysia Air 
Force – Manuri & Yaacob, 2011). 
Adkins, Bartczak, Griffin and Downey (2010) write on the progress made and lessons learned 
from the USA Air Force Knowledge Now programme, as a continuation of KM development in the 
USAF.  The USAF Knowledge Now’s definition of KM is “…a systematic process of identifying, 
capturing, and transferring personal practices, experiences, and expertise that can be used to 
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enhance performance or improve related tasks or processes” (Hague & Verma, 2008: 12).  The 
USAF Knowledge Now continuously evolves to meet the USAF requirements for knowledge 
sharing and learning.  The USA Air Force Knowledge Now also became the host for the Financial 
Management Knowledge Management programme (Hague & Verma, 2008).   
The USA Navy Knowledge Online soon followed the establishment of the USA Air Force 
Knowledge Management (Manuri & Yaacob, 2011).  The Malaysian Air Force has similar KM 
platforms as the USA Air Force Knowledge Now, USA Navy Knowledge Online and USA Army 
Knowledge Online (Manuri & Yaacob, 2011).  Adkins, Bartczak, Griffin and Downey (2010) 
summarise seven key lessons learned from the USA Air Force Knowledge Now programme as - 
 Decentralised approach.  Knowledge management initiatives benefitted immensely from a 
decentralised approach to implementation and use of KM.  The USA Air Force Knowledge Now 
only provides the information systems platform, tools and overarching governance centrally 
which was named the Air Force Centre of Excellence for Knowledge Management.  The content 
shared is managed by the users.  This developed in an open, flexible and non-hierarchical 
environment for knowledge sharing, learning and innovation. 
 User-friendly.  The system was designed for ease of use.  Simplicity and adaptability to new 
requirements and operational situations were key drivers for growth in user numbers. 
 Assistance.  A help desk function proved to be extremely useful to get users started and keeping 
users connected, which are important for knowledge sharing.  The fact that this help desk is 
staffed by people with experience made it very successful. 
 Access.  Ubiquitous access to the USA Air Force Knowledge Now system soon became a 
requirement for programme success.  Knowledge flow does not want to be hampered by 
geography, time differences or organisational structure or culture. 
 Reliability.  Confidence in the IT systems used.  Users must be familiar with these systems and 
have confidence in their prolonged availability. 
 Reward and recognition.  Contribution to the USA Air Force Knowledge Now is rewarded and 
recognition is given to important contributions.   
 Self-propagating.  The user-base will grow by word-of-mouth if the experience using the system 
is satisfactory.  
The evolution and growth of a KM initiative are important to remain relevant in complex 
military environments.  If there are requirements for organisations to evolve in response to 
complexity, then the management processes should be flexible and adaptive to co-evolve.  
Therefore, if the suite of KM processes is too prescriptive, the organisation might soon find itself 
out of sync with environmental requirements for new meaning or have knowledge processes (such 
as the OODA loop) that are reactive rather than pro-active or ahead of the curve. 
Degen (2008) writes from a USA Army perspective on USA KM imperatives for the 
management of USA military doctrine.  Degen (2008: 106) provides an explanation of the USA 
military knowledge categories or types of knowledge to be managed and how these fit the 
organisation's strategy and/or operations. Figure 3.2 provides a synopsis of categories or types of 
military knowledge to be managed from a USA military perspective.  This can be applied in general 
to all militaries with varying degrees of complexity.  These are thus adopted for the purpose of this 
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research.  However, the researcher would like to restrict the discussion and analysis in later chapters 
to policy, doctrine, IP and intelligence.  This research would like to focus on capstone military 
knowledge that is at the strategic level and provide strategic direction to the organisation.  Other 
knowledge considered as capstone military knowledge is closely related to execution but based on 
policy, doctrine and intelligence.  Intellectual Property, on the other hand, is considered capstone 
knowledge because it confers advantage if controlled, owned and used.  Subsequent research on SA 
DOD knowledge, and based on a knowledge audit, can possibly consider analysing the complete 
portfolio of knowledge discovered.   
Influencing factors that will alter the use of some of the KM tools mentioned is organisational 
culture and security arrangements.  Initially, the type of knowledge managed by the USA Air Force 
Material Command was business function related laws, directives, policy, regulations and online 
courses. (Bartczak & England, 2005: 109).  Knowledge management is posited as the enabler to 
manage military doctrine with.  Military doctrine is equated to capstone military knowledge – at 
least when it comes to force generation and operations. 
 
Figure 3.2: USA Military Knowledge Management Systems Approach 
Source: Degen (2008: 106). 
Although the diagram (Figure 3.2) is not a formal USA military KM model or system; it 
provides a synopsis of the capstone military knowledge requiring management (doctrine, tactics, 
techniques and procedures), sources and knowledge (organisational documents, handbooks) and 
KM tools for sharing and learning (e.g. community of interest/purpose/practice, collaboration sites 
and blogs) and some of the KM tools available to KM processes (typically knowledge sharing and 
learning) as enablers to mission command, military advantage and effects (e.g. knowledge 
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superiority).  Interestingly, policy, strategy and intelligence are not explicitly stated as capstone 
military knowledge but can be interpreted as being part of “Capstone Documents and Concepts”.  
Because of international militaries organisational similarity, this synopsis contributes to answering 
SRQs 3 and 4.  
Degen (2008: 103) describes the evolutionary process that shaped USA doctrine over a period 
of more than a century.  Degen (2008: 102) constantly refers to Field Manual (FM) 1 (The Army) 
and FM 3.0 (Operations) which describe doctrine as - “… a body of thought on how [USA] Army 
forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force.  Doctrine focusses on how to think – not 
what to think.”.  Interestingly, the definition does not refer to a ‘body of knowledge’ but rather a 
“body of thought”, essentially equating knowledge to thought or how to think.  Thinking is a 
process embarked on to create awareness, clarity, learning, sense, understanding and meaning in 
order to make decisions to act or not.  USA Joint Publication 1-02 (Department of Defence 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2001: 165 and not page 169 as published by Degen, 
2008) is quoted by Degen (2008: 103), defining doctrine as the - “… fundamental principles by 
which the military forces of elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives”.  
This definition distinctly links knowledge (in the form of doctrine) to action and the achievement of 
higher level objectives.  This is important when attempting to construct a KMC for an organisation.  
In terms of the USA Army, those higher level objectives are articulated in the USA National 
Security Strategy and National Military Strategy (Degen, 2008: 105), amongst others. 
The SA DOD has a very similar arrangement, RSA National Security Strategy and SA DOD 
Military Strategy, striving towards the achievement of national security objectives through decision-
making and action to achieve some desirable effects and advantage.  These objectives should be 
linked to a future SA DOD KMC to ensure the alignments of strategic vision and other strategic 
outcomes.  When it is accomplished it will set the tone for integrated and coherent SA DOD KM.  
Today, KM is a recognised and critical military capability and component of USA military 
advantage, linked to USA national security (Marshal, 2007 and USA, 2008).  Views from the USA 
Army KM Field Manual (USA FM6-01.1., 2012)
 58
 will now be discussed as the leading USA KM
doctrine. 
3.4.2 USA Army Knowledge Management Doctrine 
USA military KM did not originate in the USA Army.  The USA Army adopted KM as a 
discipline in 2003. (USA FM6-01.1.)  However, by 2011 the USA Army was leading the USA 
military KM initiative (Barquin, 2011).    
The USA Army defined KM as - “… a discipline that promotes an integrated approach to 
identifying, retrieving, evaluating, and sharing an enterprise’s tacit and explicit knowledge assets to 
meet mission objectives.” (Barquin, 2011: online).  This definition resonates with earlier definitions 
by the USA Air Force Material Command.  These processes and activities are also associated with 
58
“This publication supersedes FM 6-01.1, dated 29 August 2008. This manual provides doctrinal knowledge 
management (KM) guidance. It provides doctrine for the organization and operations of the KM section, and establishes 
the doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to effectively integrate KM into the operations of 
brigades and higher. This manual and its successors are intended to provide the guidance on how to use KM 
successfully to benefit Soldiers at the tip of the spear as well as commanders and staff, in present and future operational 
environments, in an era of persistent conflict.” (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: iii-iv) 
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other management disciplines such as data and information management as well as intelligence 
formulation.  However, the KM definition above aims at applying the said processes and activities 
to knowledge, which is closely related to IC as discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation –  
“… [tacit knowledge is the] personal store of knowledge gained from life experience, training 
[human capital], and formal and informal networks of friends and professional acquaintances 
[relation capital]… explicit knowledge include dictionaries, official department publications 
(field manuals, technical manuals, tactics, techniques, and procedural manuals,…pamphlets) and 
memorandums [structural capital]” (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-2) 
Definitional issues are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  The USA Army sets out 
to achieve KM with the USA military doctrine on Knowledge Management Operations - USA 
FM6-01.1. (2012). As such, the USA Army Headquarters (HQ) currently sets the tone for USA 
military KM with the USA FM6-01.1. (2012) dictating capstone KM doctrine.  Since the 
publication of the USA FM6-01.1. (2012) version, the USA Army committed to the implementation 
of KM to the lowest organisational level. (Mortensen, 2014: 7)  Concisely stating the USA military 
KM objective, but also providing insight as to the molecular level (down to the individual person) 
KM has to permeate the USA military, the USA military KM doctrine states –  
“Every soldier must understand and practice KM” (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-1) 
To this end, the USA Army HQ established an Army Operational KM Proponent (USA FM6-
01.1. (2012: iii).   The FM6-01.1. (2012) describes KM doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures 
for USA Army Brigades and higher.  Because of comparative sizes and levels of complexity, the 
document provides very good insight into requirements for SA DOD KM. 
The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy defines knowledge as - “The awareness of what is operationally 
relevant in the conflict space” (USA USAF ISR, 2008: 17).  The definition is very restricted in the 
sense that it only really refers to tacit knowledge, ‘awareness’ being a human phenomenon. Explicit 
knowledge such a doctrine, policy, strategy, tactics, techniques and procedures informs this 
awareness and are possibly products of such awareness to a large extent.   Years later the USA 
Army KM doctrine defines knowledge as - 
 “…information that has been analyzed to provide meaning or value or evaluated as to 
implication for the operation.  It is also comprehension [understanding] gained through study, 
experience, practice, and human interaction that provides the basis for expertise and skilled 
judgement.  Knowledge results from analysis of information and data.  Individuals gain 
knowledge when they place information in context based on what they already know, available 
factual information, and their judgement and experience.  This leads to understanding.”  (USA 
FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-2)
59
. 
The definition equates knowledge to meaningful information resulting from a number of 
sources and processes in order to ‘understand’.  This relates well to the structural capital of 
organisations.  What is problematic about the definition is that it equates knowledge to information 
and not directly to ‘meaning’.  Not all analysed information will result in meaning.  This ‘meaning’ 
must provide some value proposition; however, the definition does not elaborate on this.  The 
                                                 
59
 See footnote 53. 
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definition stops short of providing the user with a precise indication why this ‘meaning’ is required 
– for example, to facilitate enhanced decision-making, actionable, decision-quality intelligence or 
knowledge, action and effects.  When considering the first definition, the ‘meaning’ and subsequent 
‘understanding’ will probably result in ‘awareness’ – also evident in the diagram of the OODA loop 
below (Torruella, date unknown: slide 8).  The second part of the definition addresses tacit 
knowledge inherent in people, (human capital) and possibly relational capital (knowledge from 
human interaction). This is not restricted to the military but is a generic assessment of knowledge.  
From the USA FM6-01.1. (2012) description of knowledge, both tacit and explicit knowledge 
are acknowledged and separately addressed as types of knowledge; corresponding to the theory 
surrounding these types of knowledge as discussed in the epistemology of knowledge in chapter 2 
of the dissertation.  The definition also addresses the construct of IC broadly.  The USA FM6-01.1. 
(2012: 1-12) posits the dimension volumes of tacit vs. explicit in Figure 3.3.  This slightly 
contradicts the position of a 30-70% split posited by Weeks (2016) in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: USA Army Perception of Knowledge Type Volumes 
Source: USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-12). 
What is important in terms of answering SRQs 3 and 4 is the examples of (USA) military 
knowledge mentioned by the USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-2) – “… [tacit knowledge is the] personal 
store of knowledge gained from life experience, training [human capital], and formal and informal 
networks of friends and professional acquaintances [relation capital]… explicit knowledge include 
[sic] dictionaries, official department publications (field manuals, technical manuals, tactics, 
techniques, and procedural manuals,…pamphlets) and memorandums [structural capital]”; a view 
supported by Bartczak and England (2005: 109) and Manuri and Yaacob (2011: 74).  Although the 
USA FM6-01.1. (2012) provides some indication as to what is perceived as knowledge and types of 
knowledge it is by no means an exhaustive list.  Hague and Verma (2008: 12) add - “… rules, 
regulations, guidelines, and directives”.  Manuri and Yaacob (2011: 74) add - “… doctrine, policies 
and procedures, operations and training manuals, information systems, work flow [sic] and 
databases”.  Lungu (2011: 119) adds - “… processes, routines and norms” to the mix. Interestingly 
enough, no mention is made of various strategy documents, regulations and legislation as examples 
that inform the creation and maintenance of the above-mentioned types of explicit knowledge but 
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also how tacit knowledge might be generated and shared.  Another example that might be 
considered is training curricula, critical to learning organisations.  These are all examples of 
structural capital.  It also illustrates the usefulness of broader constructs such as human-, structural-, 
and relational capital in definitions rather than specific processes or artefacts.   
As a published example of explicit military knowledge; Paparone (2008) writes on the USA 
military logistics knowledge and provide an integrated model of military logistics knowledge from 
a USA Army Logistics perspective.   The model detail military logistics subject matter which could 
be refined to provide a sense of knowledge categories which should be considered for management 
within other military functional areas, e.g. personnel, finance, acquisition, research and 
development, policy and strategy, etc. – see Figure 3.4.  From a definitional perspective, these can 
be categorised according to the IC construct. 
 
Figure 3.4: USA Army Logistics 
Source: Paparone (2008: 40). 
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Lungu’s description of logistics knowledge is slightly more practical than that of Paparone 
(2008). Lungu (2011: 118) contributing from a North Atlantic Treaty Organisational perspective, 
describes at least three military logistics knowledge domains, i.e.: 
 production/acquisition logistics knowledge: “… knowledge related to research, design,
development, manufacture and acceptance of materiel, which includes standardisation and
interoperability, contracting, quality assurance, procurement of spares, reliability and defence
analysis, safety standards for equipment, specifications and production processes, trials and
testing (including provision of necessary facilities), codification, equipment documentation,
configuration control and modifications”.  Several of these fall within the domain of IP, which is
capstone military knowledge.
 in-service logistics knowledge:  “… knowledge associated with procuring, receiving, storing,
distributing and disposing of materiel, which is required to maintain the equipment and supply
the force”.
 consumer/operational logistics knowledge:  “… knowledge concerning the reception of the
initial product, storage, transport, maintenance (including repair and serviceability), operation
and disposal of materiel, that includes stock control, provision or construction of facilities,
movement control, reliability and defect reporting, safety standards for storage, transport and
handling, and related training”.
The snapshot explanation of Lungu (2011) above provides a comprehensive view of the 
vastness of a singular military knowledge domain.  Consider the vastness of an entire military force 
such as the USA military if the operational functions of a military are considered to be C2, 
intelligence, fires, movement and manoeuvre, protection and sustainment.   
The USA Joint Doctrine Publications identify the operational functions as personnel, 
intelligence, operations, logistics, plans and communications systems (JP 3-0, 2011: v).  These 
functional areas closely resembles the Continental Staff System adopted by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisational countries, to have the following nine Joint-functions: J-1: personnel and 
health; J-2: intelligence and security; J-3: operations; J-4: logistics; J-5: plans; J-6: signal and 
communications; J-7: training and coordination; J-8: continuous improvements; and J-9: 
finance and contracts. (Logavatu, 2015: online)  There are a number of variations of the 
composition of the J-1 to J-9 staff functions but in essence, all addressing the same.  These can all 
be considered key knowledge domains for militaries; in conjunction with the operational functions 
are a boundless amount of knowledge and knowledge types.  With this in mind, one could 
appreciate the complexity of knowledge and knowledge system requirements to manage this 
volume of knowledge, coherently and in an integrated manner. 
Thus, the researcher proposes to move away from listing types of knowledge in the definition 
of knowledge.  Also, the definition of knowledge should not make reference to ‘knowledge is 
information’ – because it is not.  The researcher proposes that knowledge is new and evolving 
meaning stemming from KM processes, in the form of intellectual capital, in order to understand, 
make decisions, act or not, create the desired effects and obtain and sustain advantage. 
USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-1) defines KM as – “… the process of enabling knowledge flow to 
enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking [sic].”.  This definition is simplified 
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by KM defined as - “Know, Show, Grow!” Know = tacit “head knowledge”; Show = knowledge 
that is written down and documented (explicit knowledge) to be shared with others; Grow = 
collaboration towards innovation which sparks new knowledge”.  (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: iv) 
Another definition of USA Army KM taken from USA Army Regulation 25-1 (USA AR 25-1, 
2008)
60
 is - “… a discipline that promotes an integrated approach to identifying, retrieving, 
evaluating, and sharing an enterprise’s tacit and explicit knowledge assets to meet mission 
objectives” (Barquin, 2011, online).   
Although there are some elements of the definitions (FM06-01.1. and AR 25-1) that are 
similar, the FM6-01.1.-definition is much less prescriptive regarding the processes to be followed 
and also deals with the concept of knowledge holistically (rather than splitting it up in explicit and 
tacit).  The USA AR 52-1.-definition is less clear about the KM objective, only coupling it to 
‘mission objectives’; whereas the first definition elaborates more on generic objectives that have an 
organisation wide applicability (e.g. enhanced decision-making and understanding).  These 
definitions show clearly that the USA military is also still wrestling with coherence issues. 
The USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-1) KM definition is simplistic and clearly based on the work of 
various academics as discussed earlier under the epistemology of knowledge and KM.  Zhang 
(2013: 18) defined KM as “KM = (P + K)S” – P (people), K (knowledge) and S (sharing) - as 
discussed earlier in the dissertation.  Defining KM in such a simplistic manner is useful for 
organisations because it is easy to remember and to create a management mantra from it.  However, 
this should be supplemented with detailed description to ensure comprehensive understanding and 
coherence. 
                                                 
60
 This publication has since been revised and is now called AR 25-1 (Army Information Technology (25 June 2013). 
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Figure 3.5: OODA Loop vs Knowledge Pyramid 
Source: Torruella (date unknown: slide 8). 
Key acknowledgement is the existence of both tacit and explicit knowledge, a process to 
convert or extract tacit knowledge and makes it explicit, processes to share knowledge for use 
during collaboration and the requirement to continuously generate new knowledge (which is 
consistent with the principles of the OODA loop discussed earlier as well as objectives of learning 
organisations). 
Torruella (USA DOD presentation) utilises the OODA loop to depict the link between 
knowledge and understanding, decision-making and action in Figure 3.5. The role of knowledge is 
even more evident from an Effects-Based Operations perspective, as briefly discussed in the literary 
review (dissertation Chapter 2), based on the ideas of Deptula (2001) in Batschelet (2002: 3) – see 
Figure 2.6.  Knowledge is clearly linked to action and achieving specific effects. 
The USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-11) takes the knowledge hierarchy one step further by 
considering wisdom to be the pinnacle of knowing (Torruella used ‘understanding’ as the pinnacle, 
which is probably more practical considering the shortages in wisdom).  What is problematic about 
Figure 3.6 is the fact that decision-making is distinctly linked to wisdom, which is a very scarce 
state of being.  Literature prescribes knowledge as the advantage driver, not wisdom – probably in 
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recognition of the scarcity of wisdom.  Also, shared understanding assumes coherence and 
integration.   
Figure 3.6: Creating Shared Understanding 
Source: USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-11).  Also found in discussion in Bennet, Bennet and Lee (2010: 317) 
citing Ackoff (1989) and Davenport and Prusak (1998).  However,   Bennet, Bennet and Lee (2010) posit 
that this hierarchy is not a continuum but rather a guide to comprehending how understanding and meaning 
come about. 
Two other important aspects of Figure 3.6 is the art of leadership and science and systems.  
From a mission command perspective, this is the art of command and the science of control.  From 
a KM perspective, the researcher proposes – the art of knowing61 and the science of managing
knowledge to obtain and sustain advantage - as the KM leadership philosophy. 
The researcher is of the opinion, based on the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2), that the 
USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-1) addresses the crux of KM.   However, the definition could possibly be 
expanded with objectives that address action and effects. McIntyre, Gauvin and Waruszynski, 
(2003) in Manuri and Yaacob (2011: 74) are of the opinion that - “Military KM will play a valuable 
role in leveraging existing knowledge and converting new knowledge into action through the KM 
cycle”.   
61 The art of knowing is not a novel construct.  Duguid (2005) used the phrase ‘the art of knowing’ in his chapter 
heading in which he wrote about the practicalities and realities of communities of practice as a method of knowledge 
sharing and creation.  Another author, Code (2011), use the phrase in the title of his article that explores the 
epistemology of knowing and how it relates to constructs such as imagination, science and art and implications for 
education. 
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A military effect is an operational concept used by militaries worldwide and emanates from 
Effects-Based Operations
62
 doctrine.  FM6-01.1. (2012) graphically explains that KM enables 
enhanced decision-making in Figure 3.7 – 
 
Figure 3.7: Enhancing Decisions with Knowledge Management 
Source: USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-9), also in Figure 3.9. 
The objective of KM is to - “… create shared understanding [mission command principle] 
through the alignment of people, processes, and tools within the organizational structure and culture 
[USA Army KM model] in order to increase collaboration and interaction between leaders and 
subordinates” (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-1) and KM - “… seeks to enhance shared understanding 
and decisionmaking [sic]  by creating knowledge, organizing knowledge, applying knowledge, and 
transferring knowledge” (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-2) – a KM process perspective.   
Stated more concisely, KM - “…creates, organizes, applies, and transfers knowledge and 
information between authorized people.” (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: iv).  This provides the first clear 
indication that KM has a security component – a process and requirement not highlighted by 
literature as discussed in chapter 2 of the dissertation.  Also, clearly recognise the existence of 
knowledge and information and that both get transferred by KM process.  The projected results are 
improved decision-making, flexibility, adaptability, integration, and synchronisation for the 
achievement of advantage (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1-1).   
The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy states - “… actionable intelligence” (USA: 2008: 4 & 8), “… 
decision-quality intelligence” (USA: 2008: 14) and - “… actionable knowledge” (USA: 2008: 9 & 
16) as products of KM.  This is important because it separates the constructs of knowledge and 
                                                 
62
 McIntyre, Gauvin and Waruszynski (2003) writes for the military environment and specifically from the perspective 
of the concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs.  Included in this concept is effects-based warfare (EBW), which 
could be applied to the management sciences – i.e. effects-based management.  These are important concepts for 
Defence, specifically to provide the right resources, at the right place and time, at the right force level – to create the 
right effect (notions raised by March, 2005: 1) Defence KM should be managed along these lines – i.e. to create the 
right effect in support of force development and deployment. Hildebrand (1999), from an information processing 
perspective, dispels this notion off “right” as a myth – and should therefore be interrogated to ensure that the philosophy 
of KM is based on the right assumption(s).   
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intelligence and links both to a specific quality.  Intelligence
63
 is regarded as capstone military 
knowledge, required for decisions and actions and a requirement to create effects and advantage or 
to confirm certain effects and/or advantage has been achieved. Thus, intelligence is tailored for end-
use and thus very context and time specific – conforming more to what knowledge is perceived as. 
The USA FM6-01.1. (2012:1-3) lists that the main USA military KM components as people, 
processes, tools and organisation (see Figure 3.7 and 3.9), which closely correspond to the construct 
of IC explained in the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2).  The Army Knowledge 
Management (AKM) (2008) categorise these as people/culture, process, and technology (a view 
supported by Manuri and Yaacob, 2011). The USA FM6-01.1. further recognises that KM is more 
than IT and communication technology management.   These components resonate well with 
several other KM models as discussed in the literature review (dissertation chapter 2).   
An important statement made by the USA FM6-01.1. (2012) is that people are vital for KM 
success – with a clear recognition that both internally employed people, as well as people external 
to the organisation with stakeholdership (i.e. people within other government departments, 
agencies, institutes, and even private organisations),  are included.  This perspective finds 
grounding in the 2008 USAF ISR Strategy state requirement - “… teams of humans to produce 
actionable intelligence” (USA, 2008: 8) – noting the opinion about KM and intelligence in footnote 
63.  These perspectives, again, highlight integration as a pre-requisite for KM success.  Manuri and 
Yaacob (2011: 78) articulate this as -“Conceptually, the KM in military is about connecting those 
who know with those who need to know (‘who-what-where-when’) and leveraging that knowledge 
across the military organisation and to contractors, non-governmental organisations, the other 
military services and coalition partners.”.  It presents a strong case for the inclusion or recognition 
of other stakeholders in an organisational or military KM model, acknowledging that military 
knowledge might be external to the military organisation.  It also provides strong support for 
relational capital as a vital part of military KM. 
Another component included in the people component of KM is leadership and its 
importance, discussed below more specifically in terms of the role of the CKO and highlighted 
earlier as an initial barrier to the first USA military KM initiatives and discussed as part of mission 
command as a military construct. The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy calls for “Multi-dimensional 
Leaders … the ability to lead teams to create knowledge” (USA, 2008: 9). 
When considering KM principles, the USA Army has two perspectives on the matter.  The 
USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 5-6) and Mortensen (2014: 11) describe six KM principles.  Barquin (2011) 
- based on USA AR 25-1 and Manuri and Yaacob (2011) – based on Army Knowledge 
Management (AKM) (2008) describes 12 KM principles (also contained in a KM model by Neilson 
(unknown: slide 3).  Consider the following table: 
                                                 
63
 McIntyre, Gauvin and Waruszynski (2003: 39) writes from a Canadian military perspective that – “Similarly, 
battlefield intelligence requires KM that is accurate and timely to “determine enemy or potential enemy force composition, 
position, capabilities and intentions; while reducing the potential for strategic, operational, tactical, or technological surprise.” 
22 The intelligence cycle is a four-step process for obtaining, assembling and evaluating information, converting it into 
intelligence and disseminating it. The first phase, direction, is when commanders determine the requirements, communicate 
them to staff who in turn collect existing material and request collection from other sources. The second phase, collection, 
occurs when reconnaissance and surveillance data is gathered by sources and agencies. The third, processing, phase involves 
the collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and assessment of the gathered information. This phase is the conversion of 
information into intelligence. In the final, dissemination, phase intelligence is distributed to those who require it.” 
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Table 3.1: USA Military Knowledge Management Principles 
USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 5-6) and  
Mortensen (2014: 11) 
Barquin (2011) - based on USA AR 25-1
64
 
Manuri and Yaacob (2011) – based on AKM (2008) 
“Understand - Shared understanding across, 
between, and through Soldiers/leaders and 
organizations is the desired objective.  
 
Share - Knowledge is a transferable asset which 
tends to grow with use and application. KM 
helps the Army to acquire and share knowledge 
in support of the operational objectives.  
 
Integrate - KM breaks down stovepipes and 
enhances situational understanding.  
 
Connect - KM focuses on transferring tacit 
knowledge between individuals, teams, and 
units through collaboration.  
 
Learn - KM fosters individual and collective 
learning and contributes to developing learning 
organizations by integrating informal learning, 
organizational learning strategies, and KM 
capabilities.  
 
Trust - Successful KM depends on willingness 
to share knowledge so that others can benefit. 
This sharing contributes to building an 
environment of trust and mutual 
understanding.”. 
 
People/Culture Dimension 
Principle 1: Train and educate KM leaders, managers, 
and champions. 
Principle 2: Reward knowledge sharing and make 
knowledge management career rewarding. 
Principle 3: Establish a doctrine of collaboration. 
Principle 4: Use every interaction, whether face-to-face 
or virtual, as an opportunity to acquire and share 
knowledge. 
Principle 5: Prevent knowledge loss. 
Process Dimension 
Principle 6: Protect and secure information and 
knowledge assets. 
Principle 7: Embed knowledge assets (links, podcasts, 
videos, documents, simulations, wikis ...) in standard 
business processes and provide access to those who 
need to know. 
Principle 8: Use legal and standard business rules and 
processes across the enterprise. 
Technology Dimension 
Principle 9: Use standardized collaborative toolsets. 
Principle 10: Use Open Architectures to permit access 
and searching across boundaries. 
Principle 11: Use a robust search capability to access 
contextual knowledge and store content for discovery. 
Principle 12: Use portals that permit single sign-on and 
authentication across the global enterprise including 
partners. 
Adapted from the stated sources in the first line of the table. 
Although there is a considerable overlap between the sets of principles there are some 
principles that are standalone.  One such principle is - “Principle 6: Protect and secure information 
and knowledge assets”.  Again, acknowledging the importance of both constructs to KM. 
Principle 6 is a principle or process that is not commonly articulated by academics, authors or 
practitioners.  It is probably not a very favoured principle among knowledge managers because it 
inhibits knowledge sharing and flow and thus knowledge growth and innovation.  However, 
knowledge security as a principal and/or process is extremely important for KM capabilities for the 
obvious reason that if knowledge is not secured for authorised usage the organisation could lose it 
or lose the advantage attached to it when it becomes public/opponent knowledge.  These issues are 
addressed in the military by organisational components dealing with information security and 
counter-intelligence. It could be quite possibly the result of the obvious requirement for knowledge 
security and the common practice of information security that knowledge security is not written 
about.   
                                                 
64
 The father of the 12 Army KM principles was Dr R.E. Neilson; the first Knowledge Management Advisor to the 
Army’s Governance, Acquisition & Chief Knowledge Office (Barquin, 2011). 
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Because KM is a relatively new phenomenon, militaries must integrate organisational policy 
and doctrine dealing with data, information, IM, information security, intelligence and counter-
intelligence, IT, communication and associated technology, knowledge and KM – in order to 
successfully employ KM enterprise-wide.  Organisations will thus have to make a concerted effort 
to balance requirements for knowledge sharing with that of knowledge security.  The objective of 
this balancing would be to connect people who know with people who need to know, in a secure 
manner in support of the mission command principle of creating shared understanding.  The nexus 
is; share and then secure or secure and then share?  
3.4.3 USA Knowledge Management Challenges 
Weeks (2016: slide 5) lists a number of USA Army KM challenges.  These are - disparate 
systems and repositories; stovepipes in systems and operations; inefficient, redundant processes and 
procedures and loss of knowledge.  The redundancy of KM processes and procedures is an 
indication that KM definitions and management models should not be based solely on KM 
processes.  This tends to limit flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness to changes in the 
environment. KM is about ‘dynamic human processes’ that facilitate understanding and new 
meaning.  
Organisational knowledge loss has much less to do with security than it has to do with HRM 
(resignations, death, poaching, churn, retirements, etc.).  These affect access to the tacit knowledge 
of individuals, which consists of 70% of the organisational knowledge, according to Weeks (2016: 
slide 7).  These issues are addressed separately in the USA Army KM model (Figure 3.9). 
In order to mitigate the inherent risk stemming from the challenges above, Weeks (2016: slide 
5) suggests the use of enterprise solutions (i.e. broad integration), establishing a culture of
collaboration (thus a culture of knowledge sharing and security for corporate memory), 
organisational knowledge assessments (knowledge audits) and knowledge capture (making 
knowledge explicit and contributing to corporate memory stability). 
3.4.4 USA Military Knowledge Management Models 
The USA Military KM model confirms the importance of KM processes, people, technology 
and culture to KM.  The model represents people and culture (presumably this is organisational 
culture) as the foundation to KM, with technology in an enabling role to the KM principles.  Based 
on the USA Army KM principles, Neilson compiled a presentation that contained a graphic model, 
depicted in Figure 3.8.  These can be found as fundamentals in other KM models discussed in 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation.  It confirms that these fundamentals have application and bearing on 
both private and public organisations – the military is a primary public organisation.   
From the USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 3-5 and 1-9) another detail about the USA Army KM 
models is visible.  The USA Army KM model, as per USA FM6-01.1., is a very simplistic graphic, 
packed with most of the KM elements discussed thus far in this dissertation – see Figure 3.9.  The 
four organisational components of this model are also largely included in the model below (Figure 
3.8). Of the four components illustrated, people are regarded as the most important – for obvious 
reasons already discussed up to now.  What is also important is the fact that the components need an 
alignment, which implies integration and coherence. 
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Figure 3.8: USA Army Knowledge Management – A Principles-Based Approach 
Source:  Neilson (unknown, slide 3). 
The model is not prescriptive about the processes, however, description is provided in the 
narrative of USA FM6-01.1. (2012). Figure 3.10 elaborates on the detail missing in Figure 3.8 and 
3.9.  In the KM process model (Figure 3.10) primary KM processes are identified – i.e. assess, 
design, develop, pilot, and implement. The 2008 USAF ISR Strategy identified create, broker, 
bundle, export, import and use as KM processes.  Again, like in the literature review, semantics are 
at play, but it also alludes to dissonance.  The USA FM6-01.1. (2012) describes in detail the USA 
Army KM tasks and processes.   
The KM tasks, distinctly categorised as content management activities, are knowledge 
creation, - organising, - applying, and – transfer.  These are linked distinctly to improved shared 
understanding and decision-making. (USA FM6-01.1., 2012: 1.2 and Appendix A). The USA FM6-
01.1. (2012: 1-3) summarises these tasks as follows – “… Knowledge creation is the process of 
developing new knowledge or combining, 
restructuring, or repurposing existing 
knowledge in response to identified 
knowledge gaps. … Organizing knowledge 
includes archiving, labeling [sic], and 
identifying. These are specific tasks of content 
managed under the implement step of the KM 
process. Organizing knowledge ensures that 
users can discover and retrieve knowledge that 
is relevant, and knowledge managers can track 
knowledge products throughout their life 
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cycle. … Applying knowledge refers to making knowledge accessible to those who need to use it. It 
seeks to create conditions so users can retrieve and apply the knowledge they need. This is the 
primary purpose of content management, and occurs during the implement step of the KM process. 
A key aspect is ensuring that multiple users can easily retrieve knowledge products, which enables 
collaboration in applying knowledge. … Knowledge transfer is the movement of knowledge — 
including knowledge based on expertise or skilled judgment — from one person to another. It 
describes how knowledge is passed between individuals and groups. It includes knowledge 
developed within the unit and received from other sources.  
Figure 3.9: USA Army Knowledge Management Model 
Source:  USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-9). 
Effective knowledge transfer allows all involved to build on each other’s knowledge in ways 
that strengthen not only individual Soldiers but also the entire organization. It is more than simply 
moving or transferring files and data. Since knowledge transfer occurs between people, KM 
includes creating techniques and procedures to develop knowledge skills in leaders, build 
experience, and transfer expertise. … Knowledge transfer enables units and Soldiers to begin.”. 
Note that no mention is made of data or information.  Supplementary to the KM tasks, the 
USA FM6-01.1. (2012) dedicates the entire Chapter 3 of the document to what is perceived as USA 
Army KM processes.  Mortensen (2014: 13) states - “Understand that knowledge management is 
not a single cycle process, but an integrated series of cycles – some sequential, some in parallel”.  
This is a good description of the dynamics involved.  It clearly calls for integration. 
The objective of the cyclical nature of the KM process model is to enhance continuous 
organisational performance, mission command and decisions. The process is cyclical with 
automatic backtrack options, thus allowing flexibility and adaptability in the application of the 
process.  These processes are regarded as core KM processes, not ends in themselves, and supported 
by various sub-processes. 
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Figure 3.10: Knowledge Management Processes 
Source:  USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 3-1), also used in Weeks (2016: slide 13). 
Assess provides the user with a process to monitor and evaluate the current situation and 
requirement for knowledge.  “Assess information flow in the organization. Identify obstructions to 
the free flow of information (knowledge gaps), and identify the means of eliminating or minimizing 
those obstructions (knowledge solutions).”  (Mortensen, 2014: 12).  This corresponds to the OODA 
loop processes – observe and orientate.  In short, the process determines what is required by 
leadership to make decisions and provides a gap analysis of what is known and what should be 
known in order to act and achieve the desired effects and, possibly, advantage.  Design, as a 
process, aims at constructing knowledge artefacts (the researcher prefers the word ‘artefact’ instead 
of ‘product’ because of products commercial affiliation) and services that will enable enhanced 
decision-making, action, effects and advantage.  Examples include new or updated doctrine and/or 
intelligence, new software, knowledge networks, access to experts in the field, access to retired 
expertise, etc.  This step is dependent on the gap analysis that was completed during the assessment 
and is driven by the user requirements.  The next step is to build the solution that will satisfy the 
requirements, after which it will be implemented for a pilot period to test and evaluate the output in 
terms of the requirement.  Once the KM artefact or service has been validated it will be 
implemented and integrated into other KM artefacts and services that are already operational.  This 
happens whilst the entire KM process runs concurrently, continuously assessing new situations to 
provide new solutions. (USA FM6-01.1., 2012 and Mortensen, 2016). 
These process steps include a variety of subordinate processes and activities currently in use 
with the USA Army in support of achieving set objectives.  A detailed discussion of each of these 
solutions is outside the scope of this dissertation but could be studied for applicability to the SA 
DOD in future research.  However, to list them, would support the selection of KM processes for an 
SA DOD KMC.   
The USA FM6-01.1. (2012) posits that not all KM tools are technology but anything that 
could facilitate the sharing of knowledge and information and the preservation thereof.  This 
includes tools that use IT and software to make collaboration and communication possible in a 
structured way – e.g. communities of interest and/or –practice and/or purpose, professional forums, 
after action reviews, interviews, storytelling, etc.   
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Figure 3.11: The SECI in Practice (USA Army) 
Source:  Weeks (2016: slide 15).  Some of these tools are also addressed by Degen (2008: 106), Dalton 
(2010) and USA FM6-01.1. (2012). 
The USA Army provides practical examples of KM tools that could be employed within each 
SECI component (discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation) that could be used individually by 
personnel or collectively by the organisation, as depicted in Figure 3.11.  Some of the tools listed by 
USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-4, 1-5 and Chapter 3) are a wide variety of information systems, data 
analysis tools and search tools, an assortment of collaborative tools, expertise-location tools to find 
subject matter experts and expertise development tools in support of learning organisation 
objectives. 
These tools or enablers are specific from organisation to organisation – depending on the level 
of sophistication and requirements.  For militaries such as the USA military, these tools are 
extensive.  The requirements for these systems for a developing nation such as South Africa will be 
very different in terms of scope and sophistication. 
Noticeable, even for an organisation such as the USA military, is the absence of the criticality 
of knowledge security.  It can only be assumed that it is somehow included in ‘organisation’ as part 
of Figure 3.7 and 3.9, as would aspects of leadership and culture be. 
3.5 THE RELEVANCE AND ROLE OF A CHIEF KNOWLEDGE OFFICER IN THE 
MILITARY 
Considering that leadership is identified by literature as probably the most important CSF to 
KM success, it thus seems pertinent to elaborate on a key leadership position in organisations from 
a KM perspective – i.e. the CKO.  The USA military has recently separated the roles of the CKO 
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and the CIO.  The CKO’s roles and responsibilities are formalised by USA FM6-01.1. (2012) and 
the CIO’s by USA AR25-1 (2013). 
Neilson (2001), the CKO and professor at the Information Management College USA 
National Defence University, provides some interesting graphic illustrations on the roles of the 
CKO and why knowledge is important.  He draws theory from seminal work by Earl and Scott 
(1999).  Neilson concludes that the role of the CKO is fundamental to successful KM.   
Militaries around the world are very familiar with the concept and requirements of IM, IT and 
all associated warfare disciplines (e.g. information warfare, electronic warfare, cryptography, cyber 
warfare, intelligence and counter-intelligence, etc.).  Knowledge management, however, is a new 
concept to most militaries and would thus not have a CKO, but in most cases would have an 
organisational function that mirrors that of a function that would/could typically be headed by a 
CIO.  The USA military has both acknowledged the importance of IM and KM as separate and 
distinct functional organisational requirements to ensure competitive advantage.  The USA military 
elaborates extensively on the role of the CKO in KM doctrine as discussed above and in documents 
such as those by Mortensen (2014). 
From a KM perspective and understanding from the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) 
that IM and IT plays an enabling role to KM initiatives, it should thus be clear that the CIO function 
is a key supporting role to the availability of data and information.  The output of the CIO function 
provides that product which when converted by any number or combination of conversion 
processes results in knowledge.  That conversion processes are a key function of the CKO in 
support of enhanced decision-making, action, effects and advantage. 
3.6 KNOWLEDGE SILO INTEGRATION  
Knowledge silos are a distinct feature in most organisations.  Manuri and Yaacob (2011: 74-
75) state that although the Malaysian Air Force has various knowledge domains, resources and 
processes; these are present in silos and not managed in an integrated manner and hence not 
achieving the advantage it should.  
Taken from the AKM (2008) and KM definition in Manuri and Yaacob (2011: 77) - “… a 
discipline that promotes an integrated approach to identifying, retrieving, evaluating, and sharing an 
enterprise’s tacit and explicit knowledge assets to meet mission objectives” – identifies integration 
of various processes as fundamental to successful KM.  Army Knowledge Online provides the USA 
Army with an integrated platform that provides access to the knowledge required for corporate and 
operational functions (Manuri & Yaacob (2011).   
Integration was stated as an important consideration for successful KM in the USA military 
throughout Chapter 3 of the dissertation.  Integration, as a fundamental requirement for military 
KM, is as important and very similar to the principle of ‘jointness’ in military operations.  However, 
‘jointness’ does not necessarily guarantee integration. 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
Very little academic material on military KM is available; let alone empirical studies.  Due to 
the highly complex military operational and corporate environments, it would not have been 
unreasonable to expect much more academic exploration of the functionality that KM is providing 
to militaries.  Yet, the academic space is sparsely populated with military KM research and 
publications. 
The leader in military KM publications is the USA military, but mostly in military documents 
such as doctrine and lower level procedure. Because of the size and complexity of the USA 
military; USA military KM perspectives cannot just be exported and implemented in any other 
military organisation.  Also, because knowledge and KM are highly contextual, countries should 
develop their own perspective on KM and how to implement it.   
Military KM is important for several reasons; amongst others – survival, advantage and 
superiority; enhanced decision-making, flexibility and adaptiveness; actionable, decision-quality 
intelligence and knowledge; risk mitigation; enabling strategies and organisational effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
A peculiarity of academic articles and organisational literature discussed thus far is the fact 
that virtually none discuss military intelligence distinctly as a primary function for KM and counter-
intelligence as primary military KM security function.  Very little is published on security as a 
requirement for KM.  Knowledge security is mostly dealt with from an information security and 
counter-intelligence perspective.  Most militaries will have policy and doctrine on information 
security – mostly found in intelligence and counter-intelligence policy, doctrine, tactics and 
techniques.   
As discussed in the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2), knowledge is more than 
information and data.  Thus, militaries should also be thinking about knowledge security, not just 
information security and related counter-intelligence policy and doctrine.  Knowledge security and 
protection are addressed by the USA Army KM doctrine, thus confirming that it is a distinct 
requirement to be managed. 
The largest and most complex military in the world has embraced KM as a military advantage 
enabler.  The roles and functional separation between the CKO and CIO support academics views 
that knowledge and information are mutually re-enforcing and required to be competitive; with 
knowledge being the advantage driver.  The USA military takes its mandate for KM from high-level 
doctrine, cascading KM down to the lowest levels of the organisation by means of leadership’s 
initiatives, training and organisational policy, strategy, doctrine, tactics, procedures, processes and 
techniques. 
The USA military defines KM as - “… the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance 
shared understanding, learning and decisionmaking [sic]” (USA FM6-01.1. (2012: 1-1).  However, 
this is not the only definition available for USA military KM – but probably the most authoritative.  
This is clearly a process-focused approach to KM; which is both pragmatic and practical but 
restrictive from a flexibility, adaptability and responsive perspective.  Also, the definition does not 
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clearly link KM to action, effects and advantage but just understanding, learning and decision-
making.  If it is assumed that decisions will lead to action, effect and advantage then decisions is 
probably adequate.  But such an assumption is risky. 
The USA military identified capstone military knowledge as being policy, doctrine, 
intelligence, IP, tactics, techniques, procedures and processes.  These are typical forms of structural 
capital from the perspective of IC.  Thus, the document analysis (dissertation Chapters 5 and 6) 
focuses on the DR 2015, SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine as the highest form of strategic 
direction and guidance to organisational decision-making and action in order to make sense of the 
SA DOD’s position on knowledge and KM.  Within these documents, the researcher focussed on 
policy and doctrine expressions relating to policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP as forms of capstone 
military knowledge as these forms of structural capital will have a deciding influence on the future 
of the SA DOD.  Tactics, techniques, procedures and processes will flow from these and could be 
the subject of further research and a future SA DOD knowledge audit. 
The USA military identified key barriers to the successful implementation of KM, defined 
KM and crafted KM principles and processes from an organisational perspective.  This is probably 
based on the fact that it is understood that KM is ‘ba’ specific and context driven and have to be 
tailored to suit the organisational requirements.  Based on views from the literature review 
(dissertation Chapter 2), these are all components that are important for organisations that seek to 
implement KM initiatives and will thus be explored further in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 from an SA DOD 
perspective. 
When considering the research problem and questions; there is a handful of studies addressing 
KM in the SA public sector – but there is no academic research on SA DOD or SA military KM.  
This could be reduced to a lack of interest in this particular type of management; it could be that the 
SA DOD is not aware of this type of management; and/or it could be that the security regime within 
the SA DOD hampers such endeavours and/or that the SA DOD does KM under the umbrella of 
knowledge domains such as intelligence and doctrine.  The document analysis and subsequent 
questionnaires with key personnel within the SA DOD shed light on these and other questions 
regarding the perceived absence of KM within the SA DOD. 
The discussions in the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) and this chapter provide an 
overview of the diversity that exists amongst those that theorise and practice KM.  Within the 
diversity, there are recurring themes and concepts and/or the diversity stems from semantics and 
practical applications.  An important output of this research report is to construct a proposed 
definition for SA DOD knowledge and KM.  Based on the discussion thus far, the researcher 
proposes the following working definition for SA DOD knowledge - 
 
Figure 3.12: Proposed SA DOD Knowledge Definition 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM. 
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This definition builds on the conceptions of Polanyi, Wittgenstein, Nonaka, Sveiby Spender 
and Marr and others that defines knowledge as the - “… capacity to act” and follows an 
interpretivist approach to understanding and knowledge – i.e. create meaning.  The definition is 
aligned with the complexity and discontinuous change that characterise society, today and into the 
foreseeable future, in the sense that it conceptualise ‘meaning’ to constantly evolve into ‘new/other 
meaning’ due to that infinite amount of data, information and other knowledge available to the 
individual(s) trying to understand, make decisions, act survive or gain advantage.   
Knowledge, defined thus, decouples it from individualised or organisational processes and 
prescriptiveness, setting it free to evolve with changing contexts and realities to remain relevant to 
the user when required.  However, the definition also implicitly relies on processes to create 
meaning, take decisions and actions.  These are critical for both survival and advantage. The 
implementation of the definition will rely on organisational policy to provide guidance to all KM 
initiatives within the SA DOD. All these issues highlight the requirement for KM.  Based on the 
proposed working definition for SA DOD knowledge above, the following working definition for 
SA DOD KM is proposed by the researcher - 
 
Figure 3.13: Proposed SA DOD Knowledge Management Definition 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM. 
This definition is closely aligned to the proposed definition of knowledge that was proposed 
above and could thus be associated with an interpretivist approach to knowledge and the 
management thereof, positioning the future management of SA DOD knowledge in third generation 
KM and aligned with the requirements of the knowledge era.  The researcher chose not to make the 
proposed KM definition process-based and prescriptive because it limits the applicability of the 
definition within organisational components, functions and processes.  The only prescript is the 
distinct requirement for integration.  The proposed definition for SA DOD KM allows for flexibility 
and adaptation within complex, dynamic environments.  The definition does not restrict military 
concepts of mission command and is closely aligned with the OODA loop and concepts of 
operation proposed by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  
Figure 3.14 (below) proposes recognition of the internationally accepted knowledge hierarchy 
combined with other concepts relevant to the military environment.  The graphic proposes that 
wisdom is composed of knowledge; knowledge of information and information of data – and that 
military effects should be the result of knowledge-based decisions and action (also wisdom if it is 
available), which should create and sustain military advantage. The hierarchy proposes (from 
literature) that there is a status difference in the value of the constructs. Based on discussions in the 
literature review (dissertation Chapter 2), the military KM (dissertation Chapter 3) the researcher 
proposes the following graphic to relate the various constructs to capstone military knowledge, the 
OODA loop, effects and advantage - 
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Figure 3.14: Proposed Knowledge Hierarchy 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
The knowledge hierarchy can also be conceptualised as a knowledge continuum because of 
the difficulty to define the exact of separation between each construct.  A knowledge continuum 
better represents the age-old conundrum of separation between the constructs.  This suggestion is 
reflected in Figure 3.15 - 
Figure 3.15: Proposed Knowledge Continuum 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
Based on the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) and military KM (dissertation Chapter 
3) there should be KM coherence and integration within an organisation in order to enhance the
quality of decisions, action and effect in order to unlock advantage. Coherent and integrated KM 
should at least reflect a common understanding of the knowledge continuum.  The researcher is of 
the opinion that in order to be practical and have a more realistic chance of success, organisational 
knowledge should be understood as IC.  It is thus not just a challenge of coherence and integration 
for the knowledge continuum but also coherence and integration of the components of the IC 
paradigm.  Figure 3.16 represents this thinking - 
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Figure 3.16: Proposed Knowledge Continuum (IC and Feedback Loops) 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM. 
Figure 3.16 also includes feedback loops indicating that it is not a unidirectional journey to 
advantage, but, based on the acceptance that knowledge is dynamic and evolves over time in order 
to keep pace with uncertainty, change, innovation and complexity - every decision, action, effect 
and element of advantage will create new data/information/knowledge/wisdom that will trigger 
more decisions, action, effect and hopefully elements of advantage – perpetually. In order to 
provide a focussed view of the proposed knowledge continuum (Figure 3.16) and the proposed KM 
definition (Figure 3.13), consider the following graphic: 
 
Figure 3.17: Proposed Knowledge Continuum (IC and Feedback Loops) with the Key 
Elements of the Proposed KM Definition 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM. 
Coherence and integration are the dark matter of this perpetual cycle.  Without it the 
organisation will end up with several individual cycles that possibly focus on individual or lesser 
value combinations of knowledge continuum constructs that might affect decisions, action, effect 
and advantage sub-optimally.  Currently, however, the SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine are 
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suffering from considerable construct dissonance with regard to knowledge continuum constructs.  
Based on the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine, Figure 3.18 depicts this 
dissonance -  
Figure 3.18: Reflection of the Current SA DOD Construct Dissonance 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. The red lines depict the distinct constructs and the blue 
lines depict the fact that constructs are used interchangeably and incoherently. 
Combining the findings of the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) and the military KM 
case study (dissertation Chapter 3), academic and organisational building blocks are provided for 
the final discussion on why the SA DOD should be interested in KM, what knowledge should be 
managed and how.  These proposed definitions will inform the document analysis to follow.  The 
next chapter of the dissertation discusses the research methodology followed during the research 
and the crafting of the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 4 - RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of Chapter 4 of the dissertation is to provide the reader with a detailed 
understanding of the methodology followed, why this methodology was selected, and how it was 
executed.  The chapter introduce and discuss issues regarding the study area and units of analysis, 
research approach and methodology, the research process followed and aspects contributing to 
rigour and quality.  A recognised research methodology was used to support systematic research.   
4.1.1 Research Philosophy, Methodology, Design and Methods 
Ngulube (2015) provides an excellent synopsis of the research philosophies, methodologies, 
design and methods used in KM research based on publications in the Journal of Knowledge 
Management (period 2009-2013).  Ngulube (2015) provides a concise explanation of the interaction 
between these aspects of academic research.  Another study that elaborates extensively on the 
relationships of these components was published by Na (2015).  An outline of the research 
philosophy selected for this dissertation is discussed next.  
Ontology and epistemology constitute the philosophical assumptions about the nature of 
knowledge (Ngulube, 2015).  Na (2015: 58), drawing on the work of Easterby-Smith, et al. (2012) 
and Saunders, et al. (2009), states that – “… ontology is the philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of reality”.  This refers to the worldview of a researcher, and in particular whether such 
researcher has a predisposition towards being objective or subjective. (Saunders, et al., 2009)  
These worldviews divide social reality into at least the following ontological categories according 
to Easterby-Smith, et al. (2012) in Na (2015: 59) - 
 
Figure 4.1: Ontological Research Assumptions 
Source: Easterby-Smith, et al. (2012) in Na (2015: 29) 
According to the categorisation in Figure 4.1 above, the researcher of this dissertation adopted 
a relativist worldview.  There are many and varied points of view (contexts) about knowledge and 
the management thereof (discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation) and with varied applications 
Subjective (Sanders, et al., 2009) 
Objective (Sanders, et al., 2009) 
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depending on the context and the worldviews of those that uses knowledge.  Thus the difficulties to 
define these constructs.  The second philosophical assumption to consider is about epistemology, 
i.e.  – “…‘what is knowledge and what are the sources and limits of knowledge (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2008), and ‘what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study’ (Saunders, et al., 
2009)”. (Na, 2015: 59)  Definitions vary and are numerous, however, epistemological assumptions 
can be categorised into at least positivism and social constructivism according to Saunders, et al. 
(2009) and Easterby-Smith, et al. (2012) in Na (2015: 59).  Na (2015: 60) provides the following 
comparison in Figure 4.2 below –  
 
Figure 4.2: Epistemological Research Assumptions 
Source: Easterby-Smith, et al. (2012) in Na (2015: 29) 
The researcher of this dissertation calibrate his relativist worldview with social 
constructivism.  The researcher is part of the research area and the research are in the interest of the 
individuals and the organisation constituting the study area.  The researcher also construct rich 
description of the phenomenon and make theoretical abstractions.  The selected case study is based 
on one organisation (the SA DOD) with a secondary case study being part of the literature review 
(also one organisation – the US military).  The constructivist seeks to construct reality from the 
perspective of the individual and is thus associated with subjectivism, following more than often a 
qualitative research methodology. Thus, the researcher follows a ‘there is more than one truth’ 
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approach as described in Figure 4.1. Positivism is associated with the objective realities typically 
found within the natural sciences.  It is organically, facts-based and objectivist - following more 
than often a quantitative research methodology.  Ngulube (2015: 29) provided a graphical 
representation of the relative position of these components to assist with conceptual understanding 
in Figure 4.3 below – 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figur
e 4.3: 
Research Paradigms, Methodologies, Designs and Methods followed by this Dissertation 
Source: Ngulube (2015: 129) 
To summarise, the researcher has a relativist worldview (ontological assumption), calibrated with a 
social constructivist paradigm (epistemological assumption), favouring a qualitative research methodology 
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and case study research approach/design that will render the rich description of the phenomenon using 
techniques such as document analysis and questionnaires.    
4.1.2 The Research Area and Unit of Analysis 
The research area for this dissertation is the SA DOD.  There are at least three distinct sources 
of knowledge (or IC) within this research are - SA DOD employees (human- and relational capital), 
organisational documents and SA DOD related legislation (structural capital).  These sources form 
the units of analysis for the dissertation. This makes document analysis and questionnaires attractive 
options as research techniques.  Consistent with the theory that people create, store and use 
knowledge (Levit & March, 1988 as well as Grant, 1996a & b); a selected sample of SA DOD 
Senior Management was identified to voluntarily complete a questionnaire consisting of a 
compendium of open-ended questions.   The research area and unit of analysis is graphically 
represented in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4: Research Area and Units of Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
The selected sample of SA DOD personnel represents the leadership strata of the SA DOD.  
This leadership is divided into at least two components – the Secretariat of Defence senior 
management and the command cadre within the SANDF (reflected in Sections 199(1) and 204 of 
the Constitution).  This strata of leadership must execute KM or at least have an interest in KM for 
knowledge to be managed in the SA DOD.  The sample selection criteria for possible participants 
are discussed later in this chapter.  The Depatment of Military Veterans and its members were not 
included as units of analysis because of the limited access the researcher had to the structures, 
members as well as the relative newness of the organisation.  Future studies may explore the 
integration of the Military Veterans KM with that of the SA DOD. 
4.1.3 Qualitative Research Methodology 
The researcher recognises the fact that there is an ongoing (albeit mature) debate on the 
primacy of qualitative vs. quantitative research methodology.  In agreement with the arguments of 
Collins (1984), Eisenhardt (1989), Flyvbjerg, (2006) and Neuman (2011), and various other 
authors, a qualitative approach to data collection, management and analysis was employed. Collins 
(1984) states that - 
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“Words are not only more fundamental intellectually; one may also say that they are necessarily 
superior to mathematics in the social structure of the discipline.  For words are a mode of 
expression with greater open-endedness, more capacity for connecting various realms of 
argument and experience, and more capacity for reaching intellectual audiences”  (Collins, 1984 
in Neuman, 2011: 509). 
The appropriateness of qualitative research typically applies when the researchers aim at 
revealing the nature of certain situations, processes, relationships and systems.  “Instead of variables 
[closely associated with quantitative research], we examine motifs, themes, distinctions, and 
perspectives” (Neuman, 2011: 175).  Eisenhardt (1989) aptly describes this as the answers to the 
question ‘why?’  
Understanding of a particular phenomenon is enhanced by the qualitative researcher’s 
interpretative ability (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005: 134-135).  Qualitative research also allows the 
researcher to gain insight into the specific phenomenon and develop new concepts or theoretical 
approaches to the phenomenon.  Numerous scholars (Eisenhardt, 1989; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005; 
Badenhorst, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Baxter & Jack, 2008; and Neuman, 2011), amongst others, 
agree on the fact that qualitative methodologies lend itself to extract and create a deeper 
understanding of a particular phenomenon and describing it layer-for-layer – or thick description 
according to Badenhorst (2007).  This ‘deeper understanding’ is important for this research, 
specifically to understand why the SA DOD seems to be disinterested in KM and why the SA DOD 
should be interested in KM.    
Lee (1999: 6) describes some of the quantitative research limitations as being limited in 
respect of allowing the researcher to explore multiple realities (from an ontological assumption 
perspective); to interact with the phenomenon being studied (from an epistemological assumption 
perspective); to take cognisance of biases and values that affect the phenomenon (from an 
axiological assumption perspective); to use context to transform the language used in the 
description (from a rhetorical assumption perspective); and to use - “… induction, multivariate, and 
multiprocess [sic]  interactions, and context-specific methods”.  Lee (1999) and others (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Neuman, 2011) are of the opinion that qualitative research methodologies 
do not limit these.    Neuman (2011: 214) writes - 
“Many qualitative researchers question the quantitative researcher’s quest for standard, fixed 
measures and fear that such measures ignore the benefits of having a variety of researchers with 
many approaches and may neglect key aspects of diversity that exist in the social world”.  
Quantitative research is very useful for the identification of relationships (correlation) 
between and significance of variables; but it is qualitative research that provides the utility to 
understand the reasons for such relationships or correlation (Eisenhardt, 1989).  It is this 
understanding that is important for organisational development, policy and strategy formulation and 
resource management.  It allows for open-ended thinking.  Na (2015: 70) states – “Overall 
characteristics of qualitative research methods can be concluded to be subjective and deductive 
approaches… [and are] useful methods for performing exploratory [research].”.  
Quantitative research could test certain variables for significance, but would then ultimately 
discriminate against other variables that were not considered.  Thick description, as conceptualised 
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by the academic community should, therefore, provide a more accurate, nuanced and relevant 
understanding that could be subjected to quantitative methods in follow-on studies to determine 
specific significance. The researcher agrees with the conception of Flyvbjerg (2004: 432 and 2006: 
242) that - “Good social science is problem-driven and not methodology-driven in the sense that it 
employs those methods that for a given problematic, best answer the research questions at hand.”.  
Na (2015: 74) provide a schematic that summarises the main differences between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in Figure 4.5 blow -  
 
Figure 4.5: Comparison between Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
Sources: Creswell (2009); Bryman (2012) and Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009) in Na (2015: 74). 
Therefore, to extract a rich understanding of the prevailing motifs, themes and perspectives 
interacting within a social space and associated peculiarities, the researcher must interact with the 
unit of analysis of the area of study.   
Quantitative methods could be used subsequently to determine the significance of the 
qualitative findings, but without the initial understanding of the dynamics of the area of study and 
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the unit of analysis there would be nothing to test quantitatively.  In essence, qualitative approaches 
allow research results that could not necessarily be accomplished through quantitative research 
approaches (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Thus, a qualitative research methodology was used for this 
dissertation. 
4.1.4 Research Design: Single Case Study 
In studying the KM body of knowledge there are both positivist approaches (typically suited 
for empirical studies, e.g. Kruger & Johnson, 2009; Girard & McIntyre, 2010; Manuri & Yaacob, 
2011, Musimwa-Makani, 2012) but mostly interpretative and critical approaches (typically suited 
for single case- and multiple case studies – e.g. Bartczak, Boulton, Rainer, Oswald & O’Malley, 
2010).  
The case study research design dates to the 1920s with its origins in sociological studies. 
Currently, most case studies use qualitative research approaches (Badenhorst, 2007, Neuman, 2006 
and 2011).  “Qualitative case studies afford researchers opportunities to explore or describe a 
phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources” (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 544). Case study 
research designs are typically appropriate when - “(a) the focus of the dissertation is to answer 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions [description and exploration]; (b) you cannot manipulate the behaviour 
of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they 
are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the 
phenomenon and context” (Yin, 2003 in Baxter & Jack, 2008: 545).  The goal of this research is to 
establish ‘why’ there is a perceived disinterest in KM in the SA DOD; ‘why’ KM is important to 
organisations such as the SA DOD and ‘how’ this could be achieved.  A single case study design 
with embedded units was used to analyse the SA DOD through document analysis and supported by 
questionnaire data.  Case studies are also considered appropriate where few studies have been 
conducted (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989 and Guy, 1994) 
Yin (1994: 13), assuming a constructivist
65
 posture, states that - “A case study is an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. This view is supported 
by Baxter and Jack (2008).  At the heart of qualitative case study research is expert, context-specific 
and dependent knowledge according to Flyvbjerg (2006).  Case study research is thus well suited to 
construct new meaning on SA DOD KM due to its focus on contextual expertise as well as 
contextual issues surrounding the research questions.  Reality is the focus and not some form of 
artificial laboratory experiment or environment.  
Neuman (2006: 40), Leedy and Ormrod (2005: 135) Badenhorst (2007) state that case study 
research involves the examination of - “… individuals, groups, organisations, movements, events, 
or geographic units” and/or components of these and how they relate to each other over a specific 
period of time and in specific contexts.  The SA DOD exhibits all these components and most of 
them use and creates knowledge.  They are contextually bound by various factors at specific times 
or over specific periods within specific spaces.    
65
 Constructivist’s paradigm “recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning, but doesn’t reject 
outright some notion of objectivity.”  (Miller & Crabtree, 1999 in Baxter & Jack, 2008: 545) 
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When building theory or models from case studies there is a habitual overlap of data 
collection and analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In fact, Glaser and Strauss (1967) in Eisenhardt (1989: 
538) argue for the - “… joint collection, coding, and analysis of data” to accomplish the outcome.   
A joint approach enables the researcher to conduct early analysis and also to introduce flexibility to 
the process in order to make changes to the data collection process to unearth emergent themes that 
were not evident earlier in the process (Eisenhardt, 1989). Once possible contributions emerged the 
data collection methods can be adapted (Gersick, 1988; Harris & Sutton, 1986; Sutton & Callahan, 
1987; and Barton, 1988 in Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, it must be reiterated that the flexibility 
allowed within qualitative case study designs is not consented to be unsystematic in execution 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), which might result in drifting away from the purpose of the dissertation.  
The researcher could not find any research on SA DOD KM.  The closest to this was to 
analyse the published academic and other material addressing KM theory and application in the 
wider business and public service environment. The definitions of knowledge and KM for the 
purpose of this research have been deductively derived from literature (Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
dissertations). The USA case study (Chapter 3 of the dissertations) was a desktop study of 
published literature on the topic. It did not include implementation tactics, practices and procedures. 
Deductively-determined origins of SA DOD knowledge and KM will follow in Chapters 5 and 6 as 
part of the SA DOD case study. 
This dissertation focus on document analysis in the literature review (Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
dissertations) and in particular on relevant national legislation, the DR 2015 and a selected sample 
of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  All the documents represent a snapshot of the prevailing 
thinking and understanding of a particular phenomenon at that time within national and 
organisational space.  The researcher first completed the literature reviews of Chapters 2 and 3 
before commencing with the SA DOD case study.  This provided a broad scope of perspectives 
regarding KM.  The risk of doing the literature reviews and SA DOD case study concurrently is that 
the findings and insight provided would have augmented the researcher’s perception of KM and 
thus caused the literature reviews to become narrowly focused and directed, rather than ‘open-ended 
and exploratory’.  Supporting the document analysis, questionnaires were issued first to a selected 
group of SA DOD Senior Managers (16) and in later rounds to the entire strata of SA DOD Senior 
Managers (275) that is accountable for SA DOD knowledge and the management thereof.   
Because the unit of analysis consists of the IC inherent in two primary organisational 
components with two distinct functions – i.e. the Sec Def and the SANDF – a single case study with 
embedded units design was used.  This enabled the researcher to explore the unit of analysis while 
considering the interaction and management complexities between the two embedded units where 
evident.  Yin (2003) writes - 
“The ability to look at sub-units that are situated within a larger case is powerful when you 
consider that data can be analyzed within the subunits [sic] separately (within case analysis), 
between the different subunits [sic] (between case analysis), or across all of the subunits [sic] 
(cross-case analysis). The ability to engage in such rich analysis only serves to better illuminate 
the case.” (Yin, 2003 in Baxter & Jack, 2008: 550). 
Thus, the researcher used a single case study design for the area of study with embedded units 
and a qualitative data collection, management and analysis approach.  The approach will allow 
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‘why’ and ‘how’ questions to be answered about SA DOD KM due to the fact that very little is 
known about SA DOD KM and both KM and the SA DOD are complex and extremely contextual.  
The design assisted the researcher to respond to the assumption that the SA DOD is not interested in 
KM; why the SA DOD should be interested; and which type of knowledge should be managed and 
other KM fundamentals required for a coherent and integrated KMC.    
4.2 THE PROCESS 
Published literature was used to gain an understanding of the KM body of knowledge; its 
history, epistemology, ontology and how it manifests itself in private and public organisations.  This 
is accomplished with a documentary assessment of the general KM theory and practice in the 
literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) and review of literature of military KM (dissertation 
Chapter 3); sequentially completed before the document analysis of SA DOD related legislation and 
documentation commenced (dissertation Chapters 5 and 6) in order to mitigate bias towards the 
findings in the relevant SA DOD documents.  This formed the basis for the proposed knowledge 
and KM definitions.  It also assisted with the identification of fundamental KM issues to be 
considered for the construction of a future SA DOD KMC.  These proposed definitions calibrated 
the rest of the research because of the focus it provided within the KM body of knowledge.   
Document analysis of published literature was used to establish the importance of knowledge 
and KM to organisations.  This is in support of the research question about why the SA DOD 
should be interested in the KM (SRQ 2).  Combined with research to identify the principles, 
activities, KM models, CSF and best practices that inform KM initiatives were identified.  This was 
completed for both business and militaries due to the raison d'être
66
 differences between private and 
public service organisations.  Deduced from this analysis was fundamental issues to be considered 
for SA DOD KM initiatives and KMC. 
Document analysis of relevant and a selected sample of SA DOD documents (dissertation 
Chapters 5 and 6) followed the completed literature reviews in Chapters 2 and 3.  The research 
focused on the perception of a disinterest in KM by the SA DOD (SRQ 1) but also to what extent 
the KM is important to the SA DOD and how does the SA DOD busy itself with KM (knowingly or 
unknowingly).  The document analysis is also important to identify and understand what knowledge 
the SA DOD has and should be managing (SRQ 3).  Answers to SRQ 1-3 placed the researcher in 
an ideal position to construct a conceptual SA DOD KM model as part of the fundamentals for SA 
DOD KM (SRQ 4). 
The insight gained from the literature reviews and SA DOD case study analysis assisted the 
researcher to construct a questionnaire with open-ended questions to be completed voluntarily by 
SA DOD Senior Management respondents.  The purpose of the questionnaires was to gather 
knowledge on issues relating to SRQs 1-4.  Responses aim at providing useful insight and 
confirmation of interest in SA DOD KM.  The number of no responses were indicative of the level 
of interest in SA DOD KM.  The entire process placed the researcher in a better position to assess 
the impact of the research on both theory and practice and also to suggest future research areas. 
                                                 
66
 “The most important reason or purpose for someone or something's existence” (Oxford Dictionaries. Online.  
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/raison_d'etre) 
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4.2.1 Methods: Document Analysis and Questionnaires 
The research commenced with literature reviews on KM-related theory and practice 
(dissertation chapter 2) and military KM (dissertation Chapter 3) to establish the conceptual 
framework for the research.  The primary data/information/knowledge collected focused closely on 
the research questions.  The collection process did not aim at total saturation of the subject field; 
also to limit drifting away from the purpose of the dissertation – but wide enough in scope to 
facilitate deductive reasoning.   
Initially, the researcher used the work of Ma and Yu (2010) to identify pioneers in the field of 
KM.  Ma and Yu’s research span the period 1998-2007, covering an important cross-section of the 
KM hype cycle described by Riempp & Smolnik (2007: 3).  This provided theoretical and empirical 
direction as to important authors, subject fields, academic and operational themes, concepts, etc. 
that influenced KM.   
Primary data/information/knowledge (literature) was collected from several so-called 
databases (e.g. Google Scholar, Emerald, EBSCO and Proquest, etc). Search keywords were 
restricted to knowledge, knowledge management, knowledge management factors, knowledge 
management strategy, knowledge management failures, knowledge management barriers, 
knowledge management successes, knowledge management critical success factors, knowledge 
management models, defence knowledge management, military knowledge management, and/or 
combinations of these. 
Published literature and other material published online (typical organisational policy, 
strategy, doctrine, field manuals, etc.) detailing military KM initiatives (specifically the USA 
military as a small case study) were used in the chapter on military KM (dissertation Chapter 3).  
The USA, a premier military superpower, initiated KM more than a decade ago and has published 
extensively (typically USA military documents) on progress made. No bias was intended.  Thus, a 
small case study was done on the USA KM initiatives (in the form of a literature review and 
document analysis) to find answers to SRQ 2-4.  The research did not attempt to analyse all the 
available USA military policy and doctrine on KM but focused the analysis and discussion on 
answering the research questions.  The focus of the analysis hovered at the strategic level rather 
than drilling down into tactical solutions, which could be highly contextual.  This was 
supplemented with literature and official documents available in the public domain about other 
international militaries’ KM initiatives, found to be very limited.  Chapter 3 thus constitutes a 
literature review on military KM - excluding the SA DOD which forms the area of study and unit of 
analysis in Chapter 5-7.    
The deductive output of the literature reviews (Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation) facilitated 
a broad understanding of knowledge and KM as two distinct constructs; theoretically and as applied 
by businesses and militaries.  These two chapters provided relevant insight into the body of 
knowledge to support the formulation of open-ended questions for the questionnaire (dissertation 
Chapter 7).  Once a wide swathe and deliberate understanding of the field of study was established 
the researcher shifted focus to document analysis relevant to the unit of analysis.  This sequencing 
was followed based on the researcher’s initial lack of knowledge about KM.   
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The second part of the dissertation focussed on document analysis consisting of analysis and 
discussion of the relevant RSA legislative framework and SA DOD DR 2015 (dissertation Chapters 
5).  This was enriched with deeper-level understanding of the SA DOD, gained with an analysis of a 
selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine (dissertation Chapters 6).   
The selected search keywords in the above-mentioned documents were knowledge, 
knowledge management, intelligence, doctrine, Intellectual Property (IP), Chief Knowledge Officer 
(CKO), information, information management, data, Chief Information Officer (CIO).  These 
keywords were selected based on the understanding gained from Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
dissertation. The selection criteria for the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine 
were as follows: 
 The policy and doctrine must be available on the SA DOD policy database.  As such a snapshot 
of the policy database was obtained as a searchable database folder called pp_static_20160617.  
This folder is also time stamped (20160617).  This provided stability to the analysis in terms of 
the available documents for analysis, contributing to research rigour in terms of the repeatability 
of the research.  This folder is available on request with due regard to SA DOD security 
requirements.  The second part of the Reference List provides a coded list of the selected sample 
used for analysis in Chapter 6 of the dissertation. 
 The policy and doctrine must be promulgated and current.  Policy and doctrine that were 
archived or superseded were thus excluded from the selected sample. 
 Only SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine promulgated during or after 2005 were considered.  
Promulgation is defined as ratification by the Sec Def or CSANDF or both.   This time parameter 
(2005) was selected based on the Riempp and Smolnik (2007: 3) KM hype-cycle.  It could be 
reasonably expected that the SA DOD would have been sensitised and interested in KM as a 
management phenomenon, even initiated KM initiatives, based on the hype-cycle.  Based on the 
DR 2015 acknowledgement of the SA DOD still being in the information era, the parameter 
(2005) could easily have been shifted towards 2015.  However, the researcher chose to be 
pragmatic and considered SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine from 2005 onwards in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of the possible issues prevailing.  This approach rendered a 
substantial amount of documents for analysis. 
 Only SA DOD policy and doctrine with a security classification of ‘restricted’ or ‘confidential’ 
were considered for analysis.  SA DOD KM is a general business process and management 
concern and would in the opinion and experience of the researcher not be classified secret or top 
secret.  
Importantly, Chapter 6 of the dissertation (SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine) makes 
extensive use of quotations for the simple reason that these documents (SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine) are not in the public domain.  The reader is thus privy to the actual text of classified 
documents.  The output of Chapters 5 and 6 of the dissertation enabled a comprehensive 
understanding of the SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine regarding knowledge and KM.   
The third part of the the dissertation is the gathering of data/information/knowledge with a 
questionnaire.  The findings of the dissertation thus far (dissertation Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6) assisted 
the researcher with open-ended questions formulation.     These chapters clarify why there is a 
perception that the SA DOD does not engage in coherent and integrated KM and why possibly the 
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SA DOD should.  Once these chapters were largely completed in draft, a questionnaire was 
compiled and issued to potential SA DOD Senior Management level respondents.   
The questionnaire constitutes open-ended questions.  The researcher used a questionnaire, 
completed voluntarily by a purposeful sample of SA DOD Senior Managers (which was 
subsequently broadend to include all SA DOD Senior Managers) to extract qualitative 
data/information/knowledge as input to all four research questions.  Once the questionnaire was 
distributed no further liaison with the respondents ensued that would possibly augment perceptions 
of interest/disinterest in SA DOD KM.  The questionnaire is attached as Appendix B of the 
dissertation.   
The researcher administered the first round of questionnaires to 16 SA DOD SMS members 
based on the sample criteria discussed below.  This, however, rendered very poor response, which 
hampered the research and drawing robust conclusions in support of answering 2-4.  Based on 
expert advice the second round of questionnaires was administered to all SA DOD SMS members 
(275 potential respondents), following the command line for requests and instructions.  The results 
of this process are discussed in Chapter 7 of the dissertation.  Questions raised by respondents were 
answered telephonically or face-to-face as objectively as possible.  There were extremely few 
enquiries. 
Open-ended questions were the preferred type of question to allow for exploration.  A 
questionnaire with open-ended questions was preferred in lieu semi-structured interviews because 
of several reasons: 
 SA DOD SMS members have very congested work schedules that allow very little time for this 
type of research. 
 Questionnaires with the same questions that would have been asked in interviews were used to 
allow respondents time to reflect and answer without being placed on the ‘proverbial spot’ - 
which would have been the case in an interview.  The approach allowed the respondents to think 
carefully about their answer because some of the questions required some memory search to 
recall possible events or occurrences.  It also affords the respondents (based on the public profile 
and position of responsibility) to carefully formulate positions. The aim was thus to extract 
considered responses not just responses.  It also allowed the respondents latitude to complete 
answers when they had a break in there work schedules. 
 A written/typed response eliminates the requirement for member checking.  Member checking, 
as used in the interview process to ensure accuracy, would place a further burden on the 
respondent’s already oversubscribed schedule. 
 The text provided by the respondents can be processed similarly to interview transcripts. 
 Filling out questionnaires does, however, exclude the researcher from personal interaction with 
the respondent, thus precluding the observation of body language and other environmental data.  
This does not affect the respondent’s written/typed opinions, considered primary 
data/information/knowledge that can be subjected to re-analysis as part of qualitative rigour.  
 Interviews provide the guarantee that the respondents’ opinions are collected while 
questionnaires leave the ‘back door open’; tasking staff to respond to the questionnaires.  Thus, 
the assumption was made that the formulated answers were at least checked by the respondent.  
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Where the respondent signed, the questionnaire the responses can be construed as being that of 
the respondent. 
 Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions are important to allow latitude for
expression.  This same latitude can be achieved using the same questions and allowing the
respondent to answer in their own time in questionnaire format.
 Questionnaires minimise distractions associated with open-ended conversations, i.e. drifting
away from the research problem and questions for various reasons.
 The approach is especially useful if the researcher is not an experienced interviewer; and even
more so when the interviewer is a colleague and in some cases a subordinate of the interviewee.
 Some rich description might be lost due to this approach but will be balanced with the fact that
the researcher will remain in control of the process and no time will be lost due to unrelated
conversations.  This may result in less, but more relevant, data/information/knowledge collected.
The purpose of the questionnaire is linked to the concept of ‘rich description’ and ‘deeper 
understanding’ propagated by various qualitative researchers. Conceptually, the rich description can 
be extracted from - “Both long-term involvement and intensive interviews” to reveal reality 
(Becker’s, 1970, 51ff in Maxwell, 2009: 244).  In order to achieve this Maxwell (2009) states that 
when interviews are used as a method of data collection, these should then be transcribed verbatim 
to ensure all the nuances is captured for processing and triangulation.  Questionnaires with the same 
open-ended questions that would have been used in interviews achieved the same results. The 
questionnaire data/information/knowledge collected could be used for coding and aggregation.   
The researcher did not use web-based survey tools such as, for example, SurveyMonkey
67
because of security concerns regarding the disclosed information.  Also, the approvals obtained 
from the SA DOD to conduct the research on SA DOD KM did not include permission to use such 
cyber tools. 
The research was exploratory in nature at first (asking ‘why’ questions to provide clarity for 
SRQs 1 and 2) to extract maximum context and understanding in support of subsequent research 
and discussion.  The questionnaire was supplemented with consent forms, scanned and stored on 
hard disk.  No member checking was required as discussed above.  The only member checking that 
was required was in the case of writing legibility, unfinished sentences and to verify if the question 
was understandable when it was not answered.  No such case was recorded.  In fact, only two 
questionnaires was completed and returned. 
With the research and writing mostly completed for the named chapters above an exhaustive 
process of argument refinement, consolidation of findings and conclusions and quality control 
ensued.  This required several editorial processes to ensure clarity, brevity, coherence and 
integration.  Once completed, the researcher submitted the dissertation for supervisor review which 
resulted in more refinement and finally professional editorial treatment. 
67
 See https://www.surveymonkey.com. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 158 
 
4.2.2 Sampling 
The first round of potential respondents (16 in total) were part of a purposeful sample.  This 
type of sampling is particularly useful for exploratory and field research (Neuman, 2011).  A typical 
requirement is that the researcher must be in the position to judge the relevance of the selected 
sample.  Neuman (2011: 267) writes that purposive sampling equates to non-random sampling - “… 
in which the researcher uses a wide range of methods to locate all possible cases of a highly specific 
and difficult-to-reach population”.  The selected respondents conform to this description.   The 
document analysis (specifically Chapter 6 of the dissertation) assisted greatly to narrow down the 
selection. 
Typical attributes of these individuals range from specifics relating to appointment, 
organisational component, expertise, resource control and decision-making authority embedded in 
these organisational positions.  Leadership drives successful KM as was discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3 of the dissertation.  The sample focussed on the on the executive management level of the SA 
DOD commonly referred to as the Senior Management System (SMS).  The sample thus included 
rank/appointment levels of Director General, Chief, Deputy Director Generals and one Chief 
Director.  This resulted in a sample of 16 SMS members and constituted the first round of 
questionnaires.  
Leadership and direction of SA DOD resources are initiated and accounted for by this 
selected sample.  This sample of the SA DOD is responsible for the management of SA DOD 
knowledge. Some expression on the requirement for KM in the SA DOD does exist within the 
selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine (JDP20 and DODI43), which provides 
limited evidence that the SA DOD might be interested in adopting KM as a management practice. 
JDP20 makes mention of KM in a diagram that summarises the competencies required from 
personnel at various levels of the SA DOD.  Knowledge management is pitched at the executive 
management level or what is commonly referred to as the Senior Management System (SMS) 
(JDP20: 12).  DODI43 (J4-4) elaborates on the Generic Core Management Criteria, Standards and 
Criteria for SA DOD SMS and their responsibility towards KM.   
It was thus important to learn from this sample about the conceptualisation and management 
of the resource, whether this is done or not. A specific Chief Director is included in the sample due 
to the direct responsibility in the drafting of the Defence Review 2015 and its implementation.  
Because the Defence Review 2015 is a primary source document analysed in Chapter 5 of the 
dissertation, the researcher thought it prudent to include this appointment in the sample.   
During this first round of questionnaires, the researcher purposefully did not engage the 
selected respondents on progress and intention to submit so as not to artificially raise interest or 
pressure.  The result was only one of the questionnaires returned to the researcher completed by an 
SMS member that is under command and control of a Chief.  Two questionnaires were returned 
stating no interest.  Staff Officers of at least three Chiefs telephonically communicated with the 
researcher to clarify the requirements for the questionnaire, clearly tasked to complete the 
questionnaire as delegated.  None of these reached the researcher.   
Two subsequent rounds of questionnaires were done due to the poor response rate of the first 
round.  These rounds included all SA DOD SMS members as potential respondents.  The same poor 
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response rate was experienced.   The findings of these rounds are discussed in the Chapter 7. The 
very weak response rate reflect any or combinations of the following scenarios – 
 The work schedules of the SMS members not allowing time for participation in academic 
research on the SA DOD. 
 No interest by SMS members to get involved in academic research on the SA DOD. 
 Possibly perceiving this type of academic research a waste of time. 
 Personal Staff Officers to these positions managing the staff work for the SMS members not 
being responsive enough. 
 Personal Staff Officers to these SMS members perceiving this kind of academic research as 
a waste of time and thus not presenting it to their principles for consideration.   
The approach excludes SA DOD operational and tactical level employees that execute 
possible KM processes knowingly or unknowingly.  However, this is deliberate.  If there is no 
executive-level interest or effort to implement and manage knowledge in the SA DOD, it will in all 
probability no be managed.  If there are organisational components that do manage knowledge; this 
is done without a clear policy, doctrine and strategy mandate derived from legislation or the 
Defence Review 2015.  These initiatives will also lack integration with other efforts for the same 
stated reasons.  One other weakness of this approach is in the fact that the sample immediately 
excludes the greater part of the executive management within the Defence Sector (defence 
industries, agencies and institutes) and their understanding and expectations of military KM.   
4.3 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RIGOUR 
Analysis of data/information/knowledge is essential for understanding and conceptualisation, 
necessary to codify qualitative these into - “… conceptual categories to create themes and [or] 
concepts” (Neuman, 2011: 510).  Analysis permits the researcher - “… to improve understanding, 
expand theory, and advance knowledge” (Neuman, 2011: 507).   Analysis is the central activity 
enabling theory building within case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Eisenhardt (1989: 532) goes 
further by stating that the constructed theory from case study research is - “… often novel, testable 
and empirically valid”.  Dey (1993: 31) states that the - “… core of qualitative analysis lies in these 
related processes of describing phenomena, classifying it, and seeing how … concepts 
interconnect”. Crucial for this dissertation is the creation of seminal understanding of KM by means 
of rigorous analysis why the SA DOD does not engage in coherent and integrated KM; why and 
how it should.   
Collection methods, the data/information/knowledge and the analysis aim at enhancing the 
research quality and rigour of the findings.  Lee (1999: 154-155) and Yin (2003) proposes four 
standards for quality, rigorous qualitative research.  These are reliability, construct validity, internal 
validity (not for descriptive or exploratory studies), and external validity (or transferability within a 
qualitative approach). 
Qualitative research reliability is enhanced by using multiple techniques for data collection – 
such as interviews, questionnaires, photos, document analysis, etc. (Neuman, 2011).    As such, the 
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researcher made maximum use of published KM academic material.  Ma and Yu (2010) provided a 
base of authoritative articles that were considered initially and subsequently expanded on.  Adding 
to the consistency of the research, the literature review material used is in the public domain to 
ensure the repeatability of the research at any time (Lee, 1999: 148 and 157).  The material used for 
the document analysis in Chapter 6 of the dissertation is not in the public domain.  In the short- to 
medium-term, this material will restrict repeatability.  To mitigate this shortcoming the researcher 
used as much as possible quoted text from these classified SA DOD documents in order to provide 
maximum original text in support of repeatability  SA legislation provides for the archiving and 
declassification of material over the long-term, which provides complete access in the future.  Thus, 
the research material used in the dissertation is reliable and can be traced and verified. 
Qualitative research aims at generating trustworthy, authentic and valid results (Schwandt, 
2007; Baxter & Jack, 2008; Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Neuman, 2011).  Maxwell (2009: 236), 
supported by Neuman (2011), is of the opinion that - “Qualitative studies generally rely on the 
integration of data from a variety of methods and sources of information [such as documents, 
observation and interviews] a general principle known as triangulation (Denzin, 1970 and Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994)”. Patton (1990) and Yin (2003) in Baxter and Jack (2008: 554) share this opinion.  
Triangulation facilitates the convergence of ideas, the confirmation of findings and thus the quality 
of the data, information and knowledge (Knafl & Breitmayer, 1989 in Baxter & Jack, 2008 and Lee, 
1999).  Maxwell (2009) states that a triangulation strategy minimises the possibility of only 
concentrating on the systematic biases or limitations of a specific method to base findings on.  
Triangulation enables enhanced assessment of the validity and generality of the explanations.  
Triangulation was used extensively in this dissertation.  Triangulation was achieved by means of a 
literature review on academic theory and practice, a small case study on applied military KM, 
document analysis of relevant SA DOD documents and a questionnaire with voluntary 
participation. 
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Figure 4.6: Layering and Triangulation 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
  The various other layers were necessary because of the assumption that the SA DOD is not 
interested in KM, making research by questionnaire a risky approach.  If no or marginal 
participation is achieved it supports the assumption, however, with no participation, there is also no 
knowledge gained other than support for the assumption of no interest.  Thus, the researcher layered 
the research for optimum data, information and knowledge availability in support of the research 
approach and to cement findings and conclusions in. This layering and triangulation are depicted in 
Figure 4.2 above. 
Lee (1999) proposes the construction of sequential logic in support of construct validity.  
“The reader of a case study research report should be able to reconstruct and anticipate the 
sequential logic.  The clearer and more compelling the logic, the stronger the argument for construct 
validity” (Lee, 1999: 155).  The researcher of the dissertation gradually and meticulously developed 
the constructs (SA DOD knowledge and KM), commencing with general theory and practice and 
ending in specific theory and practice based on a knitted pattern of related theories, practices and 
language.    
Flyvbjerg (2006: 227) states that whether knowledge can be generalised or not it should be 
allowed to contribute to the body of knowledge of a specific subject field - “A purely descriptive, 
phenomenological case study without any attempt to generalise can certainly be of value in this 
process and has often helped cut a path towards scientific innovation”.  Although the findings of 
this dissertation might be specific to the SA DOD; the fact that militaries internationally subscribe 
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to the same practices of learning, KM processes and similarities in military culture the findings 
could be general applicability - at least amongst developing nation’s militaries but even amongst 
militaries in general.   
Because of bureaucratic similarities between the SA DOD and the RSA government 
departments, the findings could be adapted for these departments or hypothesis could be formulated 
to test for applicability within the RSA government departments.  The proposed SA DOD KM 
conceptual model should show general utility to militaries around the world as well as SA 
government departments. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Chapter 4 outlined and discussed the research area and unit of analysis followed by the 
methodological and design aspects contributing to rigour and quality.  The research methodology is 
specifically aimed at the rich description of KM and related theory and practice that currently 
prevail and that will possibly impact the establishment of a future SA DOD KMC and associated 
KM. To this end the research was conducted with a relativist worldview, calibrated with a 
constructivist paradigm.  A qualitative research methodology, comprising a deductive reasoning 
approach and case study research design, was used to structure the research.  Document analysis 
was the primary research technique.  The secondary research technique was the use of a 
questionnaire.  The combination of the research philosophy, methodology, design and methods 
assisted the researcher in the quest to extract new meaning. 
The next chapter of the dissertation focuses on the analysis of the legislative framework as an 
entry point for the SA DOD mandate and policy.  The DR 2015 is analysed to shed light on SRQ1-
4; concluding with important factors for consideration in Chapters 6 and 7 of the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 5 
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND DEFENCE REVIEW 2015: IMPACT ON THE 
SA DOD FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is unambiguous recognition of the value proposition of KM for militaries in some 
foreign countries, particularly the USA (as discussed in dissertation Chapters 2 and 3).  However, 
limited voices of academics and the SA DOD regarding SA DOD KM represents a gap in literature 
as identified by the researcher’s assumption - why the perceived disinterest in KM by the SA DOD?  
The follow-on question is - is the SA DOD silent on KM in its organisational architecture? 
Military policy and doctrine are significant components of the SA DOD organisational 
architecture because policy and doctrine form the strategic guidance for organisational decision-
making and action.  Chapter 5 of the dissertation focuses just on SA DOD Level 0 policy.  Chapter 
6 of the dissertation broadens the scope to SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.   
Organisations should not engage in management initiatives without guidance provided via 
organisational policy.  Policy is not only knowledge but knowledge is also central to policy-making.  
Pee and Kankanhalli (2015: 1), citing several authors, state that - “… knowledge is central to policy 
making [sic] and public services”.  If this is the case then much knowledge is encapsulated in 
organisational policy based on the conversion processes of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge.  
Wiig (2002) in Pee and Kankanhalli (2015: 1) states that - “KM can enhance decision making 
[sic] within public services, aid the public to participate effectively in policy decision making [sic], 
build competitive societal [IC] capabilities, and develop a knowledge-competitive work force [sic]”.  
Wiig (1999b: 4) proposes that policy be a KM component - “Broad KM is the systematic and 
explicit management of knowledge-related activities, practices, programmes, and policies within the 
enterprise”.    
La Grange (2006: 42) clearly links the requirement for policy to action - “To ensure that a 
country remains competitive in the knowledge economy and to manage its national knowledge 
assets effectively, policy directives are required to encourage innovation, entrepreneurship, 
technical and scientific development and increased competitive ability”.  This opinion reinforces the 
stated importance of knowledge and KM within organisations; articulated in earlier chapters of the 
dissertation.  It also reiterates the importance of organisational policy as the starting point for the 
establishment of organisational KM capabilities.  The opinions of Davenport and Prusak (1998) and 
La Grange (2006) stated in chapter 2 of the dissertation reiterates the importance of a portfolio of 
actions or products required for KM – i.e. policy, routines, processes, practices, norms and 
documents.  These are also part of the IC paradigm.  Other important KM requirements are a 
strategy, funding, people and technology as were identified in Chapter 2 and 3 of the dissertation. 
The SA DOD, as an SA governmental department, is distinctly mandated to provide security 
and defence services/products to the government (as elected by the SA citizenry) in support of 
security and development imperatives (Sections 199, 200(2) and 204 of the Constitution).  These 
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imperatives are described by legislation and departmental level policy and other documents.  One 
such SA DOD document states –  
“Level 0 – Government Policy. This includes the Constitution, legislation and regulations issued 
by Ministers in terms of Acts of Parliament, White Papers, position papers, Cabinet decisions 
and Ministerial direction to the DOD – all such policy is obligatory on the DOD”.  (SANDFP4, 
7) 
Thus, national legislation and the DR 2015 are regarded as SA DOD Level 0 policy.  This is 
the focus of analysis for Chapter 5, based on the introduction above and stated opinions thus far.  
Simply stated; no KM policy, no KMC.   
The DR 2015 forms the capstone strategic direction document to SA DOD  decision-makers 
and -executers alike, as well as SA DOD stakeholders, on how best to allocate and/or leverage 
national defence resources in order to provide services and products in the national interest.  The 
DR 2015, in turn, is based on national legislation and other SA DOD IC (e.g. policy, doctrine, 
intelligence and IP); thus expressing an integrated SA DOD policy position on the future of the SA 
DOD as an instrument of national security. Chuter (2011) raises the following opinion in the DR 
2015 (0-5) – “… defence policy is the process of maintaining, coordinating and employing the 
assets of the defence sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation’s security policy goals”.  
The DR 2015 states the raison d'être of the DR 2015 as follows - 
“In essence, national defence policy defines the strategic intent of government regarding 
Defence. Therefore, a country’s defence policy, given these characteristic features, must be 
subjected to periodic review and update so as to reflect factors that have influenced a change in 
Government’s guidelines for the defence function.” (DR 2015: 0-6).  
“The Defence Review takes its lead from the national security construct, national posture and 
national interests. This is augmented by South Africa’s foreign policy obligations and 
aspirations. The Defence Review draws on the Constitution and other Statutes, establishes 
fundamental principles and tenets and cascades these to a future-orientated, concept-driven, 
effects-based defence policy and strategy.” (DR 2015: 0-6). 
The DR 2015 details the projected South African defence futures based on the development 
visions of five strategic SA DOD milestones.  These stretch over a period of three Medium Term 
Strategic Framework planning cycles (approximately 20 years).  The researcher analysed the DR 
2015 to extract views on possible future SA DOD KM initiatives and activities, types of knowledge 
to be managed and which components are critical for an SA DOD KMC.  The DR 2015, over the 
coming years, will inform revised and new SA DOD policy, which in turn will inform decisions, 
actions, effects and advantage.   
For the purpose of Chapter 5 of this dissertation, relevant SA legislation and the DR 2015 
were analysed for evidence of interest in KM, the importance of KM, types of SA DOD knowledge, 
KM activities and requirements to answer the research questions.  These capstone knowledge 
documents provided answers to the ‘who’ and ‘what’ questions and provided clues as to the desired 
effects
68
 sought.  These capstone documents all aim to facilitate decision-making, action, effects 
and advantage.  Thus, the researcher is now stepping away from academic and other military views 
                                                 
68
 “Effect. (n) The result or consequence of an action”. (JWP1: 9-4) 
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on KM and is focussing on SA DOD KM - albeit from an SA DOD Level 0 policy perspective.  
Chapter 6 of the dissertation will broaden the scope of the analysis to SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine. 
Before the researcher commences with the analysis of the DR 2015, the SA DOD and its 
mandate are unpacked from a legislative perspective to provide the origin of possible KM policy 
requirements.  Thereafter, the analysis of the DR 2015 provides detail verifying the assumption that 
the SA DOD is not interested in KM and why the SA DOD should be and what knowledge should 
be managed.  Let us commence with considering relevant SA DOD legislation concerning aspects 
already discussed thus far that relates to the knowledge continuum and KM, with the working 
definitions for knowledge and KM in mind. 
5.2 THE SA DOD REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
“The Defence Force will be subject to the Constitution, national statutes, national policy and the 
national regulatory framework” (DR 2015: 0-7) 
5.2.1 Constitution of South Africa 1996 
The 1996 Constitution enshrines the freedom of expression, access to information and 
academic and research freedoms. Section 16 and 32 of the Constitution recognise the importance of 
information to State and society. Notably, access to knowledge and the use thereof was not included 
probably because, at the time of the drafting of the RSA Constitution (1996), South Africa was still 
firmly in the grip of the information age. 
Section 195 of the RSA Constitution (1996) provides an array of principles for public 
administration (which is also applicable to the SA DOD as a government department).  Section 195 
highlights the effective, efficient and economic resource usage, focus on development and the 
importance of transparency based on information that is accessible and in-time as well as Human 
Resource Management (HRM).  Thus, Section 195 of the Constitution (1996) enshrines the idea of 
efficient, effective and economic development through the exploitation of accessible information 
and human potential (amongst other things).  Although it is not stated explicitly, the expression 
‘human potential’ includes capabilities such as wisdom and knowledge, the development and use 
thereof.   
Interestingly, the word ‘knowledge’ is only referred to four times in the Constitution (1996).  
Twice; knowledge is required for specific administrative positions (Auditor–General and 
Commissioners of the Public Service Commission) (Section 193 and 196).  Twice; knowledge is 
required for the Presidential and Deputy President oath or solemn affirmation (Schedule 2, Section 
1 and 2).  This ‘knowledge’ is personal knowledge, typically in the tacit domain.  No reference is 
made of information required to do these duties; acknowledging the importance of knowledge – 
possibly as part of the human potential - in the equation of leadership. 
Importantly, the RSA Constitution (1996) legislate the establishment of the single SA DOD 
and Intelligence Services.  The latter allowing for military and security intelligence functions 
(Section 198-210).  Section 200-204 deals specifically with the SA DOD stating that - “(2) The 
primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and 
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its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the 
use of force.” (Section 200). These are complex tasks requiring vast knowledge (and possibly even 
wisdom) to accomplish.  Just having access to information will not suffice.  The DR 2015 expresses 
in much more detail how this is projected to be accomplished. 
The RSA Constitution (1996) pronounce on the importance of knowledge, albeit non-
explicitly. So, the Constitution (1996) provides for the raison d'être of the SA DOD and the first 
stabs for the requirement of IM and KM.  The Constitution (1996) also states in Section 32(1)(a) 
that all citizens have a right to access to State information.   This right is, however, calibrated by 
Section 36 (Limitation of Rights) of the Constitution (1996).  From the Constitution (1996) all 
legislation flows.  Some SA DOD germane legislation will be discussed henceforth. 
5.2.2 Defence Act 42 of 2002 
The Defence Act 42 of 2002 (hereafter the Defence Act) emanates from RSA Constitutional 
requirements.  When understanding the complexity of defence and Defence Forces, as contemplated 
in earlier chapters of the dissertation, it would be reasonable to expect that a high emphasis will be 
placed on IM and KM. 
However, the word ‘knowledge’ is only used once in the Defence Act in Section 24(b) – with 
no relevance to KM.  The Defence Act was promulgated in the early 2000s, during the early stages 
of the emerging knowledge era and the establishment of KM.  It thus begs the question; is the SA 
DOD not interested in managing the required knowledge to fulfil its Constitutional mandate? Or, 
does the SA DOD regard IM as KM?  The latter might be the case.  In fact, Section 14.g of the 
Defence Act states that C SANDF must supply the Sec Def with information about the SANDF as 
may be required by the Sec Def.  This will certainly empower the Sec Def in the execution of the 
Defence Secretariat mandate, but not as much as knowledge would have.  The Defence Act shows 
clear signs of information age entrenchment. 
The Sec Def is the principal defence policy adviser to the MOD (Section 8(b)).  ‘Advisor’ is 
the noun for advice, which means “Guidance or recommendations offered with regard to prudent 
action.” (Oxford Dictionary: online). This implicitly translates into the transfer of a continuum of 
knowledge, not just information.   It also links this knowledge transfer to action.  This knowledge 
will be based on knowledge gathered from other SA DOD knowledge champions that will be 
explored later in this chapter and in chapter 6 of the dissertation. Section 14 of the Defence Act 42 
states that the CSANDF is responsible for - “(a) is the principal adviser to the Minister on any 
military, operational and administrative matter within the competence of the [CSANDF]; … (c) is 
responsible for formulating and issuing military policy and doctrines”.  This makes the C SANDF a 
principal custodian of specific types of capstone military knowledge – policy and doctrine.  Yet, SA 
DOD policy formulation and management is the responsibility of Chief of Defence Policy, Strategy 
and Planning resorting under the Sec Def. Thus, the Defence Act might also suffer from construct 
dissonance in that it speaks about information but probably have knowledge in mind – taking note 
of the fact that the document is a product of people that had an information era mindset at the time 
of writing. 
From Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, it is understood that policy, doctrine and 
intelligence are specific types of knowledge; doctrine, in particular, is generated and managed by 
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militaries.   Intelligence includes both tacit and explicit forms. This is also the case for the SA 
DOD. Section 14 of the Defence Act pronounces on the management of doctrine, policy (Section 8 
& several other places) and military intelligence (Section 32-42). These are, however, not distinctly 
linked to the construct of knowledge, which would have been useful when initiating an SA DOD 
KMC.  No mention is made of the requirement to manage military related IP, although all of the 
above are in fact specific SA DOD IP and regarded internationally as capstone military knowledge 
(not information).  
The Defence Act makes provision for the establishment of Defence Intelligence (DI) (Section 
33), in accordance with the prescripts of the RSA Constitution (1996) – previously stated.  DI is 
responsible for SA DOD intelligence management, and as such (Section 34) responsible to - “… 
subject to the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994), gather, correlate, 
evaluate and use…” both strategic and operational intelligence for the purposes of national security, 
formulating policy and strategy, ensuring the security of both forces and assets and to support and 
prepare forces.  Intelligence is thus perceived as critical for national security as well as the crafting 
of capstone SA DOD knowledge documents i.e. policy, doctrine and strategy.   
The Defence Act deals with the control over (military related) intelligence; i.e. access to 
intelligence (or control of specific knowledge flow) within the SA DOD and by other stakeholders.  
Section 37 describes the various security classification grades for the SA DOD knowledge 
continuum (data/information/knowledge). Section 38 and 39 outlines the role of the Sec Def in 
managing security clearances required to access this knowledge continuum.  Although DI 
functionally responsible for RSA military intelligence and counter-intelligence, the Sec Def is 
indirectly responsible for the flow of SA DOD knowledge continuum products by virtue of security 
clearances management and being the SA DOD Information Officer (PAIA, 2000: 7).  This makes 
the Sec Def and Chief Defence Intelligence very distinct SA DOD KM role-players. 
Section 50 (3) of the Defence Act states - “To the extent necessary for security and the 
protection of information, members of the [SA DOD] and employees may be subjected to 
restrictions in communicating any kind of information, and where appropriate, may be subjected to 
prohibition of communication of information.”.  Nothing said about communicating knowledge 
(e.g. policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP), although it is reasonably understood that the statement is 
inclusive of these classified documents.  This begs the question; does the SA DOD regard its 
capstone military knowledge as information?  It is quite possible. 
Defence Act (Section 82(g)) makes reference to MOD regulatory control over military 
intelligence; mostly relating to information security and classification; again no mention of capstone 
military knowledge.  Thus, the MOD also has a distinct responsibility towards facilitating 
information flow in the SA DOD by means of the information classification regime.  However, 
these functions are typically delegated to the Chief of Defence Intelligence solidifying this position 
as a critical SA DOD knowledge manager. Defence (Section 104 -19) expresses on information 
security regarding facilities, installations or instruments of the SA DOD.  Again, it fails to mention 
knowledge (e.g. policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP) security. 
Section 104-7 of the Defence Act expresses on illegal access and disclosure of information as 
addressed by the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000. This clearly legislates the 
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security component of SA DOD IM from a counterintelligence perspective.  It is a critical 
consideration for SA DOD knowledge flow and for a future SA DOD KMC.  
The Defence Act does not provide any explicit expression of the importance of knowledge or 
its management. That said, when understanding that militaries regard policy, strategy, doctrine, 
intelligence, IP, processes, procedures, tactics and techniques as knowledge – then the Defence Act 
does address types of military knowledge to be managed.   
The Defence Act is more specific about who should manage these.  As such, the MOD, the 
Sec Def, CSANDF and Chief Defence Intelligence are pivotal for SA DOD KM due to their distinct 
responsibilities to manage military policy, doctrine, intelligence and other types of knowledge (IP, 
strategy, tactics, processes, procedures, tactics and techniques) as specific knowledge generated and 
managed by the SA DOD (and militaries worldwide).  The question is; which of these should be the 
SA DOD CKO, if any?  What is not pronounced on in the Defence Act 42 of 2002 is whether and 
how defence matériel related IP should be managed – and by whom?  Expressions regarding this 
can be found in the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act 18 of 2003 discussed 
later in this chapter. Concluding, the Defence Act states no requirement for a coherent and 
integrated SA DOD KMC to engage in this management.   
5.2.3 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) 
The PFMA is the national legal instrument to regulate the financial behaviour of the SA 
government.  It expresses on the management of State assets (Section 2).  Considering that 
knowledge is widely perceived as a primary strategic asset by both business and militaries, it would 
be reasonable to expect that KM is addressed explicitly in the PFMA.  This is not the case. 
If it is accepted that knowledge is an asset, then the Sec Def has a distinct responsibility to 
manage military knowledge (e.g. IP as both a commercial and military asset) in order to abide by 
the regulation quoted above requiring State assets to be managed.  It would thus make sense that 
Sec Def manages capstone military knowledge (e.g. policy, strategy, doctrine, intelligence and IP) 
in support of the Sec Def’s role as principle Defence policy adviser to the MOD.   The 
responsibility for the safeguarding and management of assets is further rolled down to all 
government officials in Section 45 of the PFMA. Thus, knowledge as a State asset should be 
managed by all SA DOD officials. 
The reality is that no explicit statement is made of knowledge or KM in the PFMA.  The 
PFMA pronounces on the responsibilities of departmental accounting officers, in the case of the SA 
DOD, the accounting officer is the Sec Def.  PFMA Section 42 states that accounting officers (e.g. 
the Sec Def) must in the endeavour to manage assets through inventories.  From the literature 
review of the dissertation, it is clear that KM is much more than inventories of data or information.  
The PFMA, therefore, does not provide clear guidance on the management of knowledge as a 
requirement within asset management. 
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5.2.4 National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 (NSIA) 
The NSIA was promulgated to define the functionality of RSA intelligence structures that are 
responsible for the management of South African national intelligence and its apparatus.  The act 
was amended by the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Act 67 of 2002. 
The very title of the legislation alludes to a specific type of knowledge that is managed – 
intelligence (Section 6a); and/or specific actions – intelligence (Section 6c) and/or counter-
intelligence (Section 6d).  The legislation mentions the word ‘knowledge’ twice; out of context for 
this dissertation.  The amendment did not change or add any text about KM.  However, the 
legislation provides much insight on ‘intelligence’ as a form of capstone knowledge. The NSIA 
mentions the word ‘information’ in Sections 1, 2A, 3(3) and 6 in the same sentence as ‘intelligence’ 
in a differentiating manner.  It is thus clear from the legislation that information is conceptualised 
differently from intelligence. 
The Section 1 of the NSIA provides definitions for a host of types of intelligence.  The 
definitions are mostly focused on the strategic and operational level of government.  All the 
definitions position intelligence as a requirement for decision-making and action.  None of the 
definitions, however, couple intelligence directly to advantage; which, incidentally, is the entire 
raison d’être for producing intelligence.  None of the definitions refers to a 
data/information/knowledge requirement or utilisation of these.  They all just refer to intelligence 
required or used.  However, from the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) it is known and 
accepted that intelligence is a type of explicit knowledge and more specifically capstone military 
knowledge (dissertation Chapter 3) that is produced from data, information and other knowledge 
through knowledge processes commonly known as the intelligence cycle (dissertation Chapter 2). 
Most of the definitions stated in NSIA (Section 1) (as amended) couple the requirement for 
and use of intelligence to enhance South African national security and national interest and to 
determine threat perception (departmental-, domestic-, domestic military-, foreign- and foreign 
military-, national security- and strategic national intelligence) with only crime intelligence posited 
to be used in investigations, evidence preparation, law enforcement and prosecutions.  At least two 
definitions couple the requirement for intelligence to policy (NSIA, Section 1: 2 and 3).  Two 
definitions state the requirement for intelligence to enhance planning operations (NSIA, Section 1: 
2).  Time is not prescribed but it can be assumed that the requirement and use are continuous or as 
required, e.g. during peace or war and current or long-term issues.  All the definitions prescribe a 
specific ‘ba’, location or geography. Most of the definitions are coupled to threat elimination or 
neutralisation and safety and security, i.e. the why or the projected required effect.  The definitions 
also state who the recipients of these effects (safety and security of the RSA and its citizens) should 
be.  Who is mandated to conduct IntOps and functions are prescribed by the NSIA 39 of 1994 (as 
amended)?  The NSIA (as amended) provides definitions for three distinct knowledge or 
intelligence activities, i.e. counter-intelligence, covert collection and evaluation.  The definitions 
thus in broad describe the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘why’ questions.  What lacks distinctly is 
which effect is to be obtained and what thereafter.  These as well as ‘when’ and ‘how’ detail might 
be captured in policy, doctrine and procedures within organisations. 
Counter-intelligence activities mostly relate to knowledge continuum security and neutralising 
threat to access.  Legislating this knowledge (security) process is significant in the sense that the SA 
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DOD is obliged to have this process part of any proposed KM system.  The MOD, Sec Def and DI 
are functionally responsible in terms of security clearance as discussed earlier.  The DI is further 
responsible for other physical security techniques.  Chief Command Management Information 
Systems (C CMIS) and DI are responsible for cybersecurity along with other State stakeholders.  
Counter-intelligence is, in essence, a knowledge security process, with some of the actions or sub-
processes discussed in NSIA Section 2A.  It is these functions that restrict the flow of knowledge 
for security reasons.  The security regime needs to be balanced with the requirement for the flow of 
knowledge to facilitate the development of new knowledge and/or actionable decisions. 
Covert collection is a specific knowledge process to acquire knowledge continuum products 
that are particularly well protected physically (which is the knowledge security function) or very 
difficult to access due to tacitness.  There is a secrecy dimension to covert collection, emphasising 
the security function required for KM.  For the SA DOD cover collection are only mandated within 
specific parameters.  That said, it remains a critical task or knowledge process for the SA DOD that 
is distinctly linked to decisions, actions, effects and advantage. 
The NSIA (Section 4(1)(e) states that the SA DOD Chief Defence Intelligence is a member of 
the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee.  Section 2(4) states that - 
“(a) gather, correlate, evaluate and use foreign military intelligence, and supply foreign military 
intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to [National Intelligence Coordination 
Committee], but the [SA DOD] shall not gather intelligence of a non-military nature in a covert 
manner;  
(b) gather, correlate, evaluate and use domestic military intelligence excluding covert collection, 
except when employed for service as contemplated in section 201 (2) (a) of the Constitution and 
under conditions set out in section 3 (2) of this Act, and supply such intelligence to [National 
Intelligence Coordination Committee]; and  
(c) institute counter-intelligence measures within the [SA DOD].”. 
Section 2(4) of the NSIA 39 of 1994 alludes to specific knowledge processes (the ‘how’ not 
in the definitions) that are important for intelligence management.  These processes (“gather, 
correlate, evaluate and use”) should thus be considered fundamental to future SA DOD KM.   
The NSIA thus describes a very specific knowledge continuum.  The SA DOD is affected by 
and deal with all these types of intelligence because soldiers are first RSA citizens and then SA 
DOD members.  The NSIA thus provides firm evidence that intelligence is an important type of 
knowledge to be managed directly or indirectly by the SA DOD. Concluding, there is no specific 
mention of knowledge or KM or linkages between knowledge as a strategic asset and intelligence. 
5.2.5 Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (PAIA) 
The Sec Def is the CIO of the SA DOD (PAIA, 2000: 7).  The SA DOD has legislated 
prescripts to have a CIO and thus by implications must manage its information accordingly.  The 
legislation does not allude to knowledge or KM and thus does not express the requirement for a 
CKO.  By implication, the SA DOD might be inclined to only comply with legislation and thus only 
recognise the CIO and IM and not recognising the requirement for KM and a CKO in order to 
provide coherence and integration to the SA DOD knowledge continuum. 
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Another interesting implication of the legislation is that the legislation only seeks to promote 
access to information.  It does not seek to promote access to knowledge.   Nothing is explicitly said 
about SA DOD doctrine and IP.  From the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4, it is clear that there are 
differences between these constructs.  By implication, the SA DOD has no obligation to provide 
access to its knowledge (e.g. policy, strategy, doctrine, intelligence, IP) to the public, which impacts 
the security requirement for future SA DOD KM.  PAIA (2000) does, however, equate intelligence 
to information (in contradiction to the NSIA discussed above).   Discrepancies and dissonance such 
as this might drive the perception that the SA DOD is not interested in KM.   
In short, the Sec Def (in the capacity of SA DOD CIO) controls the information and 
intelligence of the SA DOD in the interest of the State.   In this capacity, the Sec Def is functionally 
assisted by various SA DOD Divisions, policy and doctrine.   This is important for the construction 
of a future SA DOD KMC. 
5.2.6 Protection of State Information Bill 
The replacement for the Protection of Information Act No. 84 of 1982 (POIA) is the 
Protection of State Information Bill, returned by the President of the Republic of South Africa to the 
National Assembly for reconsideration during September 2013.  This act expresses the requirement 
for information security and by implication knowledge security as discussed above. 
5.2.7 National Archives of South Africa Act No. 43 of 1996 (NASAA) 
The NASAA 43 of 1996 establishes the functions of archiving knowledge continuum artefacts 
for the government.  The NASAA does not make mention of ‘knowledge’ or KM.  However, it does 
address the management of - “… public and non-public records with enduring value” using a - “… 
national automated archival information retrieval system” (Section 3 of the NASAA).  Some of the 
definitions provided by the NASAA for public and non-public records are - 
“… 'non-public record' means a record created or received by a private individual or a body other 
than one defined as a governmental body in terms of this Act or a provincial law pertaining to 
records or archives; 
'public record' means a record created or received by a governmental body; 
'record' means recorded information regardless of form or medium;” 
These definitions only address information and elements of IM.  What is problematic from the 
above is no description is provided for the concept of ‘enduring value’ and that knowledge is not 
addressed.  Records could be archived based on personal views about the value of the document 
which could contribute to information overflow or to important information/knowledge being lost.  
It is the researcher’s opinion that the concept of ‘enduring value’ refers to knowledge rather than 
information and/or data.  This opinion is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of the dissertation in 
terms of time value and advantage of knowledge.   
That said, the NASAA definition for ‘record’ is based on the construct of information.  From 
the literature review (dissertation Chapter 3) it is clear that information has limited value and it is 
probably because of this realisation by the authors of the NASAA then that it was decided to 
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calibrate the construct of information with the concept of ‘enduring value’.  When combining these 
two elements the possible product is knowledge.   
Within these archived records, all types of military knowledge (e.g. policy, doctrine, 
intelligence, IP, processes, procedures, tactics and techniques) can be stored.  Thus, the SA DOD 
has a legislated knowledge storage capability and function covering the KM process – storage.  
Whether it is perceived as part of an SA DOD KMC is unlikely (based on the discussion above and 
to follow). 
The NASAA does provide insight into some processes that would be considered important for 
KM.  These are - “… arrange, describe and retrieve” (Section 5), “Custody and preservation” 
(Section 11), “Access and use” (Section 12), “… destroyed, erased or otherwise disposed” (Section 
13), records classification (Section 13) and - “… microfilmed or electronically reproduced” 
(Section 13).  This management language is very useful in conjunction with the other research in 
this dissertation in order to understand the fundamental KM processes critical to the SA DOD and 
already institutionalised.  It is also clear that the National Archive is a principal custodian of SA 
DOD knowledge and thus fundamental to an SA DOD KMC.  
5.2.8 Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) (4 December 1996) 
The MISS (1996) is the RSA National Information Security policy.  To date, no other national 
policy has been promulgated.  National departments such as the SA DOD takes its cue on 
information security from MISS (1996), also briefly summarised in Appendix A of the MISS 
(1996).  The document itself only refers to knowledge three times, out of KM context.  This is 
probably indicative why most of RSA government departments are still stagnating in the 
information era. 
The MISS (1996: 8-10, 19, 50) refers directly to - “… intelligence/information”, thus making 
a distinction between the two constructs.  From Chapter 2 and 3, it is evident that intelligence is a 
type of knowledge; making the MISS also applicable to this type of knowledge and not just to 
information.  The MISS (1996: 8-10) provides the security classification regime for RSA 
government departments’ intelligence and information.  The security classification regime is used 
by the SA DOD, i.e. restricted, confidential, secret and top secret classified knowledge continuum 
artefacts as well as physical artefacts.  This classification regime does not necessarily exist in 
business.  Businesses use a more simple classification system classifying documents of importance 
or that require discretion as ‘company confidential’, ‘confidential’ or sometimes ‘secret’.  The 
MISS (1996) also describes more practical measures to guard intelligence/information and the 
responsibilities of national departments or agencies that are responsible for RSA governmental 
intelligence/information security. 
This layered security classification of documents or ultimately the information and/or 
knowledge of the SA DOD made explicit in one or the other form of media is aimed at restricting 
the flow of such information and/or knowledge in the interest of national security (first) and 
military/operational security in parallel.  However, it will ultimately hamper KM in its purest form 
in some way, that is, KM aiming at total freedom of flow of knowledge in order to grow knowledge 
and facilitate knowing and innovation.  Because this is not the primary objective of the SA DOD, 
information/knowledge flow is restricted in order to protect national and military interests and 
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operations.  Thus, KM in the SA DOD should take these objectives on board when designing an SA 
DOD KMC.  It should also have due regard for the other RSA departments that are mandated to 
guard the RSA national security.  Thus, an SA DOD KMC should encourage integration with other 
RSA departments responsible for national security and possibly other objectives. 
5.2.9 The Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act 18 of 2003 
The aim of the legislation is to provide the regulatory foundation for the existence and 
functions of the Armament Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR).  The only instance where 
‘knowledge’ is mentioned in the context of the requirement for “knowledge and experience” is for 
ARMSCOR Board Members (Section 7). 
Section 20 of the ARMSCOR Act 18 of 2003 mentions the safeguarding of information and 
records (amongst others).  It points to the requirement for information security – and when 
considering the discussion above regarding archiving SA DOD records, it could also imply 
knowledge security.  This is a typical counter-intelligence function.   
Section 22 pronounces on the management of IP.  Distinctly so, the IP rights are to be 
managed by ARMSCOR under the direction of the Sec Dec as per the SA DOD/ARMSCOR 
Service Level Agreement. To manage the SA DOD IP rights, ARMSCOR will have to manage the 
IP itself.  To this end, functional policy will have to be created.  This makes the Sec Def the 
champion of another type of SA DOD knowledge and broadens the scope of his role as the 
departmental CIO.  The IP referred to in the ARMSCOR Act 18 of 2003 (Section 3) relates to - “(a) 
the defence materiel requirements of the [SA DOD] …; and (b) the defence technology, research, 
development, analysis, test and evaluation requirements of the [SA DOD].” 
5.2.10 Reflection 
The legislation discussed above provides no requirement for KM.  It is still firmly entrenched 
in the information era and associated thinking.  With the understanding obtained from the 
legislation discussed above, it is clear that there is a requirement for coherent and integrated KM 
within government – at least from an asset management and national security perspective.  Such a 
capability will also assist the SA DOD to cross into the knowledge era and associated thinking and 
mandate the requirement for a KMC.  What is explicitly required is the security aspect of SA DOD 
knowledge continuum artefacts; the structuring of which will require considerable debate in order to 
establish a balance between security and the objectives of KM.  Let us know consider the SA DOD 
policy framework for evidence of a requirement for KM and actual KM policy. 
5.3 DEFENCE REVIEW 2015 
 “Government’s defence policy is articulated in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence 
Review.” (JWP4: 1-6). 
The DR 2015 was approved by Cabinet on 19 March 2014 and adopted by the South African 
Parliament on 4 June 2015.  The reason for this review is stated as - “… complex changes in the 
strategic environment, increasing continental peacekeeping obligations, the need to deepen 
democracy on the Continent and the pursuit of our national interests have led to a review of our 
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strategic posture and concomitant policy” (DR 2015: i).  The Review is positioned to provide 
extended long-term SA DOD policy (DR 2015: 0-6) integrated with RSA foreign policy and 
security strategy (DR 2015: 0-4).  This integrated approach is depicted in Figure 5.1 - 
 
Figure 5.1: Defence Policy within the National Policy Framework 
Source: DR 2015 (0-5). 
“The Defence Review draws on the Constitution and other Statutes, establishes fundamental 
principles and tenets and cascades these to a future-orientated, concept-driven, effects based [sic] 
defence policy and strategy.” (DR 2015: 0-6). 
At the very basic level of document use, the researcher explored the structure of the document 
to determine in which chapter and page knowledge and the management thereof is addressed.  It 
was found that knowledge and KM are not addressed in the DR 2015 Table of Content nor the 
Terms of Reference.  Furthermore, the DR 2015 does not define important cross-cutting constructs 
inherent in the SA DOD knowledge continuum such as data, information, knowledge, intelligence, 
policy and technology.  However, these constructs are used and discussed throughout the DR 2015.  
Only doctrine and IP are defined.  The DR 2015 (0-6) describes the researcher’s proposed notion of 
a knowledge continuum, albeit at an applied level, as – “…the continuum of policy, strategy, force 
design and structure needed to set a stable long-term defence planning agenda”.  There is thus 
evidence of integrated thinking about what is currently acknowledged as the knowledge hierarchy. 
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5.3.1 Basic Knowledge Management Related Keyword Search and Analysis in the Defence 
Review 2015 
The DR 2015 is silent on KM, yet the construct of knowledge is mentioned 27 times 
explicitly in the document.  The DR 2015 identifies knowledge sharing as an objective in support of 
South African economic development (DR 2015: 15-17). 
The DR 2015 recognises the knowledge (which include SA DOD IP, intelligence, doctrine) 
hierarchy throughout the document.  The DR 2015 makes one reference to the construct of wisdom, 
separately from knowledge (DR 2015: 11-9).  However, the knowledge hierarchy is not mentioned 
explicitly but the narrative acknowledges the components thereof, albeit iteratively.  No mention is 
made of a continuum of knowledge as discussed in the previous chapters. Based on the discussion 
in earlier chapters of the dissertation; the document discusses various components of a KMC but 
does not identify any method(s) with which to accomplish coherence and integration.   
The DR 2015 is very vocal regarding the management of data and information.  The DR 2015 
states that military information is strategically valuable.  This corresponds to the expression used by 
the NASAA 43 of 1996 – ‘information of enduring value’.  However, this is contradictory to the 
current academic, business and USA military opinions that knowledge is strategically important and 
is required for advantage.  Very little is expressed on knowledge, providing a clear indication that 
this construct is not recognised for its strategic value.  There is, however, discussion on doctrine, 
intelligence and IP, which are recognised as capstone military knowledge.  Thus, whilst knowledge 
as a construct is not directly addressed, types of knowledge are directly addressed with policy and 
management guidance.   
There is no mention of a KMC to integrate different types of knowledge being generated, 
used, shared and managed by the SA DOD.  There is only a recurring theme that calls for IM, 
information- and information systems integration.  Let us now consider more detailed discussions 
on knowledge and related constructs as expressed on in the DR 2015. 
5.3.2 Wisdom and Knowledge 
The DR 2015 (11-9) recognises a separation between knowledge and wisdom.  Warrant 
officers and non-commissioned officers have different levels and types of tacit knowledge, 
experience (and possibly wisdom) and that knowledge is important in the development of warrant 
officers and non-commissioned officers (DR 2015: 11-9 and 11-10).  Career planning is the 
principle enabler to harness knowledge creation, absorption and sharing.  Time spent in a rank will 
impact the level of experience and ultimately knowledge and wisdom (DR 2015: 11-9).   
Time is clearly coupled to the development of knowledge if skill and experience are 
considered building blocks of knowledge (DR 2015: 11-5). Human resource management plays a 
critical role in knowledge creation, absorption and sharing, therefore the Arms of Service and the 
Chief Human Resources are critical role-players in the development and management of SA DOD 
knowledge. 
These are all KM aspects that are the responsibility of the individuals themselves but also the 
Arms of Services career managers as well as the Chief of Human Resources.  Without a coherent 
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and integrated SA DOD KMC, it will be challenging for individuals and the organisation to harness 
the available knowledge and possibly even wisdom required for decisions and actions.  
The DR 2015 fails to recognise the strategic value of knowledge and the development of 
knowledge within the organisation to enhance decision-making, action, effects and advantage. In 
this regard, wisdom is also essentially ignored.  However, the SA DOD pronounces information as 
the SA DOD strategic resource based on the concept of information superiority - “Military forces 
strive to achieve necessary information superiority so as to ensure own freedom of action and to 
ensure strategic dominance and success.” (DR 2015: 6-7).  This positions the SA DOD firmly in the 
information era in 2017 and years to come.  From the DR 2015 perspective it is problematic due to 
the fact that the DR 2015 is regarded as extended long-term SA DOD policy, thus considered the 
SA DOD future.  According to literature and the case study on USA military KM, KM starts or 
ends with leadership.  What is stated by the DR 2015 about leadership and KM? 
5.3.3 Leadership and Knowledge 
Leadership is an SA DOD functional attribute, as contained in the acronym POSTEDFILT(B) 
– (personnel, operations, sustainment, training, equipment, doctrine, facilities, information,
leadership, technology and budget).  The acronym is only mentioned in the List of Acronyms (DR 
2015: xxxi) and not again in the document.  The various elements clustered in the acronym are, 
however, discussed throughout the document.  Note also that knowledge is not contained in the 
acronym, only doctrine and information.  Even more interesting and distressing is that intelligence 
is not contained in the acronym.  These issues will be discussed later in this dissertation. 
The DR 2015 (11-1) describes a distinct link between leadership, knowing and knowledge, 
but no mention is made of KM leadership or its links with mission command.  Transformational 
leadership is prescribed as a particular leadership style that should be pursued by the SA DOD (DR 
2015: 11-1).  This will have a specific impact on how SA DOD knowledge will be managed in 
terms of knowledge sharing and will thus impact the SECI cycle (or knowledge transfer and 
transformation) within the SA DOD. 
Leadership is subject to education, training and development which in essence is knowledge 
and skill transfer, thus recognising the requirement for a particular type of knowledge transfer and 
knowledge curricula (refer to the discussion on a broad liberal education combined with military 
sciences later in the dissertation) to develop SA DOD leaders.  The factor of time in rank is 
emphasised, alluding to the fact that knowledge development takes time; in line with academic 
views expressed in the literature review about knowledge time value.  
The DR 2015 (10-3) identifies policies, doctrine, procedures and processes as C2 capabilities.   
Command and control and military leadership is symbiotic and embodied in the military construct 
of mission command.  Leadership is a key component of KM according to literature and the USA 
military.  Thus for military organisations, C2 capabilities should be a key component of a military 
KMC.  If the SA DOD C2 doctrine is not carefully crafted it could inhibit knowledge processes 
(such as understanding and sharing) and thus inhibit decision-making, action, effects and advantage. 
The DR 2015 (10-4) links C2, unity of effort, doctrine, interoperability and leadership in a 
cause and effect relationship.  If doctrine is capstone military knowledge that enables the other 
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elements, then it is critical for the SA DOD to employ a KM capability to ensure the meaningful 
evolution of doctrine in a quest to remain relevant. Doctrine, as capstone SA DOD knowledge is a 
key requirement for successful military leadership and interoperability (amongst other military 
concepts). 
The DR 2015 expresses in various sections on SA DOD knowledge stakeholders and role-
players.  The responsibility for the management of SA DOD knowledge is widespread when 
considering the types of SA DOD knowledge that is managed.  The following role-players are 
specifically identified or implied: Chiefs of Arms of Service/Combat Services, Chief Human 
Resources, Chief Defence Matériel, Chief Defence Scientist, C DI, Defence Academy (DR 2015: 
11-4, 11-8, 11-13 and 11-16), Chief Logistics, planners, policy managers and the defence industry 
as a primary stakeholder/role-player in military knowledge (DR 2015: 15-5).  Also, specific SA 
DOD knowledge resides with the SA Defence Industry (DR 2015: 15-12).  Specific leadership is 
required by these role-players and stakeholders to ensure coherence and integration.  This can 
possibly only be achieved if the SA DOD appoints a CKO as the central functionary for SA DOD 
KMC. 
Thus, against the background of the assessments above of the current knowledge about 
leadership, C2, mission command and KM; the researcher suggests that the SA DOD should adopt 
the following KM leadership philosophy - the art of knowing and the science of managing 
knowledge to obtain and sustain advantage.  This is based on the philosophy of mission command – 
the art of command and the science of control.   
Thus, for those that survived and strive to win, they have mastered the art of knowing (based 
on the wisdom of Sun Tzu in Giles, 1910 as discussed in Chapter 3 of the dissertation).  The 
researcher suggests that to sustain survival and winning; the science of managing that knowledge is 
paramount. 
5.3.4 Education, Training, Development and Knowledge 
The DR 2015 pairs knowledge with a broad liberal education and military sciences. These 
represent knowledge-bases or -types to be transferred to military learners (DR 2015: xxxv and 11-
3). There are links between a broad liberal education and professional military education; thus 
setting the tone for types of knowledge to be created, shared and managed. Occupational specific 
knowledge is identified to be developed through the professional military education system. (DR 
2015: 11-4)  
Knowledge is identified as an effect of ETD (DR 2015: 11-3).  Education is considered to be 
driven by knowledge processes, typically referring to SECI-type processes (DR 2015: 11-3).  The 
DR 2015 establishes clear links between ETD and knowledge and between knowledge, credibility 
and professionalism. The DR 2015 (11-4) links knowledge to professionalism.  Clear links are also 
established between ETD and doctrine (DR 2015: 11-2 and 11-6), epitomised by the SA DOD 
axiom - “We train as we fight” (DR 2015: 4-2). 
Education to develop leaders is important.  The latter part of Task 1 (Deter and Prevent 
Conflict) lists curricula involved with training, technology and doctrine (DR 2015: 5-2) as 
important sources of knowledge with which to accomplish Task 1.  Without the appropriate military 
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knowledge, education becomes a challenge.  The Defence Academy is a key enabler to develop, 
share knowledge with future SA DOD leaders and also to manage knowledge (DR 2015: 11-8, 11-
13 and 11-16).  The knowledge imparted should enable officers to manage the complexities of 
personal and professional life.   
Training knowledge is linked to military action in the SA DOD axiom - “We train as we 
fight” (DR 2015: 4-2).  Training in the SA DOD is based on a broad liberal education, military 
science, training curricula and the personal skills and attributes contributed by the mentors, trainers 
and educators.  Thus, training is based on knowledge, yet military and related organisational 
knowledge are not highlighted as the primary resource for military ETD in the SA DOD, making it 
difficult to recognise that military knowledge is the SA DOD’s strategic advantage and not 
information.  This also complicates the integration of the various types of military knowledge 
required to provide the most comprehensive knowledge artefacts to base decisions, action, effects 
and advantage on.    
An implication of ‘we train as we fight’ is linked to action and the requirement of knowledge 
to be able to ‘train’ and ‘fight’.  There are clear interdependencies between training, action, and 
doctrine (DR 2015: 11-4). There is a distinct requirement for doctrine to be translated into action, 
thus supporting the idea that knowledge is not an end in itself but that organisations generate and 
manages knowledge (such as doctrine) to facilitate action.  Action is taken to create certain effects 
according to the RMA which set in motion a continuous cycle of decisions, action and effect.  If 
these are based on knowledge instead of just information the cycle could possibly result in 
advantage which in turn will lead to a different set of decision, actions and effects. 
If we can assume that the best training results will be produced by basing training on military 
knowledge rather than just data and information, then it can be assumed that training knowledge is a 
key to military action (or fighting).  Action based on just information or data will produce lesser or 
possibly undesirable outcomes or effects.  Action based on knowledge (and if possible integrated 
knowledge) should render far superior decisions, which will lead to superior action and military 
effects.  These issues of cause and effect are initiated by creating new meaning using knowledge 
processes in order to provide enhanced decision-making, action, effects and advantage, and are 
central to defining KM for the military environment.  In fact, the DR 2015 (11-6) recognises that 
the application of doctrine in operations leads to new knowledge (experience) which contributes to 
the evolution of doctrine (new meaning is created and thus, new knowledge comes into being). New 
knowledge (or doctrine) as a result of learning from operations must be institutionalised by means 
of the ETD to ensure the relevance of the SA DOD soldier in future operational contexts. This 
highlights the requirement for integration between doctrine development, ETD and operations – and 
emphasises the SA DOD requirement for a coherent and integrated KMC. 
The DR 2015 (11-4) identifies the Defence Academy as a primary role-player in the research 
and development of military doctrine.  For this, a Doctrine Branch should be established.  The 
Doctrine Branch will be further capacitated by the Centre for Military Studies to provide the 
SANDF with a doctrine research and development capability (DR 2015: 11-5).  These are primary 
role-players in SA DOD KM. 
The DR 2015 (10-7) requires the SA DOD to be - “Intellectually agile to understand the 
evolving strategic situation and derive from it the key implications for South Africa; … 
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Continuously evolving its concepts, doctrines, organisation and training to keep ahead of 
developments;…”. This expresses the requirement for continuous knowledge creation and sharing 
in order to know and to be able to interpret and understand so that decisions and actions can be 
taken.  This can only be achieved if the SA DOD IC is managed with a KMC. 
5.3.5 Experience, Skills Development and Knowledge 
The DR 2015 (11-5) identifies a requirement for a balance between knowledge (to know) and 
skills (to do or action) which is consistent with ‘we train as we fight’.  This implies that the SA 
DOD should place emphasis on KM and skills development.  Without KM, skills development will 
remain a challenge due to the absence of a coherent and integrated capability that could assist with 
the conversion of knowledge into skill and skills into knowledge.  This all takes a certain amount of 
time, and to gain experience in a particular skill takes even longer.  The DR 2015 (10-8) 
acknowledges that it takes time to develop knowledgeable officers and non-commissioned officers, 
which is a short-term vulnerability of the SA DOD.  This vulnerability could be lessened with the 
establishment of an integrated SA DOD KM capability that manages the entire knowledge 
continuum coherently. 
5.3.6 Types of Knowledge 
There is a range of knowledge types within the SA DOD.  The range of knowledge types 
corresponds to the recognised profession of arms knowledge (DR 2015: 11-4).  This knowledge is 
made explicit, typically in categories of capstone military knowledge such as (and corresponding 
with the USA military thinking on defence knowledge) policy, doctrine, intelligence, IP, 
procedures, tactics and techniques.  Other categories may be discovered when a comprehensive 
knowledge audit is done.  These should be considered capstone SA DOD knowledge.  Within these 
categories of capstone knowledge, several subject fields co-exist and evolve as types of military 
knowledge, both academically and functionally, based on the broad liberal education philosophy 
tabled in the DR 2015.  
Although not specifically stated, the breakdown provided by the attribute acronym 
POSTEDFILT(B) (DR 2015: xxxiii) alludes to some key knowledge domains to be managed, with 
information and doctrine mentioned separately.  Doctrine is considered capstone military 
knowledge, thus providing some recognition of the knowledge hierarchy.  What is missing from 
POSTEDFILT(B) is policy, intelligence and IP (both being capstone military knowledge that 
enables enhanced decision-making, action, effects and advantage).  Open to interpretation – does 
information, doctrine and/or technology in POSTEDFILT(B) includes constructs such as data, 
policy, IP and intelligence?  Because the DR 2015 acknowledges in several places that there is a 
difference between data, information, IP, doctrine, intelligence and knowledge – then the 
POSTEDFILT(B) acronym is very limiting in that it only addresses doctrine as capstone military 
knowledge and some other SA DOD resources (information). 
The DR 2015 (6-5) expresses on the role the SA DOD has to play in national key point related 
information and IP, making a distinction between the two constructs and identifying specific 
knowledge to be managed.  Several types of knowledge are identified by the definition of SA DOD 
IP (DR 2015: DR 2015: xxxv and 15-16).  The definition identifies IP covering data, information 
and knowledge as found in or codified as part of different artefacts.  Yet, IP is not included in the 
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POSTEDFILT(B) acronym.  The DR 2015 (13-6) identifies the Defence Force Establishment 
Tables as a specific knowledge artefact being managed by the SA DOD.  This document informs 
another strategic document, Defence Macro-structure that provides distinct insight into SA DOD 
Force Structure Elements.  
The DR 2015 mentions in several places different types of knowledge to be developed in 
support of its defence and security mandate, being knowledge of culture, customs and languages 
(DR 2015: 2-19).   These types of knowledge are not further described.  The DR 2015 (2-19) also 
identifies knowledge of weapons and knowledge of systems. These can be subdivided into own 
weapons and systems and knowledge of foreign weapons and systems that are typically the subject 
matter for capstone military knowledge artefacts and training material. It can be assumed that these 
will be closely associated with the SA DOD’s areas of operations and interests. 
Military Sciences is mentioned in the DR 2015 (xxxv and 11-3) as the knowledge that should 
be taught as part of a broad liberal education of SA DOD personnel.  This forms part of the ETD 
discussion above.  The types of curricula or knowledge to be shared and developed in future by the 
Defence Academy are in sciences and humanities; based on recognised academic professional 
military curricula (DR 2015: 11-16). The DR 2015 (11-16 and 17) outlines the (future) Defence 
Academy curriculum to include subject matter on the following knowledge domains within Military 
Science: Military History, Political Science (International Relations), Strategic Studies, Broad legal 
studies (including military Law, International Humanitarian Law, criminal procedures and law of 
evidence), Military Sociology, Mathematics or Applied Military Mathematical Literacy, Defence 
Resource Management, Public Administration, Military Geography and Aeronautical Science or 
Nautical Science (as a choice and depending on the future employment of the officer cadet).  It 
implies that graduate military officers will possess various combinations of tacit knowledge on 
these knowledge domains for application within the SA DOD and during operations.  Without 
coherence and integrated KM much of this tacit knowledge could remain dormant, which is neither 
cost-effective nor efficient and will therefore not contribute to enhanced decisions, actions, more 
accurate effects and advantage. 
The DR 2015 identifies Defence Attachés as a particular function that will require specific 
and well developed broad military knowledge (DR 2015: 2-19).  Specific knowledge that the 
Defence Attachés should have absorbed or internalised, over and above functional military 
knowledge, relates to foreign policy, defence diplomacy and international objectives (DR 2015: 7-6 
and 10-5).  This corresponds to the proposed broad liberal education (DR 2015: xxxv) and the 
curricula discussed above.  Coherent and integrated KM could provide mechanisms to better 
guarantee that candidates with the correct profile and aptitude are identified during Defence 
Academy studies, allowing for optimised career path development, mentoring and knowledge 
transfer. 
The SA DOD (SA Navy) is mandated to manage hydrographic knowledge and the associated 
artefacts (DR 2015: 8-2). The DR 2015 (8-2) mentions the following knowledge artefacts relating to 
hydrography as - “... the consolidation of navigational, hazard or maritime warning data into regular 
formal navigational safety publications or promulgation as Navigational Warnings or Notices to 
Mariners … Tide Tables for South African and Namibian harbours”.  This knowledge is critical for 
both the South African and the international seafaring community’s safety.  Knowledge integration 
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with external stakeholders and role-players is thus crucial.  This could be managed by an SA DOD 
KMC. 
The SA DOD employs personnel in the form of Specialist Reserves that have particular tacit 
knowledge, skills and experience that could be useful to other national departments (DR 2015: 8-
12).  A particular example relates to medical and engineering knowledge.  An example currently in 
practice is SA DOD personnel that were transferred to the RSA Revenue Service to assist with 
customs and excise duties.  Another specialist skill with a possible national, cross-functional, 
application is the skill of tracking, as might be applied to tracking rhino poachers in cross-border 
nature reserves such as the Kruger Park.  Without an SA DOD KMC knowledge and skills might be 
lost or difficult to locate to the detriment of the broader SA society. 
Specific knowledge that should be developed within the Defence Science, Engineering and 
Technology environment is knowledge about technology support and upgrades (DR 2015: 10-7). 
This is in support of discussions above about weapons and systems knowledge to be developed.  
Specific knowledge domains outlined in DR 2015 (15-7) are - 
“[C2]; information warfare [IW], at all levels of war; Secure communications; [IT], including 
data fusion technology; Intelligence-gathering sensor, analysis and evaluation technology; Target 
acquisition and identification technology; Unmanned systems (aerial, ground, surface and under-
water); Missile and wider guided munitions technology; Night and poor visibility observation 
and engagement technology; [EW] technology; Rugged tactical vehicles optimised for 
operations in the African theatre; Mine and [Improvised Explosive Devices] detection and 
protection technology; Long-range artillery, precision bombardment and point target engagement 
systems; Chemical, biological and radiological defence, including the manufacture of military 
carbons and canisters; Battlefield medical care optimised for the African theatre of operations; 
and Modelling and simulation.”. 
These are mostly detail packed into ‘technology’ in POSTEDFILT(B).  The knowledge basis 
for these knowledge domains (described as technology domains by the SA DOD) are typically 
contracted by ARMSCOR, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the 
Defence Industry (DR 2015: 15-3).  SA DOD KM could contribute immensely to the coherent and 
integrated management of knowledge requirements stemming from operational requirements, 
lessons learned during operations and competitive edge technologies.  It could also assist with the 
leveraging of IP in the international market to generate new knowledge and advantage or to simply 
drive down units costs due to the possible economies of scale. 
The DR 2015 separates logistics knowledge from logistics doctrine, implying that there is a 
difference (DR 2015: 14-6).  In order to illuminate construct dissonance, it would be helpful to 
detail these differences by means of an authoritative, configuration controlled, taxonomy.  An SA 
DOD KMC can assist with this task. 
Other specific knowledge mentioned are applied science of educational technology (DR 2015: 
12); local knowledge for prosecutors working in and for the SA DOD (DR 2015: 12-2); information 
system IP and communication system IP (DR 2015: 14-23); government policy as a primary form 
of direction to prospective contractors (DR 2015: 15-13) and technical and scientific advice as a 
distinct knowledge to be accessed in the Defence Industry (DR 2015 (15-22).  Let us now consider 
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expressions on categories of capstone military knowledge and types of knowledge contained in 
them for insight into SA DOD KM challenges, options and prospects from an SA legislative and 
Level 0 policy perspective. 
5.3.6.1 SA DOD Policy  
Much is said about policy in the DR 2015, primarily because it outlines the Defence Policy 
for the future SA DOD.  Aptly, the DR 2015 states that –  
“Defence policy is thus understood as that body of public policy that a government pronounces 
as its guidelines for the defence objectives and functions of its armed forces. To this end, defence 
policy defines the defence or military scope of national security, the strategic posture, defence 
capabilities, defence alliances, and security institutions or mechanisms (both national and 
international) that govern the utilisation of the Defence Force. The national defence policy also 
clearly identifies the possible threats to a country’s national security and its society, economy, 
territory and environment, and provides options to government on how the Defence Force should 
deal with such threats.” (DR 2015: 0-6). 
It is thus clear that the SA DOD policy is capstone knowledge that sets the means for 
navigating complex and changing environments within the time frames and means available in the 
national interest.  It is within this body of knowledge that the researcher is searching for evidence of 
interest in KM and possible fundamentals to a future SA DOD KM capability.  “In essence, national 
defence policy defines the strategic intent of government regarding Defence.” (DR 2015: 0-6). 
5.3.6.2 SA DOD Intellectual Property  
The SA DOD IP ownership and management regime is established by the DR 2015 (15-16 
and 15-17), hence the requirement to manage this type of knowledge.  This stems from the 
ARMSCOR Act 51 of 2003.  SA DOD IP is considered a specific type of knowledge. SA DOD IP 
is typically developed within the acquisition and procurement programmes; through research and 
development programmes and/or from defence industrial programmes.  ARMSCOR and Defence 
Matériel Division thus have a prominent KM role for the SA DOD.  This identifies Chief Defence 
Matériel and the Chief Executive Officer of ARMSCOR (DR 2015 (15-17) as key SA DOD 
knowledge managers.  The ARMSCOR Chief Executive Officer is responsible for the management 
of SA DOD IP, in fact, the ARMSCOR Act mandate ARMSCOR to be the custodian of SA DOD 
defence materiel related IP. The Chief Defence Scientist is another SA DOD knowledge manager, 
linked to the establishment of the Defence Science, Engineering and Technology capability (DR 
2015: 10-7, 15-9 and 15-10). This begs the questions then – is the Sec Def/ARMSCOR Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Defence Matériel or Chief Defence Scientist to be the CKO of the SA 
DOD or are they just the custodians of particular SA DOD type knowledge that should be included 
in the portfolio of an appointed CKO? 
The DR 2015 (15-16) states the importance of and several processes for SA DOD IP 
management (both back- and foreground commercial IP).  These are the management of ownership, 
creation, use, transfer, licencing, modification, altering, development, amendment, enhancement, 
registration of patents, royalty or revenue stream management, sale or leveraging, loss, disposal, 
dispute settlement of various kinds, conventional arms control requirements and security.  
Considering the literature review, these are all KM processes or some form of variation/semantics 
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to those mentioned and recognised by scholars and businesses alike.  These will require a broad 
scope of functional expertise which in turn will require integration in order not to duplicate 
functions that will lead to inefficiencies and wastage.   
The primary decision-makers about the management of sovereign or strategic SA DOD IP are 
the MOD, Sec Def and ARMSCOR Chief Executive Officer (DR 2015: 15-17).  Some of the Sec 
Def responsibilities have been delegated to Chief Defence Matériel.  CSANDF is not recognised as 
a primary decision-maker regarding the use of SA DOD defence matériel related IP.  However, 
CSANDF is a primary stakeholder in the management of SA DOD IP due to the impact it has on the 
defence’s capabilities under his/her command.   
The DR 2015 (6-5 and 15-12) emphasises the requirement for security of information and IP.  
If IP is regarded by business as strategic knowledge, then by implication the security of this kind of 
knowledge is paramount.  The security of specific defence matériel related IP is linked to the 
sovereign ownership and control of the IP by the SA DOD, thus implying a particular level of 
security measures, both physical and contractual.  Contracting is perceived as an important method 
to secure IP (DR 2015: 15-16).  A future SA DOD KMC should thus have a firm grasp on 
contracting models.  ARMSCOR, as the SA DOD contracting agency, must provide contracting 
services.  This makes ARMSCOR a very important role-player in SA DOD KM. 
SA DOD IP management is guided by SA DOD policy, contracts and possibly patenting.  
Security of SA DOD IP based on possibilities of patenting is highlighted.  Specific protection 
measures of IP to be considered are the maintenance of trade secrets and other national secrecy and 
security provisions (typically related to information security as having been discussed above and 
found within legislation) (DR 2015: 15-17).  Contracting is perceived as an important method to 
secure IP supplemented with a trade secret regime. These are thus regarded as important 
management tools and processes for the management of knowledge in the SA DOD.  Other 
paragraphs of the DR 2015 (15-16) provides for IP classification into the foreground- or 
background- or historical IP which is important for contracting and ownership. 
SA DOD IP stemming from defence technology development can be created as a result of SA DOD 
matériel acquisition and/or procurement programmes or by means of Defence Science, Engineering 
and Technology initiatives and/or Defence Industrial programmes stemming from the named 
activities.  Within these programmes, IP will be created through the investment of State funding in 
research and development and/or product development.  Detailed SA DOD policy, contracting 
models, possible patenting and bilateral arrangements with foreign countries and their militaries are 
utilised to acquire and control SA DOD IP based on the interaction between the SA DOD, 
ARMSCOR, the Defence Industry and foreign entities (foreign militaries and their defence 
industries and technology development organisations).  (DR 2015: 15-16).  This complex 
commercial and military interaction that involves the creation, utilisation and sharing of IP provides 
a very clear business case for SA DOD KM.  In fact, the DR 2015 (15-16) expresses this 
requirement as - “… The above places the burden on the State to ensure significant rigour 
concerning the management of defence [IP] in future defence matériel contracts.”.  With the above 
in mind, the DR 2015 defines SA DOD IP as -  
“Any [IP] that is created exclusively or partially with defence funds, and may be found in, or 
take the form of, books, manuscripts, reports and notes, computer software, inventions, drawings 
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and designs, data items, data packs, specifications, models, photographs, trademarks and other 
graphical images.  [DR 2015: xxxv and 15-16]  Defence [IP] includes [IP] that is created through 
indirect contracting, such as contracts made by the other party with a sub-contractor, as well as 
[IP] that is obtained or created exclusively or partially through the [Defence Industrial 
Participation] programme or other contracts or co-operations [sic] of the [SANDF] with foreign 
entities or countries, where the Defence Force and/or the other party are legally entitled to the 
[IP]”. (DR 2015: 15-16).  
The definition provides clarity as to what is considered IP and names several artefacts. These 
are, of course, primarily the result of acquisition, technology development, research and 
development and procurement initiatives.  Hydrographic services and intelligence will also render 
IP artefacts.  They can be found throughout the SA DOD in the various Arms of Service and 
Divisions, making Chiefs of Arms of Service and Divisions responsible for components of a future 
SA DOD KMC.  Furthermore, the scope of this definition highlights the requirement for a coherent 
and integrated SA DOD KMC if any enduring value and advantage are going to be created.   
The DR 2015 (15-16) states that the SA DOD will own (fully funded) or co-own (partially 
funded) defence matériel and/or technology developed related IP as funded by the SA DOD - “… 
unless specifically ceded to another body or person, regardless of any patents that may be lodged”.  
Contracting that is designed around control, ownership and use of SA DOD IP must express on -    
“… the required levels of sovereignty and secrecy, the use of background technology, the future 
transfer of such intellectual property and the matter of royalties.”.  The SA DOD does not divest 
itself of any owned or co-owned IP except where such a business case is approved by the MOD.  As 
a rule of thumb, the SA DOD does not patent IP due to the cost implications and security concerns 
over the explicitness of the knowledge control, ownership, military operational advantage and 
industrial advantage.  The SA DOD does, however, support the principle of maintaining trade 
secrets (DR 2015: 15-17) by means of rigorous counter-intelligence measures.  
Supporting the establishment of an SA DOD KMS is the fact that royalties can be earned 
through the leveraging of SA DOD IP (DR 2015: 15-17).  Such practices are also prescribed by the 
PFMA 1 of 1999.  There should thus be SA DOD policy on IP exploitation, which is another 
building block in a KMC.   
Because IP is considered an SA DOD intangible asset it forms part of the SA DOD asset 
management regime from an accounting perspective – making the Chief of Logistics an important 
role-player in SA DOD KM.   When IP is considered for leveraging, several other role-players are 
involved i.e. the defence industry and ARMSCOR and National Conventional Arms Control and 
associated national governmental departments.  When considering software IP, State Information 
Technology Agency (SITA) becomes an important role-player.  These are all important role-players 
and stakeholders in a future SA DOD KMC, either directly or indirectly. 
Lastly, both IP and intelligence are identified as two key priorities for defence diplomacy 
initiatives (DR 2015: 7-2).  Both these have been identified in the literature to be knowledge with a 
particular strategic value to organisations and are regarded as capstone knowledge.  Both are 
mentioned because intelligence can be IP and vice versa, depending on the context. 
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5.3.6.3 SA DOD Intelligence 
The DR 2015 (3-11) identifies defence intelligence as a key enabler to anticipate change.  
Intelligence is thus a key enabler to the cycle of decisions and actions that follows anticipated a 
change in the quest to dominate the OODA loop.  Consider the following from the DR 2015 (3-11) 
- 
“Defence must be able to effectively contend with a more complex, rapidly changing world 
through timely collection, processing and dissemination of actionable intelligence in order to 
accurately anticipate and respond appropriately. This requires strategic awareness and the 
restoration of an effective defence intelligence capability that provides integrated information 
acquired through liaison with allied and friendly forces, local human intelligence and the use of 
static and mobile sensors for enhanced military decision-making. This must be pursued at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels.”. 
In the quote above the DR 2015 uses information and intelligence interchangeably, creating the 
impression that information is equal to intelligence, which of course it is not.   
Some intelligence processes are mentioned above. These are collection, processing and 
dissemination. If intelligence is equated to a type of explicit knowledge, then these can be construed 
as knowledge processes.  The DR 2015 (3-11 and 10-6) also links action to intelligence, labelling it 
- “… actionable intelligence”.  Thus, intelligence is not just generated for the sake of generating 
intelligence or ‘knowing’.  It is generated with the intent to act, which implies that it should enable 
decision-making first and has a requirement for a specific after-action effect.  Thus, to create 
defence effects and advantage through decisions and actions there is a requirement for actionable 
intelligence.  Information and data are primarily building blocks to actionable intelligence.  This is 
not explicitly recognised in the DR 2015, only alluded to. 
Also from the quote above (DR 2015: 3-11 and 9-10), intelligence stems from human 
capacities and sensors.  Typical types of intelligence that sensors can provide that will enable 
decisions and actions and monitor effects achieved in photos, videos, radar and sonar images and 
sound recordings.  
The DR 2015 (3-11) also states that - “South Africa’s prevention capability is primarily 
vested in the political, legal, diplomatic and intelligence dimensions of State authority.”.  
Intelligence as capstone military knowledge is thus perceived as a critical national capability 
delivering strategically important knowledge artefacts (or intelligence).  The SA DOD is 
responsible for a large part of this intelligence as stated earlier in the chapter.  To deliver and 
manage this military intelligence and counter-intelligence requires KM systems and processes 
enabled by IM, IT and other IC. 
The DR 2015 (7-8) requires the SA DOD, as part of Task 9 (Contribute to Peace and 
Stability), to have superior intelligence (amongst other things).  Superiority alludes to intelligence 
that will result in an advantage.  Simply stated, the SA DOD wants knowledge that will result in 
advantage from an offensive and defensive perspective.  The DR 2015 (9-10 and 3-11) proposes 
that situational awareness will enable joint C2 and action –  
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“… ensure joint action with respect to land, air, sea, information and space, and which must be 
capable of integrating with multi-national, inter-departmental and inter-agency components to 
achieve synergy. Joint [C2] must be enabled through a comprehensive situational awareness 
capability that provides integrated information acquired through liaison with allied and friendly 
forces and governments, local human intelligence, and static and mobile sensors for enhanced 
military decision making. This must be pursued at the strategic, operational and tactical levels”.   
Similarly, the DR 2015 (10-5) identifies information, situational awareness and intelligence as 
key components of a C2 capability.   Mention is also made that situational awareness provides 
information for decision support and decision-making.  Integrated information is identified as a 
requirement for intelligence and situational awareness.   This information (derived from sensors), 
probably after processing, becomes intelligence further enabling situational awareness.   
Surely, C2 and decision-making should be enabled through a comprehensive intelligence 
capability that provides situational awareness as opposed to ‘integrated information’.  Does the SA 
DOD perceive integrated information as intelligence?  The proposed situational awareness must 
provide integrated information which amongst other things can be obtained from human 
intelligence, thus recognising the difference between information and intelligence.  However, the 
notion of integrated information (also mentioned in the DR 2015: 3-11) is not clear.  Integrated 
information or information integration requires a process of interpretation and understanding and 
skill and will probably lead to an intelligence-type artefact. Thus, the sentence should probably read 
- ‘… situational awareness capability that provides superior intelligence, acquired through liaison 
with allied and friendly forces and governments, local human intelligence and static and mobile 
sensors and other sources of information for enhanced military decision-making’.  Arguments could 
also be offered that intelligence capabilities (rather than situational awareness capabilities) provide 
situational awareness and that situational awareness is an effect rather than a capability.  The 
constructs of situational awareness, intelligence and information are symbiotic and aims at positive 
OODA loop effects.  
The DR 2015 (9-13) states that intelligence uses IM systems to manage intelligence with.  
This confirms the notion that SA DOD knowledge in the form of military intelligence is enabled 
with IM systems.  This is consistent with literature that IM systems and the employment thereof is 
not KM but just enablers to KM.  Because the SA DOD seems to be entrenched in the information 
era the organisation could easily fall into the trap of believing it is accomplishing KM with IM 
efforts.  Chapter 6 of the dissertation will shed more light on this predicament. 
The DR 2015 (9-10) also links intelligence to Information Warfare (IW).  Information warfare 
is a distinct capability, well established and universally used.  There are new views on this, i.e. to 
move beyond or augment IW to Knowledge Warfare (KW), thus creating a capability that utilises 
knowledge artefacts and capabilities to conduct warfare with.  “Knowledge is seen at the cent 
economic transformation (Bell, 1978), competitive advantage of an organization (Mayo & Lank, 
1994) and a shift from “info-war” to “k-warfare” (knowledge warfare) (Baumard, 1996)”  
(Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Kouzmin, 2003: 76) 
IW might be effective to create a certain level of military effect; however, in the current 
knowledge era and quick changing complex military operational environments should produce 
more desired effects.  Why? Because warfare based on information ignores the dividends that might 
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be earned by exposing that information to intellectual processes, skill sets and experience that could 
extract the relevant meaning from the information (typically by means of SECI-like processes) thus 
enabling better understanding, facilitating more relevant decision, actions and effects based on 
knowledge (taking the form of intelligence and doctrine as examples).  This understanding is 
reflected in the proposed definition of the dissertation for SA DOD knowledge and KM and is 
fundamental to a future SA DOD KMC. 
If this is the intention of IW from the outset, then it should be called KW instead because 
knowledge and information are two different constructs as described in the literature review.  The 
researcher believes the solution is somewhere in the middle because both information and 
knowledge are used in conjunction with IM systems as enablers as well as other technology (such as 
sensors) to conduct a type of warfare that is aimed at changing the behaviour of the opponent and/or 
negatively affect the OODA loop of the opponent.  Because knowledge has been identified by 
literature to pay the highest dividends when it comes to competitiveness and advantage, the 
researcher believes this type of warfare should be labelled KW in order to redirect the focus away 
from the quest for information superiority to a quest for knowledge superiority. This would include 
all aspects of a knowledge continuum (e.g. data, information, intelligence, doctrine, IP and wisdom) 
to provide superior knowledge to the decision maker; guaranteeing superior OODA loop effects as 
well as a higher probability of disruption of the opposing forces’ OODA loop.  The DR 2015 (10-4) 
supports the conceptions of the researcher, calling for integration between different operating and 
information systems within the SA DOD.  The call for integration is a common theme throughout 
the DR 2015 and is supported by the researcher of this dissertation.  The requirement for 
understanding is highlighted here, which is a distinct effect of KM.  It underlines the requirement 
for more than just access to all possible information – it suggests there is a requirement for quality 
knowledge artefacts to support decision-making and actions. 
The DR 2015 (10-4, 3-11 and 10-9) names three intelligence functions - collection, processing 
and dissemination.  These functions are semantically closely related to KM processes.  These 
functions must be provided by all the Combat Services, making them primary role-players in KM.  
Distinct defence intelligence artefacts are stated, which should be regarded as capstone military 
knowledge artefacts specifically directed towards military operations and to achieve specific effects 
when considered.  There is again a call for integration by means of - “… tailor made [sic] 
protocols”, identifying another type of SA DOD IP, referring either to some sort of software or 
alternatively doctrine or both. The DR 2015 (10-9) identifies several types of intelligence that 
should be generated, distributed and managed, e.g. intelligence about opposing forces, terrain and 
population. 
The DR 2015 (15-10) states that the Chief Defence Scientist has a distinct responsibility to 
develop technology that will enable intelligence gathering.  There is thus a need for technology to 
enable intelligence collection.  This technology will probably take the form of sensors that collect 
various forms of media that will be subjected to an intelligence cycle to produce military 
intelligence.  
The DR 2015 (10-6) confirms the required presence of the SA DOD in rapidly changing 
complex operational environments.  Complexity demands intelligence to be competitive, not 
information.  An overload of information typically increases the complexity that decision-makers 
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have to deal with.  Defence Intelligence, as a distinct functional component of the SA DOD, is 
mandated to provide this intelligence in collaboration with other elements of the SA DOD.  Yet, 
intelligence is not mentioned as a core functional attribute in the acronym POSTEDFILT(B), 
alluded to earlier in this chapter of the dissertation.  Defence Intelligence is thus a primary role-
player in SA DOD KM.  Other role-players named that rely on military intelligence are Combat 
Services (DR 2015: 10-4), defence planners and policymakers (DR 2015: 10-6); all considered key 
role-players in SA DOD KM.  
Another requirement identified by the DR 2015 (10-9) is for information and intelligence to 
be translated into evidence for use in litigation.  This points to another type of knowledge artefact 
required by the SA DOD as a result of, for example, border safeguarding operations.   
5.3.6.4 SA DOD Doctrine  
The DR 2015 (xxxvii) defines doctrine as - “Fundamental principles by which the military 
forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in 
application.”. The SA DOD thus recognises the link between doctrine, as capstone military 
knowledge, and action and by implication decisions and their effect.  Although not stated, doctrine 
is fundamental to advantage.  In fact, advantage can be acquired with access to superior doctrine.  
The DR 2015 (14-6) identifies doctrine as being a part of defence capability required to 
achieve a predetermined effect.  Regarding doctrine as defence capability; doctrine thus equates 
capstone military knowledge as a defence capability.  It also links military effects to the use of 
capstone military knowledge.  This is reflected in the proposed definition for SA DOD knowledge 
and KM in this dissertation. 
The DR 2015 (vi) states that doctrinal competence is a key part of the SA DOD deterrent 
capability and posture.  Doctrine is, for this reason, part of POSTEDFILT(B), alluded to earlier in 
this chapter of the dissertation.  Thus, the DR 2015 is aimed at (amongst several other things) 
articulating the defence responsibility to identify required doctrine (DR 2015: A-1).  The SA DOD 
consider doctrine critical to executing its mandate (DR 2015: 2-8), as a key requirement to the 
provision of domestic security (DR 2015: 3-8).  As such, the DR 2015 (0-2) provides key 
knowledge on strategic defence concepts, capability requirements and high-level doctrine; and 
require the SA DOD to have competencies (people and structures) that generate and manage 
doctrine (DR 2015: 11-3). DR 2015 (13-5) identify doctrine as a key component that informs the 
SA DOD design and structure – reiterating the importance that doctrine has as capstone SA DOD 
knowledge.   
CSANDF is the primary generator and manager of SA DOD doctrine and also military 
strategy (DR 2015: 4-6) and should have a specific staff component for doctrine management (DR 
2015: 11-12).  Furthermore, a distinct doctrine execution capability is required (DR 2015: 4-2), 
which is essentially the SANDF. The various Arms of Service will develop and manage doctrine for 
their military capabilities (DR 2015: 10-15) specific to their functional responsibility.  
The DR 2015 (13-2) identifies two levels of doctrine - defence doctrine and functional area 
doctrine.  It is also stated that Defence doctrine will be the overarching doctrine, with the 
overarching combat service support doctrine following, culminating in specific combat service 
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support doctrines. The goal of overarching doctrine is integration.  Each functional area has its own 
doctrine which must be aligned with overarching doctrine (DR 2015: 14-2). The DR 2015 (14-1, -2) 
identifies combat service support doctrine as a key knowledge domain – addressing knowledge 
areas such as health support, organisational structure, personnel-, logistics-, and financial resources.  
The SA DOD enterprise system has to be driven by both types of doctrine – thus the requirement 
for coherence and integration.   
Noting the earlier findings on military knowledge and military KM such as tactics, 
techniques, procedures, training and legal knowledge the DR 2015 (3-8) also identifies with these.  
The DR 2015 thus confirms that the same hierarchy consisting of policy, strategy, doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, process and procedures are part of the SA DOD knowledge capability.  This conclusion 
is confirmed by DR 2015 (9-32) which states the linkages between particular types of knowledge – 
strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.  Integration is required because if there is a 
requirement for doctrine to evolve (as stated earlier) then the strategy, tactics, techniques and 
procedures will also have to be adapted.  Furthermore, there is an integrated narrative and logic 
between the defence doctrine, force design, force structure, mandate, tasks and goals (DR 2015: 10-
2).  These issues are all linked to the prescribed SA DOD axiom ‘we train as we fight’.  ‘Train’ and 
‘fight’ becomes the collective expressions for learning and action based on the knowledge 
contained in e.g. policy, strategy, doctrine, intelligence and occupation-specific subject matter as 
well as military sciences and a broad liberal education. This supports the conceptions of the 
researcher that an integrated KMC is a requirement for the SA DOD to establish coherence between 
these various components.   
SA DOD doctrine, (strategy), tactics and training must evolve and adapt to cope with complex 
defence and security environments and the unpredictability of the future (DR 2015: 3-14, 5-1, 10-3 
and 10-7). There is also a requirement for doctrine and tactics to evolve with defence requirements 
for (in this case) new technologies (DR 2015: 10-7); supporting earlier discussions on technology 
and IP.   
In fact, the complex and changing SA DOD operating environment dictates that the required 
knowledge to operate sustainably and with advantage must continuously evolve with newly created 
meaning resulting from interaction with the environment in every dimension and for that knowledge 
to be relevant to any decision and action taken in both operational and corporate environments.  The 
requirement for evolution, adaptability and flexibility supports the idea of a coherent and integrated 
KMC. 
It is important to understand the requirement for adaptation and evolution in order to remain 
competitive and in control of the OODA loop.  Thus, if doctrine needs to adapt and evolve then ‘we 
train as we fight’ will also require flexibility and adaptability to evolve under the pressures of 
environmental complexity due to change.  This evolutionary premise is reflected in the proposed 
definition of the dissertation for SA DOD knowledge and KM. 
Flexible doctrine and technology exploitation are identified (amongst other factors) as options 
to mitigate short-term vulnerability whilst the SA DOD is in the process of building its military 
capability (DR 2015: 10-8).  Technology exploitation refers to knowledge portfolios managed by 
Chief Defence Matériel (Defence Technology Development), ARMSCOR, Defence Technology 
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Intelligence and Defence Industry.  To generate the best knowledge artefact requires an integrated 
KMC that allows superior knowledge flow within the SA DOD security regime. 
The DR 2015 (7-4 and 7-5) identifies doctrinal knowledge (but also tactics, techniques and 
procedures) to cross the national boundaries of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC); thus creating the requirement for general applicability within extended geographic 
contexts to facilitate interoperability (DR 2015: 10-3).  Important knowledge domains covering 
maritime security, nuclear defence, biological defence and military health protection are considered 
to be developed and managed. This will place a large KM burden on the SA DOD in order to keep 
track of the evolution of doctrinal knowledge as applied across the SADC and to ensure sustained 
interoperability.  Some other types of military knowledge that will also be supported in a regional 
context are knowledge about logistics, training, education, intelligence, doctrine and procedures 
(DR 2015: 7-5).   
Another type of doctrine mentioned is multinational doctrine, as was discussed in the section 
above regarding the SADC countries.  This narrative clearly points to the requirement for 
integration of doctrinal knowledge, especially if doctrine at the various levels must also form a 
coherent whole with SA DOD policy and strategy and find expression in tactics, techniques, 
procedures and processes. 
International Humanitarian Law obligations are identified as an important consideration to 
ensure SA DOD doctrine does not contradict international treaty obligations (DR 2015: 8-5).  This 
requirement places an extensive KM responsibility on the SA DOD Legal Division. 
The DR 2015 (9-3) requires doctrine to be integrated into the SA DOD acquisition 
programme and Defence Science, Engineering and Technology programmes in order to drive down 
costs and to ensure doctrine-man-technology integration.  The integrated nature of defence 
capabilities, the establishment of them and the knowledge they require pre-empt a coherent and 
integrated SA DOD KMC.  
The DR 2015 (12-2) identifies mission command as specific military doctrine.  Mission 
command is a specific type of command, control and leadership philosophy; previously stated as 
‘the art of command and the science of control’. Mission command will be more effective if the 
commander has access to relevant knowledge stemming from an integrated KMC.  Thus the 
proposed SA DOD KM leadership philosophy of the art of knowing and the science of managing 
that knowledge must obtain and sustain advantage. 
The DR 2015 (14-15) states the following about logistics doctrine - “Logistics doctrine will 
[sic] informed by the defence mission, goals and tasks. Logistics doctrine will be based on defence 
doctrine and will deliver a single, rigorous, comprehensive logistics process, founded on best 
practice military logistics principles and philosophy.”.  Logistics doctrine and knowledge is 
mentioned as separate constructs in the DR 2015 (14-16).  This knowledge could refer to logistics 
policy and strategy; whereas logistics doctrine probably includes elements of tactics, techniques, 
procedures and processes. These elements address the fundamental SA DOD logistics knowledge in 
both the ‘L’ and ‘D’ in POSTEDFILT(B).  Because military operations are critically dependent on 
logistics, there should be a focus on POSTEDFILT(B) knowledge integration. 
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Chief Logistics is responsible for logistics, asset management and procurement related 
knowledge (policy, strategy, doctrine, training and procedures) (DR 2015: 14-16 and 17).  Chief 
Logistics is thus a primary role-player in SA DOD knowledge.  This knowledge significantly 
impacts the SA DOD’s ability to conduct operations as required by its mandate and as prescribed by 
the DR 2015 due to the fact that military operations is dependent on defence matériel to produce 
required effects through the applying operational functions (i.e. firepower, C2, intelligence, 
security, logistics/sustainment, etc.). 
Other specific types of doctrine identified by the DR 2015 all relate to POSTEDFILT(B); 
doctrine about personnel, common defence Information and Communication System (ICS), finance, 
combat service support doctrine (DR 2015: 14-6, -7, -9, -14, -16, -17, -19, -22, -20 and -24) and 
service-level and joint unmanned systems (DR 2015: 15-22). 
There can be no doubt that SA DOD doctrine is capstone knowledge that requires decisions, 
actions, effects and advantage and that this knowledge needs to evolve in order to keep ‘we train as 
we fight’ relevant in complex military environments.  An SA DOD KMC will greatly enhance the 
success rate of this objective.  
5.3.7 Knowledge Management 
The DR 2015 makes no specific mention of KM.  It is only implied in certain parts of the 
narrative – as discussed above.  The DR 2015 does not pronounce on an SA DOD KM champion 
and does not provide policy guidance as to the organisational structure or design, policy, strategy or 
core KM processes to be followed.  Two knowledge generation processes identified in this 
paragraph are experimentation and exercises (10-3).  The DR 2015 identifies some key KM process 
to be present in contracting documents as knowledge development and knowledge transfer (DR 
2015: 15-8) and others are stated as part of intelligence above.   
No SA DOD KMC is envisaged.  This is contrary to the current academic and business 
practices and KM initiatives.  The USA military (amongst others), as thé military superpower 
engages in KM.  
In order to gain more insight into the assumption that the SA DOD is not interested in KM, 
the researcher delved deeper into the components of the SA DOD knowledge continuum.  This is 
also based on the fact that the SA DOD seems to be entrenched in the information era; hinting that 
insight might come forth from asking questions about SA DOD IM and data management. 
5.3.8 Information, Information Technology/Systems and Information Management 
Currently, nations such as the USA recognises knowledge and KM as the primary source of 
strategic advantage or power and not information. In the knowledge era, knowledge is the power 
base with information just providing the building blocks.  The knowledge era is not acknowledged 
in the DR 2015.  The DR 2015 does not link knowledge to South African vital interests, but rather 
information.   
The DR 2015 is describing information as a form of state-power (i.e. political, diplomatic, 
information, economic and military power) (DR 2015: 3-4, 3-5 and 4-6) and not knowledge. The 
DR 2015 (2-18) also states that – “… national economies are increasingly information-based, the 
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use of [IW] is becoming a serious threat facing governments”.  This is possibly the reason why the 
SA DOD regards information as strategic (DR 2015: 6-7) and does not engage in KM yet.  This is 
illustrated by Task 7 (Ensure Information Security), labelling information an SA DOD strategic 
defence resource, hence the requirement for information security and autonomy (DR 2015: 6-7 and 
14-22 and 23).  DR 2015 (14-22) states the following - 
“Defence information is a strategic resource over which the Defence Force must exert complete 
control, ensure inviolable security and maintain absolute autonomy, ... The concept of 
‘information as a strategic resource’ will drive all thinking on defence [IM], hence the use of the 
term ‘information resource management’.”. 
This possibly influenced the DR 2015 writers and those that made submissions whilst not 
being aware that the world has entered the knowledge era during the early to mid-2000s and that 
increasingly, world-class organisations were using knowledge and KM as a basis for decision-
making, action, effect and advantage.   
The DR 2015 is very vocal on the construct information, the management thereof and its 
function as a warfare capability. DR 2015 (9-32) identifies IM as a key organic capability to the 
lowest functional level within the SA DOD.  Note should be taken that the DR 2015 does not 
express on organic KMC.  DR 2015 (14-5) states the requirement for enterprise-wide IT 
enablement.  This is in stark contrast with the USA military that is institutionalising integrated KM 
to the lowest level of their military organisation. 
Information is identified as a functional attribute of the SA DOD in the acronym 
POSTEDFILT(B) (DR 2015: xxxiii).  Notably, neither intelligence nor knowledge or IP is 
mentioned and regarded as core functional attributes as discussed earlier.    Although, both 
intelligence and information systems are identified as key defence resources in DR 2015 (14-4).  
This expands the statement above to regard both information and information systems as strategic.  
This recognition of information to be a strategic resource possibly places the SA DOD at risk of not 
managing the correct resource in the quest for enhanced decision-making, action, effects and 
advantage.  If the emphasis is on information, IM and information systems - then there is possibly 
no organisational drive to extract new and relevant meaning and understanding (or knowledge) 
from it to positively affect OODA loop cycles and with increased accuracy in effects and sustained 
advantage. The SA DOD thus entrenches itself in the information era and associated paradigms 
versus moving into the knowledge era with the rest of the world. 
The DR 2015 (4-8 and 14) identifies information as a key enabler to Parliamentary oversight 
of the SA DOD and also highlights the requirement for information security.  Again, SA DOD 
knowledge should be the enabler for Parliamentary oversight, not simply information.  If 
Parliamentarians are bombarded with SA DOD information they are also left to their own devices in 
terms of understanding and interpretation, which could lead to erroneous conclusions and/or 
assumptions that result in unnecessary parliamentary questions and wastage of time and resources 
in an attempt to answer these questions.  The researcher is of the opinion that exposure to SA DOD 
knowledge artefacts will eliminate many of these issues and possibly result in better understanding 
and more optimised oversight.  The SA DOD should never endeavour to enable parliamentary 
oversight with just information, but always with knowledge artefacts from coherent and integrated 
KM. 
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South African IT; amongst others such as safety- and security technology and aerospace 
technology; is posited as having the potential to maintain South Africa’s position at the forefront of 
science and technology on the African continent (DR 2015: 1-4).  Information technology, as a key 
enabler to progress and development, is thus recognised as such by the SA DOD in the DR 2015.  
Furthermore, the DR 2015 (10-20) identifies the SANDF as a key role-player in national 
information systems and defence and security infrastructure, emphasising the requirement for a 
comprehensive IW capability integrated with the intelligence systems and services. DR 2015 (14-6) 
identifies the Chief of Staff to be an important role-player in IM for the office of CSANDF.  DR 
2015 (14-22) identifies three types of information systems - C2 systems, administrative systems and 
service unique systems.  Throughout the document, there is much emphasis on the integration of 
systems.  This is also a key requirement and fundamental for successful KM and KMC. 
The DR 2015 (3-12) identifies information as a combat capability (albeit non-kinetic).  SA 
DOD knowledge does not share a similar affiliation.  This is endemic to entrenched information era 
thinking.  The DR 2015 (4-2) states that information is a critical capability for C SANDF in the 
form of a combat formation.  The DR 2015 (10-9 to 10, -13, 11) identifies information as SA Army, 
SA Navy and SA Air Force combat capabilities.  This fits well with the thinking that information is 
strategic to the SA DOD.  Several other combat formations are mentioned but it does not identify a 
defence intelligence capability under command and as a combat formation. Yet, a part of the IW 
capability is inherent in the DI mandate (i.e. psychological operations and some counter-intelligence 
functions).   
These envisaged combat capabilities will also have an intelligence capability.  Thus 
separating the constructs of information and intelligence and conforming it to evidence from the 
literature review of the dissertation.  The DR 2015 identifies real-time information and intelligence 
as requirements for air operations. This requirement is based on the speed with which air operations 
naturally take place and corresponds to the notion of time-value of the knowledge continuum.   
The SA Army’s signals function is tasked with information distribution and technical support.  
The SA Army engineer’s functions are to acquire, produce and manage geographic information.  
This introduces several knowledge processes; i.e. distributions, technical support (IT management), 
acquire and produce.  There is thus a distinct overlap from a process perspective between IM and 
KM; which might feed the perception that IM constitutes KM.  It is becoming increasingly evident 
that military knowledge and the management thereof are not just enabled by IT but also by sensors.  
Sensors might be described as the primary source of knowledge continuum artefacts over and above 
human intelligence and other sources of intelligence collection.  Sensors are thus fundamental to a 
future SA DOD KMC. 
The DR 2015 (xi, xxxix, 2-18, 10-20, 14-23) identifies the requirements for an SA DOD IW 
capability, which is assumed to be a non-kinetic measure; also, intelligence-related information 
systems; but also identifies information as a key support capability to military combat formations 
(DR 2015: xi).  DR 2015 (10-6) highlights IW as a key threat to be monitored by DI.  The DR 2015 
(10-19) identifies IW (informational and psychological dimensions) as part of the SA DOD Special 
Forces competencies. Air operations should also participate in IW (DR 2015: 10-11) 
The DR 2015 (10-4) also classifies information operations (InfoOps) as a form of non-kinetic 
firepower, calling for integration with other operational systems.  The DR 2015 (10-20) explains the 
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modalities of IW – which involves the defensive and offensive use of data, information, 
frequencies, information infrastructure and people.  The use of people-centred IW or psychological 
warfare aims at a psychological effect to be achieved.  DR 2015 (10-21) specifies that IW 
equipment should be locally manufactured based on the fact that IW is considered a strategic 
capability.  This aims to maintain control over the security of supply and security of the 
manufacturing process.  KW is not mentioned by the DR 2015 as possibly the next generation 
capability required, as recognised by the USA and posited by some academics.  Knowledge Warfare 
might have similar requirements regarding the security of supply of technology because KW will 
invariably be enabled by similar IT as is the case with IW.  Information-Based Warfare (IBW) is 
linked to situational awareness.  Situational awareness is a component or key effect of IntOps.  The 
DR 2015 (10-20) establishes a link between command, control and administrative information 
systems.  Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is closely linked to efforts to disruption of the 
OODA loop – as discussed in the literature review.  These types of warfare are all symbiotic in the 
sense that they are based on and distinctly use knowledge continuum artefacts, humans, IT and 
sensors in a non-kinetic manner to achieve the desired effects and possible advantage.  Knowledge 
Warfare will be a more suitable umbrella term that encapsulates the use of the entire knowledge 
continuum as a warfare capability.  The current configuration contributes to the dissonance between 
constructs, e.g. is information intelligence or is intelligence information, as an example. 
To belabour the point of construct dissonance; the DR 2015 (3:11) states the requirement for 
the re-establishment of an effective SA DOD intelligence capability to provide integrated 
information by means of various resources at all levels of organisation and operations. The 
statement creates the impression that an intelligence capability must provide information. This is 
obviously grossly inaccurate.  Intelligence capabilities process knowledge continuum artefacts as 
well as other elements of IC to produce capstone military knowledge, i.e. military intelligence and 
counter-intelligence.  This type of statement in SA DOD Level 0 policy thus creates and perpetuates 
construct dissonance.  It highlights the requirement for coherence and an authoritative taxonomy of 
concepts and constructs. 
The DR 2015 (xii and 0-8) proposes an enterprise information system (based on a single 
overarching IT infrastructure) linked to National Treasury’s Integrated Resource Management 
System as a requirement for SA DOD command, control and administration.  These capabilities and 
systems are positioned to be networked with national and international networks.  The DR 2015 
alludes to the requirement for the comprehensive integration of sub-systems to take place as the 
foundation for all defence business processes and activities.  Thus, the DR 2015 (based on this 
paragraph) proposes an IM approach as the basis for defence business processes, decision-making 
and action; rather than a KM approach.  This is contrary to what is proposed by literature. 
The criticality of information security and the perceived threat to information integrity and 
information systems due to cyber-security related threats are highlighted (DR 2015: 2-18), resulting 
in information security being labelled as a vital interest (DR 2015: 3-7).  Very importantly, it is 
stated that - “… national economies are increasingly information-based, the use of [IW] is 
becoming a serious threat facing governments” (DR 2015: 2-18).  The DR 2015 (2-27) links 
national security imperatives to information infrastructure security and by implication also to 
information security. 
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The DR 2015 (3-14) identifies information acquisition and analysis capabilities (thus also 
alluding to two types of knowledge processes) as critical enablers to respond to change and provide 
situational and domain awareness.  Because of the interchanged use of information and intelligence 
– it is not clear whether this should be information acquisition and analysis or intelligence
acquisition and analysis or both.  The DR 2015 does make constant reference to situational 
awareness (DR 2015: vii, 3-14, 5-4, 5-5, 6-2, 9-10, 10-2, 10-5, 10-11, 10-14, 10-21) as an SA DOD 
operational function; but also to domain awareness (DR 2015: viii, xiii, xxxviii, 3-14, 9-4, 9-5, 9-
11, 9-13, 9-21, 9-22, 10-11, 10-13, 10-16).  The domain awareness definition in the DR 2015 
(xxxviii) is - “The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that 
could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment South Africa or its forces.”. This refers 
to knowledge of the domain (whether it is a geographical, cyber, organisational, or another type) 
due to the use of the construct of understanding being brought into the capability fold (as per the 
proposed definition of knowledge).  The literature review identifies understanding as a key 
component of generating knowledge or managing knowledge. It is this ‘understanding’ that will 
lead to new meaning or knowledge when required for decisions, action, effects and advantage.  The 
DR 2015 (3-14) states it as follows - “Heightened levels of domain awareness and appropriate 
decision-making and leadership will therefore be the critical factor in determining the appropriate 
preparation for and responses to emerging security trends.”.  The more traditional operational 
function is called intelligence rather than situational- or domain awareness, which constitutes 
military effects.  Both of these are not possible without intelligence.  Information will only render a 
lower quality effect and thus negatively affect the OODA loop. 
The DR 2015 (4-3) identifies the continental staff system functions (briefly discussed in the 
dissertation literature review).  Both intelligence and IM capabilities are part thereof.   It is possible 
to have a KM function within the specialist staff component of the continental staff system. 
However, the DR 2015 does not elaborate on these issues to that level of detail.  The intelligence 
component only deals with specific types of military knowledge and is thus not representative of a 
coherent and integrated SA DOD KMC.   
Continuing the discussion on the continental staff system; the proposed intelligence capability 
represents a sub-system with which to provide situational and domain awareness, risk analysis, 
knowledge about military and other threats and other knowledge for operational use.  The 
information and communication systems component of the continental staff system focus on 
information technology and not the information (content) itself per se, thus supporting the idea of 
being a KM enabler for the SA DOD.  The IT invariably used, manages the content of several SA 
DOD information systems and provide enabling capabilities to KM processes such as analysis, 
search, sort, collation, archiving, share, use, etc.  The continental staff system still only addresses 
the information era management environment, except if a case could be made that intelligence 
addresses all the components of capstone and other military knowledge required to enhance 
decision-making, action, effects and advantage (which there is very little evidence of, if any). 
Intelligence, in the continental staff system, addresses all self and opposing forces’ knowledge that 
would support operations.  The knowledge that does not necessarily support operations will not be 
visible, e.g. research and development knowledge such as defence matériel related IP.    
If knowledge is considered strategic and critical to advantage then it should have a prominent 
position in the continental staff system – and not just hidden away in the specialist staff component 
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or as a part of the other components (e.g. intelligence) of the system.  It could possibly be co-
located with intelligence and named actionable knowledge.  This should integrate all relevant 
knowledge (e.g. own- and adversary intelligence consisting of comprehensive knowledge about 
doctrine, policy strategy, tactics, techniques, procedures, processes and IP at strategic, operational 
and tactical level) in a coherent and integrated manner.  When intelligence and KM are separated; 
decisions, actions, effects and advantage might be compromised due to a loss of coherence and 
integration.  However, if intelligence is understood to encompass all relevant knowledge as stated 
above, then intelligence management could be perceived as KM.  This, however, is not the case at 
all levels of the organisation (e.g. at corporate level vs. operations).  These predicaments make an 
authoritative taxonomy on these concepts and constructs paramount to the SA DODs’ functioning 
by eliminating possible construct dissonance and management ambiguities. Introducing a KM staff 
component in the continental staff system will render much debate and will require much research 
on C2 related issues – which is outside the scope of this dissertation – but nonetheless should be 
extraordinary research to complete. 
The DR 2015 (5-2) identifies information as a measure (linked to a capability) to prevent 
conflict in Task 1 (Deter and Prevent Conflict).  Information at a national strategic level (amongst 
the others mentioned - political, diplomatic, informational, societal and military measures) are thus 
positioned to have pre-emptive or deterrence value.  This is typically stated from an IW perspective 
that would include elements of intelligence.  Pre-empting and deterring would be better achieved 
through intelligence than information.  The latter part of Task 1 lists other sources of important 
military knowledge such as curricula involved with training, technology and doctrine are stated. 
The first part of Task 3 (Defend South Africa) alludes to OODA loop effects (DR 2015: 5-4), 
or first mover advantage based on first knowledge and action - “South Africa would seek to either 
take the initiative to prevent an attack or embark on deliberate self-defence when an aggressor is 
able to exercise the initiative.”.  The second part of the paragraph identifies InfoOps and 
intelligence as key enablers to the concept of initiative - “… fluid, high-mobility and high-tempo 
manoeuvre, predominantly offensive operations at the tactical level, maximum use of superior [C2], 
intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance systems and [InfoOps], and flexible, responsive 
sustainment support.”.  This supports already stated views that the SA DOD conceptualise 
information and intelligence differently, notwithstanding the fact that functions of intelligence are 
also inherent in InfoOps.  What is also important is that the concept of operations is primarily based 
in enhanced decision-making (C2); action (manoeuvre and offensive operations) and effect (mobile, 
high tempo, fluid, superior C2, flexible, responsive sustainment) in order to gain and/or sustain 
advantage.  This supports the conceptualisation that a future SA DOD KMC should principally exist 
to enhance or optimise decision-making, action, effects and advantage through the art of knowing 
and the science of managing that knowledge to obtain and sustain advantage in the national interest.  
This is captured by the dissertation- SA DOD KM philosophy and proposed definitions of 
knowledge and KM.  Just relying on information and IM will diminish the SA DOD first mover 
advantage or render the SA DOD initiative at risk. 
Task 5 (Safeguard Critical Infrastructure) mentions the criticality of information about 
National Key Points (DR 2015: 6-5).  Task 5 expresses on the requirement for protection and 
security of National Key Point information and IP.  This is recognition of the differentiation 
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between elements of the SA DOD knowledge continuum.  Both information and IP is stated as 
being a strategic resource supporting the opinion that IP is capstone military knowledge.   
Supporting Task 5; Task 7 (Ensure Information Security) addresses information security (DR 
2015: 6-6 to 8).  Task 7 identifies and discusses secure information and communication as a specific 
effect to be achieved.  There is also discussion about information security and freedom of 
expression nexus (DR 2015: 6-7).  Task 7 (DR 2015: 6-9) reinforces the security requirement for 
SA DOD and other state information.  It is positioned as a specific SA DOD task.  Communication 
is the key to KM (knowledge sharing and generation in order to execute SECI processes as 
described in the dissertation literature review).  Thus, communication security will have an impact 
on information and knowledge flow and thus on KM. 
Information security is also linked to South African national security and economic 
imperatives. In fact, this is a legislated requirement and expressed in several other places in the DR 
2015.  The SA DOD share some responsibility for information security with the State Security 
Agency [Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Limited], the Police Service, Department of 
Communication and Department of Science and Technology (DR 2015: 6-7 and 8).  These are all 
stakeholders that should be considered when constructing an SA DOD KMC.  However, nothing is 
said about knowledge security; probably because the writers of the DR 2015 perceive information 
inclusive of knowledge.  This is contradicted by the fact that there are several references to 
information, knowledge, intelligence, IP and doctrine as separate constructs.  This conundrum 
complicates coherent and integrated KM within the SA DOD.  It will certainly complicate the 
security of SA DOD knowledge.  The SA DOD needs to recognise knowledge security as the 
primary goal.  This should encapsulate all aspects of the knowledge continuum.    
Cyberspace is identified as a key enabler to information flow and also a key risk to 
information security.  It is almost overstated. No mention is made specifically about document 
security in formats other than electronic format. (DR 2015: 6-7). Information and data are also used 
interchangeably, again alluding to construct dissonance.   
Over and above information security being a priority, the SA DOD aims at information 
superiority (DR 2015: 6-7).  This might lead to information overload if not properly managed.  
Literature refers to knowledge superiority as being the current strategic objective or desired effect 
with which to achieve an advantage. 
InfoOps and IW (DR 2015: 6-7) are suggested as a possible means to secure and exploit SA 
DOD and other information. The DR 2015 (9-14) identifies the following components of IW as 
network warfare (NW), Electronic Warfare (EW), Psychological Warfare (PW), InfoBW, 
information infrastructure warfare (IIW) and C2W. These can be construed as particular types of 
KW activities and should be fundamentally enabled by a future SA DOD KMC.  Although these are 
internationally recognised and practised forms of warfare, many of these are aimed at information 
systems (hardware and software).  PW is in the human domain and will require an acute 
understanding of the human psyche which will be more closely associated with knowledge than 
with information.  Attacking and/or securing information systems will affect the integrity and 
availability of the information.  If the integrity of the information-base becomes unstable it will 
negatively affect the generation of knowledge.  Thus, IW by its very nature aims at leveraging 
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information, thus reducing the human psyche to information.  KW, though, aims at leveraging the 
entire knowledge continuum, encapsulating all aspects of technology, sensors and humans.   
The researcher is of the opinion that there is possibly a requirement for both types of warfare 
(i.e. IW and KW) because of the different decisions and actions required and the differences in 
effects that can be obtained.  It could also be argued that by attacking the building blocks of 
knowledge is a pre-emptive strike on knowing. 
Task 7 (DR 2015: 6-9) also proposes Joint IW (indicating that the effort is organisation wide 
and that there is a requirement for integration) as a possible means to secure the information but 
also exploits the information to the advantage of the SA DOD. Again, suggestions of information 
superiority as an effect are suggested by means of IW to dominate the information sphere (DR 
2015: 6-9).  What is problematic is the fact that the “human domain” is linked to information 
superiority.  The “human domain” typically refers to human intelligence – which is not IM but 
intelligence management that employs knowledge processes that others associate with IT and other 
sensors. 
In Task 7 (DR 2015: 6-9) several proposed effects are to be achieved with IW in order to 
achieve information superiority.  These are deterrence, protection, disruption, destruction, denial, 
exploitation, superiority and influencing the beliefs and behaviour of humans in the physical, 
information and cognitive (psychological) domains.  Beliefs, behaviour and cognitive processes are 
applied to information in order to generate knowledge (or intelligence in the military context).  In 
order to achieve this, there should be intelligence and IW doctrine in place.  Again, the prescripts 
are useful for organisations that function in the information era but need new thinking for the 
knowledge era.  The difference between the effects that could be achieved with IW and KW is 
quantitative (reducing information overload) and qualitative (KW should produce enhanced 
decisions, actions, effects and advantage).  
The DR 2015 (9-13) identifies IW to be conducted in all operational domains parallel with 
conventional warfare.  Integration should take place between IW capabilities and intelligence-
related information systems and other related systems. An interesting concept is intelligence-related 
information systems. Intelligence (as capstone military knowledge) is enabled or managed with IM 
systems, possibly creating the impression that intelligence is information and creating construct 
dissonance, possibly reinforcing the perception that the SA DOD needs only to manage information 
and not knowledge. 
Task 7 (DR 2015: 6-9) proposes encryption of data as a means of security.  This has vast 
implications for KM from an access and sharing perspective.  However, without the protection of 
key knowledge and its building blocks, the advantage might be lost.  This dilemma raises the 
question of how much protection is required to secure advantage without paralysing knowledge 
growth. 
The DR 2015 (7-5) identifies types of information being managed by the SA DOD but also 
the importance of information exchanged with Regional and Continental Partnerships as part of the 
SA DOD Defence Diplomacy strategy.  The types of information that are mentioned are - threat 
perceptions, defence budgets, force structure, modernisation plans, general defence cooperation, 
high-level visits and troop deployments.  These are typical essential elements of information for 
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intelligence collection requirements of any military. These can be subdivided into information 
categories as stated by DR 2015 (14-22): sensor-, military-, corporate- and common information.  
The DR 2015 (13-3) identifies performance management information as a specific type of 
information managed by the SA DOD; being typically required within the SA DOD corporate 
environment.  The DR 2015 (14-22) refers to the possible effects that the IM and the associated 
systems must achieve as being autonomy, accuracy, quality, non-duplicated, relevancy and 
timeliness.  These effects are also to be achieved by KM; again reiterating the overlap between IM 
and KM. 
Task 9 (Contribute to Peace and Stability) proposes network-enabled information sharing.  
This corresponds with concepts in RMA.  In Task 9 information and intelligence superiority are 
addressed again as separate constructs as well as desired effects.  Thus, there is a requirement for 
particular military knowledge superiority, i.e. intelligence. In the statement -“Superior [C2], 
protection, firepower (including non-lethal and precision capabilities), mobility and manoeuvre, 
information and intelligence, and sustainment are critical” (DR 2015: 7-8), situational and domain 
awareness are replaced correctly with intelligence because situational and domain awareness are 
effects of intelligence. 
The DR 2015 (9-10) identifies a situational awareness capability that should provide 
integrated information from a variety of sources (amongst others human intelligence) as discussed 
earlier.   The researcher wonders what the SA DOD intelligence capability is for? 
The DR 2015 (10-5) identifies information, situational awareness and intelligence as key 
components of a C2 capability.   Mention is also made that situational awareness provides 
information for decision support and decision-making.  Integrated information is identified as a 
requirement for intelligence and situational awareness.   This information (derived from sensors), 
probably after processing, becomes intelligence with situational awareness as an effect.  These 
discussions above about information, intelligence, integrated information, situational awareness and 
domain awareness should all be defined in detail and in a coherent manner in an authoritative SA 
DOD taxonomy on concepts and constructs.  Such taxonomy should be managed by a future SA 
DOD KMC. 
The International Hydrographic Organisation is stated as a specific stakeholder of SA DOD 
knowledge due to the responsibilities of the SA Navy Hydrographer as a service provider.  
Maritime safety information is identified as a specific type of information being managed by the SA 
Navy Hydrographer (DR 2015: 8-2). Hydrographic (also referred to as nautical) data and 
information are managed by the SA DOD to enable the safe navigation as an effect (DR 2015: 8-2).  
This data and information must be of an international standard taking into account international 
resolutions and recommendation.  Specific hydrographic knowledge artefacts are - nautical charts, 
sailing directions, lists of lights, tide tables and official nautical charts and publications.  Most of 
these conform much closer to being knowledge than information does.   
The DR 2015 (13-1) identifies a high priority requirement for a defence enterprise IM system 
due to outdated and disjointed legacy information systems, providing automated, real-time, end-to-
end defence management, supporting both defence administration (blue network) and military C2 
(red network).  It is a risk for the SA DOD to base its decisions, action, effects and advantage on an 
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IM system that is fragmented and unintegrated.  Especially if the SA DOD regards the resources 
managed with this system i.e. information, as a strategic resource.  
Task 7 (DR 2015: 6-9) states defence information systems are required for C2, administration, 
personnel, logistics and finance.  Note that fragmented management information systems inhibit 
integrated and systemic decision-making on stock levels, equipment and strategic fuel reserves, 
maintenance and repair (DR 2015: 9-6) – or simply; the ability of the SA DOD to conduct 
operations.  The remedy to this is enterprise systems. 
The DR 2015 (9-18, -21 and 10-20) identifies an integrated defence enterprise information 
system as the backbone information system to drive administration and defence C2. The DR 2015 
(9-14) identifies administrative [IM] systems as a type of SA DOD IM system; and state their 
criticality as a transverse system and to combat support (DR 2015: 14-2).  Some of the key effects 
to be delivered by the enterprise information systems are standardisation, compatibility, 
connectivity and interoperability (DR 2015: 13-1).  A Defence enterprise IM system is required to 
be (rapidly) adaptable to cope with change (DR 2015: 13-3).  Information technology is a key 
enabler in performance management, strategy execution and decision-making and thus needs to 
facilitate flexibility and adaptability.  These are important aspects to consider for a KMC.  Defence 
enterprise system characteristics include - 
“a. The enablement of combat service support through automated, tracked, in-transit visible, 
real-time information which is integrated with various resource system databases and networks. 
[DR 2015 (14-22) states that the information and communication systems is positioned as a 
combat service support system and must provide the following functions (processes): access to 
information, security, connectivity and autonomy.] 
b.  The defence enterprise system must be: 
i. Driven by core Defence Force doctrine and functional area doctrine. 
ii. Granular, secure and accessible. 
iii. Compliant with defence regulatory framework standards. 
iv. Integrated across all resource areas. 
v. Deployable at all locations of defence activity. 
vi. Operational to the lowest functional level in the field, performing over limited bandwidth and 
non-persistent network infrastructure, or even independently at remote locations. 
vii. Complete business-to-business system integration with information at the 5th line of support, 
industry standard information systems and other defence [IM] systems. 
viii. Enabling of data integrity and clean-up of disparate information.” (DR 2015: 13-2). 
This positions IM and the defence enterprise system as the primary enabler to key areas of a 
KMC such as policy, doctrine, intelligence, IP, security, integration, accessibility (knowledge 
sharing to the lowest level) and reduction in data/information overload.  Such a system will be a 
fundamental enabler to a proposed SA DOD KMC from the perspective of the integration of ‘all 
resource areas. 
Task 7 (DR 2015: 6-9) posits information systems as a C2 enabler, and by implication, an 
enabler to decision-making, action, effects and advantage.  Weapon- and administration information 
systems are also named as two distinct enablers.  
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Other types of information systems named are health informatics, telehealth and health 
intelligence, hinting at specific health information being managed by the SA DOD (DR 2015: 6-7).  
When subjected to SECI type knowledge processes, these will result in specific health-related 
knowledge, e.g. health intelligence.  
Another important information systems identified (DR 2015: 13-1) are Integrated Resource 
Management System of National Treasury and Integrated Financial Management System.  The 
migration to the National Treasury’s Integrated Resource Management System implies that Defence 
will utilise information systems common to RSA government departments.  The Integrated Defence 
Enterprise System and General Defence Network (Blue Network) are positioned to provide the 
foundation for the SA DOD business processes and activities.  These systems are thus positioned as 
primary KM enablers that should provide critical information from which new meaning can be 
extracted. 
The DR 2015 (14-4, -5) identifies SA DOD resource systems (typically information systems 
supporting the management of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, ICS, training, 
finance and specialist staffs) as a primary source of information.  These resource systems reflect the 
components of the continental staff system discussed earlier. Budgets, expenditures and revenue are 
also key financial information components (DR 2015: 13-3).  Integration with other SA DOD 
systems is a stated requirement as discussed earlier and is a recurring theme.  These must also 
provide “information and advice” (DR 2015: 14-4) to SA DOD decision-makers.  The advice in this 
instance is separated from information (content) because advice is knowledge (information in 
context).  The statement provides evidence that SA DOD decisions are required to be based on 
more than just information, a statement that is contradicted elsewhere in the DR 2016. 
Expanding on other information system requirements by the SA DOD; are a Personnel 
Information System (DR 2015: 14- 9 to 10), a Logistics Information System (DR 2015, 14-13 to 
16), a Defence Procurement Information System (DR 2015: 14-17 to 20) and the Defence Finance 
Information Management System (DR 2015: 14-20).  These are all stated as short-term 
implementation priority which must be integrated with the Defence Enterprise Information System 
and other relevant government information systems such as the National Treasury Integrated 
Resource Management System and Integrated Financial Management System as previously stated. 
The narrative refers to both Personnel Information System and personnel IT system, without 
clarifying differences (if any).  Similar effects as stated earlier in this chapter are to be achieved by 
these information systems, i.e. enhanced effectiveness, efficiency, economy, transparency, integrity 
and simplicity.  The Defence Finance Information Management System must be based on a single, 
rigorous, comprehensive and tailorable finance management process.  Important information being 
managed is personnel-related information about administration, policy, doctrine, functional and 
competency standards, standardisation and training curricula.  The Logistics Information System 
should enable military supply chain management and life-cycle management.  This should typically 
be informed by the logistics policy, strategy and doctrine. Primary information being managed with 
this system relates to financial information, defence movable and immovable tangible asset 
procurement contained in the Defence Procurement Register, assets and contingent liabilities 
procurement reporting and procurement of assets used by foreign deployments. These are typical 
types of information within the corporate, military and administrative categories. 
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The DR 2015 (14-28) identifies the priority of a Geographic Information System in support of 
the maintenance of defence ranges (amongst other requirements).  There is an SA DOD long-term 
procurement priority to implement Best Practice Military Procurement Management based on a 
single integrated Procurement Management Information System and the establishment of a Defence 
Procurement Regulatory Framework.  There should also be integration between the Procurement 
Information System and a future accrual accounting requirement. (DR 2015: 14-19).  There is 
mention of a requirement for specific SA DOD procurement curricula to train procurement 
personnel (DR 2015: 14-19).  These issues all conform to KM processes and actions.  The SA DOD 
should consider instituting best practice management for all its functional components.  Best 
practice management should be centralised in a future SA DOD KMC to ensure integrated feedback 
to knowledge champions within the SA DOD.  From the researcher’s experience, there are some 
elements of best practice management in the SA DOD.  However, best practice management is not 
institutionalised enterprise-wide and certainly not integrated. 
Records management is a responsibility of the C SANDF ICS staff as per the National 
Archives act (DR 2015: 14-24).  This can be construed as both IM and KM activities as some 
artefacts might only be of informational value, others might be knowledge. 
An IW sector is a stated requirement within the Defence Industry (DR 2015: 15-5).  
Inevitably, this will require certain technology domains to be established in the Defence Industry, 
notably IW and IT (DR 2015: 15-6).  Other related technology areas to be established or maintained 
are data fusion and intelligence gathering sensors, analysis and evaluation technology.  These 
technology products are knowledge enablers due to the processing of knowledge continuum 
artefacts. 
The responsibility for IT and IW development programmes is allocated to the future Chief 
Defence Scientist, thus identifying the Chief Defence Scientist as a fundamental role-player in SA 
DOD KM (DR 2015: 15-10).  Chapter 15 of the DR 2015 further describes key knowledge domains 
to be developed and maintained by the SA DOD.  These are, however, not labelled ‘knowledge 
domains’, but rather technology domains, raising questions as to the SA DOD definition of 
technology which is not defined in the glossary of terms, possibly resulting in less than optimal 
solutions and wastage.   These domains are - C2, IW (at all levels of war), systems integration, 
secure communications, IT, including data fusion technology, intelligence-gathering sensors, 
analysis and evaluation technology, target acquisition and identification technology, unmanned 
systems (aerial, ground, surface and under-water), missile and wider guided munitions technology, 
night and poor visibility observation and engagement technology, EW technology, rugged tactical 
vehicles optimised for operations on the African continent, mine and improvised explosive devices 
detection and protection technology, artillery, precision bombardment and point target engagement 
systems, chemical, biological and radiological defence, including military carbons and canisters, 
battlefield medical care optimised for the African continent and modelling and simulation (DR 
2015: 15-10).   
The researcher assumes that these technologies are not just hardware but that each technology 
domain supports a significant portion of scientific data, information and knowledge (e.g. IP), which, 
if not managed with coherence and integration in mind will render less than optimal solutions.  The 
key question remaining – does the SA DOD regard technology and knowledge as the same 
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construct? Clarity is required on the SA DOD definition for the construct of technology.  The effect 
to be achieved by the Chief Defence Scientist is to assure that the SA DOD -“… remains an 
intelligent, educated buyer in specific fields of defence matériel” (DR 2015: 15-10).  Both 
‘intelligent’ and ‘educated’ as criteria are offspring of knowledge.  SA DOD KM is thus a 
requirement. 
5.3.9 Data 
Data is regarded as the smallest building block within the knowledge continuum.  The 
discussion above, thus far, provided ample evidence of the status of knowledge and KM within the 
SA DOD.  However, the researcher finds it necessary to take the analysis full circle by  considering 
the remaining element of the knowledge continuum, for clarity. 
There are various types of data in the SA DOD and on the battlefield.  This requires 
networked enabled C2 to make this available to enhance situational awareness. (DR 2015: 13-3)  
The data referred to will obviously have to be processed into some form of information and then 
knowledge before situational awareness can be achieved.  This has been discussed above.  
Expenditure data (DR 2015: 2-20) and hydrographic data (DR 2015: 8-2) are identified as types of 
data being managed in the SA DOD; showing the diverse spectrum of data present.  Important types 
of data for the construction of hydrographic knowledge (navigation safety publications and 
navigation warnings or notices to mariners, tide tables for South African and Namibian Harbours) 
are maritime warning data and national tide data.  Other important hydrographic knowledge 
artefacts emanating from hydrographic data and information are official nautical charts, sailing 
directions, lists of lights, tide tables and other official nautical publications.  
Data can be defence IP, based on the IP definition discussed earlier (DR 2015: xxxvii and 15-
16).  Included in this definition are various types of SA DOD information and knowledge.  Data can 
be at risk to cybercrime and cyber-attack – thus the requirement for security (DR 2015: 2-18 and 6-
7).  This is the case for information, intelligence and IP as stated earlier.  The DR 2015 (6-7) makes 
an important contribution to how the SA DOD uses data, information and intelligence produced by 
weapons systems and sensors.  Consider the following - 
“Information and communication systems and technology are tools enabling [C2] to be exerted 
in warfare. They provide the infrastructure for weapon systems and sensors to exchange relevant 
data and allow decision-makers to use data, information and ultimately intelligence to visualise 
the battlefield [i.e. situational awareness] and make successful military decisions” (DR 2015: 6-
7). 
Firstly, the quote acknowledges the knowledge hierarchy described in the literature (data, 
information, knowledge (intelligence), posited by the researcher to be a knowledge continuum 
rather.  This continuum is recognised as ending with intelligence or capstone military knowledge.  
Importantly, that decision-making leading to success is facilitated by intelligence (a product of data 
and information processes to create new meaning or knowledge).   These issues have been 
discussed and confirmed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5, thus far.  They are thus also reflected in the 
proposed definitions of knowledge and KM in this dissertation. 
The DR 2015 (6-7) describes the sharing of data as being ‘transported’.  The literature 
describes this process as being ‘shared’ or data/information/knowledge ‘flow’.  The fact that data is 
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described as being transported almost commoditise it, enclosed in some form of container – which 
speaks to the predicament of security (through encryption) rather than the requirement for freely 
available and accessible data/information/knowledge to enable growth and innovation.  The SA 
DOD should standardise the terminology used to ensure unambiguous understanding.  The 
dissertation proposes some core processes in Chapter 8 of this dissertation to assist with this. 
The DR 2015 (13-2, -3) alludes to some important data management processes as data clean-
up, integrity determination, archiving and (DR 2015: 14-10) validation required and also identifies 
databases as the feeding source for combat service support information. 
The DR 2015 (14-9, -15, -18, -19, -20) highlights data integrity as a deliverability to be 
achieved by the Personnel Information System, Logistics Information System, Procurement 
Information System and the Finance Information System – specifically for financial data in Cabinet 
Memoranda.  This integrity is very important because it provides credibility for subsequent 
information and knowledge.  The chain (or continuum) is as weak as its weakest link. 
The DR 2015 (15-6, -10) identifies data fusion technology as part of IT – which is a 
technology development focus area for the SA DOD.  The SA DOD thus has a requirement for 
technology that can produce information. This is a responsibility is assigned to the future Chief 
Defence Scientist.   
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a view on the projected future of SA DOD KM as articulated by the DR 
2015 (SA DOD Level 0 policy) and based on the current reality stated in the national legislation.  
Knowledge management is not expressed as an SA DOD requirement in the analysed legislation nor 
the DR 2015.  The analysed legislation and the DR 2015 leave the researcher doubtful of the SA 
DOD interest in KM.  Priority is attached to various forms of military knowledge but no priority is 
expressed to manage knowledge as a strategic asset.  However, there is extensive expression on 
several of the components of a KMC, with no distinctive structure or mechanism to bring these 
together in a coherent and integrated KMC.   
The SA DOD is mandated to provide defence and deterrence as well as an affordable and 
departmental obligation to enhance decision-making, actions, effects and advantage in support of 
the national and international obligations.  The SA DOD has an international obligation to manage 
its knowledge stemming from International Humanitarian Law obligations, involvement with 
Southern African Development Community doctrine, sharing of intelligence and leveraging IP 
internationally and hydrographic knowledge for a very large geographic area, etc.  Coherent and 
integrated KM is proposed as a critical enabler to successfully address this mandate and obligations. 
There are a number of factors in the DR 2015 that will make SA DOD KM implementation 
challenging.  The DR 2015 has not progressed into the knowledge era and does not acknowledge 
knowledge as the strategic organisational resource.   The DR 2015 categorically states that 
information is strategic to the SA DOD, thus entrenching the SA DOD in the information era and 
IM for the foreseeable future.  The SA DOD still emphasises data and information warehousing for 
possible use (creating and exacerbating information overload); rather than focussing on creating 
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new meaning from the available data and information and crafting knowledge artefacts with 
enduring value that enhance decision-making, action, effects and advantage.   
The DR 2015 identifies all the components of the knowledge continuum (data, information, 
knowledge and intelligence) as variables, with differing levels of importance attached to them, to be 
managed by the SA DOD.  However, these constructs are not properly defined from the onset, 
possibly fuelling construct dissonance and the perception that the SA DOD is not interested in KM.  
This calls for a detailed, authoritative taxonomy to be constructed as the basis for policy and 
doctrine formulation. 
The DR 2015 places enormous emphasis on the development, maintenance of knowledge 
artefacts such as policy, strategy, doctrine, intelligence, tactics, techniques procedures and 
processes.  This knowledge is required for leadership (or C2), interoperability (jointness), 
operational flexibility to cope with the demands of uncertain and ever-changing defence and 
security environments.  However, coherent and integrated management of such knowledge is 
absent.  An SA DOD KMC could possibly provide such coherence and integration through 
excellence in leadership, taxonomy, best practice management and other KM techniques and 
processes. 
Types of knowledge to be managed by the SA DOD as identified from the DR 2015 are 
discussed in detail above and provide a clear indication of the complexity involved, thus supporting 
the requirement for coherence and integration.  This comes with the understanding that all the 
building blocks of the knowledge continuum need management by a coherent and integrated 
capability to be able to extract advantage from it.  Yet, no such capability is prescribed by or 
described by the DR 2015.  Various components of such a capability are mandated, described and 
prescribed.  However, no mention is made of a structure solely responsible for SA DOD KM 
coherence and integration. 
The DR 2015 identifies several primary role-players/stakeholders in SA DOD KM as the 
MOD, Sec Def, Chief Defence Matériel, Chief Defence Scientist, Chief Financial Officer, C DI, 
Chief Logistics, Chiefs of Arms of Service and Divisions, Squadron Commanders and the 
ARMSCOR Chief Executive Officer.  The question is which one of these should be the SA DOD 
CKO or should the SA DOD CKO be an entirely new mandate and structure?  
A critical success factor for SA DOD KM is a transformational leadership approach to the 
implementation of KM.  Thus, the identification and appointment of an SA DOD CKO as the 
champion for SA DOD knowledge is paramount. 
The fact that education is considered to be driven by knowledge processes; makes it 
imperative for the SA DOD to identify which are core knowledge processes.  These should be 
articulated and promulgated in KM policy and defined in taxonomy. 
Only IM and intelligence management are distinctly acknowledged by the analysed legislation 
and the DR 2015.  The researcher identifies this as a critical asset management gap that will require 
attention as part of the requirements of DR 2015 Milestone 1 (Arrest the Decline).  New and 
evolving meaning and understanding through KM initiatives can greatly assist the process of DR 
2015 implementation – at least in the medium- to long-term.   
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Because the SA DOD has to function in a very complex environment, strategic management 
(decisions, action, effects and advantage) cannot be based on information solely.  Strategic 
management should be grounded in knowledge, which is more dynamic because it is based on 
evolving meaning as information, interpreted and linked to evolving context and calibrated by 
skills, experience and value systems.  
Another problem adding to the reluctance to engage in KM is the complexity resulting from 
an integrated SA DOD KMC.  A possible reason for this is embedded in complex C2 relationships 
(boundary management) and possible fear of losing control of certain functions, skills, capabilities 
and knowledge. This erodes possible efforts to create new meaning due to information and 
knowledge sharing failures exacerbated by construct dissonance.   
A key failure currently in the SA DOD is the failure to contain the ‘brain drain’.  Skills, 
experience and organisational knowledge are bountiful in the SA DOD, however, the 
institutionalised platforms that assist with the sharing of this knowledge is lacking, absent or 
severely hampered by security requirements.  Such platforms are for example communities of 
practice, blogging and best practice management as used by the USA.   
This said; there is a glimmer of hope in the recognition that military intelligence is of strategic 
importance.  However, this recognition has not brought the SA DOD closer to knowledge era 
thinking and associated practices.  The predicament is exacerbated further by the DR 2015 that does 
not describe an SA DOD KM future; only describing the components of a possible KMC in an 
unintegrated manner. 
There is an unambiguous argument for the construction of a coherent and integrated SA DOD 
KMC.  The argument is based on the motivation provided by Chapters 2 and 3 that KM is crucial to 
coping with complexity and change stemming from the business and military environments.  It is 
reasonable to propose that a KMC would be a force multiplier for any military organisation.  The 
USA military has already implemented such a proposal.  Also, the prevalence of several types of 
military knowledge in the SA DOD, discussed above, supports this requirement.  The fact that the 
DR 2015 places great emphasis on the development of policy, strategy and doctrine and the 
establishment of information- and intelligence capabilities provides a critical foundation for the 
establishment of an SA DOD KMC. 
Chapter 5 provided the researcher with themes to inform the research and analysis for chapter 
6 of the dissertation. These themes were used to structure the discussion in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation, focussing on the research questions.  The next chapter of this dissertation focuses on 
the analysis of a selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  This analysis is based on 
analysis and emerging themes from Chapter 5 of the dissertation, to construct possible answers to 
the research questions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
LEVEL 1 POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
“A nation state’s power base is built on five key planks: Diplomacy, Information, Military and 
Economic power and Social cohesion/infrastructure” (JWP8: 1-11) 
The DR 2015 provides a clear understanding of the projected future of the SA DOD of which 
KM is not part of that future.  The researcher could have possibly ended the document analysis with 
the completion of the sample of legislation and DR 2015 analysis.  However, the researcher felt that 
the knowledge adduced evidence in this dissertation is not representative of the SA DOD policy 
direction without the analysis and assessment of the SA DOD Level 1 policy database.  Elaborating 
further on the discussion in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the DR 2015 (4-4) summarises the levels 
of decision-making in complex environments along the lines of policy, strategy and plans, as - 
“The identification of a hierarchy of defence direction, [C2] does not necessarily intend 
dogmatic and rigid obedience thereto, but rather provide a practical construct to assist with 
complex decision-making and judgement by all concerned within a continually evolving and 
fluctuating environment.” DR 2015 (4-4).  
This depiction of hierarchy corresponds with the discussion in Chapter 2 of this dissertation 
on the levels of policy and strategy. The levels of SA DOD decision-making is depicted in Figure 
6.1., with Defence policy depicted at the strategic level.  Figure 5.1 depicts another view of the 
interrelationships of Defence policy.  From Defence policy all other strategy, plans, procedure, etc. 
flow (also see SANDFP3 (1-1 to 1-5).  Interestingly, doctrine is not included in this graphic, 
probably fitting on the military strategic level.  The graphic gives the reader a sense of where the 
analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 of the dissertation is focussing. 
In order to provide further depth to answers to the dissertation research questions, the 
researcher analysed a snapshot of SA DOD Level 1 policy, based on the SA DOD policy database 
(pp_static dated 17 May 2016).  This snapshot would also cover the entire period during which the 
DR 2015 was drafted and ratified.  This resulted in very recent SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine, forming the foundation of SA DOD management direction, and were thus analysed.  
The levels of policy closely correspond to the levels of SA DOD C2 (or decision-making in 
Figure 6.1) as defined in IDODI1 (A-1 and A-2).  It also provides a glimpse at why Level 1 policy 
and doctrine was selected for this research.  The levels of policy are:  
 “a. Level 0 – Government Policy. Government Level Policy includes the Constitution, 
Legislation and Regulations issued by Ministers in terms of Acts of Parliament, White Papers, 
Position Papers, Cabinet Decisions and Ministerial Directives to the DOD. [The scope of 
Chapter 5] 
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b. Level 1 – Departmental Policy. Departmental Level Policy includes all policy issued by the 
Sec Def and the CSANDF and is obligatory upon all officials in the DOD. 
c. Level 2 – Service and Divisional Policy. Service and Divisional Level Policy includes all 
policy issued by Service and Divisional Chiefs of the DOD and is obligatory upon all officials of 
the specific Service or Division issuing the policy.  
d. Level 3 – Formation Policy. Formation Level Policy includes all policy issued by formation 
commanders and is obligatory upon all officials of the specific formation. Formations include 
Type Formations, Support Formations and their equivalents in other Services. 
e. Level 4 – Unit Policy. Unit Level Policy includes all policy issued by unit commanders and is 
obligatory upon all officials of the specific unit. The term “unit” includes combat forces, service 
centres and regional decentralised offices and depots” (DODI53: 8-9 and SANDFP4: 7)” 
 
Figure 6.1: Levels of Decision-making 
Source: DR 2015 (4-4). 
Currently, the SA DOD formalises its strategic direction of the organisation by means of 
Department of Defence Instructions (DODI), which represents SA DOD Level 1 policy.  “In the 
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[SA DOD], policies are embedded in [DODI] for the purposes of promulgation. The term policy 
and instruction may be used interchangeably for any specific policy.” IDODI2 (A-2).  DODSPF1 
(13) defines SA DOD policy as –  
“… the “action-plan” to achieve the same end-state of the Defence Strategy69.  For a single
strategy, there can be a number of defence policies which will direct the formulation and 
development of subsequent defence strategies and plans from both the core and functional 
environments (policies regarding human resource recruitment, compensation, main mission 
equipment acquisition, doctrine etc.) as derived from the Defence Strategy and will support and 
direct the resources and capabilities of the Department to the achievement of the Defence 
mandate and related performance information, as articulated through the Defence strategy.”. 
SANDFP4 (4) defines policy very practically - “Policy is a course of action selected out of 
various alternatives, that provides the guidelines to be taken in certain defined circumstances”.  
IDODI2 (A-2) and DODI30 (A-3) defines policy as – 
“… a line of action selected out of various alternatives that provides [sic] the guidelines to be 
taken in certain defined circumstances. Policy is based on fixed principles that emerge from 
strategy and which form the framework for the issuing of instructions or commands for the 
handling of a given situation. It is authoritative and is normally a determinant of current or future 
decisions.”. 
This definition highlights important aspects as to why the researcher analysed SA DOD Level 
1 policy for answers about SA DOD knowledge and KM.  One such aspect is the statement that SA 
DOD Level 1 policy provides authoritative guidance to current and future requirements.  SA DOD 
Level 1 policy will thus provide insight as to the current state of SA DOD knowledge and KM, 
which is important for the findings of the dissertation.  Thus, SA DOD policy is clearly decision 
and action orientated.  It also represents the first layer of knowledge within the SA DOD used to 
authoritatively guide, direct, instruct and manage the decisions and actions to possibly achieve the 
desired effects.   
69
 Strategy is the ways (methods) and means (resources) employed to achieve the aims (outputs) as determined (laid 
down) by higher level policy. (IDODI2: A-3) 
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Figure 6.2: SA DOD Value Chain 
Source:  DODSPF1 (16). 
This layer of knowledge (considered as capstone knowledge based on the discussion in this 
dissertation’s Chapter 3 and 5) act in an integrated manner with other critical components of the SA 
DOD towards the achievement of the SA DOD mandate, as proposed by the SA DOD value chain, 
depicted by Figure 6.2 above.  According to Dr S. Breytenbach
70
, the SA DOD policy database still
contains various formats of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  These are - 
 SA DOD Level 1 policy associated with the Defence Secretariat - DOD Directives
71
 (DODD),
Interim DODI (IDODI), Financial Management Division Instructions (FMDI) and DODI; and
 SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine associated with CSANDF - SANDF Directives
(SANDFD), SANDF Publications (SANDFP
72
), SANDF Orders
73
 (SANDFO), Joint Defence
Publications (JDP), Joint Warfare Publications (JWP), Joint Warfare Manual (JWM) and
Logistics Pamphlets.
Dr Breytenbach states that the SA DOD Policy database contains SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine.   This view is supported by SANDFP4 (5) –  
“The level 1 SANDF policy publications system shall include the following policy instruments: 
a. SANDF Directives (SANDFDs) that provide policy required or authorised by the CSANDF,
to initiate, direct, or regulate actions or conduct by members of the SANDF and to enforce
accountability. Specifically, SANDFDs establish or describe policy direction, outcomes, and
assign responsibilities. SANDFDs shall be approved and signed by the CSANDF and
endorsed by the SecDef [sic].
b. SANDF Orders (SANDFOs) that implement policy, assign responsibility and accountability,
and prescribe uniform methods for efficient execution of the policy within the SANDF. A
SANDFO implements a SANDFD and shall be approved by the CSANDF for implementation
in the SANDF and endorsed by the SecDef [sic] for support and execution throughout the [SA
DOD] as required.
c. SANDF Publications (SANDFPs). Publications that supplement SANDFOs by providing
background to policy; processes and uniform implementation procedures. A SANDFP is
authorised by a SANDFO, and its foreword is signed by the CSANDF and endorsed by the
SecDef [sic] for support and execution throughout the [SA DOD] as required.”.
In terms of SANDFP, the following is stated by SANDFP4 (2) - 
70
 Dr S. Breytenbach is Director Policy Development in the Policy, Strategy and Planning Division of the SA DOD. 
The writer consulted Dr Breytenbach on a number of occasions on the technical peculiarities of the policy database and 
the relationship between policy and doctrine on the database.  
71
 Directive. A directive is a communication that initiates or governs action, conduct or procedures. A SANDF Directive 
will establish or prescribe policy direction, outcomes and assign responsibilities. (SANDFP4: 3) 
72
 SANDF Publication. Supplements the SANDFO by providing the processes and procedures for implementation in the 
SANDF. (SANDFP4: 4) 
73
 Order. An order is a written, oral or signal communication, in which tasks and the methods for executing them are 
communicated from a superior to a subordinate. (Source: CSW) A SANDF order implements policy, assigns 
responsibility, accountability and prescribes uniform methods for execution of the policy within the SANDF. 
(SANDFP4: 4) 
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“The development, promulgation and maintenance of level 1 policy forms part of the overall 
strategic direction process of the [SA DOD] [“…the overall process that directs the functioning 
of the [SA DOD] and ensures the realisation of the departmental vision, mission and strategic 
objectives in accordance with government policy.”] Level 1 SANDF policies are authorised by 
the [CSANDF] as [SANDFO]).”. 
SANDFP4 supports the notion that JDP, JWP, JWM and Logistics Pamphlets are not 
perceived as SA DOD Level 1 policy.  JWP1 (3-4, 6-5, 7-2 and 7-3) equates JWP to doctrine and 
not policy.   Both DODI1 and JWP1 deals with SA DOD corporate communications doctrine; and 
thus, one might find doctrine in DODI and policy in doctrine.  Doctrine must take cognisance of SA 
DOD policy when being developed.  “Doctrine is defined as the fundamental principles by which 
military forces guide their action in support of objectives. It is authoritative by nature but requires 
judgement in application.” (SANDFP2: 2). 
SANDFO4 (4 and 5) provides a hierarchy of SA DOD Joint Doctrine documents, required not 
to be classified higher than ‘restricted, described as a hierarchy within a domain of doctrine – as 
follows: 
“a. Policy Documents. All [DODD], [DODI] and [JDP] as promulgated jointly by the [Sec Def] 
and the [CSANDF] must be seen as higher order publications that are to be taken into account 
at all times during the development of Joint Doctrine. 
c. [sic] [JDP]. This is the overarching term used to describe all Joint Doctrine Publications and
may consist of either a [JWP] or a [JWM].  
[SANDFP2 (2) states that the - “… aim of this [JDP] is to prescribe policy processes and 
procedures for the research, development, authorisation, publication, distribution, 
maintenance, control and management of all [JDP] in the SANDF.”.  This provides a broader 
description of JDP but also alludes to knowledge processes important to doctrine management 
and that there is a nexus between policy and doctrine.  SANDFP2 (2) states further linkages to 
action - “[JDP] are a series of publications issued by CJ Ops at departmental level pertaining 
to all matters of joint/combined and multinational operations. They provide guidelines for the 
execution of these joint activities within the SANDF.] 
a. [sic] [JWP]. These publications cover all those joint warfare and operational aspects that
require co-ordination [sic] and integration of effort whenever two or more of the
Services/Divisions are involved in joint operations. Service/Divisional aspects may be
covered when these have a bearing on the joint operations being conducted or, as and when
necessary for mutual understanding or as background information. All [JDP] fall within the
DOD functional defence publications and will be subordinate to this DODI. They should also
be mainly on the Strategic and operational level of war. Exceptions may occur...
[SANDFP2 (2) states “JWP may contain appropriate policy, principles and guidelines for the
execution of operations. These publications reside mainly at the organisational level two.”.
JWP8 (1-6) state that the JWP is doctrine and it provides information about and - “…
practical guidance for military commanders, staff and personnel involved at the operational
level in peace missions.”].
b. [sic] Joint Warfare Manuals (JWM). These publications are issued where a document usually
resides at the tactical and/or technical level. These manuals describes [sic] low level [sic]
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doctrinal procedures, tactics, practices and procedures for action and are used mainly by units 
and members on the tactical level. It will however need co-ordination at a higher level and 
should usually flow from and are usually attached to a [JWP] although this may not always be 
the case and some manuals may stand alone.”.  
SANDFP2 (2) states - “Joint Warfare Manuals are publications issued by CJ Ops that usually 
reside at the tactical and/or technical level. … These documents would usually flow from and 
are usually attached to a Joint Warfare Publication. Exceptions may occur where they may be 
individualistic by nature and may stand alone.”. 
Therefore, SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine are included in the ‘doctrinal domain”, are 
regarded as ‘higher order publications’ to be considered when drafting doctrine.  SANDFP2 (1) also 
states clearly that joint doctrine should not contradict - “… higher order DOD Policy Publications” 
and - “… other relevant governmental policies”, thus clearly separating policy and doctrine.   
From the description above - JDP, JWP and JWM do not conform entirely to the selection 
criteria for SA DOD Level 1 policy but share some of the criteria.  JDP is SA DOD Level 1 
doctrine and in some instances quasi-SA DOD Level 1 policy.  Therefore, based on the 
identification of military doctrine as capstone military knowledge, the researcher felt compelled to 
include the relevant selected samples of JDP, JWP and JWM in the document analysis in order to 
provide insight into the definition and management of doctrine, its nexus with other capstone 
military knowledge and other possible indications of KM.   Thus, for the purpose of this 
dissertation, the researcher includes the selection of doctrinal publications (i.e. JDP, JWP and 
JWM) whenever there is a reference to the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy.   
All SA DOD Level 1 policies are currently being systematically converted into DODIs.  
DODIs undergo a lengthy and inclusive development process (SANDFP4: 11-17 and A-1) 
primarily under the control and direction of the personnel of the Chief of Defence Policy, Strategy 
and Planning and the SA DOD Policy Board.  The Sec Def and CSANDF co-sign DODIs into use. 
All SA DOD policies are being published on an SA DOD internal web-based portal.  The 
policy database is managed by staff from Chief Defence Policy, Strategy and Plans with support 
from SITA.  The database separates policy into (1) Government Policy Publications – also referred 
to as Level 0, (2) DOD Policy Publications – also referred to as Level 1; and (3) Service and 
Divisional Policy Publications – also referred to as Level 2.     
The database features current, promulgated policy and archived (superseded) policy.  For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the researcher focussed on current promulgated DOD policy 
publications (Level 1 policy). 
Based on discussions in the literature review, military KM (dissertation Chapters 2 and 3), the 
analysis of the SA DOD legislative environment and the DR 2015 (dissertation Chapter 5) the 
following keywords were selected as search foci for the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy 
and doctrine – wisdom, knowledge, knowledge management, intelligence, doctrine, IP, information, 
information management, data, CIO and CKO. After applying the sample criteria discussed in 
Chapter 4 of the dissertation (including relevant doctrine) the researcher narrowed down the number 
of policy and doctrinal documents to 125 documents.  This was done by opening and inspecting 
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each document in the folder named ‘docs’ (containing 9519 files in 32 folders) contained in 
pp_static dated 17 May 2016 to ascertain compliance with the sample criteria.      
The sample contained a selection of DODD, DODI, IDODI, SANDFO, SANDFP, SANDFD, 
JDP, JWP and JWM.   This sample was then further filtered to eliminate duplication and documents 
that were merged into single DODIs.  Each selected document was assigned a dissertation 
configuration number for identification purposes and to assist with referencing (reflected in 
Selected Sample of SA DOD Level DODI and Doctrine as part of the dissertation reference 
administration). 
Once the sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine were filtered according to the 
sample criteria the researcher proceeded to analyse each document in turn according to the same 
search words used for the DR 2015 analysis.  The search functionality of the Adobe software was 
used to do this search and is this not considered perfect, but adequate. The search rendered the 
following results: 
Table 6.1: Knowledge Management vs SA DODI Level 1 Policy and Doctrine Database 
Selected Sample 
Search Word Number of 
Documents  
Number of 
Instances 
Comment 
Wisdom 4 7 
The number of instances detailed for 
keywords such as information and 
intelligence is exaggerated by the fact that 
almost each policy document has in the 
distribution list and elsewhere in the 
policy document references to 
organisational posts that refer to these.  
This is not necessarily the case for the 
other keywords. 
Knowledge 54 457 
Knowledge Management 5 11 
CKO 0 0 
Intelligence 112 631 
Doctrine 56 769 
Intellectual Property 8 157 
Information 114 4820 
Information Management 13 38 
Data 50 662 
CIO 1 1 
The search provided an initial indication of SA DOD interest in knowledge and KM.  From 
the initial search, it is rather evident that the SA DOD is entrenched in IM, as described in chapter 5 
of the dissertation.  The picture also provides substance to the argument that the SA DOD 
recognises different types of capstone military knowledge.  There is even a surprising reference to 
KM.  With the proposed working definitions for knowledge and KM in mind, let us delve deeper 
into the SA DOD policy and doctrine for clarity and clues on interest in KM, knowledge to be 
managed and what is fundamental to the management of such knowledge.  The second part of the 
Reference List provides a coded list of the selected sample used for analysis in Chapter 6 of the 
dissertation. 
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6.2 SA DOD LEVEL 1 POLICY AND DOCTRINE: DEEPER ENQUIRY INTO THE 
SELECTED SAMPLE 
As was briefly introduced in Chapter 4 of the dissertation, it is important to note that the 
following document analysis makes extensive use of quoted text due to the fact that the documents 
are not in the public domain.  Thus, the reader is allowed a glimpse at the actual (sometimes 
classified restricted and others as confidential) text.  No secret or top secret material was used in the 
crafting of this dissertation. 
The researcher did not attempt to analyse each and every keyword occurrence.  This would 
have resulted in an extremely bloated dissertation.  Instead, the researcher attempted to extract only 
broad, relevant evidence that would provide clarity with regard to the research questions.  The 
researcher used the code to refer to or reference the SA DOD policies and doctrine (reflected in 
Selected Sample of SA DOD Level DODI and Doctrine as part of the dissertation reference 
administration). 
The analysis summarised in brief above resulted in more than 120 pages of extracts and 
comments which were analysed and synthesised according to the four secondary research questions.  
The remainder of Chapter 6 of the dissertation reflects on the discussion of the synthesised result of 
this process following a logic based on the research questions and consolidated themes.  The 
discussion is at times fragmented due to the fact the analysis is based on a word or construct search 
within a selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine covering a vast array of subject 
matter. 
6.2.1 Why is the SA DOD Perceived as Disinterested in Knowledge Management? 
The following consolidated themes provide a narrative that supports the researcher’s 
assumption that the SA DOD is not interested in coherent and integrated KM.  The narrative 
highlights the fact that the SA DOD is entrenched in the information era and does not seem to 
regard knowledge as strategic to organisational performance and advantage.  Furthermore, the SA 
DOD does not have approved Level 1 KM policy or doctrine. The existing Level 1 policy and 
doctrine in existence (based on the selected sample) display considerable construct dissonance in 
terms of the knowledge continuum.  This renders the SA DOD rather paralysed within an 
information era trench.  Other issues that contribute to the view that the SA DOD is not interested in 
KM relates to the existence and persistence of SA DOD knowledge silos, requiring integration to be 
able to achieve integrated and coherent KM and KMC. 
This is followed by an exploration and discussion on reasons for interest in KM and 
establishing an SA DOD KMC.  This is accomplished with a discussion reflecting on the 
requirement for knowledge to deal with a complex environment; the vast portfolio of SA DOD 
knowledge that should be managed in an integrated manner to enhance coherence and the linkages 
between knowledge, decisions, actions and effect.  Based on the requirement for a coherent and 
integrated SA DOD KMC, the discussion is then advanced stating the types of knowledge to be 
managed and proposals are made on how this should be accomplished.  Let us first discuss the 
assumption of disinterest. 
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6.2.1.1 The Information Era Trench 
Fundamental to the assumption that the SA DOD is not interested in KM is the fact that the 
SA DOD is still guided by SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine that entrench information era 
thinking. 
JWP8 (1-11) states that a nations’ power base is constructed on diplomacy, information, 
military and economic power and social cohesion/infrastructure, or better known as DIMES.  The 
information dimension of DIMES states that - “The information ‘instrument’ aims to convey 
national and/or international intent in an open, accurate and credible manner. Under no 
circumstances should it be abused or exploited in order to manipulate the media. Some nations 
believe that ‘information’ is a common denominator, and can never be separated from any of the 
other three elements in the DIME[S] equation”.  JWP8 (2-6, 3A-18, 3A-24) states that information 
is one of the key elements underlying the success of a nation-state. The above is a typical 
information age look at the strategic lines of operation.  Currently, knowledge should be in the place 
of information as a power base for reasons stated in Chapter 2 of the dissertation on the importance 
of knowledge within the context of advantage.  A fundamental reason why the SA DOD does not 
regard knowledge as the important driver to advantage is explicit recognition of the information era 
and not the knowledge era –  
“The [SANDF] Military Strategy developed in an environment that has gone through, and is 
going through, a number [6] of drastic and influential environmental shocks
74. …  The fourth 
shock is a revolution that a number of military theorists call the [RMA]. Since 1990 the rhetoric 
on this subject had no real effect as military equipment and doctrine have undergone many 
revolutionary changes. The fifth is the movement of the [SANDF] from an agrarian and 
industrial era, into the information era. Standing on the verge of the ‘biotechnological 
economical’ era, the Defence Force has to position its policies, strategies and doctrine in such a 
way that it will be able to function within new and changing circumstances. The South African 
Government has and is embarking on a strong idealistic road in its support to the [African Union 
/ New Partnership for African Development] impetus on building peace, stability and security on 
the Continent. This sixth shock is challenging the SANDF to strategise strategic capabilities in 
support of Peace Missions and complying with our Constitutional Mandate “… to defend and 
protect …” the Republic”. (SANDFP3: 1-1) 
SANDFP3 was promulgated in 2008, well after the international community commenced 
migrating to and applying knowledge era constructs such as KM.  Yet, and within the context of 
strategic shocks, no mention is made that the world is moving towards or is in the knowledge era.  
The policy writer dismissed the effect of RMA, yet, part of the RMA is the effective use of 
intelligence and its networked integration and constructs such as effects-based operations and 
warfare.  RMA is part of the beginning of military KM - which is discarded as not important by 
SANDFP3.  However, when considering the definition offered by SANDFP3 (15-13) of RMA - “… 
phenomenon that occurs when a significant discontinuous increase in military capability is created 
by the innovative interaction of new technologies, doctrine, operational concepts, and organisational 
structures” - RMA seems significant.   
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RMA was discussed in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.  What is also significant is the source 
that this quote was taken from – “Pursuing the Real Revolution in Military Affairs: Exploiting 
Knowledge-Based Warfare
75”.  Thus, the writer of SANDFP3 probably read material dating back to 
2000 about the concept of KW.  Yet, KW was not considered in SANDFP3.   
It also states that RMA did not have a real effect due to changes in doctrine.  This assumption 
has had a significant impact on the way the SA DOD give effect to its mandate.  The SA DOD takes 
its strategic guidance from policy and doctrine trapped within the context of the information era and 
not with more current paradigms driving the knowledge era. 
Another critical issue mentioned by the policy writer is that policy, strategy and doctrine will 
have to adapt to environmental change – the policy writer makes no mention of information that 
will have to adapt.  This is probably based on the understanding that environmental changes and 
strategic shocks provide new data/information that needs processing in order to inform the 
formulation of capstone military knowledge.  In the information era, this would be attempted with 
IM, focussing heavily on IT.  In the knowledge era, this is managed by KM models and toolsets, 
focussing more on IC with IT only in an enabling role. SANDFP3 and other policy and doctrine 
state that the RSA/SA DOD is in the information era supporting the researcher’s assumption that 
the SA DOD is not interested in KM and the establishment of an SA KMC.   
Paradoxically, JDP13 is the only SA DOD Level 1 policy/doctrine within the selected sample 
that refers to the ‘knowledge economy’, a construct discussed in the literature review (dissertation 
Chapter 2) and implicit in the knowledge era.  This SA DOD policy was promulgated in October 
2006.  The context of the policy is career development, a key component of HRM - 
“The rise of a service and knowledge economy has resulted in more flexible labour relations that 
are still expanding. … The strategy followed [by JDP13] not only focuses on the establishment 
of a more dynamic knowledge development environment, but also on the modernisation of the 
career development model. It recognises that, in a knowledge environment, the lower-skilled 
workers are at risk.” (JDP13: 1). 
Therefore, the understanding is that the world is in, or moving towards, a knowledge era and 
knowledge economy already existed in the SA DOD whilst JDP13 was under development (circa 
2006).  This existed at least within the SA DOD HRM context (which by-the-by is a large and 
fundamental component of KM).  However, this knowledge or understanding (unfortunately) did 
not permeate down into the drafting and updating of the DR 2015 and most SA DOD Level 1 policy 
and doctrine since 2006.  Consequently, SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine did very little to lift 
the SA DOD from the information era trench thinking and practice for the foreseeable future.  This 
predicament is reflected in the DR 2015 (as the SA DOD vision, policy and in some aspects strategy 
and plan for the next 20 years) which is based on current policy and doctrine and new or emerging; 
KM conspicuous by its absence.    
JWP4 (6-1 and 2) and SANDFP3 (15-7) states that the “Information Onslaught” is an 
onslaught on -“… South Africa’s information, information-based processes and information 
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systems.  [JWP8 (1A-2) also refer to the information onslaught].   It includes psychological 
operations, media relations and civil [possibly rather civic] affairs”.  This is based on - “The 
principles of war for the information age”76, which clearly indicate that the SA DOD is still 
contemplating information age doctrine instead of developing knowledge age doctrine – possibly 
labelled ‘Knowledge Onslaught or Knowledge Domination’.  It is possible for this reason that the 
SA DOD still prescribes to policy and doctrine regarding InfoOps, -Campaigns and -Warfare – 
discussed later in this chapter. 
IDODI2 (1 and 2) states within the context of performance measurement that information in 
the SA DOD should be used “… strategically to improve policy and funding choices, and to enable 
accountability… Performance information is increasingly playing a significant role in informing 
budget allocations, monitoring of service delivery and value for money”. IDODI2 (5) defines 
performance information as – “…a generic term for non-financial information about government 
services and activities”.  IDODI2 (7) states that the Sec Def (SA DOD Accounting Officer and 
CIO) is accountable for establishing and managing systems for the management of performance 
information in the SA DOD. 
Another type of performance management prescribed by the SA DOD is in IDODI2 (8), 
stating that – “Results based [sic] management is a life-cycle approach to management that 
integrates strategy, people, resources, processes and measurements to improve decision-making. 
Results based management also involves monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results through 
the development and provision of integrated financial and non-financial information.”.  DODSPF1 
(15) states the SA DOD resources in the strategy map.  This confirms that information and 
intelligence are perceived as recourses. 
It is well recognised that ‘to measure is to know’.  However, once performance statistics have 
been collected and processed, the results should be integrated with other knowledge continuum 
artefacts in order to arrive at actionable, decision-quality knowledge.  The paragraphs above let the 
reader believe that performance data and information is enough to base decisions about 
performance and resource management improvement on.  
IDODI2 (12) states that – “At any given time within government, information from multiple 
years is being considered”.  Also, “Strategic plans include high level [sic] information on outcomes 
and outputs with five-year targets, whereas annual performance plans provide details of outputs and 
indicators with targets for the current year and the medium term period”. This confirms that time is 
an important factor when working with knowledge continuum artefacts.  
IDODI2 (12) states that during the process of collating performance information – “The 
performance data must then be collated and aggregated to such an extent that it provides 
information that can be analysed on the applicable level of the organisation. Sifting through 
mountains of data must be avoided as this will discourage decision makers [sic] to refer to 
performance results in the decision-making process.”.  IDODI2 (28) states the following about 
performance information -  
“82. The public sector delivers services essential to the well-being and development of the 
nation. To ensure that public service delivery is as efficient and economical as possible, all 
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government institutions are required to formulate strategic plans, allocate resources to the 
implementation of those plans, and monitor and report the results. Performance information is 
essential to the public and oversight bodies on whether government departments are delivering 
value for money, by comparing their performance against their budgets and service delivery 
plans, and to alert managers to areas where corrective action is required. [These statements 
positions information correctly – i.e. to inform.  The notion of information being used 
‘strategically” can possibly be confused with being used ‘effectively’.  However, in the absence 
of knowledge (e.g. policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP) the organisation will have to revert to 
information as the lone alternative.]  
83. Performance information indicates how well an institution is achieving its outcomes and
outputs in the execution of its mandate and is key to effective management, including planning, 
budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Performance information also plays a 
growing role in budget allocations and will increasingly be used to monitor service delivery. This 
means the information must be accurate, appropriate and timely. 
84. Monitoring and evaluation pre-supposes an openness to continuously evaluate the success of
what we are doing, diagnose the causes of problems and devise appropriate and creative 
solutions. Monitoring and evaluation can, however, only be influential if it provides quality 
analytical information and if decision-makers are willing to consider and act on that 
information”. 
In a similar vein DODI29 (A-1) states that information is important in the process of risk analysis. 
These paragraphs speak to the knowledge continuum that, if approached or aggregated 
incorrectly, will negatively impact decision-making, action and effect. It goes hand-in-hand with the 
time value of knowledge continuum artefacts above.  The information must also be of a particular 
quality.  The information used is important to assure service delivery, “well-being and 
development” of South Africa – which is the desired effect.  This makes performance information 
important from a national interest perspective. In order to enhance the decision-action-effect cycle, 
this information should be converted into knowledge by the organisation. If processed incorrectly 
the knowledge might be too late for meaningful impact.  The element of timing is fundamental 
when considering survival and advantage.  If the SA DOD bases decisions on poorly aggregated 
data and information, survival and winning become problematic.  It is for this reason that an SA 
DOD KMC is proposed. 
IDODI2 (28) states that performance information is “… essential to the public and oversight 
bodies on whether government departments are delivering value for money, by comparing their 
performance against their budgets and service delivery plans, and to alert managers to areas where 
corrective action is required”.  Performance data and information are, however, lagging indicators – 
or after the fact.  The government places undue emphasis on this type of information because of the 
responsibility to account, based on the PFMA, for the resources used. From a corporate perspective, 
business intelligence is also gainfully developed and employed to enhance performance. However, 
as a remnant of the information era, governments using business intelligence are probably still just 
using data and information packaged as intelligence.  Militaries continuously enhance policy, 
intelligence and doctrine to increase performance.  The researcher is of the opinion that the 
preoccupation with lagging indicators (such as financial data) lures the focus away from the 
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importance of converting data and information into knowledge that could be used to enhance 
performance and advantage which should over time improve performance significantly. 
In the observation of the researcher, government (more specifically the SA DOD) seems more 
interested in past performance (based on data and information) - than how to perform better 
(knowledge-based and enabled).  This predicament is driven by the entrenchment of information era 
management principles. 
JDP9 (6 and 9) refers to the South African National Standard (SANS) 15489-1:2004 Edition 1 
(ISO 15489-1:2001 Edition 1) Information and Documentation - Records Management, Part 1 
General.  The SA DOD conducts IM as prescribed by national standards.  The question is – is there 
a national standard for KM in the RSA yet?  The researcher could find none.  This may then transfer 
the onus to the SA DOD to develop their standard until such time that a national standard for KM is 
developed.  This dissertation endeavour to develop a clear understanding of the future SA DOD KM 
and KMC requirements, as a starting point. 
6.2.1.2 Misunderstanding about Value and Function 
The SA DOD regards information as strategic and paramount to its decisions, action, effects 
and advantage.  There is limited acknowledgement, in isolated policy expressions, that knowledge 
as a construct is strategic.  This contributes to the perception that the SA DOD is not interested in 
KM.   This predicament reinforces the SA DOD’s foothold in the information era and its associated 
IM practices.  There are several policy expressions supporting these views.  Consider the following 
policy statements –  
“The [SANDF] Military Strategy … as well as the Public Service Act, Proclamation 103 of 1994 
as amended … recognise information as a strategic resource. The confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of timely and accurate information are thus paramount in sound decision making. As 
such, information warrants a similar degree and level of management and protection as any other 
strategic resource.” (DODD10: 2 and DODD4: 2).  
“The [SA DOD] views and addresses information as a strategic resource that needs to be 
managed effectively and efficiently throughout its lifecycle,…” (DODD4: 1).  
“The [SA DOD] Information Strategy … and Information Management Philosophy77 for the [SA
DOD] endorses information as a strategic resource in support of the [SA DOD] business as it 
forms the basis for decision-making and effective management. It also emphasises the strategic 
importance that the resource "information" is managed over its total life cycle in an effective and 
standardised manner in order to support the [SA DOD] in gaining a competitive advantage”. 
(JDP9: 1 and 8, JDP9: 8, DODI9: 2 and DODI57: 2). 
 “The Military Strategy …, Force Employment Strategy … and the [SA DOD] Information 
Strategy … are [SA DOD] strategic documents that also emphasize the importance of 
information for decision-making in the SANDF. These strategic documents stipulate that in the 
context of multi-discipline approach, the SANDF will execute SANDF authorised missions 
jointly, inter-departmentally and multi-nationally. In an attempt to enhance interoperability, the 
use of frequencies in the execution of SANDF missions becomes a necessity because radio 
77
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communications is [sic] one of the robust technological communication means which plays a 
most important role in making information exchange possible”. (SANDFO3: 1). 
“Information is managed as a strategic resource within the [SA DOD] and therefore the 
discipline of [IM] is effectively and efficiently practised. Software enables the utilisation of 
information.” (DODI24: 19). 
 “… considered a strategic resource in the [SA DOD] as it forms the basis for decision-making 
and effective management”. (DODI30: 5-8).  
The picture is clear.  Information is strategic; it is linked to decision-making, action, effects 
and advantage.  Nothing in these texts states the same of knowledge or hint that there are more to 
this than meet the eye – such as a knowledge continuum for example.  Furthering this stagnation in 
the information era, DODI39 (2) and DODI57 (2) (amongst others) refer to an Information Strategy 
–  
“The DS/DEISMD/R/516/B: Information Strategy v3.2 dd 18 Jan 2010 … is applicable to 
[DODI39] in that it presents principles, characteristics and implementation guidelines for 
managing and utilising information as a strategic resource throughout its life cycle. The Strategy 
further states that the value of information lies in the usage thereof, which means that just having 
the required information available is not good enough as it must be used for the purpose it was 
intended for. Information on the [SA DOD] Intranet must therefore be managed as a strategic 
resource over its life cycle and utilised according to its purpose. ... The Information and 
Communication Technology Strategy, Version 1.0, approved on 24 October 2011 … is 
applicable to [DODI39]. It states that Information Communication Technology (ICT
78
) is all the 
aspects of technology which are used to manage and support the efficient gathering and 
utilisation of information as a strategic resource.” (DODI39: 2). 
Interestingly enough, the word ‘knowledge’ is not mentioned once in SANDFO1 (Policy on 
the South African National Defence Force Military Strategy).  However, in SANDFP3 (xiv, 11-1) – 
The South African National Defence Force Military Strategy is referenced as describing the 
battlespace in terms of “… knowledge of the strategic environment in which the [SANDF] could be 
expected to operate, in order to achieve its Military Strategic Objectives (Ends).”.  Thus the strategy 
is regarded as knowledge yet the SA DOD regards its information as strategic.  
The policy statements above are evidence of the entrenchment in the information era and that 
information is regarded strategic in SA DOD Level 1 policy, doctrine and strategy, which are 
capstone knowledge.  This is also articulated in the DR 2015.  The information strategy referred to 
above (dated 2010) corresponds well to the time KM started to gain maturity in propagating the 
position that knowledge is the driver of organisational advantage. 
DODI43 provides a detailed account of the importance of information to the SA DOD Senior 
Management System (SMS).  It states the requirement for information for SMS personnel to 
execute their jobs and provide much insight into the amount of information required to appoint 
SMS members.  This may be so, however, no indication is given what knowledge is required.  
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Based on the discussion about construct dissonance later in the chapter, the researcher assumes that 
information also includes knowledge.  If not, the SA DOD SMS system will require optimisation to 
ensure the relevant SA DOD knowledge is also considered. 
Some SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine from the selected sample even stretch as far as 
classifying data as a strategic resource.  DODI39 (A-5) classifies data as strategic from the 
perspective of intranet services with the following definition – “Strategic Resource. A carefully 
designed or planned means that is available to system users, including computational power, 
programs, data files, and storage capacity to provide a particular purpose or advantage”. 
Contrary to the policy and doctrinal expressions above, internationally knowledge is regarded 
as a strategic resource and not as information.  The information era thinking is clearly visible in 
these statements.  The policy and doctrine statements above contribute to SA DOD entrenchment in 
the information era, hampering advancement to the knowledge age and KM.  They also contributed 
and reinforced the DR 2015 position on the strategic nature of information and IM.  According to 
the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2); the business world has moved away from this thinking 
since the early 2000s; recognising knowledge as the advantage driver for business.  Militaries such 
as the USA military strive towards knowledge superiority.   
SANDFP3 (10-3) states within the context of - “… an appropriate technological edge” and the 
SA DOD requirements for situational awareness and information assurance that - “Information 
superiority is a key enabler to operational success. It must create niche competencies that can assure 
that forces can acquire, verify, protect and assimilate information to effectively neutralise and 
dominate adversary forces”.  The policy statement above seems to position information as the 
driving force behind operational success and niche competencies, which might be a contentious 
position from the information era. The USA military is moving towards the concept of knowledge 
superiority within the context of KW and operations.  It is widely accepted by militaries that 
operational success is achievable with superior intelligence-based decisions, actions and effects.  
Superior information might add to the quality of the intelligence or the uniqueness of the 
technology being developed.   
The policy and doctrine statements above are fundamental to the SA DOD psyche about the 
value of information versus knowledge.  They also inform management decisions within the SA 
DOD.  In the SA DOD IM takes priority. KM is not considered or practised (at least not coherently 
as will be discussed later in this chapter).  Thus, it might not be a case of not being interested in KM 
but more a case of being hostage to outdated paradigms cast in legislation, policy, doctrine and 
strategy. 
However, some isolated policy expressions on the importance of knowledge (whether it be 
e.g. policy, doctrine, intelligence and/or IP) also exists.  DODI25 (20) acknowledges that 
knowledge is a - “… fundamental ingredient for dynamic competitiveness”.  Doctrine is also stated 
as providing strategic direction to operations (DODI1: 4-1), providing practical support for the idea 
that knowledge is strategic in nature.  Doctrine is also pivotal in advising strategic SA DOD 
leadership (i.e. the MOD, Sec Def and CSANDF) on matters of corporate communication (and any 
other POSTEDFILTB function for that matter).  So it would seem that the SA DOD is in two minds 
about the value of its knowledge.  This will have a negative effect on the performance and 
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advantage of the SA DOD. This might, however, be due to construct dissonance within the SA 
DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine framework. 
DODI30 (2) states the importance of SA DOD information, personnel, infrastructure and 
material assets (these are all considered resources) and JDP1 (5C-1) distinguishes between 
knowledge and resources. DODI26 (2, 4) states that information is an SA DOD resource but fail to 
make mention of knowledge as a resource within the context of business process management.  
DODI30 (2) does not support the importance of knowledge as an asset or strategic capability, either 
deliberately or inadvertently.  Adding fuel to the fire, DODI57 (2) states that certain information 
quality is paramount for decision-making and strategic military capabilities. This is problematic 
when knowledge is not even perceived as a resource in SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine. 
Considering the discussion in the literature review and the military KM (dissertation Chapters 2 and 
3), knowledge is probably currently the most important resource (typically labelled as an asset) and 
strategic capability organisations have distinctly linked to competitive advantage.  If not included in 
the resource-based view of the organisation, it might not be efficient and effectively managed. 
JDP4 (D2-11) states that the SA DOD management information philosophy is – “Information 
is regarded and managed as a resource, a crucial organisational asset that has many attributes and 
characteristics that are similar to those of other corporate resources – financial, human, physical and 
natural.”.  No mention of knowledge.  Thus, the proposed SA DOD KM leadership philosophy is 
‘the art of knowing and the science of managing that knowledge to obtain and sustain advantage’.   
JDP4 (D2-11) states further that - “The management of information as a resource in the DOD 
includes the management of information handling technologies (physical assets). It includes the 
content of the information itself in terms of accuracy, completeness, reliability, timeliness and 
usefulness. It is essential to decision-makers and problem solvers at all levels to achieve their 
respective objectives”. 
This is relatively misguided.  All assets are resources, but all resources are not necessarily 
assets.  Information is rarely an asset, but probably a resource.  Knowledge is an asset (e.g. doctrine, 
intelligence and IP).  Also, information has a time-value.  Its value rarely increases over time but 
rather diminishes.  The fact that careful record keeping is done does not increase the value of the 
information, just its configured availability.  Instead, the organisation is experiencing a continuous 
outflow of financial resources to ensure information of diminishing and/or no value is stored.  This 
predicament could be mitigated with a KMC. 
Having reviewed some strategic misunderstandings above, misunderstanding permeates to the 
SA DOD capabilities.  SA DOD decisions, actions, effect and advantage are dependent on military 
capability. The SA DOD has several capabilities.  DODERFM1 (5-2 and 5-3) identifies data and 
information as key SA DOD capabilities.  No mention of SA DOD knowledge as a capability is 
made.  The researcher is not convinced that data, information or knowledge are capabilities. They 
are resources that are part of capabilities, with knowledge being the strategic resource.  Managing 
the knowledge continuum in a coherent and integrated manner to the SA DODs’ advantage could be 
considered a capability, i.e. SA DOD KMC.  To substantiate this opinion consider the discussion 
below. 
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SANDFP3 (x) states that military strategic capabilities are people, matériel and procedures. 
At the military strategic level, procedures might not necessarily be a strategic capability but rather 
capstone military knowledge as found in policy, doctrine, intelligence and/or IP.  
SANDFP3 (15-2) and JWP1 (9-1) define a capability as the – “Potential to carry out 
prescribed actions or operations or to render services or deliver matériel. A capability captures the 
elements of personnel, organisation, support, technology, equipment, doctrine, facilities, 
information and training”.  When describing SA DOD functional capabilities the acronym 
POSTEDFIT (Personnel, Organisation, Strategy, Training, Equipment, Doctrine, Facilities, 
Information and Technology) is used (DODI26: A-1 and others). JWP1 (8-1 and 9-7) – “DOD 
Corporate Communication (Corp Com) has its own capabilities, namely People, Organisation, 
Sustainment, Training, Equipment, Doctrine, Facilities, Information and Technology 
(POSTEDFIT), …”.   
SANDFO2 (2-1 and A-1) adds “Budget” to the acronym POSTEDFIT(B).  This is also used 
in the DR 2015.  Another version of the acronym is found in JWP4 (4-6). The ‘I’ in this version is 
for IT, explaining that IT empowers members – “… to be empowered and enabled with all tactical, 
operational and strategic information”.  Information technology might actually be the capability 
rather than the artefacts it manages – i.e. information.  According to the DR 2015, POSTEDFIT 
does not include intelligence (dissertation Chapter 5).   
In the spirit of having contradictory policy positions on knowledge related matters, DODI40 
(24) replaces information in POSTEDFIT, with intelligence. DODI40 (24-25) states that data and 
information are important factors in the ‘I’ in POSTEDFIT.  DODI40 (25) states information as 
being part of the support and the intelligence functions in the acronym POSTEDFIT.  The ‘I’, 
representing intelligence, is defined from the perspective of a user system as - “The characteristics 
of defence intelligence, information, data and data processing systems required, including content, 
timeliness, presentation, format, reliability, compatibility, validity, data correlation and fusion.”.  
This definition separates the constructs intelligence, information and data as is the case with several 
other SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine from the selected sample. The policy position of 
DODI40 also seems to be more inclusive than that of DODI26 (A-1).   Thus, even amongst the SA 
DOD functional capabilities, there is dissonance regarding what the ‘I’ represents.  The question 
should be raised – which is it, information or intelligence or both?  Again, the researcher would 
argue that information and intelligence are not capabilities but rather artefacts stemming from 
several capabilities. Intelligence, from a cognitive and process perspective, is a military capability 
that produces various levels of intelligence through the intelligence cycle processing of information 
and data.  It is also military intelligence that enhances decisions, actions, effects and advantage 
rather than information or data. 
SANDFP3 then expands on the statements about capability in SANDFP3 (xvii and xviii) that 
military strategic capabilities are (amongst others mentioned) C
4
I
3
RS (Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Infrastructure, Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance).  SANDFP3 (15-2) states under the heading “Business Strategy” – “C4I3RS is a
collective description consisting of the elements of command and control, communications, 
computers, information, intelligence, infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance. It is the 
essential military sensory capability, command and control support for the whole range of military 
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missions”.   Intelligence is a capability from a cognitive and process perspective but not from an 
artefact perspective.  Intelligence as a knowledge artefact is regarded as capstone military 
knowledge. For example, JWP8 (6C-6) states that intelligence is a critical part of the defensive 
mechanisms available to humanitarian actors (i.e. those people involved in PSOs). 
DODI1 (4-12) states the importance of intelligence for the environmental scanning process 
that determines changes impacting the strategic planning process.  This provides more support to 
the importance of capstone military knowledge in key organisational processes. However, if it is 
considered that there are several policies (SANDFP4: L-1, DODI26: 17, JDP9: D-5) that support 
the definition that information includes all knowledge, then the ‘I’ can represent information – 
which does seem to be the case.   Consider the discussion to follow below on the dissonance that 
exists within the SA DOD on the constructs data, information and knowledge.   
SANDFP3 (11-17) states within the context of IW that knowledge can be turned into a 
capability.  There are a number of intelligence related operational concepts in IW.  Yet, throughout 
the paragraph, IW is described as the use of information as a weapon, and not knowledge. 
Knowledge, mentioned as part of the IW construct, is also pitched as an equaliser on the battlefield 
and not information. Also, mention is made of “advanced technology” as a requirement for effective 
IW.  Earlier SANDFP3 stated that technology is knowledge.  So, it could be reasonably assumed 
that knowledge is important for IW, although the intention of IW – to disrupt, destroy or neutralise 
the information capability of the adversary – is vastly different from a concept such as KW which 
would target every aspect of technology and the knowledge continuum.  Due to construct 
dissonance, the understanding of these issues will result in varied applications with resulting 
anomalies in decisions, actions, effects and a possible loss of advantage.  There is a clear 
requirement for KW policy and doctrine to provide coherence and integration to these types of 
operations as the paradigm shift towards knowledge. 
Although IW is regarded as a military strategic capability, information is not a military 
strategic capability but a product of several military strategic capabilities in action, for example, 
information gathered by sensors during the application of military surveillance capabilities during 
operations.  C
4
I
3
RS includes both information and intelligence but no other capstone knowledge
such as policy, doctrine and IP. It also does not speak of matériel and procedures as in SANDFP3 
(x).   However, C
4
I
3
RS includes people, matériel and procedures in various configurations, which
by themselves are not capabilities but inherent in capabilities.  The policy position that military 
strategic capabilities are (amongst others) C
4
I
3
RS as per SANDFP3 (xvii) is supported by several
other SA DOD Level 1 policies. 
DODI40 (16) and SANDFP3 (13-1, 13-2 and 15-2) state within the context of C
4
I
3
RS that
both information and intelligence is part of a joint strategic capability.  Jointness requires 
integration.  SANDFP3 (13-1) describes this joint strategic capability as - “C4I3RS Strategic
Capability (the knowledge edge/foresight)”79.  It does not call for an ‘information edge’ but rather a
‘knowledge edge’, which is in essence military advantage.  Yet, from the discussion thus far only 
79
 SANDFP3 (xvii) states that “C4I2RS” [note- only I2 instead of I3 as previously stated above) is essential for the entire 
range of military missions.  It is not clear which of the ‘I’ is not important for long range missions – or if it is just a 
typing error. 
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information and intelligence are regarded as strategic by the SA DOD.  No mention is made of other 
capstone military knowledge.  There is thus limited recognition of the strategic nature of what is 
regarded as capstone knowledge.  Although intelligence is considered capstone military knowledge, 
military knowledge is much broader than that.  For example, IP is capstone military knowledge that 
stems from and feeds technology, yet IP is not stated as part of SA DOD strategic capabilities.  The 
SA DOD will only achieve competitive advantage or military advantage if the different types of 
military knowledge are managed in a coherent and integrated manner towards achieving new and 
evolving meaning.   
SANDFP3 (10-2) states the following about information requirements to remain 
technologically advanced and to develop credible military capabilities –  
“To fulfill [sic] the constitutional obligations of the SANDF, the military must be able to execute 
the full range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance to major warfighting. An 
important element of achieving this will be the ability to acquire appropriate information in order 
to timely initiates [sic] the development of credible capabilities that will successfully address the 
military requirements. Defence related [sic] research and technology development need [sic] to 
meet new and undefined threats in the complex battle space of the future. Technology to be used 
in capability superiority must be a principal characteristic of our military advantage.”. 
So, the SA DOD is attempting to achieve capability superiority with the development of 
technologies based on ‘appropriate information’.  However, technological advantage is achieved 
with the development of superior IP, which is capstone military knowledge.  The failure of the 
policy statement to correctly contextualise information as an enabler or building block in the 
knowledge continuum upon which capabilities and advantage should be based seek to create the 
perception that it is the function of information – which it is not.   This might be due to construct 
dissonance resulting from entrenched information era thinking and understanding.   
DODI23 expresses SA DOD IP management policy with specific reference to ownership, 
disposal, income, royalties and revenue, protection and recording of IP.  DODI23 (vi, viii and 1) 
states a management focus shift from SA DOD IP to SA DOD Intangible Capital Assets (ICA).  
Currently, IA is the umbrella term for, amongst other things, SA DOD IP.  It is acknowledged that 
the SA DOD focuses strategically on IP management to protect military strategic value.  This is an 
important knowledge era acknowledgement – i.e. that strategic value is based on knowledge (in this 
case IP) and not information.  The following quote illustrates this - 
 “The purpose of the management of defence matériel related IP is 
a. to protect and manage the military advantage that is locked up in defence matériel related IP
in favour of the Department;
b. to ensure defence matériel related IP with military strategic advantage is secure for use by the
Department, the defence related industry and the defence research institutes to leverage
strategic business and military advantage when required;…” (DODI23: 1).
“… IP management … is strongly focused on military strategic need and the management of
military strategic advantage.” DODI23 (6, 7 and 10).
The same opinion holds for other SA DOD IP.  DODI28 (8) states that the SA DOD has an 
ergonomics database that contains SA DOD IP.  
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“The ergonomics database is viewed as a strategic asset to the DOD. It contains subject specific 
[sic] [IP], knowledge, research information, strategic personnel and job profiles, Defence 
ergonomics best practices and analysed operational data. Specific RSA Defence ergonomics 
information (RSA-Mil-Documents) is available on the ARMSCOR website at 
http//armscor.co.za.”. 
This policy statement strongly reinforces the discussion above on IP.  It also raises questions 
about the coherent and integrated management of this knowledge.  The SA DOD might not get the 
full benefit of capstone knowledge that is managed in silos.  From the quotes above it is clear that 
SA DOD IP is regarded as strategic and inextricably linked to military advantage.  This view is 
supported by discussions earlier in the dissertation. The policy statements on IP above provide a 
glimmer of evidence that the SA DOD might not entirely be apathetic to the idea of KM.  However, 
IP is not included (probably erroneously) as a military strategic capability in C
4
I
3
RS.   
Once the SA DOD has adopted KM as the preferred way forward, then the capability 
acronyms of POSTEDFIT(B) must become POSTEFKTB - (Personnel, Organisation, Strategy, 
Training, Equipment, Facilities, Knowledge, Technology and Budget). C
4
I
3
RS must become 
C
4
IKRS - (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Infrastructure, Knowledge, 
Reconnaissance and Surveillance).  This will better facilitate leadership in the art of knowing and 
the science of managing that knowledge to obtain and sustain advantage.  There might be other 
military concepts that will require review for relevance in the knowledge era.  Such review is 
outside the scope of this dissertation but is a possible research question for future research. 
6.2.1.3 Strategic Management Requirements 
DODSPF1 (7) states that the SA DOD Strategic Planning Framework (SPF) should (amongst 
other things) deliver - “… strategically focused and managed Defence performance [IM] in support 
of the Defence mandate and priorities of Government.”.   DODSPF1 (15) links the SA DOD 
Balance Score Card to its performance IM system.  The strategy map as an output of the Balance 
Score Card states the importance of - “… integrated and reliable information and intelligence 
management” (R3, third line) as SA DOD resources (left column, third line) - but says nothing 
about other SA DOD capstone knowledge from a resource perspective.  It does, however, require 
“doctrine renewal” (F2, fourth line), thus implying that doctrine is a resource currently under 
management which requires continuous renewal.  In this there is a glimmer of hope, depicted in 
Figure 6.3 below - 
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Figure 6.3: DOD Strategy Map 
Source:  DODSPF1 (15). 
The SA DOD SPF thus makes provision for information- and intelligence- and doctrine 
management explicitly and implicitly.  These are not only regarded as military strategic capabilities 
but also key resources.  If it is considered that defence “matériel” (R2, third line) includes the 
responsibility for SA DOD IP management, then the SPF makes explicit provision for the 
management of most capstone military knowledge {policy is not mentioned explicitly but is 
probably represented in D1 (Level 0) and D3 (Level 1-4)} – but not in a coherent and integrated 
manner.  Information, intelligence, doctrine, IP and policy are also linked to ‘action’ in D1, which 
express the need to - “… conduct ordered defence commitments”.  Thus, knowledge forms the 
backbone of several components of the SA DOD SPF based on the strategy map.  Yet, the SA DOD 
does not have a KMC and thus does not engage in coherent and integrated KM.  A silo approach 
seems to be predominant.  With the recognition of the knowledge era, this strategy map will 
probably change in many aspects, highlighting more explicitly the SA DOD knowledge continuum 
and its significance. 
6.2.1.4 Knowledge Management Policy and/or Doctrine Vacuum 
This is a significant contributing factor to the perception that the SA DOD is not interested in 
KM.  The DR 2015 (Level 0 policy) does not express the need for KM.  Furthermore, the selected 
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sample SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine contains no KM policy or KM doctrine and there is no 
reason to expect that such documents will be found outside the selected sample.  There is no policy 
that describes a KMC.  There are several policies on the management of different kinds of SA DOD 
knowledge (e.g. intelligence, HRM, finances, acquisition, IP, etc.) – these are discussed below.  
Without a KMC and a KM model stating the raison d'être of SA DOD KM; elaborating on the 
vision, role-players, the objectives, types of knowledge to be managed, processes and critical 
success factors; the SA DOD will fall short of a coherent and integrated approach to managing the 
knowledge continuum, negatively affecting decisions, action and eroding military advantage.   
6.2.1.5 Knowledge Management as a Senior Management Requirement 
JDP20 makes mention of KM in a diagram that summarises the competencies required from 
personnel at various levels of the SA DOD.  Knowledge management is pitched at the executive 
management level (or SMS) (JDP20: 12).  Because of the importance of knowledge as an asset; it 
would have been reasonable to expect that KM principles and methods will find their way to every 
level of the SA DOD, not just the SMS-level.  It would appear that this is not the case, supporting 
the view that the SA DOD is not interested in a coherent and integrated KMC.  However, some 
expression on the requirement for KM in the SA DOD does exist within the selected sample of SA 
DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine, which provides limited evidence that the SA DOD might be 
interested in adopting KM as a management practice.   
DODI43 elaborates on the SA DOD SMS and actually provides a definition of what is 
perceived as KM, as follows – “Obtains, analyses and promotes the generation and sharing of 
knowledge and learning in order to enhance the collective knowledge of the organisation“ 
(DODI43: J4-4).  This definition is described in the Generic Core Management Criteria and 
Standards of DODI43 and is very important from the perspective that it identifies an intention of the 
SA DOD to manage knowledge.   When considering the proposed KM definition (dissertation 
Chapter 2) -  KM is the integrated process transforming the organisational intellectual capital into 
evolving meaning to capacitate understanding, decision-making, action, effect and advantage – the 
difference is clearly visible.   
The DODI43 KM definition is not based on any clear definition in SA DOD policy and 
doctrine that defines knowledge.  The DODI43 definition is also proposing and restricting the SA 
DOD to a number of processes (albeit a firm starting point).  Furthermore, the DODI43 definition 
does not clearly link KM to enhanced decision, action, effects and advantage – but merely to 
generate more knowledge and enhance organisational knowledge.  So what?  The SA DOD does not 
just generate knowledge it also acquires knowledge.  The SA DOD also does not just horde 
knowledge for the sake of knowing.  The SA DOD seeks knowledge to facilitate understanding, 
enhances decisions, take actions with specific effects in mind and ultimately strive for advantage.  
The DODI47 definition does not clearly indicate what is regarded as knowledge (e.g. IC).  The 
proposed definition addresses all these issues. 
KM is also listed as a Generic Core Management Criteria in Section C (Assessment of Core 
Management Criteria).  DODI43 (J4-4) goes further by stating the following tasks in conjunction with 
the definition above - 
 Manage organisational knowledge with the appropriate information systems.  
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 Stay abreast of world trends and information by using modern technology. 
 Evaluates information from multiple sources.  
 Utilise information to influence decisions. 
 Create mechanisms for organisational knowledge sharing and associated structures and promote 
the importance of knowledge sharing within own area of responsibility. 
 Enhance organisational efficiency with the use of libraries, researchers, knowledge specialists 
and other knowledge-bases. 
 Adapts and integrates multiple source information to create innovative [KM] solutions.  
 Cultivates a knowledge-enabling environment. 
These tasks recognise the fact that information is ‘more than’ knowledge (second last bullet) – 
thus there is a requirement for KM and not just IM.  However, information is distinctly coupled to 
decision-making.  In particular, knowledge sharing and knowledge creation are identified as 
important KM processes.  However, no reference is made to why – i.e. that knowledge enhances 
actions, effects and advantage.  Information management systems are also identified as a key 
enabler in KM.  However, KM is not just achieved with IM systems.  Also important is the fact that 
Senior Management is tasked with KM processes - “… create mechanisms and structures for 
sharing knowledge…nurtures a knowledge-enabling environment”; but no distinct task to report to 
an SA DOD KM champion (e.g. a CKO) or to create a KMC.  The PFMA (1999) uses the terms “… 
efficiency, effective and economic” (Sec 38(1)(b)) to describe the management of departmental 
assets.  The only objective that is highlighted amongst the tasks for KM is to “… improve 
organisational efficiency”; which is very vague because the objectives of militaries are normally 
linked to specific levels of readiness and certain effects achieved.  Mention is also made of 
‘knowledge-bases’ to improve efficiency.  This is contrary to the use of the commonly used phrase 
– ‘databases’.  Most of the selected sample SA DOD Level 1 policies and doctrine express on the 
use of databases to manage knowledge continuum artefacts.   The attempt by DODI43 to address 
KM is thus lacking fundamental expressions on at least KM champions, structures, process and 
objectives.  However, of importance is that it tasks SA DOD Senior Management with KM 
obligations – by implication points to the types of knowledge to be managed in the SA DOD – i.e. 
per SA DOD staff and line functions.  It also confirms that the SA DOD is interested in KM, but did 
not manage to convert this interest and policy prescript into required action in the DR 2015 and 
other relevant policy and doctrine which reinforce the perception that the SA DOD only pays lip 
service to KM. 
6.2.1.6 Knowledge Management Enabling Functions 
DODI57 alludes to KM enabling functions that would facilitate the following: 
“A [SA DOD] wireless [KM] database in order to increase sharing of [SA DOD] wireless 
expertise to include information on vulnerability assessments, best practices and procedures for 
wireless device configurations and connections. … The [KM] database shall be utilised to help 
determine acceptable uses of wireless devices and employ appropriate mitigating actions. … The 
[SA DOD] Services and Divisions shall use the [KM] database to coordinate, prioritise, and 
avoid duplication of vulnerability assessments of wireless devices. ... Information on 
vulnerability assessments shall be handled in accordance with the security classification 
allocated.” (DODI57: 7-22). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 230 
 
DODI57 only describes a particular type of knowledge to be management by this - “… 
knowledge database” in various forms such as - “… vulnerability assessments, best practices and 
procedures”.  The text also mentions some objectives to be achieved – “… to help determine 
acceptable uses of wireless devices and employ appropriate mitigating actions” and to - “... 
coordinate, prioritise, and avoid duplication of vulnerability assessments of wireless devices.” 
(DODI57: 7-22).  These are in line with the Senior Management KM tasking as stated above.  
However, it would seem to be a far cry from being a comprehensive, coherent and integrated 
approach to KM.  The wording also incorporates a considerable amount of construct dissonance.  It 
would have been far more useful to refer to a ‘knowledge-base’ rather than database because a 
database has a clear IM link whereas a knowledge-base includes all of the issues raised by the text. 
6.2.1.7 Vacuum: Knowledge Operations, Knowledge Warfare Policy and Doctrine  
SANDFP3 (6-2 and 3) states that one of the scenarios of a military threat to or attack on the 
RSA, its citizens and national interests, is - “… action/attack against [RSA] information, 
information-based processes, and information systems. It includes subjects such as psychological 
operations, media relations and civil [possibly rather civic] affairs”.  This is based on “The 
principles of war for the information age” (see footnote 76).  SANDFP3 makes no reference to a 
scenario that involves knowledge.  
If the statement above is based on information era thinking, it then begs the question what the 
principles of war would be in the knowledge era?  This could be an interesting research question for 
future studies, but outside the scope of this dissertation. 
There are several policies and doctrine that elaborate on what is understood by IW and 
InfoOps. A discussion about InfoOps and other related military concepts follows.  IntOps should 
not be confused with InfoOps (JWP8:  4-25) - “In the SANDF military doctrine, the concept of 
[InfoOps] is not yet operationalised, and the concept of [IW] is used. [IW], however, is being 
developed as a capability to enhance the SANDF’s war-fighting capability”. SANDF military 
doctrine has not yet operationalised InfoOps as a military concept; still favouring IW as a military 
concept.  There are several policies and doctrine from the selected sample that elaborate on what is 
understood about IW. JWP1 (5-2) and JWP8 (4C-4, 4C-5 and Def-5) define IW as –  
“… all actions taken to defend the military’s information-based-processes, information systems 
and communication networks; and to destroy, neutralise, or exploit the enemy’s similar 
capabilities within the physical, information and cognitive domains”. [IW] consists of six pillars 
(domains), namely [EW], Network Warfare (NW), [PsyOps], [C2W], Intelligence Based 
Warfare [IntBW] and Infrastructure Warfare (IIW).”.  
A very similar explanation is provided by JWP1 -  
“Information in War. The use of information to achieve objectives during a state of war.  … 
Actions taken to defend the military’s information-based processes, information systems and 
communication networks, and to destroy, neutralise or exploit the enemy’s similar capabilities 
within the physical, information and cognitive domains, while protecting one’s own”. (JWP1: 9-
5) 
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These definitions cluster several military concepts of operation into IW that in fact is much 
closer to KW (e.g. PsyOps
80
, C2W and IntBW).  These definitions cluster information-based 
operations and knowledge-based warfare constructs into IW.  It also gives recognition to aspects of 
RMA, which were stated previously as not having an impact on current warfare.  SANDFP3 (2-21) 
states that IW is a component of InfoOps - 
 “This refers to that dimension of the battlespace, which is composed of the electromagnetic 
spectrum and the non-human sensing dimension in which stealth-masked forces seek refuge 
from attack. The focus is primarily on the control and manipulation of information. In this 
dimension vulnerabilities are exploited through electronic means, psychological operations and 
other measures designed to manipulate, deceive, disable, or destroy an opponent’s information 
systems. The fact is that “weapons of mass disruption” can be a greater danger than “weapons of 
mass destruction”. In [a] Clausewitzian sense, it is characterised by the effort to turn knowledge 
into capability, the option needed to level the playing field. Unfortunately, being capable of 
launching attacks of this kind does not always require the presence of advanced technology in 
the hands of the attacker. This makes the more developed/advanced nation or organisation more 
susceptible to attacks of this kind by an adversary, such as individuals, terrorist groups, rogue 
nations or deranged hackers. There is an increasing trend in African governments to introduce 
intranet-based governmental communication systems using satellite communications, so called 
[sic] E-Governance. Seven Sub-Saharan African countries have introduced such systems since 
2000. While enhancing communication and effectiveness, this also increases the vulnerability of 
these countries to [IW]. These threats will be dynamic, continuous and complex in nature, thus 
requiring our defence to be able to adapt and change rapidly. It also requires that the [IW] threat 
should be considered during the development of communication systems to guarantee that 
sufficient protection and redundancy are built into these systems to ensure protection. Success 
will no longer be primarily the result of who puts most capital, labour and technology on the 
battlefield, but who has the best information about the battlefield”. (SANDFP3: 11-17) 
The construct dissonance is clearly visible; using information and knowledge interchangeably 
without regard for specific meaning.  Information is linked to success (or advantage) and 
knowledge to ‘levelling the playing field’.  This is contradictory to knowledge being perceived as 
the spearhead.  The contradiction is thickened by endeavouring to turn knowledge into capability 
and not information (whilst information is perceived as the advantage driver?)  Yet the primary 
focus is expressed as being information manipulation.  Knowledge is targeted for weaponisation, 
not information.  Yet, there is no indication of the knowledge continuum with which to accomplish 
this.  This level of contradiction contributes to possibly misunderstanding the value and use of 
knowledge vs. information.  Figures 6.4a, 6.4b and 6.9 endeavour to illustrate the differences 
graphically.  Advantage on the battlefield is best created or enabled with the best (relevant and near 
real-time) intelligence (a form of capstone military knowledge), as postulated by Sun Tzu with the 
wisdom ‘know your enemy like you know yourself’.  This does not imply being informed 
(information-based) but knowing (knowledge and possibly wisdom-based).  All of this said, 
specific applications exist for IW concepts, doctrine and techniques.  These should be a subset of a 
much broader warfare paradigm – i.e. Knowledge Operations (KOps) and KW based on knowledge 
continuum superiority. 
                                                 
80
 See footnote 25 on Effects Based Operations. 
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SANDFP3 (2-21 - 2-22) states in more detail what consists of, who is primarily responsible, 
what should be used and certain effects to be achieved –  
“The Government expects the [SA DOD] to concentrate primarily on the [IW] component of 
[InfoOps]. This would include the offensive and defensive application of the following: 
i. [EW], defined as “The military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to 
determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum while retaining 
its friendly use.”. 
ii. [NW], defined as “It is the ability to exploit or use the Information Systems (offensive) or an 
adversary and to protect all [SA DOD] Information Systems (defensive) to ensure use of own 
forces.”. 
iii. [PsyOps]
81
, defined as "Planned and coordinated psychological activities, including political, 
economic and military actions, in peace, military operations other than war, and war directed to 
an enemy and/or foreign friendly and neutral audiences (internal audiences in exceptional 
mandated circumstances), in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and 
ultimately, attitudes and behaviour, to secure the achievement of national and military 
objectives.”. 
… It is further expected of the [SA DOD] to become an [IW] centre of excellence and by so 
doing provide the necessary assistance to [South African National Intelligence Agency] and 
other government departments in the government’s national responsibility of defending South 
Africa against an information attack. The [SA DOD] must also be in a position to defend South 
Africa against an information onslaught. It refers to that dimension of the battlespace, which is 
composed of the electromagnetic spectrum and the non-human sensing dimension in which 
stealth-masked forces seek refuge from attack, the focus being primarily on the control and 
manipulation of information. In this dimension vulnerabilities are exploited through electronic 
means, psychological operations, and other measures designed to manipulate, deceive, disable, 
or destroy an opponent’s information systems as part of hostile actions. The [SA DOD], together 
with the other government departments, should form a national [InfoOps] Hub and by so doing 
form a unified organisation to manage National [InfoOps].  
The SA DOD is tasked specifically with the following IW focus and boundaries -  
“i. Opportunities and Constraints of the [SA DOD] within the Conduct of [IW -] 
(1) The [SA DOD], in its defensive posture, must ensure that it is combat ready in order to 
provide defensive IW measures against an information onslaught. These defensive IW measures 
must concentrate on and protect against a possible enemy outside the borders of South Africa. 
[these are typical cyber and media threats] 
(2) The [SA DOD] must, however, prepare itself to utilise offensive IW measures against the 
opponent during an information onslaught. Offensive IW measures will, however, only be used 
with the authority of the Commander in Chief. 
ii. The Boundaries and Roles for [PsyOps -] 
(1) The [SA DOD] will ensure that all of its fighting forces are protected against a possible 
opponent/enemy [PsyOps] on and off the battlefield. This protection will be conducted within 
                                                 
81
 Also defined as – “planned psychological activities in peace and war directed at enemy and neutral audiences, create 
attitudes and behaviour favourable to the achievement of political and military objectives. These operations include 
psychological action that encompasses those political, military and economic ideological and intelligence activities 
designed to achieve a desired psychological effect. (JWP1, 9-8) 
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[Force Structure Elements] by means of Command Communication, which will be controlled by 
the [CSANDF] (Corporate Communication). 
(2) Offensive [PsyOps] on the other hand will be restricted to use against the enemy in times of 
combat. The [SA DOD] must, however, ensure that it has the capability to utilise [PsyOps] as a 
force multiplier on the battlefield. 
(3) [PsyOps] in the [SA DOD] will always be subservient to the national corporate 
communications authority with respect to message content”. (SANDFP3: 2-22 - 2-23) 
Information era perspectives where information is regarded as strategic and an advantage 
multiplier are clearly visible.  This quote separates IW and PsyOps although other statements 
include PsyOps in IW.  It might be just to give more guidance on PsyOps or it might be related to 
the realisation that PsyOps is not about information and sensors but more about the human mind 
and much closer to KM than to IM.  InfoOps is defined in detail in SANDFP3 (2-20) as –  
“[InfoOps] are joint and coordinated measures in times of peace, crises and war in support of 
political or military goals that affect or use information and information systems owned by the 
opponents or other foreign parties… Using own information and information systems, which 
also simultaneously require protection will provide for this. An important feature to be 
considered is the influencing of the processing of decisions and decision-making [this factor will 
be discussed in more detail later in the chapter] … There are both offensive and defensive 
[InfoOps], which are conducted in conjunction with political, economic and military relations. 
[other statements use DIME to describe the lines of operation]. Examples of [InfoOps] are [IW], 
media manipulation, [PsyOps] and [IntOps].  Defensive [InfoOps] are joint and coordinated 
measures in times of peace, crises and war regarding policy, operations, personnel and 
technology to protect and defend information, information systems and the ability to undertake 
rational decision-making…The South African Government recognises its national responsibility 
to manage [InfoOps]. These [sic] it will be conducted by making use of all government 
departments and centralising the control of [InfoOps] with the [South African National 
Intelligence Agency] … [InfoOps] are conducted at national level. Government is responsible for 
directing the specific government departments. The effective coordination of the effort to obtain 
the ultimate goal, viz “Achieving Information Superiority” must be the total focus when 
contributing to [InfoOps]. [InfoOps] will be used to attempt a number of different capabilities 
(within the national sphere) such as perception management (psychological operations), 
deception, computer network attack and electronic warfare, to shape and influence the 
information environment.”.  
This quote separates IW, PsyOps and IntOps, contradicting other statements.  The primary 
goal is information superiority, which is an information era construct.  Knowledge superiority 
should be the focus.  This manner of thinking might also be due to the use of POSTEDFILT(B) and 
C
4
I
3
SR constructs rather than (as proposed by the researcher) POSTEFKTB and C
4
IKRS.  This will
assist the commander in knowing his enemy like he knows himself, not just being informed about 
his enemy.  JWP1 (5-2) defines SA DOD InfoOps and IW as follows – 
“[InfoOps]...“ a wide range of military and government activities to protect and/or exploit 
designated information domains in support of specified initiatives” [also found in JWP8 (Def-5)]. 
[InfoOps] targets mainly the adversary decision-maker “To affect the adversary decision-maker 
[InfoOps] will attempt to use a number of different capabilities (within the national sphere) such 
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as perception management, deception, computer network attack and [EW], to shape and 
influence the information environment”. (Also JWP8: 4C-4 and 5 and SANDFP3: 2-21) 
“[IW], however, is being developed as a capability to enhance the SANDF’s war-fighting 
capability. [IW] is defined as: “all actions taken to defend the military’s information-based-
processes, information systems and communication networks; and to destroy, neutralise, or 
exploit the enemy’s similar capabilities within the physical, information and cognitive domains”. 
[IW] consists of six pillars (domains), namely [EW], [NW], [PsyOps], [C2W], [IntBW] and 
[IIW].”. Also, “Although [IW], and specifically PsyOps, as well as Corp Com all support the 
communication and the information campaign of government and are therefore related, they are 
clearly separate entities and activities. Each is performed according to its own principles and 
standards while supporting the mission and overall political and military objectives.”.  
Yet, InfoOps is described in other statements already mentioned as incorporating knowledge 
related warfare.  And then there is the consistent linkage of information to decision-making and 
action without the mention of knowledge.  JWP8 (4-25) states about InfoOps –  
“[InfoOps] (including [PsyOps]), as well as the separate but related activity of Corporate 
Communication, are directed at the State’s population at large and at neighbouring states which 
share borders in the sub-region; indirectly [InfoOps] are aimed at the military contingents and 
civilian agencies that comprise the overall peace mission. The audience targeted by [InfoOps] 
and Corporate Communication may widen to include states at a greater geographical distance 
that share ethnic or cultural roots with the affected state, and the international community – 
notably those countries that are contributing military forces and other resources to the peace 
mission”. 
JWP8 (4C-4 and 5) describes the relationship and activities of SA DOD corporate 
communications with [InfoOps] and [IW] in PSOs as close -  
“Although [InfoOps], and specifically [PsyOps], as well as Corporate Communication, all 
support the communication and the Information Campaigns of national governments, and are 
therefore inextricably linked, they are clearly separate entities and activities. Each must be 
performed according to its own principles and standards while supporting the mission and 
overall political and military objectives.”. 
Thus, InfoOps is positioned to have a high-level strategic impact.  All the more reason to 
incorporate InfoOps and all its elements into a construct such as KW that would seek to use the 
entire knowledge continuum as a weapon for deterrence, defence and offence. 
The information era thinking is clearly visible in the quotes thus far.  The “information 
onslaught” was also mentioned earlier in this chapter of the dissertation as a driver of information 
era related thinking and operational requirements.  That information onslaught has probably 
mutated into a ‘knowledge onslaught’ in order to gain an advantage based on knowledge artefacts 
stemming from the knowledge continuum (e.g. intelligence and IP).  The fact should not be 
disregarded that there is and probably will be, into infinity, an information overload or saturation.  
This is a separate issue from IW (clearly defined above).  A key objective is raised as gaining or 
having information superiority which stems from information being perceived as being strategic.  
No mention is made of the requirement for knowledge superiority.  No mention is made of the 
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probability of KW that is based on knowledge superiority and its impact on decision-makers, 
actions, effects and advantage.  There seems to be an SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine gap on 
these matters.  This gap probably stems from construct dissonance and the fact that the SA DOD 
has not formally recognised the international transition to the knowledge era, neither has the SA 
DOD formally entered the knowledge era.  This also impacts another doctrinal statement ‘we fight 
as we train’.  If the SA DOD’s training is based on information era constructs then the ‘fighting’ 
will also be based on information era constructs.  The result is that the SA DOD will train for the 
previous war.  Taking a more practical view on IW in unique and complex PSO environments - 
“Efficient co-ordination of the use of all available military capabilities to protect the [Peace 
Support Force]’s [C2] in support of the mission will be a high concern. C2 protection is vital to 
overall force protection and should incorporate an [operational security] policy that specifically 
considers vulnerabilities in the [Peace Support Force]’s communications and information 
systems as well as other [operational security] areas. An analysis of the parties subject to the 
PSO is invaluable to assigning military intelligence priorities and the prioritised use of EW and 
other specialist resources to support the mission. Continual analysis of hostile parties’ media 
resources is important to ensure their objectivity and that they are not used as a C2 means to 
incite violence and opposition to the mission. In certain circumstances, the use of deception or 
physical destruction may be appropriate to deceive or destroy a hostile party’s C2 capability. In 
addition, EW assets may have to be used to secure friendly forces use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, and to deny its use by hostile parties. Information planning and activity forms [sic] an 
integral element of deep operations within the [Peace Support Force] Campaign Plan”.  (JWP8: 
4-26) 
This quote provides a glimpse at the level of integration required to secure C2 in PSO.  This is 
no different for military operations not classified as PSOs.  The level of complexity cannot be 
overstated.  Yet, the level of coherence and integration required is fairly understated.  The 
requirement for security of information is significantly underlined.  Knowledge security is thus 
implied based on the significant amount of construct dissonance identified thus far in the selected 
sample of SA DOD. 
SANDFP3 (10-1) states - “Opponents will seek to contest technological advantages of armed 
forces through [IW] and asymmetric techniques.”.  This should not be problematic if the SA DOD 
uses KW as a deterrence, defence or offence. 
JWP8 (5B-1) states the following about information and C2 –  
“The information and data essential to effective logistic planning are much less readily 
transferred between nations with disparate doctrine and different Management Information 
Systems (MIS). Some nations may not be willing to divulge information, even to allies, and the 
absence of, and incompatibility of MIS within the African Union and Southern African 
Development Community will undoubtedly hamper the sharing of information”.  
Command and control are critical to advantage and required for any military operation.  Again 
only data, information and information systems are stated as critical enablers to C2 (although it is 
stated within the specific context of logistics planning).  Doctrine is stated to have a critical impact 
on data and information sharing.  It will possibly have the same effect on other capstone knowledge 
sharing, thus hinting at a KM doctrine to inform this process and to facilitate coherence and 
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integration of the knowledge continuum, both within the SA DOD as well as between the SA DOD 
and international partners. 
JWP8 (Def-5) defines information campaigns within the context of PSOs as follows – “Co-
ordinated information output of all Government activity undertaken to influence decision-makers in 
support of policy objectives, while protecting one’s own decision-makers”.  Again the notion is that 
information is the decision-making enabler as opposed to knowledge (i.e. intelligence). 
JWP8 (2-1, 3-2 and 3-8) makes mention of the use of campaign InfoOps, which will be 
inclusive of InfoOps and public information strategy in PSOs.  This is typically IntOps alternatively 
labelled due to the sensitivity of the use of IntOps within the context of PSOs.  This sensitivity is 
summarised as follows –  
“The parties to a conflict, and even some Mission elements may perceive the gathering of 
intelligence as a hostile and sinister action. It is for this reason that UN led [sic] operations 
deliberately replace the term military intelligence with ‘military information’. To ensure no 
misunderstanding within the context of the SANDF for which this JWP is intended, the term 
‘intelligence’ must be maintained. ‘Intelligence Integrity’ must be established and maintained; 
this involves the physical management and conduct of [IntOps]”. (JWP8: 4-10) 
JWP8 (5-23) states about SA DOD Special Forces and information in PSOs –  
“[SA DOD Special Forces] conduct covert surveillance and reconnaissance by land or sea in a 
static or mobile role. They can provide timely information to political and military decision-
makers and commanders. This contributes to the overall intelligence picture and may provide 
collateral for information from other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, be 
used to cue such systems to confirm technical intelligence or to trigger interdiction. [SA DOD 
Special Forces] may provide a more appropriate means of obtaining information due to hostile 
terrain or climate and by developing information from human contact. Where ambiguity exists 
[SA DOD Special Forces] can provide ‘ground truth’.”. 
This text relates information to being a contributor to intelligence, decision-making and 
action, which is probably correct.  It also equates information to ‘ground truth’.   The importance of 
having information should thus not be underestimated in the process of knowledge generation.  
There is, however, risk in basing decisions and actions purely on information.  ‘Ground truth’ 
within the context stated is probably closer to knowledge than information when considering one of 
the first definitions of knowledge stated in the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) as being 
‘justified true belief”.   Ground truth should also be defined as this is not a military term.  Real-time 
or near real-time intelligence is a more recognised term.  Intelligence is used in this construct 
because it is closer to being ‘true’ from a process perspective. 
IntOps (including surveillance and reconnaissance) are clear sub-sets of the proposed broader 
KOps and KW constructs.  IntOps are based on capstone military knowledge (intelligence) and 
techniques which is employed to ‘know the enemy’ and are thus clearly linked to principles of war.  
Information Warfare more than often provides data and information to IntOps operatives and 
processes.  It is thus a complex system that requires multi-layered and joint action based on 
coherent and integrated management as well as excellence in C2.  This can hardly be achieved with 
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only IM.  The USA military understands this and therefore embarked on the journey towards 
knowledge superiority through KM, a decade ago already. 
6.2.1.8 Construct Dissonance 
Construct dissonance, about data, information and knowledge, is wide-spread throughout the 
selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  Several examples have already been 
highlighted and discussed thus far.  Construct dissonance seems to be a primary contributing factor 
to the SA DOD entrenchment in the information era, consequently resulting in the perception that 
the SA DOD is not interested in KM.   The contradictory use by the SA DOD of the named 
constructs highlights the poor understanding of the constructs and their respective value and use in 
terms of decision-making, action, effects and the creation and sustainment of advantage.  This 
predicament was also graphically illustrated in Figure 3.18 at the end of Chapter 3 of the 
dissertation. 
For the SA DOD, coherence can only be achieved if the various constructs are appropriately 
defined in an authoritative SA DOD taxonomy, as the first step towards meaning and 
understanding.  This should be a priority of a future SA DOD KMC.  Because there is synergy 
between the proposed definitions of this dissertation, relationships displayed in Figure 3.17 also 
holds true for knowledge.  A focussed view of the proposed knowledge continuum (Figure 3.16) 
and the proposed KM definition (Figure 3.13) is provided in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.   
Thus, whereas the ideal picture would be based on the approach above in Figure 3.17; 
currently in the SA DOD data may be used mistakenly as information and/or knowledge and 
information is equated to various types of military knowledge – and vice a versa.  This predicament 
is probably negatively affecting the quality of decisions, action, effects and possibly eroding 
advantage.  The graphic clearly shows that ‘all roads lead to’ information – reinforcing the SA 
DOD perception based on its Level 1 policy and doctrine that information is strategic and should be 
managed as such.  The graphic above was extrapolated and supported by the tabulated information 
below. 
Table 6.2: Evidence of the Construct Dissonance found within the Selected Sample of SA 
DOD Level 1 Policy and Doctrine within the Context of this Dissertation 
Factors Impacting Perceived Dissonance Source 
Distinguish between wisdom and knowledge JDP13 (A-3) and JDP4 (B-5) 
Distinguish between skill/know-
how/expertise and knowledge 
DODERF1 (B-4) DODD18 (3), DODI1 (various pages), 
DODI10 (1), DODI14 (2,3), DODI26 (13, B10), DODI25 
(20), DODI27 (D-1), DODI28 (10 and A-2), DODI30 (4-7), 
JDP19 (4), JDP15 (A-2, A-5), JDP16 (A-3, A-6, A-7), 
DODI40 (15, M9-1), DODI42 (17), DODI49 (1), DODI43 
(ix, N-1, N-4, N-7, N-10, N-13), DODI45 (14), DODI61 (3, 
5, 12, 22),  JDP13 (3,7,8,11, A-1, A-2, A-3), JDP14 (2, 3, 4, 
5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, A-1, A-2, A-5, D-4), JDP1 (8-1, 8-7), 
DODI56 (2, 3, 7, 8, 13, A-1, A-5, A-6, I-1, I-2, I-5), JDP10 
(2), JDP15 (A-2, A-5), JDP20 (3, 4, 5, 10), JDP3 (3-2, D-4, 
H-6), JDP4 (B-4, D-3, D1-8, D1-9, D5 para 79, 126, E1-7, 
E1-12), JDP6 (2, A-2), JDP9 (10), JWP4 (4-6, 5-5), 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 238 
 
Factors Impacting Perceived Dissonance Source 
SANDFO2 (B-1-4, B-1-5) and SANDFP3 (xiv, xviii, 8-1, 9-
3, 13-3, 15-9, 15-14) 
Distinguish between experience and 
knowledge 
DODI14 (3), DODI27 (D-1), DODI30 (4-7), JDP16 (A-6), 
DODI40 (33, 49, 50), JDP13 (A-2), JDP14 (4), JDP1 (4-5), 
DODI56 (2, 3, 7, 8, I-2), JDP3 (D-10, D-12), JDP4 (D1-8), 
JWM1 (viii), JWP1 (1-2, 2-2, 2-4, 9-5) and JWP8 (6C-6) 
Several academics are of the opinion that knowledge is in 
fact particular skills sets (e.g. T-shaped skills).   
Distinguish between understanding and 
knowledge 
JDP13 (A-1), JDP14 (A-1, A-2, D-4), DODI56 (13, A-1, A-
6), JDP20 (3, 4, 5, 10), JDP4 (D3-2), JWP1 (1-2, 6-5) and 
JWP8 (3A-20, 4C-1, 6-1) 
KMI is of the opinion that knowledge is understanding 
gained through various knowledge processes 
Knowledge and skill is part of competence DODI26 (B10), DODI27 (D-1), JDP4 (D1-9) and JDP9 (2) 
Distinguish between knowledge, skills and 
competence 
DODI43 (N-1, N-4, N-7, N-10, N-13), JDP14 (6, 11), JDP4 
(D1-8) and SANDFP3 (xviii)  
There are academics that is of the opinion that knowledge is 
general competence 
Knowledge is inherent in experience JDP14 (9) 
Distinguish between knowledge and 
information 
DODI1 (9A-6), JDP13 (A-2), DODI56 (A-6), JDP4 (D2-5, 
D5-2), JDP9 (8), SANDFP4 (L-1) and DODI61 (B-3)  
 
Equates data with knowledge DODI23 (A-2) 
Equates information with knowledge SANDFP4 (L-1), DODI26 (17) and JDP9 (D-5) 
Equates doctrine with knowledge DODI1 (1A-6) 
Equates doctrine with information DODI50 (11) and JWP8 (1-6),  
Distinguish between doctrine and 
information 
DODI1 (1A-3) 
Distinguish between doctrine and policy SANDFP2 (1) 
Distinguish between doctrine and procedures SANDFP2 (1) 
Distinguish between IP and information DOD23 (43, A-3) 
Uses knowledge and IP in the same context DOD23 (26) 
Distinguish between data and information 
DODERMF1 (5-3, 6-1, B-5, B-6), DODI1, DODI23, 
DODI24 (B-4), DODI26 (24), DODI30 (3-10), DODI39 (A-
2), DOD42 (J-19), DODI50 (13), DODI57 (1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 7, 
B-3), DODI60 (5, 10), IDODI2 (14), JDP16 (C-1), JDP3 (D-
8, D-9), JDP4 (Appendix E), JDP9 (10), JWP1 (2-12), JWP8 
(5-15,  5B-1) and SANDFP3 (4-3) 
Equates data with information 
DODI23 (A-1), DODI24 (24, 35), DODI42 (A-6), DODI61 
(A-1) and SANDFP4 (L-1) 
Distinguish between data, information, 
policy, doctrine and knowledge  
JDP16 (C-1)  
Separates intelligence from data  SANDFP3 (4-3) 
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Factors Impacting Perceived Dissonance Source 
Equates intelligence with data JWP8 (15, 16) 
Equates intelligence with information DODI1 (7A-4) and DODI26 (17), 
Distinguish between intelligence and 
information 
DODSPF1 (18) , DODI26 (17), DODISPF1 (17-18), JWM1 
(2-4), JWP4 (3-2), JWP8 (4-10, 4C-4, 6B-5) and JWP1 (1-6, 
1-8) 
Distinguish between knowledge and 
resources 
JDP1 (5C-1) 
This is problematic for the SA DOD when knowledge is not 
perceived as a resource.  In fact, from the discussion in the 
literature review, knowledge is perceived by business 
organisations that seek competitive advantage as a strategic 
resource 
Distinguish between knowledge and insight 
JDP1 (5C-2), JDP12 (A-3), JDP3 (3-2), JDP4 (B-5) and 
JWP1 (1-2)  
In the researcher’s opinion, to have insight is to have 
knowledge 
In order to supplement this tabulated construct dissonance position, a number of quotes from 
the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine and comments are provided because 
the reader might not have access to SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine documents.  The 
researcher did not reintegrate any discussion or quote, thus far in Chapter 6 of the dissertation, on 
construct dissonance.  The following definitions strengthen the perception of construct dissonance 
which contributes to the SA DOD’s lack of awareness of the requirement for coherent and 
integrated KM.  Let us first consider some statements and definitions from the selected sample of 
SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine. 
DODI57 (B-3) defines data as - “… a graphic or textual representation of facts, concepts, 
numbers, letters, symbols, or instructions suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing. 
Data is the basic element of information that is used to describe objects, ideas, conditions or 
situations.”.  IDODI2 (14 and 15) acknowledges that data is transformed into information.  
DODERFM1 (A-5) states that data is included in information as a construct.  These statements are 
the closest to the academic interpretation of the construct as discussed in the literature review 
(dissertation Chapter 2) and supported by the researcher of the dissertation. 
There are a number of definitions and statements that equates data to information and 
information to knowledge, contributing to probably the incoherent use and application of these 
constructs.  DODI28 (A-1) and DODI61 (A-1) define consultant data as – “… recorded 
information, regardless of medium or characteristics, of any nature, including administrative, 
managerial, financial and technical. (Mil-Std-973)”.  This definition reflects a statement from a 
Military Standard, which should be an authoritative expression on definitions and concepts.   
DODI50 (13) perpetuates the confusing use of the data and information as constructs -
“Detailed information on the performance, capabilities, technical specifications and serviceability of 
Defence equipment provided that such data is not already generally publicly available”.  This is 
probably not data but rather information or knowledge. 
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DODI28 (15) makes reference to “... raw data” and “… analysed data”.  Analysed data is 
nothing other than information and raw data is data.  This typology used in DODI28 is not helpful 
to the SA DOD to distinguish between data and information if not defined with care.  JDP9 (14 and 
D-5) defines metadata as -   
“… data describing context, content and structure of records and their management through 
time… descriptive data that gives context to documents. Without the necessary descriptive 
metadata attached a document cannot be considered to be a record. Descriptive metadata gives 
information about where a document comes from, who the creator was, when it was created, 
where it is located”. 
This quote confirms that the SA DOD recognises data and information as separate constructs, 
and reflects on the granularity of data.  Metadata is typically found in the area of overlap between 
data and information based on the opinion that metadata is data with contextual elements attached 
to it.  JDP16 (C-1) also separates data, information, policy, doctrine and knowledge within its 
Education, Training and Evaluation value chain.  
 DODI1 (7B-11) makes mention of metadata that enable searching for information in a 
database.  The existence of metadata is thus very important for the accessibility of information and 
knowledge.  The definition also confirms the important elements for the construction of military 
knowledge (who, what, where, when, how, which effects and what thereafter) as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation.  Individually these elements probably represent data; in 
combinations, they probably represent information – combined all together they probably represent 
knowledge.  DODI60 (9) provides another example where data and information is used 
interchangeably -  
“Print documentation containing information about the receipt of the message when required for 
record keeping purposes, and attach it to the message. The transmission data identifies the sender 
and the recipient(s) [who], as well as the date and time [when] that the message was sent and/or 
received [when]. This data provides the essential context for the message. This is equivalent to 
correspondence on paper, where the record includes information identifying the sender and 
recipient, as well as the date of the letter and not just the message.”. 
In both cases (electronic and paper correspondence) the identity of the sender and/or receiver 
(who) is probably data as well as the times involved (when).  When read with the message (what, 
where, when, how, which effects and what thereafter) it becomes information and read together 
with the entire conversation between the parties involved might be regarded as knowledge.  These 
issues illustrate the diminishing granularity of the knowledge continuum as the density of 
information and other knowledge increase.  This concept is illustrated in Figure 6.4b along with its 
importance to the OODA loop.  DODI23 (A-2) defines a “data item” as - 
“… a contractually deliverable information document, including, but not limited to a plan, a 
specification, an analysis, a study, a standard, a design, a drawing, a model, an algorithm, 
computer software, a process document, a design report, a technology report, a test and 
evaluation report, and a qualification report;” Also, “data packs” means logically grouped 
collections of data items;” 
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Probably all the above proposed “data items” are knowledge closely associated with what the 
SA DOD considers to be IP, (or at the very least information).  Considering the definition of 
defence IP in DODI23 (A-4) -  
“defence foreground IP” means any IP that is created exclusively with or partially by defence 
funds, and may be found in, or take the form of patents, copy right [sic], trademarks, trade 
secrets, books, manuscripts, reports and notes, computer software, inventions, drawings and 
designs, data items, data packs, specifications, models, photographs, and other graphical 
images…”. 
JDP3 (D-8) states within the context of ETD that - “A learning unit has identifying data such 
as the title of the subject/module, the topic of the learning unit and maybe even a number for the 
unit.”.  This supports the view that data has very coarse granularity (i.e. describing elements such as 
who, what, where, when, how, which effects and what thereafter) compared to information and 
knowledge as mentioned earlier. 
DODI1 (7B-3) states - “Collect and Prepare the Data (Including Benchmarking). This 
involves the collection of information according to the research design in order to gather all relevant 
information pertaining to research question – including “benchmarking”.”.  The description does 
not refer to data collection, leaving the reader of the policy to ponder whether data and information 
might be the same thing.  DODI26 (A-3) defines a repository as – 
“… a centralised store (integrated holding area) for information about modelled artefacts 
(strategy, processes, and the events that trigger them to represent the approach in satisfying 
customer requirements - It attempts to show how business is to be done). A database that is 
structured according to a framework, which provides a central store to hold all baselined 
architectures”. 
Thus, a repository is essentially a database.  The SA DOD manages several of these (see the 
discussion on types of knowledge later in this chapter).  The quote above equates modelled artefacts 
to strategy and processes.  From the literature review and military KM (Chapters 2 and 3), it 
became clear that strategy and processes constitute a form of military knowledge.  Therefore, by 
labelling SA DOD military knowledge (such as strategy and processes) as ‘modelled artefacts’ it 
will only serve to broaden the conceptual dissonance.  These are knowledge artefacts.  DODI61 (A-
1) defines the consultant database as –  
“… the collection of data in a form capable of being processed. The consultant database refers to 
recorded information, regardless of medium or characteristics, of any nature, including 
administrative, managerial, financial and technical and shall be divided into various categories, 
where each category represents the type of specialist service/advice.”. 
DODI28 (A-1) defines a database as - “…a collection of data in a form capable of being 
processed. (Mil-Std-973).”.   DODI61 (A-1) defines the consultant database as –  
“… the collection of data in a form capable of being processed. The consultant database refers to 
recorded information, regardless of medium or characteristics, of any nature, including 
administrative, managerial, financial and technical and shall be divided into various categories, 
where each category represents the type of specialist service/advice.”. 
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This compounds the problem of understanding what SA DOD databases actually contain – 
data, information, knowledge or all three.  It clearly requires separation into different types of bases 
in order to improve decision-making.  The SA DOD tends to classify all repositories as databases 
instead of making a distinction (i.e. database, information-base and knowledge-base) in order to 
provide more structure and coherence and to enable aggregation and integration in a more 
systematic manner.  Because of possible misunderstandings of the various constructs, the SA DOD 
attempts to manage all the constructs as information within databases with IM processes and 
practices.  This is information era thinking.  This will lead to a deterioration of advantage over time. 
This opinion is eloquently illustrated with quotes from DODI1 (1A-4 and 6A-2) and DODI39 (10 
and A-2) stating information can be stored and accessed from a database and with a quote from 
DODI1 (6B-3) stating the following - 
“Update and Maintain the Information Centre Digital Repository. The information database 
comprises written products, photos and short videos. It is an electronic database of questions and 
answers that is to be continually updated and maintained in order to have updated and 
maintained information available on a continuous basis”. 
This maintenance requirement is also stated by DODI22 (4) - “… maintenance of data 
integrity of the organisation life cycle information systems is provided for”.  These maintenance 
issues are related to knowledge continuum security. 
DODI1 (7C-25) states – “Obtain Knowledge of Stakeholders Visiting Official DOD Websites 
[sic] (Determine Virtual Stakeholders). Determining of data concerning the visitors to DOD 
websites ensures valuable knowledge of stakeholders, which will result in satisfying the information 
needs of stakeholders”.  The quote recognises the different constructs but fails to structure the 
statement in such a manner consistent with the proposed knowledge continuum.  This leaves the 
policy reader to believe that if he/she has data they have knowledge.  The use of knowledge in the 
sentence is not well considered.  Also, stakeholders will be interested in knowing (or knowledge) 
more than just information.  This type of misconception and the construct dissonance discussed 
above could be mitigated with the establishment of a detailed authoritative taxonomy of the 
knowledge continuum artefacts. 
Perpetuating construct dissonance, DODI28 (2, 15 and 19) states the importance of data to 
ergonomics management - “[DODI28] must provide for an adequate and sustainable knowledge-
base to access ergonomics information and databases on a continuous basis … The ARMSCOR 
Institute ERGOTECH, is responsible to establish and manage an ergonomics knowledge-base in the 
form of ergonomics literature (journals, text books [sic]) and computerised research reports”.  These 
statements make the distinct connection between data, information, knowledge, databases and 
knowledge-bases. The ‘knowledge-base’ referred to is probably the employees and the database the 
repository for knowledge continuum artefacts and probably computer-based.  This confirms that the 
SA DOD manages or is at least interested in knowledge-base management and that (from the 
above) there are knowledge-, information- and databases in the SA DOD (or managed for the SA 
DOD).   
DODI28 (8) states that the SA DOD ergonomics database is a strategic asset because it 
contains – “… subject specific [IP], knowledge, research information, strategic personnel and job 
profiles, Defence ergonomics best practices and analysed operational data. Specific RSA Defence 
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ergonomics information (RSA-Mil-Documents) is available on the ARMSCOR website at 
http//armscor.co.za.”.  This database thus contains probably mostly information (e.g. research 
information, analysed operational data) and knowledge (e.g. intellectual property, knowledge, best 
practices).  However, all of this is found in a database, supporting the conception of the researcher 
that there should be differentiation. 
The storage of knowledge continuum artefacts on a database is commonplace in militaries and 
businesses. This legacy practice might be one of the contributing factors to construct dissonance.  It 
would be more appropriate to store data on a database, information in an information-base and 
knowledge in a knowledge-base; and then have software and other methods that integrate the 
content to such an extent that the user can find relevant data and/or information and/or knowledge 
on a particular subject.  Quality decisions typically require knowledge whereas research would 
require the entire continuum.  Because there is no agreement on knowledge ontology, all is just 
dumped in a database.  From a strategic asset management perspective or a resource-based view of 
the organisation - it is a bit like storing and managing fighter aircraft with the rest of the inventory 
and spares in a general logistics store or warehouse because there is no purpose-built storage facility 
for the fighter aircraft.  Thus, the absence of purpose-built SA DOD knowledge storage facilities 
and management system/capability will result in the knowledge being stored in general databases 
with data and information and managed with data- and IM processes. These issues support a 
requirement for different types of repositories to be properly defined and integrated.  This practice 
contributes to construct dissonance and management paralysis within organisations such as the SA 
DOD because of the interchanged use of already very contention constructs.  An SA DOD KMC is 
proposed to cross these hurdles with.   
DODI24 (16 and C-3) states that the Software Asset Manager is responsible for data 
management of software and related assets.  This confirms that the SA DOD does engage in data 
management; also mentioned in JDP9 (D-6).  There is thus no reason for confusing data 
management with IM.   
With insight into what the SA DOD regards as data and databases; let us discuss policy 
expression, from the selected sample of SA DOD policy and doctrine, on information as a construct.  
Information is regarded as - “Any recorded or displayed data or knowledge or communication 
content, regardless of its format” (JDP9: D-5, SANDFP4: L-1 and DODI57: B-7).   JDP9 was 
ratified as early as 2008, roughly at the beginning of the process to draft the DR 2015.  Possibly a 
more detailed definition is - 
 “Information is any recorded or representation of knowledge or communication content, 
regardless of its format concerning objects such as facts, events, things, processes, ideas or 
opinions that has [sic] a particular meaning within a certain context (adapted from: Reference A: 
ICT Strategy)”   DODI39 (A2).   
The word knowledge in this definition should have been data, bringing the definition closer to 
the opinions in literature – i.e. information is data within context.  Another version of this definition 
is - “… any recorded or displayed data or knowledge or communication content, regardless of its 
format.” (SANDFP4:  L-1 and DODI57: B-7).   
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The construct dissonance in these definitions is clear.  What is not clear is the meaning of 
‘communication content’ in the quotes above?  Does this refer to something other than data, 
information or knowledge?  This requires a detailed descriptive taxonomy.  Other definitions are -
“Information can include historical data, theoretical analysis, informed opinions, and the concerns 
of stakeholders”.  (DODI42:  A-6 and DODERMF1: A-5) Also “Information is any knowledge, 
which can be transmitted by means of any method, whether by way of word of mouth or by way of 
a document or materiel [sic], irrespective of how it was originally obtained. (Source: Military 
Dictionary)” (DODI30: A-2) 
The Military Dictionary is referenced as the source in DODI30 (A-2).  This dictionary 
definition encapsulates the entire problem – information is equated to knowledge.  The Military 
Dictionary (also a document available in the SA DOD policy database (pp_static dated 17 May 
2016), but not part of the sample due to the age of the document) – was consulted by the researcher 
to verify the definition.  The following was found - 
“information : informasie 
1 Any knowledge which can be transmitted by means of any method, whether by word of mouth 
or by way of a document or material, irrespective of how it was originally obtained 
2 Unevaluated material of every description, including material derived from observations, 
reports, rumours, photographs and other sources, which, when analysed, produces intelligence.” 
(Military Dictionary, 185-186). 
The first part of the definition actually refers to the fact that information needs to be made 
explicit to be regarded as information.  The fact that it is labelled ‘knowledge’ is unfortunate and 
possibly due to a poor understanding of the construct at the time of publishing.  The second part of 
the definition in the Military Dictionary was not included in DODI30.  The second part of the 
definition alludes to ‘intelligence’ as a product of analysed information and possibly data that is 
labelled ‘unevaluated material’.  This brings the researcher back to the first part of the definition; 
which could have substituted the word ‘knowledge’ for ‘evaluated material’.  Thus, not only is the 
construct of knowledge included in information but also data (“unevaluated material of every 
description”) and intelligence.   
DODI30 also fails to provide a definition for intelligence as a construct. DODI30, aiming at 
(amongst others) information security (which apparently also include knowledge security), is silent 
on intelligence security.  This is possibly a result of the inclusive approach to the information as a 
construct – i.e. information = data, knowledge and intelligence.  
JWP8 (Def-5) defines information as - “… data collected from the environment, processed 
and put into context. (JWP 101 Operational Art)”. This is probably the closest definition to that of 
definitions and perceptions found in academic literature as discussed in the literature review.  The 
researcher supports the JWP8 definition based on the literature review of the dissertation. 
Also supported by the researcher of the dissertation, acknowledging the differences between 
data, information and knowledge, DODI39 (A2) defines content as - 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
245 
“… all the data, information and knowledge contained in a record. Content is the essential matter 
or substance of a record, as opposed to its form or style. In a more general sense, content reflects 
all the ideas, topics, facts, or statements contained in a record.”. 
In contrast, DODD4 wants the reader to believe that records only contain information and not 
necessarily data and/or knowledge.  JDP9 (1 and 3) and DODD4 (1) define a record as information 
– “Records are information created, received, maintained and used as evidence and information by
an organisation in the pursuance of legal obligations or in the transaction of business” JDP9 (1 and 
3) adds to this – “… Well-managed records are a vital part of the DOD’s information resources.
Appropriate management of records is a vital aspect of maintaining and enhancing the value of this 
asset”.  This statement is most likely based on the perception that information is data and 
knowledge as expressed in the definitions of information above.  It also reflects the SA DOD’s 
understanding that records management is tantamount to IM and because information is regarded as 
the strategic asset of choice (and not knowledge) and that IM is the management model choice. As 
stated earlier by the researcher; well-managed information generally does not increase in value, but 
rather diminishes.  Information management just assures the availability of information over an 
extended period of time.  JDP9 (6) states the requirement for “direct knowledge” for a record to be 
considered reliable –  
“A reliable record is one whose contents can be trusted as a full and accurate representation of 
the transactions, activities or facts to which they attest and can be depended upon in the course of 
subsequent transactions or activities. Records should be created at the time of the transaction or 
incident to which they relate, or soon afterwards, by individuals who have direct knowledge of 
the facts or by instruments routinely used within the business to conduct the transaction.”. 
There is no definition of ‘direct knowledge’ provided, thus making the statement ambiguous 
and open to interpretation.  It does articulate the importance of knowledge in the process of 
assembling reliable records for the SA DOD – records being one of the primary methods managing 
the SA DOD organisational memory.  Organisational memory is important for decisions, action, 
effect and advantage, thus linking knowledge (not information) to decisions, action, effect and 
advantage.  These records need to be reliable, accurate and useful.  It begs the question, however, if 
records that just contain data and information are not regarded as reliable?  If this is the case, then 
how can the SA DOD regard information as strategic?  This type of logic is the result of the extent 
of construct dissonance within the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine. 
An intention is stated in JDP9 (8) to provide for organisational memory development and 
maintenance, however, not based on knowledge but on “accurate and up-to-date information” - 
“Corporate records thus form the stable core of [IM] – reliable, accurate, quality information – 
taking in records from day-to-day operational systems, extracting and summarising to 
knowledge-based and briefing systems (and capturing the result), and publishing in different 
formats to websites, Intranets, publication schema, asset registers. Well-managed records and 
archives are a vital part of the [SA DOD]’s information resources and must be managed within a 
wider information management system to guarantee accurate and up-to-date information, 
controlled versions, and sustainable corporate memory.”. 
This is indicative of the fact that the SA DOD has not made the shift to the knowledge era and 
also has not made up its corporate mind about what information is and what constitutes knowledge 
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and their relative uses and values. This statement clearly calls for IM and not KM, with a brief 
introduction of knowledge-based systems, which is not clearly defined as to its purpose and method 
as well as corporate memory (which will include data, information and knowledge).  KM is thus a 
requirement albeit not clearly stated and confused with IM.  Important though is the mention of 
knowledge-based systems. These seem to support the notion of differentiating between databases, 
information-bases and knowledge-bases.  The complexity and contemplation of such a separation 
are outside the scope of this dissertation but would make for interesting future research. 
JWP8 (4-10) states that background information can be obtained from libraries, the media, 
satellites, etc.  Based on the definitions of SA DOD information it is to be understood, probably 
incorrectly, that information in this context includes knowledge. Libraries probably contain more 
knowledge than just information.   
Central to the problem of construct dissonance is the fact that there is no definition of the 
knowledge in the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  Knowledge is included 
in the definitions of information as being part of information. There are only descriptions of 
function-specific knowledge found in some policies.  DODI1 identifies a number of specific types 
of knowledge associated with the SA DOD Corporate Communications environment.  These are: 
“Applied Knowledge. … the application of existing Corp Com knowledge in the work place 
[sic]. It incorporates practical skills, i.e. Creative writing skills, associated with the Corp Com 
occupational responsibility of each of the occupational tasks identified (the tasks to deliver Corp 
Com products).”. (DODI1: 1A-1) This is typically Human IC. 
“Contextual Work Place Knowledge. … relates to the specific knowledge that can only be 
obtained in the work place [sic]. This includes knowledge of specific strategies, brands, products, 
protocols and procedures. This knowledge is only provided by the work place [sic].”.  (DODI1: 
1A-4)  This is typically Structural IC. 
“Functional Knowledge. … the technical expertise and knowledge required for a Corp Com 
functionary to perform the prescribed functions of the post within the framework of the scope of 
practice and standards as required by the relevant area of responsibility.”. (DODI1: 1A-10, 
IDODI1: A-3 and JWP1 (9-5)   This is typically Human IC. 
“Knowledge Component. … comprises various subject specifications. Knowledge refers to 
discipline or conceptual knowledge (including theory) from a recognised disciplinary field found 
on subject classifications systems.”. (DODI1: 1A-12).  This is typically Structural IC. 
“Knowledge Focus Areas. … the conceptual knowledge/theory and information required to 
produce the product or services identified.”. (DODI1: 1A-10) This is typically Structural IC. 
The knowledge constructs mentioned above are a requirement for the entire scope of the SA 
DOD.  All of these are very closely related and in some cases possibly overlapping.  They closely 
conform to the construct of IC discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. No mention is made of 
relational IC. They do not offer a concise definition of SA DOD knowledge.   The word 
‘knowledge’ is also used in the description which is not useful when describing what it is.  Some 
descriptions equate knowledge to discipline, conceptual- and theoretical knowledge, but still, do not 
define knowledge as a construct leaving the space open for every functionary to define knowledge 
as required.  The definition of learning component in DODI1 (1A-10) – “The learning component 
consists of conceptual knowledge/theory and information, practical/applied knowledge and skills 
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and work experience”, illustrate these issues clearly.  If the SA DOD understands information to be 
inclusive of knowledge and knowledge (according to literature are inclusive of skills and 
experience) then the definition should be much shorter.  However, the definition separates all these 
constructs letting the reader believe that they are different with clear boundaries. 
DODI26 (17) provides another clear example of the dissonance within the SA DOD about 
what knowledge and information in the following quote are – “Business process modelling captures 
fundamental enterprise business knowledge and displays this information graphically.”.  In the same 
paragraph, it is stated that business intelligence is important to achieve this.  In DODI26 (17 and 18) 
the following is stated about business analysis – “This activity involves the gathering and analysing 
of information to obtain an in-depth understanding of the business area, its goals and objectives, 
directions and priorities. This knowledge enables the creation of a business model…”.  This 
statement actually acknowledges the symbiotic relationships between processed information, 
understanding and new meaning (or knowledge).  This statement recognises the importance of 
understanding in the knowledge generation process.  It also recognises the importance of knowledge 
as the enabler to business model creation.  This is a contradiction to the perception of the SA DOD 
perpetuated by SA DOD Level 1 policy that information includes knowledge.  
DODI42 (2, C2-2) states about risk within the context of risk management – “Uncertainty is 
the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to, understanding or knowledge of an 
event, its consequence, or likelihood.”.  This equates knowledge to understanding, analogous to 
academic views stated in the literature review of the dissertation, and is reflected in the proposed 
definition of knowledge of the dissertation. So, within these two paragraphs of DODI26 (17) 
knowledge is equated to information and processed information is regarded as knowledge.  
Business intelligence is perceived as a critical enabler.  In the researcher’s opinion, it is probably 
just a matter of poor attention to detail and the ability to articulate thinking clearly by the policy 
writer in this case.  This might, in fact, be the case in many instances within the selected sample of 
SA DODI Level 1 policy and doctrine.  These issues can be corrected with an authoritative SA 
DOD taxonomy managed within a coherent and integrated SA DOD KMC.  It will provide 
unambiguous policy and doctrine that will enhance decisions, actions, effects and advantage at all 
levels of the organisation. 
Uncertainty is also expressed on from an intelligence and knowledge perspective.  JDP4 (D1-
4) equates knowledge to intelligence and also that a lack of both these two constructs contributes to 
uncertainty in operations and the accomplishment of the mission.  JDP4 (D1-4) defines uncertainty 
as - “… a lack of knowledge essential to the accomplishment of a mission. The lack of intelligence 
and purposeful deception actions by the enemy are the main reasons why most commanders 
experience a high degree of uncertainty during combat situations”.  Uncertainty is distinctly linked 
to situational awareness and to decision-making (or the lack thereof) and subsequent action/non-
action.  It is thus clear that knowledge enhances the ability of leadership to take decisions and 
enable actions by reducing uncertainty.  The researcher agrees with this policy statement.   
In this paragraph knowledge and intelligence are used interchangeably as if the reader should 
intuitively understand these two constructs as being the same.  From the military KM (dissertation 
Chapter 3), intelligence is indeed perceived as capstone military knowledge.  When following the 
logic of the definition provided for ‘uncertainty’ – i.e. a lack of knowledge/intelligence – then a 
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supply or abundance of knowledge/intelligence should then result in certainty which is a powerful 
state of mind to be in when decisions and actions are pending in order to deliver a specific effect 
and secure advantage.  Thus, it is knowledge that is perceived to be strategic and not information. 
SANDFP3 (15-7) defines intelligence as the – “Product resulting from the collection, 
evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one 
or more aspects of importance to an intelligence or security service”.  Thus, intelligence is a 
product, probably better described as a knowledge artefact, of processed information (also in JWP1 
(8-3)).  Intelligence is not information.  A gap in this definition is probably that it should include 
data and knowledge in the definition.  The definition assumes that data has been processed to 
construct information or that intelligence cannot be constructed from just data.  It also assumes 
incorrectly that knowledge is included in information because of the definition of SA DOD 
information in various policies and doctrine.  The researcher is of the opinion that intelligence is the 
knowledge artefact that stems from processing knowledge continuum artefacts originating typically 
from organisational IC. 
JWP1 (8-3) states that essential elements of information (i.e. combinations of who, what, 
why, where, when, how, which effects and what thereafter) are the building blocks of intelligence.  
DODSPF1 (18) separates information and intelligence as constructs.  The researcher agrees with 
these policy statements.  This is contradicted by DODI50 (12) that equates intelligence to 
information.  From Chapter 3 of the dissertation, intelligence is regarded as capstone military 
knowledge and not information. 
JWP8 (4-10) discusses the dilemma of using ‘military intelligence’ in PSOs.  The UN prefers 
‘military information’ for various reasons which is outside the scope of this dissertation.  
Supporting this preference, JWP8 (4-10) states that - “The parties to a conflict, and even some 
Mission elements may perceive the gathering of intelligence as a hostile and sinister action. It is for 
this reason that UN-led operations deliberately replace the term military intelligence with ‘military 
information’. 
However, JWP8 (4-10) states further that - “To ensure no misunderstanding within the 
context of the SANDF for which this JWP is intended, the term ‘intelligence’ must be maintained. 
‘Intelligence Integrity’ must be established and maintained; this involves the physical management 
and conduct of [IntOps].”.  It supports that intelligence is not information – and the SANDF is 
adamant about this. This policy statement aims at eliminating construct dissonance.  However, 
IntOps is still clustered within InfoOps and IW constructs.  This might leave a novice perplexed as 
to the differences.  For this reason, the researcher proposes KW as the catch-all construct within 
which to cluster various knowledge continuum-related operational and warfare concepts. 
JWP8 (1-6) states that JWP is doctrine and it provides information about - “… practical 
guidance for military commanders, staff and personnel involved at the operational level in peace 
missions.”.  This statement incorrectly equates doctrine to information.  Doctrine is capstone 
military knowledge that provides practical guidance.  JWP1 (1-2) states that knowledge is a part of 
doctrine in the following definition - 
“It is the body of corporate concepts, knowledge and beliefs that provides [sic] a common 
approach and way of thinking and that informs the making of decisions and the creation of 
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policy, strategy, orders, instructions, rules and procedures. A sound understanding of an 
organisation’s doctrine, which comes firstly with the insight gained, for example, in the initial 
training and/or orientation received on joining the organisation, and later from experience 
achieved simply by working within the organisation and absorbing its culture [JDP4 (B-1) 
propose knowledge to be part of culture], enhances the understanding of strategy and policy and 
should be sufficient to guide any element of that organisation, down to the individual responsible 
for planning and executing activities, to a reasonable chance of success in any endeavour of the 
organisation, even in the absence of any other policy, guidelines, orders or instructions.”. 
JWP1 (1-2) states further that - “… the purpose of military doctrine is to structure knowledge 
of warfare (also in JWP4: 1-2), unbound by prescriptive rules, to enable clarity of thought in the 
chaos and crisis of war,…”.  These definitions and descriptions do not contradict discussions in the 
literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) and military KM (dissertation Chapter 3).  These 
definitions are fundamental to SA DOD KM and a KMC.  The description recognises the 
importance of the process of understanding in knowledge formulation.  It recognises doctrine as 
capstone military knowledge and SA DOD IC.  It recognises the link between doctrine and other 
knowledge constructs as well as decisions and actions.  It informs the development of other types of 
capstone military knowledge such as “… policy, strategy, orders, instructions, rules and 
procedures”.    DODI26 (17) makes these confusing statement –    
“Business process modelling captures fundamental enterprise business knowledge and displays 
this information graphically. These models give executives, business staff, and ICT departments 
a complete view of the “big picture” of end-to-end process chains spanning the business. The 
models also make it possible to drill-down to details driving the day-to-day organisation. This 
top-down approach leverages business intelligence and enables a fluid, efficient and strategy-
aligned enterprise.”.  
This is another glaring example of construct dissonance.  Knowledge is equated to 
information and information to intelligence.  By exchanging the construct ‘information’ with 
‘knowledge’ or ‘intelligence’, this paragraph would be much more accurate.   Using the constructs 
of information and knowledge interchangeably is endemic to SA DOD policy and general thinking 
and practice.  It results in decisions being based on information rather than on knowledge; probably 
resulting in the incorrect decision, less desirable actions and effects and a loss of advantage. 
JWP8 (5-16 and 17) states that Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Signal Intelligence 
(SIGINT) can provide useful PSO domain related data.  ELINT and SIGINT systems and sensors 
provide data and information required to be processed into intelligence.  Such intelligence might 
then be labelled ELINT and SIGINT.  The current format lets the reader believe ELINT and 
SIGINT are data. 
The fact that data, information and knowledge share various characteristics and 
functional/management processes could also perpetuate construct dissonance.  The following table 
represents a list of characteristics that are shared by data, information and knowledge as distinct 
constructs as found in the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine and based on the 
discussions in Chapter 2 of the dissertation: 
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Table 6.3: Construct Characteristics 
Construct Data Information Knowledge (policy, 
doctrine, intelligence and 
IP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
reliable, accurate, current, 
centralised, integrity, 
trustworthy, timeliness, 
presentation, formatted, 
compatibility, validity, 
correlated, fusioned, 
processable and quality 
useful-, understandable, 
relevant, secure, 
appropriately classified, 
authorised for 
publication, 
confidentiality, integrity, 
timely, tempo, accessible, 
adequate, accurate, 
consistent, complete, 
coherent, up-to-date, 
current, in-time, 
compatible, availability, 
quality, reliable, credible, 
valid, transparent, 
materiality
82
 and 
veracity/authenticity 
integrated, reliable, 
accurate, current, 
centralised, integrity, 
trustworthy, timeliness, 
presentation, formatted, 
compatibility, validity, 
correlated, fusioned, good, 
real-time and near real-
time 
 
 
 
Reference 
DODI1, DODI22, 
DODI24, DODI40, 
DODI48, DODI57, 
DODI61, JDP1 and JWP8 
DODD4, DODD10, 
DODI12, DODI24, 
DODI27, DODI39, 
DODI48, DODI61, 
IDODI2, JDP3, JDP4, 
JDP9, JWP1 and JWP8 
DODI31, DODI40, 
DODSPF1, JWP4 and 
SANDFP3 
There is a significant overlap with the characteristics identified for knowledge.  This is 
possibly due to the interchanged use of the constructs by the SA DOD.  Most of these 
characteristics for knowledge were described in the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) from 
the perspective of the KMI.  These should thus be pursued both for data and information in order to 
have enhanced building blocks correctly configured to be transformed into knowledge.  JWP1 (1-4) 
states objectives of Corporate Communications in operations as (amongst others) –  
“Advance the military operation through the creation of timely and relevant information 
products. … Defend and protect the operation from unjustified criticism and misinformation … 
Counter propaganda [sic], false information and hate messages that are harmful to the objectives 
of the operation and the achievement of peace”.  
The importance of timely, relevant and accurate information and the management thereof is 
highlighted throughout the policy.  Due to the rapidly changing environment and the requirement 
for the SA DOD to be able to adapt, this requirement is critical to the achievement of SA DODs 
operational objectives.  
JWP1 (1-7) states the importance of -“…timing, timelines and tempo of information flow and 
communication”.  The tempo for the availability of knowledge and new knowledge, in particular, 
will be determined by the tempo of business (policy and IP) and/or operations (intelligence and 
                                                 
82
 “Information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions of management 
made on the basis of the financial statements of the DOD. Materiality could be either qualitative or quantitative, 
depending on the specific circumstances.” (DODI48: A-2) 
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doctrine) This will certainly influence the tempo of decision-making, actions required, the timing of 
effects to be achieved and possible advantage.  
Continuing with the discussion on the construct dissonance, consider the following quote 
from JWP8 (6-7) – “Within RSA, national early warning mechanisms will assess data provided by 
the intelligence community for the discretionary utilisation at the political and military strategic 
level”.  It would be very dangerous from a principle of war perspective if commanders/decision-
makers at the political and military strategic level base their decisions on data.  JWP8 (6-7) states 
further –  
“The heart of the [African Union Continental Early Warning System] will consist of a Situation 
Room that will be part of the Peace and Security Department of the [African Union]. The 
Situation Room will, in turn, be linked to the observation and monitoring units of regional 
organizations who will collect and process data at their respective levels and transmit the same to 
the continental Situation Room. Within RSA, national early warning mechanisms will assess 
data provided by the intelligence community for the discretionary utilisation at the political and 
military strategic level.”. 
The quote above wants the reader to believe that the intelligence community collects only 
data and that this data is then shared with the situation room to act on.  This is probably not correct 
and results from a poor understanding of intelligence.  The intelligence community collects data, 
information and knowledge and subjects it to the intelligence cycle which allows it to be shared 
with users in the form of intelligence artefacts (or currently described by policy as products). 
DODI1 makes reference to KM within the context of document management (content 
management on digital repositories).  No further explanation is provided as to the KM process.  It 
wants the reader to believe that content management is KM, creating construct dissonance. 
The discussion above provide documentary evidence that the SA DOD is not necessarily 
disinterested in knowledge or KM, but is thoroughly confused about the various constructs 
clustered in the knowledge continuum, their use and value – hence they do not engage in coherent 
KM. 
6.2.1.9 Capstone Military Knowledge Silos 
The SA DOD manages several categories capstone military knowledge, as stated and 
discussed thus far in the dissertation.  This may support the perception that the SA DOD is 
interested in KM.  However, the knowledge silos point to the fact that SA DOD knowledge is not 
managed in a coherent and integrated manner possibly resulting in less than optimal decisions, 
actions, effects and advantage. 
There is no mention of a CKO in the SA DOD; not in legislation, the DR 2015 nor in SA 
DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  However, the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine express on the management of policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP (amongst others).  This 
is done mostly in a silo approach.  These capstone military knowledge domains are not managed in 
a coherent and integrated manner by an SA DOD CKO and with a dedicated KMC as can be found 
in business and in e.g. the USA military.  The result is that SA DOD KM remains fractured, in silos, 
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with no coordinating structure and function such as provided by a KMC to ensure coherence and 
integration.   
The SA DOD does have a CIO (i.e. the Sec Def).  This brings us back to the construct 
dissonance.  The SA DOD regards most, if not all, the capstone military knowledge as information 
(per definition), and thús the requirement for a CIO and not for a CKO.  This state of affairs 
possibly also drives the notion that information is strategic (based on the legislative requirement for 
a CIO and not a CKO) and that decisions, actions, effects and advantage should be based on 
information.  However, from the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation, there is a broad 
academic and applied recognition that information and knowledge should be separated and 
managed distinctly and that it is knowledge that drives enhanced decisions, action, effects and 
advantage. 
6.2.2 Why Should the SA DOD be interested in Knowledge Management? 
The importance of KM was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation.  The importance 
is mostly based on the perception that knowledge is a strategic resource and asset and a driver of 
advantage.  No mention of the importance of KM for the SA DOD could be found in legislation or 
the DR 2015 (dissertation Chapter 5).  However, SANDFP3 (11-10 and 11-20), promulgated in 
2007, identifies knowledge as a primary source of power.  This fact was already recognised in the 
SA DOD circa 2007 but did not filter into comprehensive policy and structure up to now (mid-
2017).  Therefore the question – should the SA DOD be interested in KM?  Some perspectives have 
already been provided above that the SA DOD should be interested in KM because of the coherence 
and integration it would provide to the SA DOD towards recognising knowledge as the driver of 
advantage instead of information, assisting the SA DOD to enter knowledge era thinking and 
practices, eliminating construct dissonance, integrating knowledge silos, and providing knowledge 
policy in various forms.  The following discussion will delve into more reasons why the SA DOD 
should be interested in coherent and integrated KM and a KMC. 
6.2.2.1 Complexity 
The SA DOD operates in a very complex business and operational environment.  This 
complexity generates infinite amounts of data, information and knowledge, requiring appropriate 
management thereof for it to be useful.  JDP4 (D1-5 and 6) provides a brief summary of the 
complex environment in which the SA DOD must operate –  
“Leaders … are experiencing increasing complexity and diversity of tasks and are subject to 
competing demands from the external environment and the internal organisation. Advances in 
technology are placing complex aids at the disposal of commanders that increase the flow of 
information available to them. This places a premium on the ability of a commander to absorb a 
mass of information and to make rapid decisions…Organisations today are faced with a rapidly 
changing environment characterised by uncertainty, turbulence, complexity and unpredictability. 
Furthermore, the increased diversity of the workforce causes certain shifts in socio-cultural 
values. The [SA] DOD is no different, and in addition, faces variables like a shift in its role 
because of the absence of a military threat to the country, budgetary constraints, and the typical 
demands that a liberal democracy place on military forces”. 
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JWP4 (2-7) also acknowledges the fact that commanders are swamped with data that requires 
analysis and processing before it is useful to them.  No mention is made of the importance of 
knowledge and its management towards reducing this complexity – only information.  This is 
typical information era thinking and practice and possibly the result of construct dissonance.  
Successful, highly competitive organisations such as the USA military have adopted knowledge era 
thinking and practices to reduce their dependency on information in favour of knowledge in order to 
gain and sustain advantage. 
 
DODI26 (12) links data systems to enhanced organisational control.  Control is invariable a 
casualty in complex organisations and environments.  No mention is made of information- or 
knowledge systems.  One would expect that control is much closer associated with ‘knowing’ (i.e. 
knowledge) than being informed with only data.  This is a predicament resulting from construct 
dissonance and information era thinking.   
There are at least 42 different policy documents in the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 
policy and doctrine that make reference to databases and associated systems of various kinds.  This 
is a snapshot of the complexity of knowledge continuum artefacts currently available in these 
various repositories.  These databases are not static but expand day-by-day.  SA DOD policy also 
makes reference to knowledge-bases, which adds more layers to the complexity to what is known 
by the SA DOD.  This is just explicit knowledge and does not even begin to comprehend that vast 
amount of tacit knowledge that is available in the form of know-how, experience, skill, judgement, 
insight, etc.  Then there are the complex relationships internal to the SA DOD between various 
people and between various positions.  These are overlaid with external relationships with 
stakeholders and role-players.    
The SA DOD should thus be very interested in KM – because of the volumes of knowledge in 
existence and currently managed by the SA DOD with no KMC and KM policy and doctrine that 
ensures coherence and integration.  
6.2.2.2 Knowledge and Knowledge Management Drives Decision-making, Action, Effect and 
Advantage 
From discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation, it was found that decision-making, 
action, effect and advantage have strong dependencies on data, information and/or knowledge 
(amongst other things).  If this is the case, then the researcher proposes that knowledge-based 
decision-making, action, effect and advantage be primary objectives of SA DOD KM.  Several 
examples of linkages between information and decision-making, action and effect are present in the 
selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  There are even explicit examples of 
linkages to knowledge (e.g. intelligence and doctrine).  SANDFP2 (1) clearly links doctrine to 
action by stating the criticality of doctrine for operations.  JDP20 (3) states that both knowledge and 
thinking is important to take action.  DODI1 (1-12) and DODI1 (Chapter 4) ties corporate 
communication doctrine inextricably to action and effects.  These linkages are discussed in more 
detail below.   
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This symbiotic relationship should be understood within the context of the SA DOD 
definition for information to be inclusive of data and knowledge (be it correct or not).  A good 
example of this is provided by JDP9 (8) with support in DODI57 (2), linking information to 
decisions, actions and advantage, stating the following –  
“The [SA DOD] Information Strategy83 … endorses information as a strategic resource in 
support of the [SA DOD] business as it forms the basis for decision-making and effective 
management. It also emphasises the strategic importance that the resource "information" is 
managed over its total life cycle in an effective manner and standardised way in order to support 
the [SA DOD] in gaining a competitive advantage… In the [SA DOD] much of the information 
will be identified as a [SA DOD] record because it documents [SA DOD] activities or because of 
the value of the information it contains. Records are fundamental to policy formulation, decision-
making, business operations and organisational accountability [and thus by implication 
information, inclusive of data and knowledge]. The process of records management captures 
evidence of an organisation’s transactions, documents its activities and decisions and provides 
ready access to this evidence.”. 
There is almost nothing to be said further about this symbiotic relationship.  DODI1 (4-9) 
states, from a corporate communication perspective,  that it is paramount to understand that - “… 
doctrine is not policy, strategy, orders and instructions; it is the body … concepts, knowledge and 
beliefs that provide a common approach and way of thinking that informs the making of decisions 
and the development of policy, strategy, orders and instructions”.  This is also reiterated by JWP1 
(1-1 and 2) and JWP4 (1-2).  JWM1 (3-3) directly links command decisions to doctrine. JWP4 (4-2) 
states that - “Doctrine impacts on the conduct of the armed forces”.  This reinforces that fact that 
doctrine as capstone military knowledge and action is inextricably linked. This is an important 
statement because it links capstone military knowledge to other capstone military knowledge, to the 
way the organisation think (tacit knowledge) and subsequent decisions.  Policy and doctrine are the 
primary leadership instruments within the portfolio of knowledge continuum artefacts.  Leadership 
is about decisions, actions, effects and advantage, thus making knowledge a critical bonding agent 
between these constructs. 
JDP4 (D2-5) links those responsible for SA DOD decision-making to a distinct need for 
knowledge and information to do so.  There is a logical argument to be made for the need for 
information to make decisions, and not just knowledge.  Depending on the impact of decisions on 
(typically) issues of survivability, effectiveness, efficiency, economy, advantage, etc.; the decision-
maker will access either information or knowledge.  It will sometimes be a pure case of availability.  
Realistically and from a practical perspective, good intelligence, for example, is not always readily 
available.  Thus, decisions, actions, effects and advantage are very exposed to information and 
knowledge supply and demand cycles.  This is why the SA DOD should consider institutionalising 
KM and establishing a KMC to take control of the supply and demand of the SA DOD knowledge 
continuum. 
Not repeating the discussion above on performance information (IDODI2: 1 and 2); it is 
important for government and the SA DOD to apportion focus carefully between lagging indicators 
such as performance information and that of initiative and advantage drivers such as knowledge 
                                                 
83
 SA DOD Information Strategy Version 3.2 dated 18 January 2010. (DODI57: 2) 
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(e.g. intelligence, doctrine and IP).  The SA DOD’s focus should shift towards better performance, 
which requires knowledge to be recognised as strategic and managed accordingly.  JWP4 (4-3) 
states the importance of information in the OODA loop (Figure 6.4 and 2.14) – 
 “Attacking the Decision-making Process. A key characteristic of the conceptual component is 
the attacking of [Opposing Force] commander’s decision-making process. This is done by 
attempting to make decisions at a tempo that outpaces the ability of the adversary to react in time 
effectively (get inside [Opposing Force] decision-making cycle). The Boyd Cycle or OODA loop 
consists of the following parts, namely observation, orientation, decision and action.”. 
 
Figure 6.4: Boyd’s OODA Loop 
Source: JWP4 (4-3).  See also Figure 2.14 in the dissertation. 
What is missing from the OODA loop is the fact that at several points the information is 
processed by people and systems to facilitate understanding and to create new meaning (or 
knowledge).  It is this knowledge that should form the basis for decision and actions to create the 
desired effect and sustainable advantage.  Considering the discussion regarding the knowledge 
continuum, time component and granularity or density of knowledge (dissertation Chapters 2, and 6 
thus far), the researcher combined these elements graphically in Figures 6.9a and 6.9b to portray 
their interaction with constructs such as usefulness and advantage.   
The time-axis (vertical axis) in Figures 6.9a and 6.9b portrays the importance of the time-
value of information and knowledge is stressed by several policies and doctrine.  In other words, 
‘fresher’ information and/or knowledge is conducive to better decisions, ceteris paribus.  JDP4 (D3-
8), JWP7 (1-5) and JWP1 (1-7) stress the importance of “up-to-date information” within a 
decentralised command (or where mission command is of primary importance).  JDP4 (D3-5) states 
– “Timely decision-making and initiative at all levels are the keys to getting inside the enemy’s 
decision-making cycle”.  SANDFP3 (14-3) supports decision-making/intelligence dependencies as 
well as highlight the importance of the time-value of intelligence – 
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 “… real-time intelligence is required to formulate informed decisions for force employment 
activities. Defence Intelligence is to furnish advanced warnings of threats ensuring the timely 
update of the Military Strategy and subordinate strategies. This includes the ability to provide 
military insight in geo-strategic developments in Africa. Defence Intelligence must be equipped 
with strategic and operational collection sensors – inline [sic] with the Defence Act. Defence 
Intelligence must be enabled to provide integrated real/near real-time intelligence”.   
When the OODA loop is superimposed on this graphic, then it becomes clear that if the 
OODA loop is only based on data and information it will possibly short-circuit before advantage 
can be gained/sustained that is based on better understanding gained from denser context.  The link 
between the knowledge continuum (inclusive of intelligence and its cycle), the OODA loop and a 
time axis can be graphically displayed as follows - 
Figure 6.4a: Information-based OODA Loop Superimposed on a Three Axis Time-
Granularity-Knowledge Continuum Graphic 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
However, if the OODA loop is expanded to be inclusive of knowledge and its processes then 
a much denser context is developed that facilitate richer understanding and new meaning upon 
which to base decisions, actions, effect and advantage on.  JDP4 (9) states the following about the 
OODA loop effect – 
“Much of the art of command consists of a timely recognition of the circumstances and moments 
demanding a new decision. This is dependent on good judgement and initiative. The [SA DOD] 
approach to operations requires that the commander must aim to reach a timely decision in 
relation to an opponent’s own decision-making process. Implicit in this is the ability to know if a 
decision is required at that level of decision-making, and if it is, when it must be taken. The 
requirement is thus to make the appropriate decision at the right time. In some circumstances it 
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will be wise for a commander to delay a decision if he/she has insufficient information, or when 
he/she is dependent on other decisions yet to be made. However, fleeting opportunities should be 
grasped. [Figure 6.4b applies] Thus many tactical decisions, in particular, will have to be made 
on the basis on incomplete information. He/she who always waits for the latest available or 
“complete” information, is unlikely to act decisively or in good time” (Figure 6.4a applies). 
Thus, at the strategic operational and strategic level knowledge should be the basis for 
decisions, actions, effects and advantage.  At the tactical level and based on the scarcity of 
sometimes good intelligence, decisions, actions, effects and advantage it should, more than often, be 
based on information.  Figure 6.4b below is relevant for operational and strategic scenarios -  
 
Figure 6.4b: Information- and Knowledge-based OODA Loop Superimposed on a Three 
Axis Time-Granularity-Knowledge Continuum Graphic 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM. 
This decision-making cycle is dependent on both information and knowledge (e.g. 
intelligence) – but probably optimised best with a complete and real or near real-time intelligence 
picture.  A coherent and integrated SA DOD KMC employing KM (and processes such as the 
intelligence cycle) is critical to achieving this.  When considering the importance of knowledge to 
gain an advantage; JWP1 (1-6 and 7) states the following within the context of corporate 
communications but relevant in general – 
“The Information Domain, in which information is seen as the essential factor in making 
decisions and as a critical war-winning factor. In this domain, one finds two distinct aspects, 
namely [IW] and information in war. Information in war, with which Corp Com is associated, 
concerns using information to make better decisions. Modern information systems and 
infrastructure have contributed to more effective use of information, which in turn contributes to 
the achievement of an operation’s objectives by allowing rapid exploitation of opportunities. In 
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addition to elements commonly associated with information in war, such as [C
4
I
3
RS] systems,
Corp Com contributes in its own way to situational awareness, shaping the battle space by 
affecting public support and reinforcing morale.”. 
Knowledge is thé ‘war-winning factor’, i.e. the use of superior policy, doctrine and 
intelligence to dominate the adversaries of the OODA loop (illustrated by Figure 6.4b above).  Data 
and information provides building blocks (who, what, why, where, when, how, which effects and 
what thereafter) required for processing to generate capstone military knowledge that will shape the 
battlefield, ensure precise effects and assure the winning edge. 
Amongst other fundamentals, SANDFP3 (4-3) states that - “No operations can take place 
without intelligence at all levels of warfare. The ability to collect, integrate and disseminate real 
time [sic] data, information and intelligence in the decision-making process is essential”. This 
paragraph states the SA DOD’s understanding clearly with regard to the linkages between the 
constructs and decision-making and underlines the importance of what is graphically depicted in 
Figure 6.4b.  JWP8 (5-23) states clear links between intelligence, decisions and actions within the 
context of the capabilities provided by Special Forces - 
“[Special Forces] can provide timely information to political and military decision-makers and 
commanders. This contributes to the overall intelligence picture and may provide collateral for 
information from other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, be used to cue 
such systems to confirm technical intelligence or to trigger interdiction [or action].”. 
It would be problematic if the decisions were based on information (only in tactical situations 
as described above).  However, the statement implies further processing in the second sentence to 
compile an intelligence picture and to base possible action on.   The role of SA DOD Special Forces 
is (amongst a host of other incredibly interesting things) to collect information and/or intelligence 
that would improve or complete ‘the overall intelligence picture’ or situational awareness or early 
warning and thus enhance decision-making, action, effect and advantage.  This notion is also found 
in JWP1 (5-4) stating DI is a “… rich source of valuable information for Corp Com planning, 
particularly in terms of preparation for an operation or activity.”.  The notion that intelligence 
systems provide information is half the truth.  Intelligence systems are there to provide both 
information and intelligence, depending on the type of system.  JWP4 (5-10) defines early warning 
as follows –  
“Adequate warning of an impending crisis is crucial. By adequate is meant sufficient information 
to provide political and military strategic decision makers with the necessary background and 
time to consider appropriate options. These options include both the possibility of early positive 
engagement leading to rapid effect, and that of avoiding inappropriate embroilment in a crisis. 
Links into the intelligence community and the ability to monitor situations around the world are 
paramount. The aim is to avoid being caught unawares, although, by their nature, crises are 
unpredictable.”.   
Early warning is a time-dependent construct as depicted in the time-axis of Figures 6.9a and 
6.9b above and will in some cases be based on information.  However, the statement above does not 
imply that decisions, action and effect should be based on it.  If the military intelligence system 
functions, early warning will be based on intelligence which would enable decision-makers to use 
optimised actions for accurate effects and sustained advantage.  Additionally, the notion that 
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political and military strategic decisions should be based on information is probably less than 
favourable.  This opinion was also expressed by the researcher of the dissertation earlier in this 
chapter.  If intelligence is not available to decision-makers at all levels of the organisation then 
there is a good reason to consider establishing a KMC that will focus on the KM leadership 
philosophy proposed by this dissertation – the art of knowing and the science of managing that 
knowledge to obtain and sustain advantage. 
Figure 6.5: Leadership Philosophies 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
JWP1 (1-8) states that all SA DOD corporate communication activities - “… should be based 
on scientifically authenticated principles [or knowledge] and information”.   These principles will 
typically be articulated in policy and doctrine, which is capstone military knowledge.  This provides 
a clear link between knowledge and action. 
As with the DR 2015, JDP4 (3-12, 15 and 16) states that mission command is SA DOD 
doctrine.  Mission command is a type of leadership philosophy and approach to decision-making, 
control and action as defined earlier in the dissertation from a USA military perspective.   
Therefore, doctrine is very important for decision-making and action.  JDP4 (D3-2) links 
doctrine to the ability of the commander to exercise control. JWP8 (5-10) states the following about 
mission command and information - 
“Mission command negates the requirement for all but essential information to be passed up and 
down the chain of command so allowing appropriate decisions to be made rapidly in the 
confusion and uncertainty of land operations. During operations local commanders may have to 
use their initiative and might even break both the chain and states of command to ensure timely 
and effective action in unexpected circumstances. Their only guidance will be their training, 
experience and understanding of what they think their superior wants”.  
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Doctrine is thus inextricably linked to decisions, action and effects and if executed correctly 
will assist in gaining an advantage. The proposed KM leadership philosophy is based on mission 
command as a philosophy as was discussed earlier in the dissertation.  Thus, the proposed KM 
philosophy is linked to optimised decisions, actions, effects and gaining and sustaining advantage.  
This is exactly why the SA DOD should be interested in a KMC and KM. 
JWP8 (5-15) states that helicopters during PSO provide both information and data that are 
critical from a reconnaissance perspective in order to facilitate command decisions and action.  
JWP8 (3A-25) links intelligence to the assessment of effects to be achieved by PSOs.  Such 
assessments are critical for command decisions and action in order to respond to the changing 
conflict or humanitarian situation.  It speaks to situational awareness and its links with decisions, 
action and effects. 
DODERF1 (2-2 and 4-11) identifies a number of thematic risks facing the SA DOD of which 
knowledge risk is one and that the management of these risks must be integrated into the various 
levels of decision-making (i.e. strategic, operational and tactical).  Without knowledge decision-
making and subsequent actions and effects, as have been discussed thus far, becomes less than 
optimised.  Knowledge risk identification and mitigation should thus be a primary task for a 
proposed SA DOD KMC, integrating the various knowledge risks stemming from the various SA 
DOD functional components into a single risk reduction strategy.  This is what the art of knowing 
and the science of managing that knowledge to obtain and sustain advantage are about. 
DODISPF1 (17-18) states (amongst others) that integrated defence intelligence and 
information form part of SA DOD requirements for action.  That action typically stems from 
InfoOps, IW and IntOps as have been discussed thus far. 
JWP8 (4C-4 to 5) and JWP1 (5-2) define InfoOps and IW at the conceptual level (as 
discussed in detail earlier in the chapter), directly linking its action with specific effects such as 
destroy and neutralise.   When the pillars of IW, mentioned earlier in this chapter, are integrated 
they provide various knowledge continuum artefacts used for decision-making, action, effect and 
advantage.  As stated earlier, these should probably be integrated into KW.  However, because of 
the dissonance existing about the differences between information and knowledge, policy and 
doctrine will remain for years to come.  Establishing an SA DOD KMC and associated KM policy 
and doctrine will accelerate the process of understanding a construct such as KW and its utility. 
JWP1 (5-2) defines InfoOps and IW as quoted and discussed in section 6.2.2.8 of the 
dissertation earlier. The definition of PsyOps, as a knowledge-related operation within IW, not 
described yet, provides further clear linkages between decisions, actions, effects and advantage as 
follows -   
“PsyOps are planned [decision] psychological activities in peace and war [actions] directed at 
enemy and neutral audiences, create attitudes and behaviour favourable [effects] to the 
achievement of political and military objectives [advantage]. These operations include 
psychological action that encompasses those political, military and economic ideological and 
intelligence activities [action] designed to achieve a desired psychological effect [effect].” 
(JWP1, 9-8). 
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Other supporting evidence that link knowledge to decisions, action, effects and advantage are 
in JWP8 (DEF-11) “Action taken, normally based upon intelligence, in anticipation of a possible 
situation arising, in order to stop it from occurring now or at any stage in the future.”.  Also, 
SANDFP3 (2-17) identifies “intelligence driven [sic] operations” to be directly linking intelligence 
to action.  These operations will, invariably, have a specific effect in mind and will be linked to 
capturing advantage.   
SANDFP2 (A-9) states that “Joint Operational enablers, such as operational intelligence, 
[InfoOps], force protection, etc. are vital for shaping the joint environment.”.  Shaping the 
environment has to do with effects achieved, based on the availability of intelligence and other 
operational decisions, actions and effects.  If done correctly, the shape of the environment will be to 
your advantage.   
These definitions and discussions above clearly link knowledge continuum artefacts and 
associated operational and warfare concepts to decisions, action, effects and advantage at the 
tactical, operational and strategic levels.  The complexity of the C2 and technology relationships 
and networks between these constructs should motivate the SA DOD to optimise their output.  This 
could be done under the umbrella construct of KW as have already been proposed by the researcher 
of the dissertation.  This will require the SA DOD to become interested in knowledge era constructs 
such as KM.   
From the discussion above on the various elements of IW and possible KW, the researcher of 
the dissertation proposes the following graphic representation of these concepts to illustrate the 
complexity thereof and their relationship with effect - as follows: 
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Figure 6.6: Complex Relationship between Information Warfare, Knowledge Warfare and 
Effects 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
SANDFO3 (1) states the critical requirement for information transmission within the context 
of frequency spectrum management.  It states – 
“One of the SANDF challenges in the execution of its missions is the ability to exchange 
information between decision-makers from the strategic level down to the tactical levels of 
command and management. This requirement for the exchange of information at all levels of 
command and management means that the SANDF must have sufficient dedicated frequencies 
for use over the SANDF Information and Communications Systems, to enable command and 
control in the execution of SANDF authorised missions”.  
Linked to the problem of information overload; JWP4 (5-10 and 11) states the following 
about management information –  
“The management of information presents a wide range of difficulties. The essential problem is 
that of quantity and the selective dissemination of that which is relevant to conducting effective 
operations and to managing crises. The crisis management authority has to cope with large 
amounts of information by selecting that which is important and ignoring that which is not. 
Analysis of information planning is an important step in the planning process, which needs to be 
completed for any crisis likely to lead to involvement by the armed forces.”.   
DODI22 (5) states the following about the SA DOD management information capability - “… 
management information capability (data warehouse) utilises the data of the organisation life cycle 
systems as their backbone (reference source) to structure management information reports for 
decision-making by top management.”. This confirms that information is the foundation for 
decision-making in the SA DOD. 
From the discussion about management information (the volume, distribution, relevance, 
priorities, analysis, etc.) it is clear that the SA DOD uses information to base decisions on.  Within 
the context of construct dissonance already described, management information probably also 
contains data and knowledge, which provide a glimmer of interest in knowledge.   
Highlighted by these statements is the criticality of information sharing as linked to 
bandwidth for decision-making at all levels of the SA DOD and IT an important enabler to 
accomplish it.  This will have the same impact on knowledge sharing.  Although, there is generally 
not an overload of knowledge so the sharing should be less cumbersome and have a lesser 
requirement for bandwidth from an IT perspective.  This illustrates the problem when decisions and 
actions are based on information.  The sharing of information becomes problematic when the 
system is overloaded.  A KMC should be designed to reduce these masses of data and information 
to decision quality knowledge.  This is why the SA DOD should become interested in a KMC. 
Taking the discussion further regarding IT as an enabler to knowledge sharing, SANDFP3 
(10-3) states with regard to C2 that – “The technological focus should be to provide the force with 
an integrated, real-time digital information and communication system that will ensure decision 
superiority in operations and peacetime activities”.  There is again recognition of the value of quick 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 263 
 
communication to facilitate ‘fresh information’.  These issues have been addressed in discussions 
earlier in this chapter.  On another tack, information technology might enable information and 
knowledge flow but it will not provide decision superiority.  Decision superiority is dependent on a 
complex mixture of cognitive processes and knowledge.  To integrate these complex processes and 
the available knowledge continuum artefacts will require a coherent and integrated SA DOD KMC. 
JDP16 (A-3) links knowledge directly to action within the context of competence.  From the 
literature review, this is one of the primary reasons why organisations acquire, generate and manage 
knowledge – i.e. to enable action.  JWP4 (2-21) defines indirect action as – “… denying to an 
opponent the availability of key resources or capabilities that he requires to pursue the interests or 
objectives causing the conflict or potential conflict. Included are information resources and human 
and physical resources. Indirect action can be used by a nation, a coalition or, more generally, by 
the United Nations or even the African Union.”.  The knowledge continuum is thus recognised to be 
linked to all forms of action. 
JDP9 endorses information as the driver for decision-making and gaining competitive 
advantage – not knowledge.  This is contrary to the discussions and findings of Chapters 2 and 3 of 
the dissertation but is probably based on the SA DOD policy position that information includes all 
data and knowledge.  This of course directly links knowledge to decision-making and advantage. 
The writer of JDP9 alludes to a ‘knowledge-based’ system that is fed with the information 
that is critical to decision-making, policy formulation and business operations.    No mention is 
made of such a system anywhere else in policy.  Information management is distinctly linked to 
corporate memory.  If corporate memory becomes corrupt, unstable or extinct advantage will 
certainly be lost.  JDP9 (8) states that records management is a subset of IM.  As such the following 
is stated –  
“In the [SA DOD] much of the information will be identified as a [SA DOD] record because it 
documents [SA DOD] activities or because of the value of the information it contains. Records 
are fundamental to policy formulation, decision-making, business operations and organisational 
accountability.”. 
Thus, although not explicitly said, and severely hampered by construct dissonance, IM is an 
important enabler to a proposed KMC.  In order for the SA DOD to manage these disparate 
approaches the knowledge continuum, serious consideration should be afforded to the establishment 
of an SA DOD KMC practising coherent and integrated KM. 
6.2.2.3 The Importance of the SA DOD Capstone Military Knowledge Portfolio  
The SA DOD manages several types of capstone military knowledge as were discussed thus 
far in the dissertation.  This fact contributes significantly to the requirement for a coherent and 
integrated SA DOD KMC because of the complexity of integrating the SA DOD knowledge 
continuum in order to reduce complexity through information overload mitigation, enhance mission 
command and other military operational constructs and in general facilitate the continuous creation 
of new meaning and understanding that provide insight to decision-making and operations.  This is 
the collateral that a proposed SA DOD KMC would provide. 
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Knowledge management is encouraged because of the strategic nature of knowledge and 
being fundamental for decisions, action, effect and advantage.  The categories and types of 
knowledge identified in the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine will be 
discussed in greater detail in section 6.2.4. of the chapter. The following paragraphs provide quotes 
from the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine in support of the importance of 
various capstone military knowledge that the SA DOD owns and manages.   
There are much policy and doctrinal support for the importance of intelligence to the SA 
DOD.  JDP4 (D3-10) states that intelligence is a principle of war and this refers to ‘knowing’ and 
the capabilities that assure this.  The ‘art of knowing’ as proposed by this dissertation as KM 
leadership philosophy is thus eloquently aligned with this principle of war.   
Principles of war are those principles that when resourced and applied correctly assure 
advantage.  JWP4 (3-2) states the following about the value of intelligence –:  
“Information and Intelligence. From the earliest generals grasped the importance of having good 
intelligence and denying it to the opponent. Not only is intelligence required to obtain the best 
results in war, but also good planning to deny the opponent intelligence by deception, surprise 
and well thought out stratagems, are essential”.   
Although information and intelligence are grouped together in the heading to the quoted 
paragraph above, information is not mentioned any further, and correctly so.  This is supported by 
JWP1 (1-7) stating that knowledge is a distinct requirement to obtain and maintain the initiative 
(initiative being perceived as a form of advantage).  The importance of intelligence is further 
explained by JWP4 (3-7) stating that – “The continuous provision of in-time and real-time 
intelligence is a fundamental and indispensable requirement for the conducting of warfare”.  
SANDFP3 (4-3) states that – “No operations can take place without intelligence at all levels of 
warfare. The ability to collect, integrate and disseminate real time [sic] data, information and 
intelligence in the decision-making process is essential [OODA loop].”.  Intelligence is the driver of 
advantage and is thus regarded as strategic to the SA DOD survival and winning edge.  Note that 
these statements make continuous reference to the time value of intelligence, an aspect included in 
Figures 6.9a and 6.9b and fundamental to the OODA loop, effects and advantage. 
Capstone military knowledge in the form of intelligence is strongly linked to ‘early warning’ 
(JWP4: 5-10).  Early warning depends inextricably on the domination of the OODA loop (as 
discussed above).  These constructs fuel initiative or advantage.  JWP8 (6-6 and DEF-3) defines 
early warning as – “… process of collection, verifying and analysing information and 
communicating the results to decision makers”.  An early warning will in some cases be based on 
information.  However, if the military intelligence system functions, early warning will be based on 
intelligence which would enable decision-makers to use optimised action for accurate effects and 
sustained advantage.   
DODI31 (2, 7, 11) states that chemical, biological and radioactive defence is based on 
intelligence (amongst other things) in order to have early warning.  JWP8 (4-8) also discusses the 
directing of intelligence resources and thus the production of intelligence in order to facilitate early 
warning.  JWP8 (4-11) states - “… military intelligence will meet a vital early warning requirement 
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in monitoring and reporting those aspects that may destabilise or escalate the overall security 
situation”.  
JWP8 (4-10) describes two intelligence processes within the context of IntOps, stating its 
importance in terms of the responsibility within a peace mission to provide situational awareness –  
“… geopolitical and economic assessments and therefore cover the full spectrum of intelligence 
support and not just military intelligence. The SANDF [DI] will take a role in fulfilling this need. 
The flow of information to and from the JOA must thus be guaranteed and provided to ensure 
comprehensive situational awareness by the decision makers within the mission area and RSA.”. 
The quote above differentiates between ‘full spectrum’ intelligence (JWP8: 4-11 – label this 
strategic intelligence) and military intelligence, thus alluding to a much wider intelligence 
capability, underlining the importance of intelligence for situational awareness at national or 
departmental level.  This requires a proposed SA DOD KMC to recognise the dependencies on 
other RSA government departments for data, information and knowledge.  As such, structures 
within the intelligence community is the South African National Intelligence Coordinating 
Committee and National Intelligence Agency, South African Secret Service, South African Policy 
and Department of Health (SANDFP3: 2-19 and 6-4) are relevant stakeholders. It supports the call 
for coherent and integrated SA DOD KMC to manage knowledge across organisational boundaries. 
DODI46 (1) states that data is a change driver for the construction of maps and mapping process – 
 “The world of maps and mapping has undergone profound changes as a result of developments 
in data gathering and processing technology. While hardcopy maps still have an important role to 
play in everyday life, most disciplines, particularly the military, increasingly rely on the 
collaborative analysis of data from a variety of data sources and databases. The emphasis is on 
adding value through the extraction and fusion of data relevant to a specific purpose. In the 
military environment geospatial data is extensively used in electronic format, embedded into 
weapon systems. Aerial imagery is a critical component of the overall system, but must be seen 
in that context, rather than as a separate means of information collection.”. 
These perspectives on imagery underline the requirement for coherence and integration of the 
SA DOD knowledge continuum.  This integration should not only be internal but also with 
stakeholders from other government departments and business (where applicable) and in the 
national interest.   DODI46 (1) states the importance of imagery as a form of intelligence - 
“Aerial photography or imagery is important for both civilian and military purposes. … The 
military use [sic] it for specialised purposes such as imagery intelligence, operational planning 
and target acquisition. … Such imagery is part of a greater system of information collection and 
intelligence production” 
Military intelligence in the form of imagery not only supports military operations but also 
those of certain civilian endeavours (possibly in the domains of agriculture, policing, 
communications, etc.).  Intelligence as capstone military knowledge thus has cross-departmental 
value and importance.    Intelligence is thus a fundamental component of the SA DOD knowledge 
portfolio, underlining its criticality to obtain accurate effects and sustained advantage. 
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JWP8 (1-12) states that intelligence is critical to any peace mission and therefore PSOs.  JWP 
(3A-7) states the importance of intelligence in the determination of an operational culmination 
point.  An operation has culminated when the operational advantage has been lost or where the 
operation can only be maintained (in other words, stalemate).  Therefore, intelligence can provide 
the tipping point to gain advantage and win.  For militaries, the gaining or having the initiative is a 
principle of war and a prerequisite for enhanced decision-making, action, effects and advantage. 
Capstone military knowledge (in particular intelligence) is thus regarded as the driver of advantage 
due to the fact that it creates new meaning and facilitates understanding -  as reflected in the 
proposed definition of knowledge and KM for the dissertation. 
Knowledge as a resource is stated as important to the SA DOD.  Knowledge is a pre-requisite 
to SA DOD fighting power (JWP4: 4-3).  Fighting power within this context is probably asset based 
not action-based.  However, the potential of the asset (fighting power) to support certain actions and 
gain certain effects is linked to the knowledge on how to apply (the commander's imagination and 
intuitive abilities) fighting power.  Knowledge is thus important from several perspectives; as an 
asset to augment capability as well as the knowledge to apply the military capability.   
A number of resources that are required to be considered when policy is crafted are identified 
by DODI53 (10, 12 and A-3).  Information is one such resource mentioned.  No explicit mention is 
made of knowledge (doctrine, intelligence, IP and other SA DOD policy).   Expanding on the 
opinions raised in DODI53, DODSPF1 (15) provides a graphic of the SA DOD strategy map that 
illustrates which resources are to be managed (see Figure 23: SA DOD Strategy Map as used earlier 
in the chapter).  The strategy map states that information, intelligence (also in DODSPF1: 17-18), 
matériel and people are considered resources.  These resources are linked to action - “…what we 
use to do our work” (DODSPF1: 17).  From a knowledge perspective, this would then include 
defence matériel related IP and tacit knowledge inherent in people. No explicit mention is made of 
doctrine and SA DOD policy as resources.  Mention is made of doctrine that needs renewal in the 
‘building for the future’ line of the SA DOD Strategy Map.  This implies that doctrine should be in 
existence and be regarded as a valuable resource – though not mentioned specifically as such.  
Considering that specific knowledge is identified by the SA DOD Strategy Map (in contrast to not 
any physical capability mentioned), it can be stated without doubt that knowledge is regarded as 
strategically important to the SA DOD.  It would be very reasonable to expect the SA DOD to be 
interested in a coherent and integrated KMC. 
DODI54 is one of several SA DOD Level 1 policies that makes mention of resource system 
owners of resources such as finance, HR, logistics, matériel and information (DODI54: 4). 
Although capstone knowledge is implicit in most of these, none of them is explicitly stated as 
resources. It might be because of the notion that military knowledge forms part of the construct of 
information as per the definition of information.  This makes it difficult for the SA DOD to 
understand the importance of the portfolio of military knowledge owned by the SA DOD and the 
requirements for coherent and integrated KM.  This possibly also feeds the perception that the SA 
DOD is not interested in KM, contracting the SA DOD Strategy Map discussion above that makes it 
clear that this is a requirement. 
Knowledge is important to communication in the SA DOD.  JWP1 (2-2) states that pre-
planning of corporate communication operations should be based on a knowledge-base.  JWP1 (3-
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3) states that a critical success factor for internal communication is messages that are based on 
knowledge. JWP8 (4C-2) states knowledge is a pre-requisite for pro-active communication.  Thus, 
knowledge and knowledge-bases are important to the SA DOD from a communication perspective.  
Thus, knowledge is an important SA DOD resource for fundamental functions and military 
constructs of the SA DOD such as early warning, situational awareness, initiative, advantage, 
communication, firepower, etc.  For the dividends and advantages stemming from the SA DOD 
knowledge continuum to be maximised, it requires coherence and integration. 
6.2.2.4 Integration and Coherence  
Without endeavouring to repeat what has already been articulated about coherence and 
integration; throughout Chapters 5 and 6 there are supporting arguments for coherence and 
integration of the SA DOD knowledge continuum, typically based on the complexity of the 
environment resulting in information/knowledge overload. “The essential problem is that of 
quantity and the selective dissemination of that which is relevant to conducting effective operations 
and to managing crises.”. (JWP4: 5-10 and 11), summarises the predicament.  Other issues 
contributing to complexity that results in requirements for integration are the continuous changing 
security environment and defence requirements, interaction between the SA DOD and international 
partners during operations and in defence diplomacy, between the SA DOD and other departments 
and local stakeholders and role-players, requirements for jointness in military operations, the 
divergent and fragmented SA DOD knowledge portfolio, the existence of paralysing construct 
dissonance within SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine, the linkages between knowledge, 
decisions, actions, effects and advantage, etc.  These are reasons for the SA DOD to strongly 
consider the establishment of a KMC.  
6.2.2.5 Risk Management 
DODI42 (2, A-5, C2-2) states about risk within the context of risk management and more 
specifically about uncertainty – “Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information 
related to, understanding or knowledge of an event, its consequence, or likelihood.”.    The quotes 
use knowledge within the context of understanding or know-how, alluding to the fact that 
uncertainty is a result of a lack of knowledge/understanding of a particular event and its 
consequences. There is also some construct dissonance evident.  These constructs are recognised 
within the same context by academia.  Thus, KM should have a profound impact on the mitigation 
of uncertainty for the decision-makers.  
DODI42 (A-8) states that stakeholder requirements and issues, as well as knowledge, drives 
risk perception.  This sentence supports the relationship between knowledge and understanding that 
allows perceptions or meaning to be formed.  Knowledge is thus important within organisations in 
order to manage risk and the perception of risk.  If knowledge is not intentionally managed then 
organisations will probably attempt risk management that is based on information, which is risky in 
itself.  To mitigate risk based on an incomplete picture or half-truth is equal to mitigating 
uncertainty with uncertainty.   This said, the SA DOD is concentrating on the importance of IM to 
risk management.  DODERMF1 (B-5) states that IM is a requirement for SA DOD risk 
management. DODI29 (A-1) states that information is important in the process of risk analysis. 
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DODERMF1 (B-5) states that the SA DOD must include IM in its estimate of organisational risk 
appetite and tolerance guidelines.  
DODI42 (6) states – “Appropriate resources (human, financial, equipment, facilities and 
information technology) shall be assigned to the management of risks in such a way as to optimise 
value for money and respond to risks within acceptable norms, standards and boundaries.”. DODI42 
(A-6) states that risk analysis is the - “Systematic use of information to identify sources and to 
estimate the risk”.  Also, “Information can include historical data, theoretical analysis, informed 
opinions, and the concerns of stakeholders”.   Uncertainty is a constant for the SA DOD due to the 
complexity of the environment.  It is thus paramount for the SA DOD and to the entire knowledge 
continuum to minimise uncertainty and risk, making a coherent and integrated SA DOD KMC of 
paramount importance.  
6.2.3 Knowledge Continuum Artefacts that should be managed by the SA DOD? 
Thus far all indications are that the SA DOD should seriously consider the establishment of a 
KMC based on SA DOD KM policy and doctrine to ensure coherent and integrated KM in the 
national interest.  In order to draft future KM policy and doctrine the dissertation proposes 
definitions for knowledge and KM, a KM leadership philosophy and clear guidance on some of the 
leading indicators from literature and documents analysis promoting the adoption of the knowledge 
era and its associated constructs and practices which is important to SA DOD decision-making, 
actions, effects and advantage.   
In order to provide structure within the extant SA DOD knowledge typology, the typology is 
divided into categories and types (or subject fields) of SA DOD knowledge.  In order to establish an 
SA DOD KMC and coherent and integrated KM, the SA DOD must understand what categories and 
types of knowledge will require managing as part of the SA DOD knowledge typology.  Without 
restating what has been said about possible categories of SA DOD knowledge by the dissertation 
thus far; the SA DOD manages capstone military knowledge such as policy, doctrine, intelligence 
and IP.  This is also consistent with the findings of Chapter 4 of the dissertation.   
Within these categories of capstone military knowledge, there are several types of knowledge 
or subject fields.  A more detailed discussion from an SA DOD perspective follows, based on 
analysis of the selected sample SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  Due to much construct 
dissonance (as discussed throughout Chapters 5 and 6 of the dissertation), the researcher lists all the 
relevant constructs and types identified in the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine to get a holistic view of the scope of the SA DOD knowledge continuum to be managed by 
a proposed KMC.  Due to the fact that SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine mostly regard data and 
knowledge as part of information, the discussion is supplemented with a discussion of SA DOD 
data and information portfolio.  It is also assumed that the existence of certain types of data and 
information presuppose knowledge on these.  This provides the reader with a detailed view of the 
extent of the SA DOD knowledge continuum to be managed – just from the selected sample of SA 
DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.   
Table 6.4 at the end of this section provides an overview of the categories and types (subject 
fields) of different data, information and knowledge identified from the selected sample of SA DOD 
Level 1 policy and doctrine using the search criteria explained in the research methodology 
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(dissertation Chapter 4).  The list (tables 6.4) is certain to expand considerably if all SA DOD 
policy and doctrine are considered.  This is, however, outside the scope of this dissertation based on 
the research criteria set in chapter 4 of this dissertation.  It does, however, highlight the requirement 
for research mapping the entire SA DOD knowledge continuum; possibly within the context of the 
IC framework.  Such research will also provide valuable insight as to the readiness of the SA DOD 
for KM.  The following two sections provide clarity about the significant amount of data, 
information and knowledge inherent in the SA DOD knowledge continuum and currently being 
managed by the SA DOD.     
6.2.3.1 Typology: Categories of SA DOD Knowledge 
The construct of wisdom is used in connection with the description of work (JDP13) and 
mentorship (JDP4).  In another policy document, wisdom and doctrine are placed in perspective - 
“The development of sound doctrine is, therefore, as much to do with challenging received wisdom 
as it is codifying established practice” (JWP4: 3-1)  This expresses recognition for the presence of 
wisdom and tacit knowledge when doctrine is crafted.  Wisdom is thus included in the proposed SA 
DOD knowledge continuum.  It is included in human capital as part of the IC construct.  This 
requires an integrated approach to SA DOD KM in order to transform wisdom into explicit 
knowledge artefacts that would greatly enhance the SA DOD’s prospects of achieving advantage.  
Integration is required because of the illusiveness of wisdom.  Let us now discuss knowledge 
categories. 
DODI14 makes a distinction between knowledge and experience (DODI14: 3). DODI14 (4), 
JDP14 (4-5), JDP15 (A-2).  JDP20 (3) links levels or types of competence to knowledge as well as 
separating knowledge and skills in the following statement – 
 “Foundational competence is the understanding of what the candidates are doing and why they 
are doing it, in other words what theoretical knowledge they have… Reflexive competence is the 
candidates’ ability to integrate or connect their knowledge and skills so that they learn from their 
actions and are able to adapt to changes and unforeseen circumstances. … Applied competence 
is how the candidates put their knowledge into practice. Applied competence is the overarching 
term for foundational, practical and reflexive competence.”.   
From Appendix A to the study of Holliday and Chandler (1986) in Kakabadse, et al. (2003: 
80) knowledge is associated with competence.  Thus, there is a requirement for coherent and 
integrated SA DOD KM because of the dispersed nature of knowledge in the SA DOD in terms of 
human capital, structural capital and relational capital.    
DODI1 (1A-12) identifies the requirement for SA DOD corporate communicators to have - 
“… knowledge of policies, regulations, procedures, channels of C2, as well as those factors both 
internally and externally that affect them.”.  This corresponds to SA DOD structural IC.  SANDFP3 
(14-3) calls for the use of innovative measures to be used to - “…develop and maintain the 
knowledge base [sic] for both matériel and doctrine”.  The wording does not pre-suppose an 
information-base or database.  Over and above the functional knowledge relating to SA DOD 
matériel acquisition and management, a primary knowledge artefact stemming from the application 
of this type of structural knowledge is IP.  Both doctrine and IP are regarded as capstone military 
knowledge because of their distinct influence on SA DOD advantage.   
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DODI26 (10) describes what is meant by “business knowledge”.  It is essentially the answers 
to the questions who should know and act, what should be done, when it should ideally be done and 
when should the effects be visible, where it should be done and ultimately where should the effects 
be felt, why the actions are important, and how should the actions be carried out to optimise the 
effects.  This policy statement has important parallels with the rhyme (‘who-what-where-when-
how-which effects-what thereafter’) as described throughout the dissertation in terms of granularity 
(see Figures 6.9a and 6.9b).  Each element builds towards actionable pieces of knowledge about the 
past, current and future, enabling decisions, actions, effects and advantage.  Thus, each fragment 
(data) provides increasing context, which as a whole, is considered knowledge.  So knowledge at 
the corporate (or business level) of the SA DOD is not different from knowledge in military 
operations.  Just the context and content varies. 
DODI28 (A-2) provides a definition that links the construct of technology to a combination of 
elements, including knowledge. JDP4 (D3-3) states that doctrine, technology and people are 
interdependent.  This is consistent with the view from the literature review of the dissertation that 
knowledge is linked to technology and people.  JDP4 (D3-3) also clearly separates the constructs of 
knowledge, expertise, process and techniques in the definition of technology - “Technology. Any 
knowledge, expertise, process or technique which is developed, collected and used to create, use or 
maintain products and services to achieve a set goal. (RSA-Mil-Std 4: Acquisition Glossary).”.   
These constructs are all considered to be knowledge by the USA DOD (see discussion in 
dissertation Chapter 3).  As previously stated in this chapter, it is not clear whether the SA DOD 
regards the construct of knowledge to be similar or inclusive.  What is certain though is the fact that 
technology includes much knowledge continuum artefacts as stated by JDP4 above.  What is 
problematic is when technology is regarded solely as knowledge and knowledge solely as 
technology.  Figure 6.7 graphically articulating the components proposed to be part of the 
technology construct. 
SANDFP3 (10-1) describes technology as involving - “… the use and application of 
knowledge (e.g. scientific, engineering, mathematical, language and historical), both formally and 
informally, to achieve some “practical” result”, as well as - “Technology can also be defined as any 
knowledge, process or technique which, when used, will increase effectiveness to achieve a specific 
goal.”.   DODI23 guides the management of SA DOD IA and in particular refers to a defence 
technology knowledge-base (DODI23: 26).  Research is undertaken by the SA DOD within the 
context of technology development to - “… gaining new scientific or technical knowledge and 
understanding” (DODI23: 38).   
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Figure 6.7: Technology Components Triangle 
Source: SANDFP3 (10-2).   
DODI40 (21) states the following about technology acquisition by the SA DOD, echoing the 
requirement stated by DODI23: 38 –  
 “During [technology acquisition], technologies that will support the future needs of the SANDF 
weapon systems, are identified on a long-term prediction basis. Technology management is 
regarded as the activity of strategic planning, operational research, basic technology research 
(with no aim and not based on any existing knowledge), applied technology research (with 
specific aim and not based on existing knowledge), and experimental technology development 
(with specific aim and based on an existing knowledge base [sic]). The DOD technology 
acquisition is presently focussed on applied research and experimental development.”. 
This indicates the SA DOD’s requirement for understanding the current technology and future 
technologies.  “The technology focus should be on technologies essential to establish and maintain 
the Military Strategic Capabilities required to execute the Military Strategic Missions.” (SANDFP3: 
14-2 and 14-3).  SANDFP3 (10-3) states a clear link between technology and - “Battle-space 
Effects”. This is based on the Technology Triangle in Figure 6.7.   
DODI23 (44) separates technology and knowledge as constructs. From the SA DOD’s 
perspective and that of the researcher’s, technology certainly embodies knowledge but does not 
consist solely of knowledge.  These issues require robust definition within the SA DOD policy 
framework to avoid construct dissonance.  When this is achieved the SA DOD might recognise the 
requirement for more policy and/or different policy.  An SA DOD KMC will certainly provide 
coherence and integration to such initiatives. 
What is potentially missing from Figure 6.7 above is the importance of relationships between 
people and between organisations in the form of relational capital.  Science, engineering and 
technology thrive on clustered relationships that allow for knowledge sharing.  Relationships and/or 
collaboration should be fitted between ‘people’ and science/knowledge’ on the red side, above and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 272 
 
below ‘know why’.  Another thing that is problematic is the ‘or’ sign (/) between science and 
knowledge.  Science is knowledge and knowledge stems more than often from science (even more 
so within the context of technology).  Another construct missing at the top of the triangle is 
‘engineering’.  The DR 2015 labels the capability to be established under the leadership of the Chief 
Defence Scientist as Defence Science, Engineering and Technology; the output of which is 
knowledge.  All of this said, the SA DOD has a vast portfolio of science, engineering and 
technology knowledge, tacit and as knowledge artefacts, managed by its personnel and by 
stakeholders.  Without coherence and integration with SA DOD structural capital (e.g. policy and 
doctrine), the SANDF will end up with science, engineering and technology solutions to required 
operational capabilities that do not fit doctrine and contradict policy.  An SA DOD KMC could 
assist with integrating and optimising this predicament to the advantage of the SA DOD.  
JDP4 (D3-9) states that knowledge facilitates insight that leads to understanding.  This is 
captured in the proposed definitions adopted by the dissertation.  JDP4 (D3-2) states that knowledge 
and understanding is a prerequisite for C2.  The argument is expanded with doctrine and the 
“philosophy of command” posited as unifiers of understanding.  It would also seem that command 
philosophy is different from doctrine and a distinct category of knowledge within militaries.  
Expanding this line of thinking, JDP4 (D4-4) separates the constructs of philosophy, policy and 
doctrine within the context of organisational culture development. JDP4 (D-5) states that the – “… 
emphasis placed on the application of philosophies of leadership, command and management, as 
well as the doctrines and practices from them, will vary considerably at each level of the 
organisational structure, as well as the particular circumstances prevailing at any one time.”. These 
statements allude to a number of knowledge categories – philosophies of leadership, -command, –
management, policy, doctrine and practice.  It also confirms the time value of knowledge as 
discussed earlier in the chapter, providing a murmur that these must evolve to remain relevant.  
Philosophies are not just information and/or data.  They are ostentatious and intricate explorations 
of phenomena in order to extract new meaning that might facilitate understanding   Knowledge, 
such as doctrine and practice, stems from these philosophies according to JDP4, thus evolving into 
applied knowledge or structural capital.   
Still, on the subject of philosophy, JDP4 (D2-2) and JDP4 (D2-13) states that the SA DOD 
uses management philosophy and doctrine, within the context of public service.  Management 
philosophy is also mentioned in DODI26 (13) within the context of business process management – 
stating “… [business process management] must not only be an integral part of the [SA DOD] 
management philosophy but should also become part of the organisation culture”.  This can also be 
assumed to be part of business knowledge (DODI26: 10) as described above.  JDP4 (D2-2) calls for 
the alignment of instructions (DODI), management philosophy and doctrine.  A coherent and 
integrated SA DOD KMC could achieve this. Management philosophy is thus found in both SA 
DOD policy and doctrine and also seems separate from them.  This kind of disparity can be 
harmonised by an SA DOD KMC. 
JWP4 (1-3) states that doctrine development is perceived to be inextricably linked to history 
and is “… primarily developed to win the next conflict or war and is therefore forward-looking”.  
An SA DOD KMC is also focussed on the next challenge, operation, battle or war.  JWP4 (1-5 to 6) 
elaborates in detail on the SA DOD knowledge continuum and the symbiotic relationships between 
the constructs and also introduces ‘capstone’ as the measure for authoritative –  
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“Within the realm of strategy there is always a complex relationship between doctrine and 
policy, with each having an influence on the other. Defence policy, representing South Africa’s 
considered response to the strategic environment, is the principal source of direction for the 
[SANDF].  Policy is undoubtedly influenced by what is militarily possible (and in that sense is 
influenced by military strategic doctrine). However, military doctrine at all levels must be 
developed in a manner consistent with the demands of defence policy… Defence doctrine on the 
military strategic level has an important relationship with capstone defence policy. In contrast 
with the potentially fluid and changeable nature of policy, military strategic level doctrine is 
informed by fundamental lessons learned over time about ways in which the armed forces can be 
used effectively in support of policy. Doctrine is more enduring and less subject to change, 
although it is by no means rigid or inflexible. The hierarchy of military doctrine produced in 
South Africa is a guide to military commanders on the conducting of campaigns and operations 
and the tactical employment of the armed forces in support of national policy… South Africa’s 
military strategy draws together defence policy (which must reflect the realities of the strategic 
environment) and military strategic doctrine (which provides guidance on the military means of 
support for policy …. An alternative way of expressing military strategy is to describe it as the 
bridge linking national policy and operational effect or performance. … Government’s defence 
policy is articulated in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review.”. 
This policy statement identified reiterates the categories of SA DOD knowledge to be policy, 
doctrine and strategy.  It provides a very considered view on the symbiotic tendencies of the 
capstone military knowledge.  An SA DOD KMC is ideally suited to manage these symbiotic 
relationships for the SA DOD in its quest for new meaning, understanding and advantage. 
Continuing with the discussion of the various SA DOD knowledge categories; IDODI1 (3) 
separates the constructs of doctrine and policy; DODI1 (4-9) separates doctrine, policy, strategy, 
orders and instructions and JWP1 (1-1 and 2) separates policy, strategy, orders, instructions, rules 
and procedures.  These are all categories of SA DOD knowledge, albeit not all capstone.   
DODSPF1 (13) and SANDFP2 (1) state that there can be SA DOD policy about doctrine but that 
doctrine should not contradict SA DOD policy (SANDFO4: 1) and (SANDFD2: 1). SANDFD2 (1), 
SANDFO4 (1) and SANDFP2 (1) state that - “A policy is therefore required that sets out the 
guidelines for initiating, compiling, authorising, issuing, maintenance and controlling of all Joint 
Doctrine Publications”.  SANDFP2 (1) also states that - “Joint Doctrine must be compiled to 
expand on, and to be in accordance with, the Departmental Strategy drawn up by the [Sec Def] and 
with the overall military policy laid down by C SANDF.”.  This statement links doctrine 
inextricably to both policy and strategy at SA DOD Level 1 (i.e. Sec Def and C SANDF).  Various 
types (subject fields) are found within the categories of knowledge, policy and doctrine are 
tabulated in Table 6.4. 
JDP20 (10) states that doctrine is a distinct requirement for the development of military skill 
and knowledge-based competence. In support, JDP16 (D-4) states that doctrine is an ETD resource. 
JDP16 (B-3) states that policy and doctrine is an integral part of the SA DOD ETD system. JDP16 
(C-1) states that policy and doctrine are part of the ETD value chain.   
JWP4 (1-1) states - “Doctrine is not a set of rules, which can be applied without thought; it is, 
rather, a framework for understanding the nature of armed conflict and the use of military force. Its 
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purpose is to guide, explain and educate, and to provide the basis for further contemplation and 
informed debate. Doctrine teaches what to think and what to do, rather than how to think and how 
to prepare to do it.”. These definitions support the linkages between understanding as knowledge, 
decisions, actions and effects. There are academics that equate knowledge to beliefs and/or concepts 
(amongst many other constructs), all part of organisational IC.  DODI1 (4-9 and 4-10) states that 
when reviewing doctrine it must be ensured that all relevant information is included in doctrine – in 
order to construct this ‘way of thinking’.  DODI1 (4-9 and 1A-6) and JWP4 (1-2) link knowledge 
and doctrine and states that doctrine is - “… a common approach and way of thinking” -  
“Corp Com doctrine is to structure knowledge of Corp Com support to warfare, of the Corp Com 
aspect of warfare (which includes all tangible and nontangible outcomes of the practice of Corp 
Com, eg [sic] mutually beneficial relationships, a positive image, a good reputation and 
legitimacy) and of the Corp Com function in warfare. Sound Corp Com doctrine provides a 
common approach and way of thinking to Corp Com in operations, which is not bound by 
prescriptive rules (which can be found in Corp Com policy) (JWP 116)”.  DODI1 (1A-6) 
JWP4 (1-2) states that the “… purpose of doctrine is to structure the knowledge of warfare”.  
Doctrine is thus the instrument with which to structure knowledge. These policy statements allude 
to several elements of organisational IC and military effects to be achieved with doctrine.  Doctrine 
is also positioned to structure knowledge and is therefore knowledge.  A ‘common approach’ 
alludes to doctrines’ ability to integrate action and thinking.  JWP1 (1-1) defines doctrine, based on 
the South African Military Dictionary, as – 
“… fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in 
support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application”. This 
definition is accepted internationally and by the SANDF. Another definition given is an “explicit 
set of concepts according to which action in a given field is discussed and executed”.”. 
JWP4 (1-1) quotes the DR 1998 (Chapter 2) in defining doctrine as – “… the main principles 
and concepts by which armed forces guide their actions in military operations in support of national 
objectives. Doctrine derives from, and must be consistent with, defence policy and posture.”.   A 
very similar definition can be found in DODI1 (1A-6), JWP4 (1-1 and 4-6), SANDFP2 (2), JWP1 
(9-4) and SANDFP3 (15-10) – “… fundamental principles by which military forces guide their 
actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application”.  Note that 
it does not include “national” before objective.     
JWP4 (3-1) states that – “Doctrine is not merely a record of past practice; it is an assessment 
of the best approach based on a sound understanding of current imperatives and lessons learned 
from past experience”. JWP4 (1-2) states that doctrine includes - “…intellectual, practical and 
dynamic, and predictive components.”.  JWP1 (1-20) also states that - 
“A sound understanding of an organisation’s doctrine, which comes firstly with the insight 
gained, for example, in the initial training and/or orientation received on joining the organisation, 
and later from experience achieved simply by working within the organisation and absorbing its 
culture, enhances the understanding of strategy and policy and should be sufficient to guide any 
element of that organisation, down to the individual responsible for planning and executing 
activities, to a reasonable chance of success in any endeavour of the organisation, even in the 
absence of any other policy, guidelines, orders or instructions.”. 
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These opinions again reiterate the symbiotic nature of the interaction between insight, 
intellect, experience, understanding and doctrine.  This interaction assists with prediction and 
projection and provides the knowledge with which the next challenge, operation, battle or war will 
be fought with. 
DODI40 (24) defines a system as – “A system is a combination of mutually dependent items, 
assemblies, skills, techniques, doctrines, or anything that can play and/or support an operational role 
in the intended environment”.  This supports the idea proposed by corporate communication that 
doctrine is part of a user or product system.  What is interesting is that knowledge is not stated as 
part of a system. Other capstone military knowledge missing from the definition is IP, especially 
because the context of the policy is the acquisition of such knowledge and other hardware, as well 
as policy. 
The researcher steps away from doctrine as a category of capstone SA DOD knowledge to 
discuss other categories of SA DOD capstone knowledge.  DODI23 provides policy on the 
management of SA DOD IA.  In general, DODI23 outlines all the matters concerning the 
management of SA DOD IP with regard to legislative -, accounting - and contracting aspects.   
DODI23 uses the constructs of ‘knowledge” and ‘IP’ in the same context but does not include 
‘knowledge’ as a construct in the definition of IP.  DODI23 (A-3) defines SA DOD IP as – 
“… any creation of the mind that is capable of being protected by law from use by any other 
person, whether in terms of South African law or foreign law, and includes any rights in such 
creation, but excludes copyright in a study, dissertation, article, handbook or any other 
publication which, in the ordinary course of business, is associated with conventional academic 
work”.   
The SA DOD thus manages a specific IP portfolio with DODI23, leaving a significant 
portfolio of IP possibly unmanaged (the second part of the definition).  The silo approach to KM is 
quite evident as previously discussed and highlights the requirement for coherence and integration.  
In contradiction, DODI57 (B-9) defines IP as “… Concepts, ideas, planning documents, 
designs, formulas, processes and other information-based materials intended for products or 
services that have some commercial value or represent original thoughts or theses. It is thus an 
intangible asset.”.  Contradictions such as these have been highlighted earlier in this chapter as 
construct dissonance.  In this case, it could possibly lead to management dissonance and a loss of 
advantage, especially when original thoughts are not properly codified, controlled and managed 
because it is excluded by the DODI23 definition or does not seem to have commercial value as in 
the second definition.  It is more than often original thought that unlocks advantage or secures a 
specific effect. 
DODI50 (13) equates trade secrets to information.  Trade secrets normally relate to IP, which 
is considered knowledge.  It is a clear case of dissonance (information being regarded as inclusive 
of data and knowledge) with ramifications for the management of the knowledge being kept secret.  
Trade secrets also indicate the importance of knowledge security or the security of the knowledge 
continuum. Various types (subject fields) found within the constructs of data, information and 
knowledge are tabulated in Table 6.4. 
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SA DOD capabilities and resources have been discussed at length earlier in the dissertation, 
specifically relating to POSTEDFILT(B)  The researcher of the dissertation proposed earlier that 
this understanding of capabilities is probably due for revision in order to align it and others with the 
requirements of the knowledge era.  Several SA DODI policy and doctrine link POSTEDFILT(B) 
to capability and action (DODI1: 1A-3, 1A-22, 4-23, 7B-2; DODI26: A-1; JWP1: 8-1, 9-1, 9-7; 
SANDFO2: 2-1, A-1 and JWP4: 6-1). POSTEDFIT includes doctrine and information, and exclude 
IP and intelligence.  However, in contradiction, DODI40 does not make mention of information, but 
rather intelligence and doctrine.  DODI40 (26) states that doctrine is part of an SANDF user system 
but not a product system.  Interestingly IP is not cited as part of either of the two.  DODI57 (B-14) 
states that doctrine is part of a “user system”.  DODI40 (24-25) describes doctrine and intelligence, 
as part of a user system, and in terms of POSTEDFIT. Both doctrine and intelligence are thus 
characterised as capstone military knowledge managed by the SA DOD.    
Let us now consider some of the knowledge continuum artefacts, as articulated by the selected 
sample of SA DOD policy and strategy, and perceived as types of data, information and knowledge.  
These typically relate to a vast array of subject matter currently being managed by the SA DOD 
with IM methodologies.  It provides a clear picture of the requirement for coherence and 
integration, as proposed throughout the dissertation by the researcher, to be achieved by the 
establishment of an SA DOD KMC and institutionalisation of KM as policy and doctrine. 
6.2.3.2 Typology: Types (Subject Fields) of SA DOD Knowledge  
The following tabulated list represents types (subject fields) of knowledge found in the 
selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  The table is in support of the stated 
requirement for coherent and integrated SA DOD KM, providing evidence of the vast portfolio and 
sheer variance in the subject matter currently inherent in the SA DOD.  Table 6.4 does not represent 
a finite list of subject fields within the SA DOD knowledge continuum but is a reflection based on 
the search words used as described in Chapter 4 of the dissertation and in Chapter 5.  This list will 
expand if the entire volume of SA DOD policy and doctrine are considered and scrutinised as part 
of an SA DOD knowledge readiness audit or any related research. 
Table 6.4: Categories and Types of SA DOD Data, Information and Knowledge 
Constructs 
and 
Categories 
Type (subject field) 
 
Knowledge 
contextual work place-, applied-, enterprise risk management-, corporate communication-, 
general knowledge of the SA DOD, stakeholder-, HRM related -, defence technology 
knowledge-base, scientific-, technical-, business process management-, ethics and moral 
knowledge, PFMA-,RSA  Military Standards, treasury regulations and the Institute for 
Internal Auditing Standards, practical audit implementation methodologies-, practical 
implementation of investigation methodologies-, ergonomics science-, threats to 
munitions-, knowledge of the role of the different role-players within the "peace building" 
process, knowledge of the organisational structure, processes, functions and records 
systems of the SA DOD; records management practices-, relevant records management 
and archival standards-, acquisition-, risk management-, principles on service delivery 
innovations-, vulnerability assessments-, best practices and procedures for wireless device 
configurations and connections-, eligible members-,  dependants and other approved 
clientele-, career development -, theoretical,  indigenous and  specialized-, chain of 
command-, unit standards-, knowledge of the different opportunities for collecting 
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evidence and how candidates with special assessment requirements are given access, 
essential embedded knowledge (principles of assessment, principles and practices of 
Recognition of Prior Learning, methods for gathering evidence, potential barriers to 
assessment, feedback techniques, assessment policies; specialist-,  psychological-, 
knowledge relating to ethical and professional behaviour of psychologists, professional-, 
nutritional-, unit standard or qualification-, subject matter-, basic service rights-, specific-, 
knowledge and understanding of the SA DOD, functional-, existing-, new-, past, present 
and expected-, extended-, essential-, command and control-, professional-, multi-cultural 
issues-, general knowledge, job-, practical expert-, aviation safety-, knowledge of the 
susceptibility of the aircraft, its crew, equipment, weapons and ammunition to the hazards 
of electromagnetic radiation, principles of flight-, communication-, warfare-, stakeholders 
and stakeholder groups-, enemy’s most probable course of action-, knowledge of policies, 
regulations, procedures, channels of command and control as well as those factors both 
internally and externally that affect them, broad spectrum of knowledge, professional-, 
knowledge of the role of the different role-players within the “peace building” process, 
knowledge of the crisis region and the local people, in depth -, particularly of regional 
actors and the diplomatic scene. In addition, many of those selected will be proficient 
linguists with an understanding of the local culture, knowledge of local contractor 
facilities, SAMHS-, logistic knowledge at both national and multinational levels, basic 
knowledge of mathematics, science, technical/mechanical fields, computers, characteristics 
of the battlespace, knowledge of the future (i.e., to know what will be), but only to have 
knowledge about factors shaping the future….and their possible consequences for the 
future, conventional-, mission essential-, knowledgeable buyer of military armament, 
knowledgeable users, knowledgeable managers of defence capabilities and knowledgeable 
maintainers of our capabilities, business enterprise knowledge 
 
Knowledge 
References 
IDODI1, DODERF1, JWP1, DODI1, DODI9, DODI10, DODI11, DODI14, DODI23, 
DODI25, DODI26, DODI27,  DODI28, DODI29, DODI33, DODI40, DODI42, DODI43, 
DODI57, DODI58, JDP13, JDP14, JDP1, DODI56, JDP12, JDP20, JDP3, JDP4, JWM1, 
JWP1, JWP4, JWP8, SANDFO2, SANDFP3 
Intelligence 
strategic-, technical-, operational-, tactical, imagery-, country specific-, situation specific-, 
health-,  criminal-, human-, trans-national activities-, electronic-, signal-, command 
intelligence  
Intelligence 
References 
DODI31, DODI46, DODI50, DODI58, JDP1, JWP8, SANDFP2, SANDFP3 
Doctrine 
corporate communications-, logistics-, chemical and biological weapons and radioactive 
materials -, matériel, management-, command-, operational-, service-, mission command 
as doctrine, doctrine for helicopters, airforce-, doctrine for amphibious operations, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisational tactical air doctrine, doctrine for airspace control in times of 
crisis and war, United Nations and United Nations public information doctrine, South 
African Development Community-, warfighting-, SA DOD command-, SANDF doctrine 
on psychological warfare, fire and rescue service operational -, SANDF operational-, 
African Union deployment-, Southern African Development Community deployment-, 
SANDF deployment-, South African Military Assistance and Training Teams (SAMATT)-
, employment-, joint-, interim-, joint warfare-, operational-, multinational operations-, 
common-, defence posture doctrine 
Doctrine 
References 
DODI1, DODI31, DODI33, DODI40, JWP1, SANDFP3, JDP4, JWM1, JWP1, 
SANDFO2, SANDFO4, JWP4, SANDFO4, SANDFD2, JWP4 
IP 
defence matériel related-, Software related-, Source code, Front-end Source Code, Rear-
end Source Code, Ergonomics-, knowledge, research information, strategic personnel and 
job profiles, Defence ergonomics best practices and analysed operational data, RSA 
Defence ergonomics information (RSA-Mil-Documents), 
IP References DODI23, DODI24, DODI28, DODI57 
Other philosophies of leadership, command JDP4 (D-5) JDP4 (D2-2), JDP4 (D2-13) 
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and management DODI26 (13) 
Information 
management-, defence-, health-, risk-, Public Service Act Personnel leave management-, 
medical-, career-, contract-, ETD-, receipt or giving of official donations or sponsorships-, 
debt-, vehicle accident report-,   organisational address-, geographical-, IP ownership-, 
electronic-, supplier-, software-, software licence-, network-, staff visit-, business-, 
organisation-, behaviour-, qualitative-, information about activities, business objects 
involved, resources, timing, business rules, policies, and constraints governing the process,  
project progress-, verbatim-, relevant-, financial-, operating-, ergonomics-, munition 
safety-, classified-, CI-related-, Defence Community-, Instructions, orders, guidelines, 
bulletins, news clippings, calendars, contact details, structures, forms, manuals, acquisition 
management-, background-, project management-, acquisition documentation-, tender-, 
factual-, internal audit findings-, Public-Private Partnerships project-, aerial photography-, 
performance-, pertinent-, guest speaker-, defence foreign relations-, military installations, 
buildings or structures which house, sensitive equipment and/or operational sensitive 
processes, methods, techniques, procedures or guidelines used during an investigation 
concerning the detection, curtailment or investigation of a matter if such disclosure can 
impede the prosecution process, trade secrets, financial, commercial, scientific or 
technical, evaluative material supplied, tactical manuals, examination, test, auditing 
procedure, Foreign government-, country- or situation-specific intelligence assessments 
and appreciations, Intelligence sources and Counter- Intelligence activities, Operational 
and contingency scenarios, plans and measures, operational and tactical capabilities and 
strengths of a formation or the SA DOD, performance, capabilities, technical 
specifications and serviceability of SA DOD equipment, Technical information on 
communications, cryptography and electronic warfare capabilities and equipment, 
research, development and acquisition projects, details on technology development 
programmes, personal privacy of SA DOD personnel, incident-, gift register-, learner 
assessment-, demographic-, learner-,  resettlement management-, Managing Programme 
Performance-, payment-,  telegraphic transfer-, foreign payments , budgets, expenditure 
and revenue, planning-, service delivery-, organisation-, job evaluation-, remuneration-, 
benefits-, personnel expenditure-, the utilisation of consultants-, affirmative recruitment-, 
promotions-, termination of services-, performance management-, skills development, 
injury on duty-, labour relations-, leave and discharge due to ill-health-, clinical-, learner-, 
disability-related-, youth related-, written-, spoken-, computerised-, private-, career-, 
Recognition of Prior Learning opportunities/ services and programmes, assessment-, 
donor-, sponsorship-, legally privileged, frequency-, track-, situational awareness-, 
battlespace-, tactical-, battlefield related-, tactical image-, tactical text-, battlefield 
awareness-, aeronautical-, target-, position-, range-, IFF/SSR-, heading-, helicopter 
operations related-, false-, terrain information 
Information 
References 
DODD2, DODD13, DODERMF1, DODI11, DODI15, DODI16, DODI17, DODI21, 
DODI22, DODI23, DODI24, DODI25, DODI26, DODI27, DODI28, DODI29, DODI32, 
DODI38, DODI39, DODI40, DODI41, DODI42, DODI43, DODI45, DODI46, DODI48, 
DODI49, DODI50, DODI51, DODI53, DODI55, DODI56, DODI59, DODSPF1, FMDI1,  
IDODI2, JDP1, JDP3, JDP4, JDP13, JDP14, JDP17, SANDFO1, SANDFO3, JWM1, 
SANDFP1, JWP1, SANDFP3 
Data  
numerical-, corporate communication environment-, historical-, performance-, descriptive-
, Content Management System (CMS)-, Cell phone numbers-, off-strength-, technical-, 
logistics-, human resource-, debtors-,  financial-, electronic-, accounting-, software-, ICT 
asset-, command and control-, ergonomics (anthropometry, controls, human performance, 
human computer interaction, displays, biomechanical forces, physiology and 
environmental influences, psychological and Occupational Health and Safety-, raw-, 
analysed-, standardisation-, project-,  task analysis-, munitions-, supplier-, statistical-, 
demand/dues-in no, manufacturing data pack,  historical cost-, serial number specification-
, strategic/political-, planning-, engineering-, acquisition phase-, LSAR, -life cycle cost-, 
procedural-, system pass-, classified-, transactional-, operational baseline-, integrate 
logistics support-, customer furnished equipment-, codification-, disability- , Senior 
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Management Service-, skills-,   geospatial-, areal imagery-, reconciliation-,  simulated-, 
patients-, transmission-, geographic-, manufacturing-, system-, clinical-, human resource 
related-, learner achievement-, learner-, biographic-, target group profile-, disability 
desegregated, aircraft accident and incident-, radar-, research-, Aircraft Radiation Hazard 
Designators-, Transmitter Radiation Hazard Designators-, operating envelope-, briefing-, 
emergency-, separation/exit of members and employees -,  tidal and related meteorological 
data 
Data  
References 
DODI1, DODI2, DODI4, DODI21, DODI23, DODI24, DODI26, DODI28, DODI29, 
DODI32, DODI35, DODI38, DODI40, DODI43, DODI57, DODI58, DODI60, DODI61, 
FMDI1, IDODI2, JDP13, JDP3, JDP4, JWM1, JWP1, JWP3, JWP4, SANDFP3 
It is fundamental for any organisation to know what the extent of it is to be able to 
comprehend how to manage it.  More so if that organisation is a public service organisation 
accountable to the taxpayer.  Contributing to the arguments already forwarded by the researcher of 
this dissertation; the sections above dealing with categories and types of SA DOD knowledge serve 
to answer SRQ3 and certainly inform questions raised by the other secondary research questions.  
Some of the fundamentals relating to how to manage knowledge in the SA DOD will now be 
reflected on in this last section of Chapter 6 of this dissertation.  This will be followed by a proposal 
of an SA DOD KM model that draws the fundamental components and arguments together into a 
graphic illustration of a future SA DOD KMC. 
6.2.4 Fundamentals of SA DOD Knowledge Management? 
Considering the arguments and the identification of the vast portfolio of SA DOD knowledge 
above it is clear that a paradigm shift is required towards a coherent and integrated KM and the 
establishment of an SA DOD KMC.  Based on insight gained thus far from this and other chapters 
of the dissertation, the following discussion will reflect on some fundamentals for a future SA DOD 
KMC and coherent and integrated KM. 
6.2.4.1 Security 
Knowledge security is not very prominent in literature.  From discussions in Chapter 3 of the 
dissertation, data, information and knowledge security are a critical requirement for militaries; a 
principle of war.  There are several and varied requirements for the security of knowledge 
continuum artefacts detailed in Chapter 5 (SA legislation and DR 2015) and the selected sample of 
SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine discussed in this chapter.  With foreknowledge of what 
categories and types of knowledge the SA DOD actively manage, let us discuss some of the 
statements that speak to the security of these knowledge continuum artefacts.  A particular caveat 
important to mention again at this point is that the SA DOD regards (mostly) information as 
inclusive of data and knowledge.  It will also be tempting to quote the entire SA DOD information 
security policy (DODI50), however, this will probably result in the exploration of issues that is 
outside the scope of the dissertation. 
DODI50 (5) alludes to the “secrecy dilemma” linking information to national interests - 
“Secrecy is vital to the functioning of government in an uncertain world. Its purpose is to prevent 
the access of adversaries to information that could be used against the interests of the state, its 
people or allies - in short, to protect national security, to enable effective diplomacy, to save lives, 
and to bring criminals to justice.”.   Another part of DODI50 (5) describes the secrecy dilemma.  It 
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provides some important calibration to the requirement for information security in five broad 
categories; information regarding –  
“… Defence and the Security of the RSA, including information regarding military operations 
and weapons technology. … International relations, including diplomatic information. … 
[relating to] law enforcement, including activities associated with such. … [relevant to] the 
economic interests and financial welfare of the RSA, including information regarding the 
commercial activities of public bodies. … [and] … pertaining to personal privacy”. 
DODI50 (5) states - 
“Not all information in the above categories need, or should be protected and it should not be 
used to protect government officials, or agencies, from public scrutiny, accountability or censure. 
In this regard, the MISS stipulates that security measures are not intended to and should not be 
used to cover up maladministration, corruption, criminal actions etc., or to protect individuals or 
officials involved in such cases. On the contrary, access to information is essential if policy 
makers [sic]  are to be fully informed, if government is to be held accountable for its actions, and 
if the public is to engage in informed debate. Access to information is also vital to stimulate 
discussion, to enable criticism and to stimulate scientific and technological development. 
Transparency therefore enhances security by reducing the risk of the abuse of power and by 
enabling the dissemination of knowledge that is essential for development. The dilemma is to 
effectively protect information that should be kept secret, while disclosing or allowing access to 
that which is necessary for good government and the enhancement of participation in decision 
making.”. 
These statements describe the adversarial nexus between knowing and its prevention.  For the 
SA DOD, as with all militaries, adequate distribution of knowledge continuum artefacts to be able 
to generate new decision-quality knowledge and understanding that will enhance decision-making 
and action, enabling precise effects and advantage is a fundamental requirement. Knowledge 
continuum security is fundamental to a future SA DOD KMC and a managed adversarial nexus 
between freedoms to share and legislated to restrict knowledge flow and usage.  DODI50 details the 
SA DOD Level 1 policy on information security and access as follows -  
“The question of public access to defense [sic] information in a democracy in a time of peace is 
inevitably characterized by a tension between the imperatives of transparency and accountability 
on the one hand, and the legitimate need to preserve the confidentiality and secrecy of certain 
information on the other. The advent of democracy in South Africa has brought about a level of 
openness about defence matters that is in stark contrast to the secrecy of the past. The change has 
however created uncertainty about which information should routinely be available to the 
public.”  (DODI50: 1). 
The requirement for access to information as expressed by DODI50 relating to the 
Constitution and PAIA is discussed in Chapter 5 of the dissertation.  Neither the Constitution nor 
PAIA defines the construct information.  DODD4 (2) states that the PAIA provides for the 
constitutional right of access to State held information - “… that is required for the exercise or 
protection of any right”.  No mention is made to access to State knowledge within this context.  If it 
is assumed that knowledge is excluded from this legislation, it would typically exclude policy, 
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doctrine, intelligence and IP as capstone types of military knowledge from this security provision as 
well as having to provide access to SA DOD knowledge.  DODI50 (7-8) states that - 
 “According to the PAIA, access to defence and security information may be denied in terms of 
Section 41, if its disclosure could reasonably be expected to influence the defence or security of 
South Africa if it would reveal information regarding… 
d. intelligence held for the purpose of the defence of the RSA, or for the detection, prevention,
suppression or curtailment of subversive or hostile activities;
e. methods, and scientific or technical equipment for collecting, assessing or handling of such
intelligence information; and
f. the identity of a confidential source or any other source of information concerning the
collection of intelligence.”.
The statement clearly separates the constructs information and intelligence.  The statement 
seeks the protection of information about intelligence and its collection.  It does not seek the 
protection of the intelligence itself, which is problematic.  This problem could probably be 
attributed to construct dissonance and the correct usage of the constructs information and 
intelligence.  The researcher is of the opinion that both information and intelligence should have 
been clearly delineated in the statement above and the separate security requirements explicitly 
stated. 
DODI50 (11) deals with information security and equates doctrine to information based on 
the requirements of the Constitution and the PAIA.  Discussion in Chapter 3 of the dissertation has 
a different view.  Doctrine is regarded as capstone military knowledge.  Neither the Constitution nor 
the PAIA makes mention of disclosure of knowledge, just the requirement for the disclosure of 
information is legislated.  Thus, if the SA DOD properly classifies what it considers to be 
knowledge, the organisation might drastically change what can be disclosed as information 
according to the PAIA.  In this sense, just due to proper definitions of military knowledge, 
enhanced security of knowledge could be achieved.  JWP1 (3-5) states the nexus as follows from a 
corporate communications’ perspective –  
“Provision of information must be in accordance with [SA DOD] Corp Com policy and must 
balance security concerns with the obligation of openness, transparency and of keeping the 
public informed of [SA DOD] matters. Classified information must be handled according to 
security policy”.   
DODI46 (1, 6 and 9) reiterates the necessity for security regarding aerial imagery and 
provides a practical inclusion of the requirement to mitigate the secrecy dilemma as much as 
possible – 
“For security reasons the collection, distribution and possession of aerial imagery of defence 
installations and national key points, like other defence information, is subject to restriction, as 
enabled by inter alia the Defence Act …, the National Key Points Act … and the Protection of 
Information Act”. Other legislation that is important in this regard are [sic] the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act, as amended, the Constitution of the RSA, the Land Survey Act … 
and the Air Information Publications ... The need to protect information must, however, be 
balanced against the constitutional right to information and its expression in the Promotion of 
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Access to Information Act …  The [SA DOD] policy on aerial photography should therefore 
strive to balance the requirement for security with the right of access to information and what is 
openly available.”.   
Security is not only based on the requirements of the Defence Act but on other national 
legislation in parallel.  The SA DOD knowledge continuum security is based on an integrated 
national imperative.  No mention is made of knowledge in these quotes.  This is probably based on 
the notion that the SA DOD regards information as knowledge and vice a versa, which is 
problematic from several perspectives – resource management, security and decision-making – to 
name just three.  Transparency and sharing are critical to the management of information and 
knowledge, security and the for a balanced security nexus that facilitates trust building and 
knowing.  The statement above reflects an improvement in the adversarial nexus.  It is from this 
perspective that SA DOD information security is currently being managed.    
SANDFP4 (L-1) states that classified information is – “… any information which is held by 
or for, is produced in or for, or is under the control of the State or which concerns the State and 
which must, for the sake of national security, be exempted from disclosure and must enjoy 
protection against compromise”.  DODI50 (A-1) defines sensitive information as that which – “… 
may be protected from unauthorised disclosure in order to prevent the national interests of the 
Republic from being endangered.”. Both these quotes state the requirement for information security, 
and by implication also data and knowledge security, against the requirement for national security 
and interest protection.  Therefore, national security and interests are linked to KM from a security 
perspective, but probably also others such as innovation and asset management. 
“Security involves the defence of high value [sic] assets and information that are vital to the 
nation’s armed forces. A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of 
action to launch an offensive in pursuit of the aim. This could imply that risks are to be taken in 
order to surprise the enemy and gain a favourable situation”. (JWP4: 3-6) 
One can assume that capstone military knowledge (e.g. doctrine, intelligence and IP) is 
included in ‘high-value assets’ because these are military assets clearly linked to military advantage.  
However, the assumption is not supported explicitly by JWP4 or elsewhere in SA DOD policy and 
doctrine as have been discussed thus far in this chapter.  The researcher of the dissertation considers 
this a considerable gap in policy and doctrine, which could be corrected with clear policy and 
doctrine on what is considered SA DOD resources and assets.  A future SA DOD KMC should be 
positioned to express on this in policy and doctrine and manage the evolution of this policy and 
doctrinal position.  A high premium is also placed on security for decision, action, effects and 
advantage – all-inclusive in the military concept ‘freedom of action’, ‘surprise’ and ‘gaining a 
favourable situation’. 
DODI50 (5) also describes the dilemma of the cost associated with classifying information.  
Unnecessary classification or typically over classification leads to wastage due to the management 
requirements associated with classified information.  This also relates to de-classification of 
information.  There is thus a distinct argument for a pragmatic and practical information 
classification system in order to maintain information security without unnecessary wastage, stated 
as follows –  
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“… uncontrolled proliferation of classified material results in a lack of discrimination, a shortage 
and waste of resources, and the devaluation and degradation of the entire classification system, 
which makes it difficult to adequately protect or control that which truly requires protection. 
Other intangible costs of excessive classification are: … It limits the opportunity for input, 
review and criticism, thereby undermining well-informed judgement and perpetuating 
entrenched, outmoded beliefs and ways of thinking. … It prevents the sharing of technological 
and scientific information, stifling discussion, retarding development and leading to the 
duplication of effort. … It leaves the public uninformed about important decisions and prevents 
public participation in decision-making processes. … It enables and encourages the 
monopolisation of information to enhance political or bureaucratic power. … It increases the risk 
and probability of inadvertent or deliberate leaks. … There are thus excellent grounds for 
maximising access to information while at the same time protecting that information justifiably 
requiring protection. This interaction between the need for access to information and the need to 
protect other information is reflected in the Constitution and the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act. ” (DODI50: 6) 
This again highlights the secrecy dilemma.  The policy statement also echoes the requirement 
for SA DOD capstone knowledge to be adequately protected as previously stated.  This protection 
should always be balanced against the need for public trust, resource availability (funding, etc), 
knowing and the need to know.  Literature primarily only discusses the need for sharing knowledge 
and largely ignores the requirement for protection (not sharing or sharing selectively).  By 
adequately protecting knowledge, advantage is also protected.  By overprotecting knowledge, 
advantage might be lost due to access being restricted that will hamper innovation, decision-making 
and action (amongst others).  This is the dilemma that should be managed between the future SA 
DOD KMC and the DI. 
IDODI2 (21) states a particular requirement for information security as follows – “There has 
also been a consistent inclination towards the provision of the performance information in separate 
documents for the two constitutional institutions, namely, the Defence Secretariat and the SANDF, 
due to the requirement by the Executive Authority to protect sensitive departmental performance 
information”.  This statement just confirms that the SA DOD information security regime is 
applicable to both the Sec Def and CSANDF.  
DODI 30 (3 and 8) states importantly that it is the duty of the MOD, Sec Def, SA DOD senior 
command and ARMSCOR Chief Executive Officer, under the supervision of C DI, to ensure 
classified information security policy and procedures are adhered to by all SA DOD personnel.  
This statement thus confirms the roles of Sec Def and C SANDF but also expresses on the wider 
responsibility towards SA DOD knowledge continuum security. 
DODI9 (5) states that C DI is responsible for information security as well as the definition of 
SA DOD security requirements, responsibilities, and control mechanisms to be applied to 
information in order to ensure and maintain its availability, integrity and confidentiality.    DODI50 
(2) states that “[C DI] shall be ultimately responsible for the authorisation of requests to release 
classified information”.  This position is echoed by every SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine that 
express on information security (for example DODI23: 8). There is also calls for knowledge 
security, e.g. DODI46 (3) stating the requirement for policy on and the security of imagery 
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intelligence for which DI is responsible. C DI is under the command of CSANDF, one of the 
components named in the previous paragraph.  C DI is also then correctly identified by policy to be 
responsible for the management of the secrecy dilemma.  C DI should in future be assisted in the 
management of the secrecy dilemma by an SA DOD KMC, as stated above.  This championship 
will be discussed later in the chapter. 
DODD10, DODD15 (2) and DODI24 state that the security of information and 
communication systems are essential.    Information and communication systems security and 
related software security are stated by most of the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policies and 
doctrine.  This relates more to the security of the hardware components of these systems and 
software.  However, the security of the content managed by the systems are implied but also stated 
in other policy and doctrine. 
SANDFP3 (6-6) asks about one of the persisting uncertainties facing South Africa - “Will the 
effect of innovations in [IT] affect [IM] within the [SA DOD], inclusive of information security?”  
This can be answered positively.  Small innovations such as cloud computing and storage are cases 
in point.  This introduces another dilemma for the SA DOD to manage – how to embrace innovation 
and technological change with maximum effect without negatively affecting knowledge continuum 
security?  In the discussion to follow, it is very evident that data and information security are 
addressed exhaustively with the criticality thereof placed in the spotlight.  DODI50 (8) states the 
legislative requirement regarding data security.  SANDFP3 (10-2 and 10-5) states the following 
with regard to perceived uniqueness and the requirement for data protection -    
“The [SANDF] is actively initiating and exploiting new and enabling technologies and 
contributes to the identification or development of future defence related technologies across the 
spectrum of potential threats. The [SA DOD] requirements and contributions to science and 
technology are fully aligned with the Governments National Science Initiative and the protection 
of its data, due to the unique nature of the military, is guaranteed”. 
This highlights the importance of SA DOD data due to the unique nature of the military and 
its relationship with other governmental stakeholders.  Within the context of the selected sample of 
SA DOD policy and doctrine, there is, therefore, acknowledgement of the security requirement for 
military knowledge (if knowledge is understood to be technology).  It is, however, important for 
each building block of the knowledge continuum to be secure in order to have a secure knowledge 
continuum.  It would thus be very helpful to have policy and doctrine expression on knowledge 
continuum security which would then express the desired level of security for data, information, 
knowledge and wisdom as an inclusive concept, once the dissonance amongst the various constructs 
have been cleared with the introduction of an authoritative taxonomy.   
Continuing the discussion of data security requirements, DODI30 (3-10, 3-15, B1-2 and C1-
1) and DODI39 (E-3) explain the security requirement for stored SA DOD data and databases.   
DODI57 (2-3) states the following about SA DOD data security requirements for information 
systems design in terms of confidentiality and flow control -  
“Provision shall be made for [SA DOD] approved security mechanisms during the design phase 
of secret and top secret [sic] systems to ensure the confidentiality of data (for example 
encryption). … The system shall be designed in such a way that the various components (for 
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example transaction modules, software, operating system interfaces and databases) can exercise 
full control over the data or capabilities they share among them.”. 
DODI40 (M12-5) states -“Classified data shall be identified, controlled, stored, distributed 
and destroyed in a secure manner. All transmitted data shall be protected against disruption and 
unauthorised access”.  The statement makes mention of more detailed processes required for the 
management of the knowledge continuum and security.  At the very basic level, the statement 
expresses the need to manage the knowledge continuum without which the security of the 
continuum will probably become very difficult. 
DODI30 (5) states that - “All classified knowledge/information which can be recorded or 
transmitted by any means, is safeguarded against compromise, loss or destruction”.  DODI24 (35) 
highlights the importance of data security during data transfer whilst updating or disposing of 
software. This security is probably inclusive of integrity management.   DODI28 (9, 15 and 18) and 
DODI48 (15) call for data and information integrity and security.  Thus, security of the knowledge 
continuum has at least two components, the security of the content from an integrity perspective and 
the security of the content from a loss or compromise perspective.  Both these have serious 
consequences for decision-making, action, advantage and innovation. 
DODI60 (5) expresses on data security for communication by email – “Only data where the 
content is classified up to and including “Confidential” may be transmitted via e-mail. No 
information classified secret or top secret shall be sent via DOD E-mail System unless authorised 
by the appropriate authority.”.  DODI60 (6) states that - “Any official without a valid [DI] issued 
confidential security clearance classification shall not be allowed to use [SA DOD] e-mail system.”.  
This makes the use of SA DOD specific communications systems such as the email system 
exclusive.  This should not hamper the communication of data, information or knowledge within the 
SA DOD, but might hamper communication with other stakeholders and role-players.  These policy 
statements provide a glimpse of the security requirement for KM processes such as knowledge 
sharing, both for voice communication and electronic communication.  Encryption is thus a very 
important KM tool from the perspective of security and integrity to ensure advantage is not lost.   
DODI57 (4-1, 5-2, 6-4 and 7-1) discusses the requirement for SA DOD database security, 
also mentioned in other policies.  No mention is made of securing SA DOD knowledge-bases.  
DODI28 (2 and 19), for example, states that the SA DOD must - “… provide for an adequate and 
sustainable knowledge-base to access ergonomics information and databases on a continuous 
basis”.)  
DODI57 (1-5) makes mention of the criticality of disaster recovery plans for data.  As it 
should, this indicates that the SA DOD regards data to be very important –– data being a critical 
building block in the construction of knowledge.  It also indicates that it is a systems approach.  It 
should not just be protection against a loss of data but extend beyond that to be able to recover such 
losses if it occurred.  Knowledge continuum security should thus ensure the protection of the entire 
value chain of SA DOD knowledge. 
DODI30 explains the notion of SA DOD information security within the context of 
counterintelligence, in other words, the security effort and tradecraft required to prevent SA DOD 
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classified information from falling into the hands of the adversary due to negligence or espionage
84
.  
With the risk of having to quote the entire DODI on the importance of information security, the 
researcher took a different tack and analysed what is not said.  DODI30 does not address knowledge 
security, intelligence security, doctrine security and IP security explicitly.  Instead, and in line with 
legislation, it addresses information security.  These are all possibly inclusive in information 
security based on the definition of SA DOD information.  In fact, DODI30 (2) states the importance 
of information, personnel, infrastructure and matériel assets are of critical importance to the SA 
DOD. DODI 30 (5-8) states that information is - “… considered a strategic resource in the [SA 
DOD] as it forms the basis for decision-making and effective management. It is therefore of utmost 
importance that the provisions of the different areas of security as contained in this policy be 
executed.”.  That may be so, but one would have expected that line to read - of information and 
knowledge (inclusive of intelligence, doctrine, IP), personnel, infrastructure and matériel assets are 
of critical importance for decision-making and strategic assets to the SA DOD.  This is only briefly 
alluded to under auditable outcomes (DODI30: 5) that both for knowledge and information needs 
protection.   
DODI30 (2-1) deals with information security extensively and knowledge security very 
briefly.  The real problem with DODI30 is in the definition provided for information, i.e. – 
“Information is any knowledge”, rendering the overall requirement found in several other policy 
and doctrine also for information security and not knowledge security. 
DODI30 (A-1) defines acts that endanger security as - “Any form of behaviour, activity or 
omission within own ranks, which exposes own forces information, plans, operations, human 
resources, infrastructure, installations, equipment or any other resource to exploitation by an 
adversary to the detriment of the State or any agency of the State.”.  It again fails to acknowledge 
the fact that military knowledge (intelligence, doctrine and IP), if exploited by an adversary, would 
have a much greater impact on own force advantage.  This policy phrasing is the result of 
information era thinking and construct dissonance.  It is for this purpose that the researcher 
proposed a review of SA DOD military concepts to bring them in line with knowledge era thinking.  
The definition also does not include the possibility that own forces security might be compromised 
when any of the named components above of an allied force(s) are endangered. 
DODI50 (5) identifies five broad SA DOD information security categories.  One of these 
worth noting is - “Information regarding Defence and the Security of the RSA, including 
information regarding military operations and weapons technology”.  DODI50 makes it clear that 
not all information needs protection and that it is in the interest of the government to allow access to 
information as much as possible; alluding to the secrecy dilemma previously discussed.  Knowledge 
security is a critical requirement for the SA DOD and a tailored solution will have to be constructed 
in order to deal with the secrecy dilemma of what to secure and what not. DODI30 (A-1), DODI46 
(A-1) and DODI50 (A-1) define explicit classified information as -   
“…sensitive, commercial or personal information which is in material or record form, must be 
protected from unauthorised disclosure and must be safeguarded according to the degree of harm 
that could result from its unauthorised disclosure. It may be made accessible only to those 
                                                 
84
 Espionage. The covert means by which countries, organisations and individuals endeavour to acquire classified 
information of national interest to which they are not entitled, with the objective of gaining a strategic or tactical 
advantage over the target country. (Source: Defence Intelligence Division own Description). (DODI30: A-2) 
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holding an appropriate security clearance and who have a legitimate need-to-know to fulfil their 
official duties or contractual responsibilities. Classified information must be classified as MOD 
Restricted, Confidential, Secret or Top Secret.”. 
This definition does not include tacit forms of the knowledge continuum that will also need 
protection from a counterintelligence perspective.  Using the construct which is being defined in the 
definition is also problematic, resulting possibly in a very limited definition and understanding. 
DODI50 (A-1) defines sensitive information as that which - “… may be protected from 
unauthorised disclosure in order to prevent the national interests of the Republic from being 
endangered.”.   
DODI60 (B-1) states another definition of classified data/information as being - “Official [SA 
DOD] information that has been determined to require protection in accordance with the sensitivity 
thereof.”.  This points to explicit information and leaves the interpretation of what is official and not 
an open question.  It introduces a requirement for policy and doctrine on tacit knowledge held by 
human capital.   DODI40 (38) describes classified commercial information within the SA DOD 
tender process as –  
“Companies who lose in the tender process shall, on request, be informed of the evaluation 
criteria and process that was followed, without divulging information of commercially 
confidential nature, detail evaluation results, or information that could prejudice the competitive 
advantage of any of the companies who participated in the tender process.”. 
Classified commercial information thus speaks to the advantage of contracted companies 
when contracted by the SA DOD, with typically IP in mind.  Nothing is said about knowledge in 
the definitions above, which has implications for the security of the tacit knowledge inherent in 
human capital.    If information is representative of the entire knowledge continuum, from an SA 
DOD perspective, it could be assumed that the policy statements hold true for the entire knowledge 
continuum and not just explicit information.  It does, however, not include tacit knowledge held by 
human capital.  Thus, the requirement for a coherent and integrated understanding and management 
of the knowledge continuum is evident in order to provide comprehensive knowledge continuum 
security.   
These statements and descriptions above are calibrated inadequately.  The sheer number of 
different conceptualisations of what classified information also pose a problem.  an SA DOD KMC 
could be of great value in managing the taxonomies of these constructs.  For the SA DOD classified 
information should be all information (based on the SA DOD policy and doctrine that information 
includes data and knowledge) that is critical to national security, military security and advantage in 
operations as alluded to in DODI30 (A-2) in the definition of espionage (see footnote 84).  This is 
stated in  SANDFP4 (L-1) – “… any information which is held by or for, is produced in or for, or is 
under the control of the State or which concerns the State and which must, for the sake of national 
security, be exempted from disclosure and must enjoy protection against compromise”.  Classified 
SA DOD knowledge continuum artefacts share a direct and distinct nexus with advantage. Nothing 
is said about classified human capital (tacit knowledge). Thus, the security-related classification of 
SA DOD knowledge continuum artefacts and human capital should share a direct and distinct nexus 
with advantage in order to calibrate the value of these unambiguously. 
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In order to calibrate ‘sensitivity’ of information as described above, DODI39 (A1-2) details 
the information security classification regime as follows: 
“g. Classified Information. Refers to all information that qualifies for protection against 
unauthorised disclosure [due to its possible impact on national security and interest]. The 
allocation of a security classification is the responsibility of the originating authority of the 
information to be classified and shall be done in accordance with the following definitions; 
i. Restricted: The security classification allocated to all information that may be used by 
hostile/opposing/malicious elements to hamper activities or inconvenience an institution or an 
individual;  
ii. Confidential: The security classification allocated to information that may be used by 
hostile/opposing/malicious elements to harm the objectives and functions of an individual and/or 
institution; [DODI23 (A-1) - “… information that is protected by the domestic law of the Parties 
to the agreement or is protected in any other way”.] 
iii. Secret: The classification allocated to information that may be used by 
hostile/opposing/malicious elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of an institution 
and/or state; and  
iv. Top Secret: The classification allocated to information that can be used by 
enemies/hostile/malicious elements to neutralise the objectives and functions of institutions 
and/or the State. (Source: DOD Dictionary of ICS Terms v 1.0).”.  
The quotes above seek to regulate the security requirement for SA DOD information.  Note, 
policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP are not even mentioned as constructs.  This is again a product 
of the SA DOD conceptualisation of information as inclusive of these.  When accurately defined in 
an authoritative taxonomy and managed by an SA DOD KMC, the impact of classified data vs. 
classified information vs classified categories of capstone knowledge will become clearer.  This 
clarity should have an impact on the allocation of management resources and funding.   
The classification regime outlined above also impacts the sharing of SA DOD knowledge 
continuum artefacts.   Sharing, within this context, will become increasingly cumbersome as the 
threat level to national and defence interest increases.  This translates into a KM quandary – 
knowledge sharing will be hampered most when knowledge is needed most.  To manage this 
predicament the SA DOD needs a tailored solution for SA DOD KM.   
DODI28 introduces classified knowledge.  DODI28 (8) states that access to classified 
ergonomics knowledge is controlled by the Controlling Body for Ergonomics - 
“Ergonomics Database. The ergonomics database is viewed as a strategic asset to the DOD. It 
contains subject specific [sic] intellectual property, knowledge, research information, strategic 
personnel and job profiles, Defence ergonomics best practices and analysed operational data. 
Specific RSA Defence ergonomics information (RSA-Mil-Documents) is available on the 
ARMSCOR website at http//armscor.co.za. Access to classified data is limited and controlled by 
the [Controlling Body for Ergonomics].” (DODI28: 8).  
The quote above includes security requirements for data, information and knowledge but not 
human capital.  The requirement is also linked to the strategic nature of this to the SA DOD.  
DODI23 (42-43) states the requirement for IP security but mostly focuses on information security.  
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DODI28 (18) also makes reference to data security from the perspective of IP management - “In 
terms of data security, the rules of the DODD/POL&PLAN/00010/2003: Management of Defence 
Intellectual Property, dated 10 March 2005 (Reference I), must be adhered to”.   
DODI28 (13) states further that - “The ARMSCOR Institute, ERGOTECH, shall be 
considered the primary ergonomics provider for the DOD”, responsible for the security of the 
ergonomics database.  This identifies the security requirement for SA DOD IP over and above 
information security.  
DODI28 states the requirement for data security (DODI28: 8), IP and information security 
(DODI28: 16 and 18) as the responsibly of the Controlling Body for Ergonomics -  
“Intellectual Property and Information Security. RSA-Military standards are administered by 
ARMSCOR, but remain the intellectual property of the DOD ... Aspects pertaining to the 
issuing, distribution and use of RSA-Military standards fall within the mandate of the CBE and 
are regulated by pre-determined conditions of use. The [controlling Body for Ergonomics] and 
ARMSCOR are responsible for exercising the necessary control measures to ensure, as far as 
practically possible, that intellectual property conditions are being complied with, and to prevent 
security violations regarding the use of military related [sic] information.” (DODI28: 16 and 18). 
What is problematic about the heading above; it clearly separates IP and information.  This 
questions the definition of SA DOD information as being inclusive of knowledge such as IP.  On 
the other hand, it assists with the understanding that security is a requirement for SA DOD 
information and knowledge.  One might even go as far as assuming that there might be management 
differences for these constructs from a security requirement perspective. 
SANDFP3 (15-4) defines counter-intelligence as that phase inclusive of all activities - “… 
devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the 
protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or 
material against sabotage”.  DODI57 (B-3) defines counter-intelligence as – “Measures and 
activities conducted, instituted or taken to impede and to neutralise the effectiveness of foreign or 
hostile [IntOps], to protect classified intelligence and to counter subversion, sabotage and terrorism 
aimed at or against personnel, strategic installations or resources of the [RSA]”.  The question is 
whether counter-intelligence is directed to protect information or intelligence?  The clue is in the 
name – counter-intelligence.  However, because the SA DOD regards information as inclusive of 
data and knowledge and thus by implication intelligence, counter-intelligence is directed towards 
the protection of SA DOD information.  The fact that the SA DOD has not made up its corporate 
mind about this is evident in the second definition.  The researcher is of the opinion that counter-
intelligence should be mandated to protect all SA DOD knowledge continuum artefacts and human 
capital in the interest of national security and interest in order to secure advantage.  Again, a 
proposed SA DOD KMC should have a priority tasking to provide the SA DOD with an 
authoritative taxonomy on these and related construct meanings. 
DODI23 expresses on the requirement for management information in order to manage SA 
DOD IP in accordance with the regulatory framework and the requirement for information security.  
DODI23 does not equate information to SA DOD IP but rather expresses the requirement to have 
information about SA DOD IP in order to successfully manage and secure these assets. 
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DODI23 (6) states - “Defence matériel related IP management (as part of ICA management) 
is focused on the practice of trade secrets …” and - “… ensures contracting with the distinct aim to 
secure continued use and security of supply of defence ICA (specifically defence matériel related 
IP) by the [SA DOD]”.    To this end, DI (counterintelligence specifically) are to manage the - “… 
security and other aspects of project security that relates to the establishing and managing of 
defence IP” (DODI23: 8).   DODI23 (10 and 33) further highlights the importance of IP protection.  
These matters correspond to the discussion earlier in the dissertation on the importance of security 
of knowledge.  DODI23 (43) states that DI is responsible for the classification of SA DOD records 
– in particular, ensuring these are not disproportionately overclassified.  SA DOD KM champions 
and role-players are discussed later in this chapter. 
DODI50 (11) equates doctrine to information and DODI50 (12) equates information to trade 
secrets (or IP), thus linking the three constructs.  In terms of trade secrets, it states the following – 
“Trade secrets of the State or a public body, or [sic] financial, commercial, scientific or technical 
information, which would be likely to cause harm to the commercial or financial interests of the 
State or public body if it is released. Information of which the disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to put such public body at a disadvantage in contractual negotiations or prejudice it in 
commercial competition may also be denied.”.  This speaks about IP and its security is at the 
discretion of the SA DOD (DODI50: 12 and 13).  It also confirms the link between SA DOD 
capstone knowledge (IP in this case), security and advantage. 
IDODI1 (9) states that it is not allowed to publish copyrighted information on social media.  
What it fails to do is labelling the copyrighted material as IP.  As with IP, the copyrighted material 
should enjoy the same protection as other SA DOD knowledge continuum artefacts.  Copyrighted 
material is typically assigned copyright because it is publically available and can thus be copied 
with associated loss of control, income, and advantage.  The security is thus from a commercial 
perspective.  Trade secrets, however, are not copyrighted because secrecy is more important than 
having the material in the public domain.  The secrecy element to trade secrets ensures exclusivity 
and control and aims at a commercial and operational advantage.  Trade secrets are typically found 
in the science, engineering and technology domain and associated knowledge and products.  The 
SA DOD has a considerable portfolio of knowledge that is managed in this domain that requires 
security using trade secrecy as well as the SA DOD security classification regime outlined above. 
DODI30 explicitly deals with the requirement of security within the SA DOD.  As such 
DODI30 (5) makes mention of - “… classified knowledge/information” and also mentions two 
processes - “… recorded or transmitted”.  The protection required is security measures against - 
“…compromise, loss or destruction”.  The policy statement makes a distinction between knowledge 
and information but fails to mention data.  In essence, no access will be provided to 
knowledge/information if there is a risk of compromise, loss or destruction.  Such a risk is always 
present and cannot possibly be totally mitigated.  Thus, this severely impacts knowledge sharing, 
transferring and growth in order to protect what is known.  It will have a distinct impact on 
decision-making, action, effects and advantage.  In the same manner as the dissonance achieved by 
DODI28 above – DODI30 (2-1) states the following about information security - 
“1. The classification of [Defence Community] information in order to protect it from 
unauthorised disclosure is an important security measure. All [Defence Community] information 
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must therefore be classified according to one of the classifications prescribed in Chapter 3 of 
[DODI30]. 
2. All classified [Defence Community] knowledge which can be transmitted by any means or 
any method, whether by word of mouth or by way of a document or materiel [sic], irrespective of 
how it was originally obtained, must be protected against any compromise or loss, irrespective of 
the CI threat manifestation.”. 
Both knowledge and information are listed under the heading ‘information security’ as if the 
policy writer at the time was sure of the distinction but hesitant to make a chapter for knowledge 
security.  However, what is important is that security for both is stated separately.  Also important is 
the mentioning of human capital that is included in the policy statement (i.e. verbal articulation of 
knowledge).  It is only data that is excluded from the statement. 
SANDFO4 (4 and 5) provides a hierarchy of SA DOD Joint Doctrine documents stating that 
the Joint Warfare Publications (JWP) and Joint Warfare Manuals (JWM) should not have a security 
classification higher than Restricted.  This is important for the sharing and use of this knowledge.  It 
still restricts the distribution of the documents in the public domain. 
DODI27 (A-3) quotes the South African National Treasury Regulations dealing with 
unlimited access to information afforded to internal auditors in the execution of their governance 
related duties.  This is, however, calibrated by security clearance requirements as stated by DODI27 
(10) and in general by SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine dealing with information security and 
counter-intelligence.  DODI48 (16-17) states in terms of performance auditing – 
“The [Auditor General South Africa] has, in terms of Section 15 of the Public Audit Act, 2004, 
unrestricted access to all [SA DOD] documentation and personnel to successfully execute its 
functions. The [Auditor General South Africa]’s access to [SA DOD] information is however 
subject to the [SA DOD]’s security arrangements. … Appointment of External Auditors. The 
[Auditor General South Africa] may in terms of Section 12 of the Public Audit Act appoint 
external auditors to conduct audits within the [SA DOD] on behalf of the [Auditor General South 
Africa].  These external auditors will be subject to the [Auditor General South Africa]’s code of 
conduct and any directives issued by the [Auditor General South Africa] (including the [SA 
DOD]’s security arrangements), and will always be issued with letters of appointment from the 
[Auditor General South Africa]. The external auditors’ access to [SA DOD] information is 
subject to the [SA DOD]’s security arrangements.”. 
Thus, although there is other legislation that impacts access to SA DOD information – it 
remains the SA DOD’s prerogative to authorise and facilitate this access based on its own security 
regime.  Also note, this access requirement for [Auditor General South Africa] is for information – 
not knowledge, stated by legislation, not SA DOD policy.   
DODI39 speaks to the management of the SA DOD intranet system and related websites.  The 
policy elaborates on specific technical issues as well as on the security requirement for the web-
based content.  As such DODI39 (viii an ix) states - “The [SA DOD] Intranet Service is secure, 
protected from external and illegal internal access and information is appropriately security 
classified and authorised for publication by [DI]” and “[SA DOD] Intranet users are responsible for 
their information activities and Chiefs of Services and Divisions must ensure that Information and 
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Communication Security prescripts pertaining to the [SA DOD] Intranet are adhered to.”.  Again, 
only information?  The security requirement is thus extended to include cyberspace as a domain 
used to share and store knowledge continuum artefacts.  It will require specific competence to 
manage such artefacts in the form of web-based content; such responsibility is allocated to 
Command Management Information Systems (CMIS) and DI.  Web-based content can portray 
similar characteristics as records.  The question is; are they similar or not – raising further questions 
as to the records management policy of the SA DOD and its applicability. 
DODI42 (10) describes specialised risks as follows - “Risks which fall into specialised 
categories (risk areas where different risk criteria are required due to corporate governance needs 
and regulatory framework requirements) such as fraud and corruption, security, information …, 
must be managed by means of separate risk assessments, conducted by Services and Divisions. The 
risks identified during these risk assessments must be included in the relevant risk registers … and 
in the [SA DOD] consolidated risk register.”.  When there is risk, mitigation and/or security is 
required.  Notably, knowledge is not mentioned as a specialised risk, only information.  This is 
probably based on the perception of the SA DOD that information is knowledge.  
DODI46 details aerial photography policy in the SA DOD.  It states that – “Aerial 
photography or imagery is important for both civilian and military purposes.” - and that “The 
military use it for specialised purposes such as imagery intelligence, operational planning and target 
acquisition … Such imagery is part of a greater system of information collection and intelligence 
production.”  (DODI46: 1).   This text not only separates information from intelligence as different 
constructs but insinuate the intelligence cycle by stating that information is collected (not produced) 
and then subjected to a process (the intelligence cycle or puzzle building) to generate intelligence.  
This policy statement clearly recognises that intelligence is more than information.  Several other 
references are made to the needs for security of SA DOD aerial photography information (DODI46: 
2, 5, 6, 9 and 10) and by implication also knowledge security.  In fact, aerial photographs are 
probably much closer to being a knowledge artefact than being information. 
DODI39 addresses the requirement for information security on SA DOD intranets in general.  
Knowledge security is not addressed. DODI57 details the SA DOD Level 1 policy on Information 
Communication System (ICS) security.  The entire DODI57 is relevant, however, for the researcher 
not to stray too far from the research questions, it is safe to say that DODI57 highlights the 
requirement for SA DOD information security, and Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) and system security as enablers to IM – and inevitably will result in important enablers to a 
future SA DOD KMC.  DODI57 does not describe knowledge continuum security in general.  
DODI57 (B7 and B8) elaborates on security requirements for ICS only, and in particular - 
“65. [ICS] Domain. An inter-connected [sic] set of information resources under the same direct 
control of a single management authority (for example system manager) within a domain that 
shares common functionality. A domain is a group of computers and devices on a network that 
are [sic] administered as a unit with common rules and procedures where all the components of 
the system are subject to a single, system-specific security plan. 
66. [ICS] Security. The protection afforded to information systems in order to preserve the
availability, integrity and confidentiality of the systems and the information contained within the 
systems according to affordable security practices. Such protection is the application of the 
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combination of all security disciplines, including information security, communication security, 
operations security, resource protection, physical security and personnel security. 
67. [ICS] Security Officer/Official (ISSO). An officer/warrant officer/manager appointed and 
sufficiently cleared and qualified to assure security of information systems and the information 
during insertion/extraction from information systems within the context of a user system (unit), 
higher order user system (Brigade/Division/Service), or within the context of product system 
management. (Also in DODI60: B-2) 
68. [ICS] Security Policy. A security policy applicable to all components of ICSs in an 
organisation that addresses the course of action to implement rules, regulations and controls to 
ensure physical, environmental, personnel, information and communications security. (Also in 
DODI60: B-2) 
69. [ICS] Technology. Any equipment or interconnected system or sub-system [sic] of 
equipment, that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, 
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission or reception of vocal, pictorial, 
textual and numerical data or information by a micro-electronics based combination of 
computing, telecommunications, video and/or any electronic or electro-magnetic [sic] 
communication means. 
70. Information Assurance. Measures used to protect and defend information and information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-
repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 
71. Information Security. The method of protecting information in computer and 
communications systems against unauthorised access, disclosure, transfer, modification and 
destruction whether accidental or intentional.”.  
DODI60 (3 and 5) states that - “No information with a classification higher than “confidential” 
may be sent over the [SA DOD] Electronic Mail System unless an appropriate [SA DOD] approved 
encryption application and algorithm is used …”; and - “Only data where the content is classified 
up to and including “Confidential” may be transmitted via e-mail. No information classified secret 
or top secret shall be sent via DOD E-mail System unless authorised by the appropriate authority”.  
This will considerably slow down knowledge sharing if users do not have the correct clearance and 
encryption level to access the information. 
Other security-related policy statements deal with social media and personal information.  
IDODI1 details the use of social media by the SA DOD.  FMDI1 (8 and 9) states the security aspect 
about information published on social media by the SA DOD, primarily referring to legislation and 
other SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine on matters of information security.  JDP1 reiterates the 
right of confidentiality of medical information and DODI 43 (J2-3) states the security requirement 
for SMS personal data.  These stipulations conform to the security issues already discussed above. 
6.2.4.2 Philosophy, Architecture and Integration 
The researcher could not find any evidence of an SA DOD KM Philosophy in any of the 
policy documents selected or elsewhere.  DODI24 (35) states that the SA DOD has IM Philosophy 
that should be followed whenever there is a risk of loss of data, typically when software is disposed 
of or updated.  For the purposes of this analysis and the apparent importance of the SA DOD 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 294 
 
philosophy as stated in several of the selected samples of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine, the 
IM Philosophy was consulted for clarity.  The SA DOD IM Philosophy can probably be considered 
Level 2 policy and/or doctrine. 
The SA DOD IM Philosophy aims at the management of the SA DOD enterprise information, 
progressively moving away from an IT-driven IM philosophy to that of an SA DOD information 
systems philosophy (Information Management Philosophy: 2007) -  
“The focus of the IM Philosophy is on providing direction with regard to IM in the [SA DOD]. 
This is to ensure a comprehensive and consistent approach to the management of information in 
the [SA DOD], which will optimise the value of [SA DOD] information assets, aligned with 
recognised IM standards and good practices.” (Information Management Philosophy: 2007: vi). 
This, according to the document, is the first step towards the “… ability to improve [SA DOD 
organisational] maturity by inculcating a knowledge culture in an information orientated 
organisation therefore becomes the next strategic ICT management perspective.” (Information 
Management Philosophy: 2007: v). 
Although firmly entrenched in the information era and its associated thinking, the philosophy 
is positioned to provide a sound platform for the construction and implementation of SA KM 
(Information Management Philosophy: 2007: 31 and 41). This is one of the few SA DOD 
documents that refer to KM and provides some hint as to a definition of knowledge promoted 
within the SA DOD.  The philosophy does not offer an analysis of knowledge nor KM as the next 
level to be achieved.  In the researcher’s opinion, this is a symptom of SA DOD capability 
champions retiring without being able to commence with the construction of the next phase, and/or 
not being able to instil adequate interest in the successor to take the initiative to its conclusion – i.e. 
SA DOD KMC.  The DR 2015 speaks of this knowledge sharing and leadership gap, but only 
speaks to information and IM and not recognising the importance of knowledge as the actual 
strategic asset and KM as the enabler to secure an advantage from knowledge. 
The SA DOD IM philosophy recognises the knowledge hierarchy (i.e. data, information, 
knowledge and wisdom), but interestingly, no mention of intelligence is made as was discussed in 
the literature review (Chapter 2 of this dissertation).  It could thus be assumed that intelligence is 
conceptualised as being part of either information or knowledge.  The IM philosophy, however, 
does not recognise that there is a dynamic overlap between the constructs which makes the 
conceptualisation of a knowledge continuum much more preferable. 
The definition of knowledge promulgated in the IM philosophy is - “Knowledge is 
information in context, together with an understanding of how to use it (Brooking, 1999)
85” 
(Information Management Philosophy: 2007: 9).  This would correspond to elements of the 
definition of knowledge and KM of this dissertation but is by no means comprehensive enough.  It 
also contradicts the definition of information in several SA DOD Level 1 policies.  There is thus a 
recognition of the fact that knowledge is more than information and data – hence the projection of 
the philosophy that the next level for the organisational growth path is KM.  Reference made to the 
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constructs of context and understanding points to the complexity of KM vs. IM.  How this 
definition of knowledge was chosen amongst many others available from the literature, at the time, 
is not clear.  It does not indicate how much context is required to reach knowledge status and 
understanding is only linked to utility and not to knowing.  Also, the Brooking definition originates 
from an early stage of the development of KM as a management discipline.  More definitions 
should be considered for the SA DOD to be able to construct a knowledge and KM definition 
suitable for an SA DOD KMC.  This dissertation considered several definitions originating from all 
parts of the world and over an extended period of time to inform the definitions of knowledge and 
KM proposed for a future SA DOD KM and KMC.  The definition does not allude to the 
evolutionary process that considers changing context and is thus very static.  The definition does not 
point to the objective of creating knowledge – i.e. to create new meaning – and what this new 
meaning will be useful for, which could be indicators for what IM and KM systems are required by 
the SA DOD – i.e. systems for decision-making, action, effects and advantage. Thus, the SA DOD 
will possibly manage information for the sake of managing information and not linked to the 
requirements of managing knowledge in the SA DOD.  Information management systems will be 
selected and maintained based on the silos that exist within the SA DOD.  Knowledge management 
systems can be the integrators to this predicament.  There is a considerable requirement for 
integration of the SA DOD knowledge continuum based on the discussion thus far.  
The SA DOD, furthermore, recognises the value of mapped organisational information.  This 
is fundamental to IM.  JDP4 (D2-12) states the following about information architecture –  
“ … Information Architecture is a high-level map of the information requirements of an 
organisation. It is a personnel, organisation and technology independent profile of the major 
information categories used within an enterprise. It provides a way to map the information needs 
of an organisation, relate them to specific business processes, and document their 
interrelationships. The interrelationships between information and processes are used to guide 
applications development and facilitate integration and sharing of data.”. 
DODI22 (16) states that IM code is important to the establishment of organisational structures 
in particular during the planning phase. The statement confirms the co-dependency of data and 
information with regard to organisational information requirements.  It further states the importance 
of this architecture to be able to implement and/or integrate the correct IT solutions as enablers.   It 
does not express a relationship with organisational knowledge.   
Much the same, DODI26 (Appendix A -1) defines business architecture as - “The coherent 
and authoritive [sic] source of knowledge about what an enterprise does; how, when, why and 
where it operates; what resources are being used in the process; and with whom it interacts 
(internally and externally) in fulfilling its mandate”.  SANDFP1 (2) states that the SA DOD has the 
- “Defence Enterprise Information System (DEIS) Master Plan” to facilitate integration. It provides 
an - “… integrated [SA DOD ICS] view and a realistic single execution mechanism of all [ICS and 
Services] initiatives, programmes, projects and requirements in terms of both the investment and 
maintenance portfolios”. So, the SA DOD is thoroughly entrenched in IM architecture. 
These architectures will provide a valuable foundation to SA DOD KM because it will inform 
a knowledge audit of the SA DOD and subsequent SA DOD knowledge map.  For the SA DOD to 
get to the next level of competitiveness and advantage it needs to progress to a knowledge 
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architecture, thus separating the information and knowledge components to ensure that decisions, 
actions, effects and advantage are based on knowledge rather than on information.  The final goal 
for the SA DOD would be to construct a dynamic integrated enterprise architecture that exists to 
integrate the entire SA DOD knowledge continuum with processes, sensors and IT systems.  This is 
reflected in Figure 6.9. 
DODI26 (10) makes mention of external data sources and that the SA DOD should endeavour 
to maintain links with these where relevant.  SANDFP3 (xvii and 12-2 and 12-3) states that IT is an 
important enabler to provide the deployed forces with tactical, operational and strategic 
information.  “This information must ensure that all members participating in the mission are 
adapting in near real-time to rapid changing circumstances.” (SANDFP3: 12-2).   It should also 
ensure the - “… sharing of information within the joint, inter-departmental and multi-national 
context … The enabling of the seamless sharing of information during the interdepartmental 
deployment of forces.”  (SANDFP3: 12-3).   
These requirements point to the fact that integration should also be achieved with external 
stakeholders and role-players.  This confirms the requirement for integration of IT systems and IM 
efforts in support of agility, adaptability and flexibility within complex environments and 
facilitating information sharing.  This supports the idea that IT is a mere enabler to IM and KM and 
does not constitute IM or KM.  The level of integration highlighted above will require strong 
leadership. 
6.2.4.3 Knowledge Champions and Primary Functional Role-players 
The selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine documents do not make any 
mention of an SA DOD KM champion of a CKO.  This clearly points to the fact that there is no 
single point in the SA DOD where all types of SA DOD knowledge converge to be managed in a 
coherent and integrated manner.  Although the SA DOD employ information managers, doctrine 
managers, intelligence managers, and IP managers – the management of these functional areas 
remain in silos with no integrating functionary such as a CKO leading an integrated KMC to ensure 
advantage maximisation. 
The CIO for the SA DOD is the Director General (or Sec Def) as per PAIA (Sec 1(a)(ii)) as 
discussed in Chapter 5 of the dissertation. Yet, DODI50 (Disclosure of Defence Information) makes 
no mention of this.  The researcher could only find one reference to the SA DOD CIO in the 
selected sample, as legislated - “No staff member shall provide information and records that are not 
in the public domain to the public without consulting the [CIO].  Specific guidelines regarding 
requests for information are contained in the Promotion of Access to Information Policy.” (JDP 9: 
31).   
IDODI2 (7) states that the Sec Def (CIO and SA DOD accounting officer) is accountable for 
establishing and managing systems for the management of performance information in the SA 
DOD.  However, the functional responsibility lies with C CMIS.  The reason for this is that CMIS 
not only manages the information technology of the SA DOD but also de facto the 
data/information/knowledge flow within the SA DOD by virtue of the responsibility for the 
functionality of the SA DOD data and information networks, cyber domain and the archive function 
as described in the DR 2015 and SA DOD policy.  The Sec Def is thus a primary SA DOD 
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knowledge champion from the perspective that the SA DOD regards information as inclusive of 
data and knowledge, critical for integration with a future SA DOD KMC. 
DODI48 (2) states – “The CSANDF is responsible for the command, control and 
administration within the SANDF and must supply the Accounting Officer [Sec Def as the SA 
DOD CIO] with any information as requested. [Section 15(e) and (g) Defence Act]”. DODI27 (A-1) 
quotes the legislated requirement (Defence Act 42 of 2002 (Section 14.g) of information sharing 
between CSANDF and the Sec Def.  As stated in Chapter 5 of the dissertation – knowledge should 
be included in Section 14.g of the Defence Act.  This information sharing requirement between the 
two components of the SA DOD (the Defence Secretariat and the SANDF) is and should be the 
primary driver for the requirement for coherence and integration.  Such coherence and integration 
will require the identification of leaders within each domain in order to understand C2 relationships 
that will require refinement to replace the information and knowledge silos in the SA DOD with an 
integrated enterprise knowledge continuum. 
JWP4 (vi), SANDFO4 (1 and 3), SANDFD2 identify key research, development and 
management role-players of SA DOD joint doctrine as being CSANDF, C JOPS, Chiefs of Services 
and Divisions, Joint Doctrine Committee and operational level staff.  More detail as to their 
responsibilities are as follows: 
“a. Controlling Authority – [CSANDF]. He is overall responsible for all aspects relating to the 
development of Joint Doctrine. He may delegate this to the [C JOPS]. 
b. Responsible Authority – [C JOPS]. He is responsible to the [SANDF] for the research and
development of Joint Doctrine and the management of the Joint Doctrine process as delegated in 
his performance agreement. 
c. Staff Authority - Chief Director Operations Development. He is responsible to the [C JOPS]
for the development, control and management of Joint Doctrine. 
d. Staff Authority - Director Doctrine Development. He is responsible to the Chief Director
Operations Development for the research, planning, development, approval, promulgation, 
distribution and maintenance of all Joint Doctrine. He also is the appointed chairperson of the 
Joint Doctrine Committee. [SANDFP2 (7) states that the Director Doctrine Development should 
maintain a joint doctrine publication register and issue a status report on doctrine every two 
months.  JDP will be published on the SA DOD policy database.] 
e. Staff Authority – Joint Doctrine Committee. This committee consists of representatives of the
services and divisions and they are responsible for scrutinising doctrine for appropriateness and 
correctness. This committee forms the first level of approval. They may initiate the development 
of doctrine by issuing a project directive to any specialist in his/her field within the SANDF. 
f. Staff Authority – Chiefs of Services and Divisions. They are to assist with the research and
development of all Joint Doctrine. They are to implement promulgated Joint Doctrine. They are 
to test Joint Doctrine during force preparation and are to give feedback in the form of lessons 
learnt to [C JOPS] regarding all aspect of Joint Doctrine.”.  
Specifically, also, DODI31 (9 and 10) states that the Chief of Services and Divisions are 
responsible for their own chemical, biological and radioactive doctrine under the guidance of [C 
JOPS].    In support of the above policy statement, DODI1 (4-9 and 4-11), SANDFP2 (2- 6) and 
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SANDFP3 (vi) state key SA DOD doctrine management role-players – i.e. C JOPS, the SANDF 
Joint Doctrine Committee and Doctrine Development Task Teams, Operations Staff Council, SA 
DOD Planning Board and the Military Command Council, Publication Development Officer (also 
SANDFO4: v, SANDFP2: 2, 3 and 6), Director Doctrine Development (also SANDFO4: v, 
SANDFP2: 2, 3 and 6), Director Doctrine and Policy, SO1 Doctrine Management, SA DOD Project 
Officer (DODI40: 112 and M9-4) and  Services and Division (SANDFO2: 2-1-11 - unique fire and 
rescue doctrine).  
DODI40 (27 and 50) states throughout that doctrine development form a distinct part of the 
acquisition of a user system.  DODI40 (109) states that the SANDF is responsible to conduct a 
comprehensive doctrine study before acquired systems can be operationalised.  Thus, the 
development of military knowledge, as well as the alignment of matériel with existing military 
knowledge such as doctrine, is an integral part of defence matériel acquisition. DODI56 (2) states 
that ETD doctrine is the responsibility of the Chiefs of Services and Division.  DODI40 (56) states 
that the Command and Control Capability Board is distinctly responsible for the review and 
approval of doctrine that impacts C2.  These role-players ensure SA DOD doctrine coherence and 
integration.        C SANDF is ultimately responsible for SA DOD doctrine and is thus a primary SA 
DOD knowledge champion, critical for integration with a future SA DOD KMC. 
DODI9 (4) names two key role-players in SA DOD IM – the Government Information 
Technology Officer and C CMIS.  
“The [Government Information Technology Officer], on behalf of the [Sec Def], is the appointed 
functional authority for defence enterprise information, information technology and information 
management in the [SA DOD]. This implies the specific responsibilities of strategic direction, 
policy and control with regards [sic] to information and information communication 
technology.”.  Also - “C CMIS as head of the CMIS Division and the prime system integrator is 
responsible for realising effective management of information, including the management of 
records as strategic resource. The [Sec Def] as Head of the [SA DOD] has designated [C CMIS] 
as the [SA DOD] Records Manager in terms of section 13(5) of the National Archives and 
Records Service of South Africa Act.”. 
All the policies and most doctrine refer to C CMIS in the distribution list.  DODI53 (13) 
refers to the C CMIS erroneously as Chief of Command Information Management Services 
(DODI53: I-2)). C CMIS is mandated to execute SA DOD IM and ICT management on behalf of 
the Sec Def (or SA DOD CIO), making C CMIS the de facto SA DOD CIO.   
It could be argued that either one of these should be considered to be the SA DOD CKO since 
there is no SA DOD Chief of Command Knowledge Management Services or a CKO.   However, 
this would encroach on the mandates of those functionaries responsible for the management of 
policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP as other categories of capstone SA DOD knowledge. 
SANDFP3 (14-6, 7, 8) confirms the process support role of CMIS to the SA DOD.  DODI40 
(56 and 58) states that the CMIS Board is responsible for - “… to ensure uniformity in 
infrastructure & data management throughout the [SA DOD].”.  This Board is thus a key role-
player in the governance and management of enablers for a future SA DOD KMC and a dynamic 
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integrated enterprise architecture.  However, it only refers to data management, which is 
disappointing.   
IDODI2 (8) states that the Information System Support Manager within the CMIS 
environment - “…is responsible to provide the infrastructure and specification standards for 
information systems to support monitoring and evaluation in the [SA DOD]”.  DODI24 (3) 
confirms the SITA roles within the SA DOD - amongst others data processing.  DODI24 (16 and C-
3) states that the Software Asset Manager is responsible for data management of software and 
related assets. 
DODI57 (7-1, E2 and E3) refers to the function of the Computer Information Management as 
a function of CMIS.  Computer Information Management is basically the maintenance, in 
conjunction with the logistics officer, of a detailed record of all equipment linked to the local area 
network to maintain and update a detailed logical and physical design plan of the network and 
monitor the total performance of the network.  It is a system to enable asset management. 
DODISPF1 (23) and IDODI2 (23) state that DI is a Defence Programme.  C DI and in 
particular Sub-Division Counter-Intelligence are responsible for SA DOD information-, intelligence 
security and counter-intelligence as discussed in some detail above. DODI28 (5 and 9) states that - 
“[C DI], [Sub-Division Counter-Intelligence], is responsible to monitor information security of the 
ergonomics databases and to scrutinise and provide authority for the release/access to [SA DOD] 
records in cases where such access to records is not requested in terms of the [PAIA]”.  Thus, C DI 
is not only a primary role-player in SA DOD KM (intelligence perspective) but also a primary role-
player and security custodian of data, information and knowledge (counter-intelligence 
perspective).  Another role-player in securing the information is the Controlling Body for 
Ergonomics and ARMSCOR (DODI28: 6, 8, 15 and 16) as stated above. 
DODI33 (9 and 10) states the responsibility of DI for security within the context of South 
African Military Assistance and Training Teams.  This would include information and intelligence 
security.  DODI1 (7C-4) recognises the role of DI, specifically counter-intelligence in scrutinising 
corporate communication intranet information, which may also contain data and knowledge.  
DODI24 (8) states the responsibilities of DI regarding software management as the 
performance of security testing of suspect software, specifically if used in sensitive environments 
and the security classification of SA DOD specific software.  DI is also responsible for business 
processes publications security vetting (DODI24: 5) and SANDF policy publications security 
vetting (SANDFO5: 5).   This reiterates the security requirement for policy as capstone military 
knowledge.  Furthermore, as SA DOD KM champion, C DI is responsible for the management of 
two distinct types of intelligence as stated below.  DODI31 (15) adds operational- and tactical 
intelligence to the list -  
“a. Management of Strategic Intelligence. Determination of the strategies, policies, missions, 
force structures and developments regarding the use of [chemical and biological] weapons of 
foreign states. 
b. Management of Technical Intelligence. Determination of technical capabilities of foreign 
weapon systems, types of agents and stockpiling of agents in order to be able to take timely 
decisions on effective defensive measures.”. 
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This DI responsibility, in addition to what has already been highlighted earlier in this chapter, 
is the link between intelligence time-value, decisions and actions.  In addition to the primary 
responsibility of DI for information and military knowledge security, Service/Divisional Chiefs 
shall be responsible for own specific tactical chemical, biological and radioactive related defence 
intelligence (DODI31: 4).   
DODI57 (1-2) states the responsibility of C CMIS and C DI (Sub-Division Counter-
Intelligence) to secure SA DOD data.  C CMIS is responsible for the data and information integrity 
contained in IT systems
86
.  This makes C CMIS a key role-player in a proposed SA DOD KMC due 
to the responsibility for the technology enablers to manage the knowledge continuum with.  JDP15 
(12) states that C CMIS and C DI are responsible for – “The authorisation for the use and retrieval 
of military information for the writing of a study or treatise”.  This statement highlights the fact that 
SA DOD data, information and knowledge security is a joint function based on two different 
perspectives – i.e. IT system perspective and a counter-intelligence threat perspective.  
Interestingly, it is legislated that the SA DOD CIO is the Sec Def, yet the Sec Def is not included in 
the approval line for research and dissertation writing.  Chief of Human Resources as a primary 
knowledge champion of the SA DOD is also not included in the statement.   These are important 
role-players in decisions about future knowledge creation as facilitated by the academic processes. 
Thus there is continuously a stated requirement for integration in order to provide coherence and 
optimum solutions to KM.   C CMIS and C DI are thus primary SA DOD knowledge champions, 
critical for integration with a future SA DOD KMC.  JWP8 (4-23) states about the role of SA DOD 
Corp Com as an integrated governmental function, linking communication and information very 
closely as follows - 
 
“In order to play its role in government communication and information campaigns the [SA 
DOD], led by the [Head of Communication] in the Office of the Minister of Defence, uses [Corp 
Com] to manage its total communication effort. [Corp Com] is aligned with government 
communication policy and direction, which is currently given to all government communication 
by the [Government Communication and Information System] in the form of the government 
communication strategy, themes and messages. In the [SA DOD], this direction is provided and 
channelled by the Head of Communication in the form of [Corp Com] policy, strategy, plans and 
guidelines, and includes messages and themes. [Corp Com] is also integrated throughout the [SA 
DOD].”. 
This policy statement confirms the complexity of the macro environment within which the SA 
DOD functions and its dependency on other departments for knowledge continuum artefacts, 
human and relational capital.  DODI1 (1-4, 1-10, 2-5, 3-4, 4-37, 5-2 and 7-2), DODI23 (9) and 
IDODI1 (3) state that the SA DOD Head of Communications is the functional authority for the 
execution and implementation of SA DOD Corp Com doctrine and that doctrine forms part of the 
SA DOD Corp Com user and product systems.  The SA DOD Head of Communications is central 
to this process.  The future SA DOD CKO will thus have to be positioned carefully in order to 
facilitate this inter-departmental knowledge continuum management and exchange that will enable 
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the SA DOD Head of Communications with the appropriate knowledge continuum artefacts.  
Another integration is with C DI.  Integration and coherence cannot be overstated as a requirement.   
JDP4 (D2-6) states the requirement for the SA DOD to progressively develop towards a 
learning organisation. JDP3 (3-2) uses the construct of knowledge in conjunction with the study or 
learning process.  For this to happen the SA DOD is required to continually invest in the “… 
knowledge, skills and competencies of its personnel”.  This is the responsibility of every SA DOD 
leadership position, but in particular and coordinated by C HR.  Other primary role-players are 
Chief of Joint Training, which is a function with SA DOD C HR, responsible for SA DOD ETD 
doctrine (DODI16: 9). The importance of doctrine to SA DOD ETD was discussed earlier in this 
chapter (JDP16: B-3 and JDP16: C-1). The Joint Training Division has a Directorate Policy and 
Doctrine (JDP16: D-1).  Thus, C HR is not only a primary custodian of human capital development 
within the SA DOD; CHR is also the knowledge champion on HRM related doctrine.  This makes 
C HR a primary SA DOD knowledge champion that is critical for integration with a future SA 
DOD KMC. 
DODI23 (v, 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15 and 43) states key role-players in the management of SA 
DOD IP; MOD, Sec Def (responsible for SA DOD oversight), Chiefs of Services and Divisions 
(designated nodal points for their structures for IP management), Chief Defence Matériel (the 
appointed nodal point for defence materiel related IP), Chief of Defence Legal Services, C DI 
(primarily counter-intelligence) and SSO Science and Technology Knowledge and Intellectual 
Property.  The SSO post has since been renamed to SSO Intangible Assets.  The Head of Supply 
Chain Integration function has since been integrated into Defence Matériel.  Thus, over and above 
those already identified as primary SA DOD knowledge champions; the MOD, Chiefs of Services 
and Divisions, Chief Defence Matériel, Chief of Defence Legal Services is primary SA DOD 
knowledge champions, critical for integration with a future SA DOD KMC. 
DODI40 (79) states that Defence Matériel Division is managing the SA DOD project database 
and DODI40 (F-4) adds the project milestone database. DODI40 (21 and 31) states that a 
manufacturing data pack of drawings and specifications are important products of the design 
development phase of SA DOD acquisition projects and that the main contractor is responsible for 
the configuration management of the data packs.  Thus, the defence industry (represented by the 
contractor) plays an important role in the quality and security of SA DOD acquisition related data. 
This makes Defence Matériel Division an important role-player in SA DOD KM based on the 
formal and informal relational capital with the defence industry as well as the structural capital 
managed by the SA DOD by the defence industry as overseen by the Defence Matériel Division and 
Armscor through contracts. The manufacturing data pack of drawings, specifications and project 
milestone documents are considered capstone military knowledge from a project management 
perspective.  These documents are not policy, doctrine, intelligence but much closer to a form of IP.  
Contracts are very comprehensive documents covering every aspect (why, who, what, where, when, 
how, which effect and what thereafter) and should possibly be considered another category of 
capstone military knowledge.  Within contracts as a category of capstone military knowledge 
Memorandum of Understanding, Memorandum of Agreement and Service Level Agreements could 
possibly be added.  Contracts form part of the organisational structural capital. 
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DODI40 (48 and 99) states the functions of the joint project team for armament acquisition, of 
which one is to address IP related issues during the project.  Intellectual Property rights must be 
addressed in the Project Study, Project Study Report, Development Plan and Acquisition Plan 
(DODI40: 92, 94 and 104).  ARMSCOR is responsible to address IP related issues (DODI40, 97, 98 
and 102) during the System Study and Acquisition Study Competitive Tender and Acquisition 
Study Single Tender.  This basically requires the project team to be aware and to manage SA DOD 
defence matérial IP related issues on a continuous basis.   
DODI23 (13) states the key SA DOD decision-making forums involved with SA DOD IP 
management as the Armaments Technology Acquisition Secretariat, Defence Research and 
Development Board, Armaments Acquisition Control Board which provide approval for the 
leveraging of defence matériel related IP by Chief Defence Matériel.  The Armaments Acquisition 
Steering Board provides approval for the leveraging of strategic defence matériel related IP by the 
Sec Def.  The Armaments Acquisition Council provides approval for the leveraging of strategic 
defence matériel related IP by the MOD.  These SA DOD knowledge champions and the associated 
management forums play a very important role in SA DOD KM and should thus be integrated with 
the management initiatives of a proposed SA DOD KMC. 
DODI29 (9 and B-1) states the role of the Ammunition and Explosive Functional Controlling 
Authority in the management of the munition database.  DODI29 (5) states the importance of the 
Munitions Safety Information and Analysis Centre for the sharing and analysis of technical 
munition related information to - “… aid munitions developers developing or modifying munitions, 
so as to have reduced vulnerability to unplanned stimuli and to reduce collateral damage.”. This 
data is important for the control of munitions but also for research and development of munitions 
and explosive materials.  It falls within the knowledge managed by Chief Defence Matériel. 
DODI61 expresses on the SA DOD requirement for the maintenance of a Consultants 
Management Information System (which is essentially a database) for management and reporting 
purposes. The Chief Director Materiel Governance and the Consultant Control Principal within the 
Defence Matériel Division are responsible for this which adds to the importance of Chief Defence 
Matériel as an SA DOD KM champion.  
DODI44 (7) states – “All badges, logos, insignia (or any other heraldic devices) are to comply 
with Government Communication Information Service and Heraldic prescripts”.  As stated earlier, 
GCIS is an important role-player in SA DOD KM from a corporate branding perspective but also 
from a military identity and esprit de corps perspective, because soldiers attach much value and 
pride to corps and unit insignia and qualification badges (amongst others things).  These insignias 
are also important from a C2 perspective in military operations. 
DODI23 (4, 13 and 15) identifies SITA and ARMSCOR as primary agencies in SA DOD IP 
management.  ARMSCOR is responsible for SA DOD IP by virtue of the ARMSCOR Act (51 of 
2003).  ARMSCOR is the legislated custodian of SA DOD IP under the shareholdership of the 
MOD and direction of the Sec Def.  DODI28 states that ARMSCOR is responsible to maintain the 
SA DOD ergonomics database as discussed earlier in terms of the requirement for security.  This 
makes SITA and ARMSCOR a primary stakeholder in SA DOD KM and a key partner to a future 
SA DOD KMC. 
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DODI23 (3) states that the National IP Management Office is a key role-player in IP that is 
generated with RSA public funds.  As such, all SA DOD IP is generated with public funds.  The 
National IP Management Office is a structure within the Department of Science and Technology, 
which makes this department an important role-player in SA DOD IP management and a key 
partner to a future SA DOD KMC.  The level of integration that can be achieved between the 
proposed SA DOD KMC, government agencies such as SITA and Armscor and other RSA 
governmental departments will have a significant impact on the success of SA DOD KM. 
6.2.4.4 Critical Knowledge Management Components 
Over and above the identification of SA DOD knowledge champions above and other 
fundamentals expressed on thus far; there are other critical components expressed on in the selected 
sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine that will contribute to SA DOD KMC success. 
Funding remains fundamental to the success of any organisational capability. Funding SA 
DOD knowledge development and then funding SA DOD KM are both critical. Some discussion 
about funding can also be found in the section dealing with security and the associated costs of 
security classifications. Knowledge plays a significant role in determining the funding requirements 
of SA DOD functions and capabilities.  DODD2 (3) for example, makes reference to health 
intelligence as a factor in determining the costs of SA DOD health care.  Having a KM champion, 
funding and other resources committed to a KMC fundamentally enhance the success rate; as was 
discussed in Chapter 3 of the dissertation from a USA military perspective. 
JWP8 (4-11) states that the primary source of intelligence is human intelligence.  This states 
the importance of people management in terms of knowledge development and sharing.  This is 
premised on the fact that people inherently possess tacit knowledge and wisdom.  When these are 
articulated or codified it becomes explicit knowledge (who, what, where, when, how, which effects 
and what thereafter).  Such explicit knowledge is shared amongst interested parties typically at 
seminars and similar events but also during intelligence operations.  This knowledge and the 
associated processes are critical to knowledge development from a learning perspective and from a 
situational awareness perspective. 
The SA DOD recognises seminars, conferences, congresses and symposia as events that SA 
DOD personnel can gain knowledge from applicable to the workplace (DODI15: 4).  If this is the 
case then the SA DOD should have a policy in place to manage the attendance of these events in 
order to expand the knowledge-base of the SA DOD.  These events are critical knowledge sharing 
opportunities that should be managed in an integrated SA DOD knowledge sharing programme by 
the proposed SA DOD KMC.  Also part of a learning organisation concept is transformation.  JDP4 
(B-6) states that data are important to the monitoring function within SA DOD transformation 
management. 
DODI26 makes reference to a - “… subject matter specialist”; but more specifically, the 
requirement for this person to use their knowledge to - “… provide guidance to human resources so 
that they can make judgments, formulate decisions and do their work.” (DODI26: 10).  This is the 
ultimate goal of KM – i.e. to enhance decision-making, to enable actions and to deliver the desired 
effects and establish or increase advantage.  Subject matter specialists are pivotal to corporate 
memory and are primary candidates for use in ETD, seminar, communities of practice, as sources of 
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intelligence – amongst several other uses.   Subject matter specialists are the SA DOD’s incubators 
of new and evolving meaning.  Their availability to share knowledge should be managed centrally 
and in an integrated manner by a proposed SA DOD KMC, the Service and Divisional Chiefs and C 
HR (at the very least).  A subject matter specialist database could be a powerful enabler to get ‘the 
right knowledge to the right place at the right time in support of the right effects’.  A form of 
subject matter expert is mentors which the SA DOD uses from time-to-time.  JDP4 (13 and B-5) 
states that mentors should be considered as sources of knowledge to protégés.  Mentors can also be 
positioned as an important coordinator for the sharing of knowledge and the establishment of a 
learning organisation.  This not only confirms the distinct link between knowledge, people and 
learning but also support the importance of subject matter specialists.     
In order to achieve ‘learning organisation’ status (as mentioned above and earlier in 
conjunction with doctrine, technology and people) it is important to have all the necessary 
knowledge resources in place. JDP9 (10) states that the SA DOD should make effective use of 
available expertise in the SA DOD such as - “… expertise in archives and records management, 
[IT], data and [IM], business system analysis and design, auditing, risk management, and law.”.  
JWP1 (8-3) states – 
 
“b. Information as a Resource. CMIS has information resources in terms of libraries, digital 
information repositories and databases that can be most useful to [any SA DOD] functionary. 
This type of requirement may need to be fulfilled from South Africa when deployed externally 
and may require research, so lead times must be taken into account to allow for timely delivery 
of the required products. The majority, however, should be available on digital repositories 
accessible on the contingent’s Wide Area Network.”. 
As such, all data, information, knowledge, and their associated repositories and subject matter 
experts are important resources to be managed by a KMC in a coherent and integrated manner for 
internal use but also when external partners are involved.  Much of this has been discussed already 
above.  The security aspect of knowledge continuum artefacts cannot be overstated, particularly 
when sharing is allowed and required with foreign partners during operations.  
SANDFP3 (xv) states that a lack of infrastructure in the battlespace might hamper the flow of 
information.  This statement can be expanded to ‘flow of knowledge continuum artefacts’ to 
eliminate ambiguity about what is required for operations in the battlespace.  JWP8 (5-27 and 5B-1) 
states from a PSO perspective that - “Some nations may not be willing to divulge information, even 
to allies, and the absence of, and incompatibility of MIS within the [African Union] and [South 
African Development Community] will undoubtedly hamper the sharing of information.”.  
From the perspective of knowledge related structures, an organogram is provided by JWP8 
(5-3) – see Figure 6.8 below, depicting the J2 (Intelligence) position within the context of the 
continental staff system discussed in military KM (dissertation Chapter 3). 
The continental staff system and its shortcomings with regard to KM were discussed earlier in 
the dissertation.  However, it remains a critical organisational structure and a C2 concept for the 
management of capstone military knowledge such as military intelligence and counter-intelligence.   
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JWP1 (7-2) states the importance of establishing an operations information centre for 
corporate communication activities –  
“An operations information centre is established in close proximity to or within the main 
operations centre, as a central point for the reception and dissemination of information about the 
operation, including media releases and briefings. It acts as the point of entry for all external 
requests for Corp Com related information”. 
 
Figure 6.8: Continental Staff System 
Source: JWP8 (5-3).   
Corporate communications are part of the J5 staff function (Figure 6.8).  The quote identifies 
another component of the knowledge continuum that exists in the continental staff system critical to 
the success of operations.  This quote above highlights the importance of having structures or 
organisational components that provide coherence and integration in terms of what and how 
knowledge continuum is managed.  The SA DOD has several organisational components that 
generate and manage knowledge (as discussed above) but no central organisation or component 
with which to achieve coherence and integration. The continental staff system could, however, be 
revised to include the C2 of the entire knowledge continuum in order to minimise the risk of not 
considering the impact of the entire knowledge continuum in an integrated manner.  Integration 
with a KMC should enhance access to ‘evolving meaning’ by the commander and his staff. 
Just as with funding discussed above, knowledge needs to be planned for and is fundamental 
to planning.  For example, intelligence requirements must be planned for - “The [Force 
Commander], … , must drive and direct the conduct of intelligence gathering during PSO as in all 
military operations.” (JWP8: 4-10). Within the context of PSOs planning assure – “… accurate, up-
to-date information is vital to effective logistics planning and to supply distribution … The 
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information and data essential to effective logistic planning are much less readily transferred 
between nations with disparate doctrine and different [MIS].” (JWP8: 5-27 and 5B-1). 
The planning for knowledge is a critical requirement stemming from the time-value of 
knowledge construct.  It is closely associated with the concepts of ‘real-time’ and ‘near-real-time’ 
knowing required for decisions and actions. The more current knowledge is, the more accurate 
planning will be, enhancing the quality of decisions and subsequent actions, their effects and 
gaining advantage.  These issues are reflected in Figures 6.9a and 6.9b.   
Earlier in the chapter, the researcher referred to several policies, doctrine, strategies and 
philosophies.  None of these exists for SA DOD KM.  Without structural capital the SA DOD KM 
will not achieve coherence and integration and the establishment of an SA DOD KMC will have no 
basis.  Structural capital is fundamental to SA DOD KM. 
6.2.4.5 Processes 
Taking note that SA DOD policy regards information as inclusive of data and knowledge; 
policy and doctrine statements about data management, IM and KM processes are considered and 
discussed in this section.  Processes are fundamental to a future SA DOD KMC.  Clarity is required 
about which are considered core processes and what other processes exist that are practices and 
prescribed within the SA DOD environment.   
The following table represents a list of stated KM related processes from the selected sample 
of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  The similarities in those identified as core processes in 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation is quite evident -  
Table 6.5: Types of Knowledge Management Related Processes 
Knowledge Processes Source Recurring (with 
consideration of 
semantics) 
Liaison and transfer DODI1 Acquire, 
Generate, 
Integrate, 
Use, 
Retain, 
Sharing, 
Secure and 
Dispose 
Transfer DODI26 
Conceiving, creating, planning, designing and synthesis DODI28 
Sharing, transfer, capture, store, process, communicate, 
protect, sustain, integrate and present 
DODI39 
Transfer and injection JDP16 
Acquire DODI40,  JDP14 
Retain, obtains, adapts, integrates, analyses, generation and 
sharing  
DODI43 
Transfer DODI61 
Transmit, evoke and acquire JDP20 
Internalise, gain, acquire and apply JDP3 
Acquire, acquisition and share/dissemination JDP4 
Plans, collects, creates, organises, uses, controls, 
disseminates, sharing, recycling and disposes 
JDP9 
Manipulation SANDFP3 
Asses, identification, acquisition, procurement, registration, 
maintenance, use, retention, transfer, disposal/discarding,  
ownership, protection, funding, maintenance, management of 
royalties and revenue 
DODI23 
Identification, acquisition, procurement and registration, DODI24 
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maintenance, use, transfer and disposal/discarding 
Maintain, sustain, safeguard, access, traceability and security DODI28 
Capture, store, compute, disseminate and archive DODERFM1 
Collection, gathering, evaluation, collation and integration, 
interpretation and dissemination 
JWP8 
Collect, integrate and disseminate SANDFP3 
Collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation SANDFP3 
The following table represents a list of IM related processes.  The overlap between the list and 
discussion in Chapter of the dissertation, the list above and below is easily recognisable - 
Table 6.6: Types of Information Management Processes 
IM Processes Source 
planning-, managing-, gathering-, capturing-, 
collection-, compilation-, registration-, 
processing-, creating-, generating-, compute-, 
collate-, recorded-, modelling-, analysis-, 
evaluating-, verification-, controlling-, monitor-, 
transportation-, transmission, communicated-, 
reporting-, distribution-, disseminate-, exchange-, 
released-, storage-, archive-, retrieving-, 
communicating-, protecting/securing-, 
sustainment-, integration-, presenting-, flow- and  
disposal  
DODI24 (2, 25, 33 and 35), DODI26 (1, 15, 17, 24, 
26, B-2 and B-7), DODI27 (D-1), DODI28 (2 and 5), 
DODI30, DODI39 (3, 10, 11, 14, A-2 and 3),   
DODERFM1 (6-1), DODI40 (50), DODI43 (J4-4, 
J4-6 and J4-8), DODI45 (33), DODI46 (1, 3 and 9), 
DODI48 (A-1), DODI57, IDODI2 (4, 8, 15 and 27), 
JDP4 (8, 9, 11, 13, D1-5), JDP9 (1, 8 and 16), JDP12 
(5) SANDFO2 (B-1-5, B-1-6, B-1-13 and B-1-16), 
SANDFP1 (2,3), JWP1 (1-1, 2-12, 2-13, 2A-1, 3-3, 
3-5 and 5-4), JWP8 (3A-10, 4-6, 4-10, 4-13 and 5-
16) and SANDFP3 (4-3 and 15-3) 
From the tables above it is clear that the SA DOD utilises several and various processes to 
manage the knowledge continuum with.  From the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) most (if 
not all) of these are also recognised KM processes.  This overlap in processes possibly also 
contributes to the level of construct dissonance currently present.  The researcher proposed earlier 
in the dissertation that the construct of KM be expanded to knowledge continuum management 
(KCM) which would support the continuous requirement for the integrated management of the 
various components that are considered part of the knowledge continuum.  The construction of a 
KCM will also provide a platform for the integration of the various sets of processes involved in the 
management of the various components.  For this dissertation, the researcher will, however, focus 
on the establishment of SA DOD KM as a first and necessary step towards knowledge era thinking 
and understanding within the SA DOD.  Future research may involve the exact structure of a KCM. 
A primary question that needs answering is – which are the core KM processes for the SA 
DOD? As with definitions for knowledge and KM, there is no agreement on the answer to this 
question.  Research could thus be dedicated to answer just this question and to validate the findings 
empirically.  This is suggested for future research.  However, this dissertation recommends 
perceived core KM processes.  In order to expand on the fundamentals of SA DOD KM, the 
researcher discusses some of the identified processes from the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 
policy and doctrine.  
Core KM related processes involved in doctrine management are set out in SANDFD2 (1), 
SANDFO4 (1) and SANDFP2 (1) - “A policy is therefore required that sets out the guidelines for 
initiating, compiling, authorising, issuing, maintenance and controlling of all [JDP]”.   
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SANDFO4 (1) states that the SANDF has a doctrine development process, which is close to 
the core KM process of generating.  This process is important because it is used to develop SA 
DOD capstone military knowledge.  SANDFO4 (6) states that Joint Doctrine with significant 
resource implications must follow the approval route used for SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine.  
SANDFP2 (12-18) describes the exact layout, formatting and development process for JDP.  The 
prescribed process state various KM related processes, such as analysis, the leadership of the 
doctrine development, approval of the doctrine, distribution, feedback, assessment, review, 
amendments, register and archiving. DODI31 (15) requires research and development to be 
conducted on chemical, biological and radioactive doctrine.  DODI40 (107) states that operational 
test and evaluation is used to streamline doctrine (amongst other things during acquisitions).  These 
developments related processes are important because it is used to develop and maintain SA DOD 
capstone military knowledge.   
SANDFO4 (6) states that interim doctrine will be promulgated where there is an imminent 
need for doctrine that does not exist.  This interim doctrine will obviously evolve to become SA 
DOD doctrine once properly developed after research and analysis of the situation and 
requirements.  It can, therefore, be assumed that the SA DOD regards doctrine to be dynamic; that 
capstone military knowledge needs to evolve to remain relevant in support of advantage. 
Notwithstanding any other KM related process, in order to assist with the continuous 
improvement (evolution) of SA DOD doctrine, the doctrine is subjected to regular review.  JWP1 
(4-3) states that - “Continuous intellectual stimulation and in-depth involvement in Corp Com 
activities across the spectrum, as well as dynamic testing, reviewing and updating of doctrine is 
necessary to maintain the synergy, understanding and shared intent required for Mission 
Command.”.  This is true for all SA DOD policy and doctrine.  It calls for continuous engagement 
with the doctrine and its application in order to adapt, remain relevant and competitive.  This is the 
quest for new meaning that enables understanding as articulated in the definition of knowledge and 
KM of the dissertation. This is also reiterated by SANDFO2 (2-1-1) that states within the context of 
fire and rescue doctrine that continuous improvement of both doctrine and policy is required to 
maintain relevance.  JWP4 (1-1) does not call for information renewal but for knowledge renewal, 
stating -  
“Doctrine has its foundation in history and derives its authority from being the distillation 
[meaning and understanding] of much hard-won experience [know-how]. Therefore it is 
enduring [enduring value], but it is not unchanging [dynamic]. Doctrine evolves in response to 
changes in the political or strategic background, in the light of experience, or as a result of new 
technology. In turn, it influences the way in which policy and plans are developed …”. 
This clearly agrees with the notion of a dynamic and complex defence environment that needs 
responsive, dynamic policy and doctrine to mitigate the deterioration of advantage.  There are 
several other policy and doctrinal statements that support the continuous renewal of doctrine.  
Renewal can be included in a core KM process – generate.   Information is fairly static (a snapshot 
in time) from the perspective of time and relevance.  However, as new information becomes 
available, and with cognitive processes active, this information can be processed into new meaning 
that will facilitate new understanding on a continuous basis.  DODSPF1 (18) and SANDFP2 (3) call 
for continuous doctrine renewal in order to ensure accuracy and relevance and to stimulate 
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knowledge evolution.  JWP4 (4-3) states that innovation of ideas is key to doctrine development.  
JWP1 (1-9) states regarding the generation inclusive of doctrine renewal–  
“[Doctrine] Development is essential for it to remain valid and useful in a constantly changing 
communication environment. Therefore, users of [JWP1] must constantly strive to challenge the 
concepts contained in it and actively develop and propose relevant updates and corrections to 
maintain the necessary dynamism and relevance.”.   
Contradictory statements between SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine exist on the 
requirement for corporate communications doctrine renewal.  DODI1 (4-9) states that corporate 
communications doctrine must be reviewed annually.  In contradiction, elsewhere it is stated that 
corporate communications policy must be reviewed every 3-5 years (DODI1: 4-37).  JWP1 (1-1) 
states that corporate communication doctrine will remain constant.  This is not consistent with 
theory about knowledge and other policy and doctrine statements discussed above.  Knowledge 
evolves over time as new understanding is generated based on evolving or drastically changing 
circumstances.   
DODI16 (9) states that SA DOD ETD doctrine is the responsibility of Chief of Joint Training 
and should be reviewed regularly.  These statements provide insight into the perceived pace of 
change within different doctrinal environments.  It can be assumed that policy and doctrine within 
each environment will thus have an evolutionary pace unique to each environment.  If the 
assumption is correct, the SA DOD will require a coherent and integrated KMC to cope with the 
complexities of these changes.     
SANDFP2 (6) states some elements that need consideration for doctrinal review as - “… 
current doctrine becoming outdated; … new equipment being introduced; ... new methods, 
procedures or structures being adopted; and … legal or legislative changes”.   
Stepping of the requirement for doctrinal review, which incidentally is also applicable to SA 
DOD policy, the researcher discusses in the next paragraphs intelligence-related processes.  
Universally, intelligence processing is a very important military knowledge capability.  This stems 
from Sun Tzu wisdom – know your enemy as you know yourself – stated in Chapter 3 of the 
dissertation.   
Intelligence should be available to decision-makers and should reach them in time 
(DODI30:5, also alluded to in DODI31: 15), as follows - 
“d. The collection of information, i.e. overt, covert, electronic and geospatial is regulated and 
executed effectively, efficiently and economically. 
e. The processing of intelligence is regulated and executed effectively, efficiently and 
economically. 
f. The dissemination of intelligence is regulated and executed effectively, efficiently and 
economically by ensuring that relevant stake holders [sic] and decision makers receive CI 
guidance and support timeously.”. 
The quote above highlights critical elements of the intelligence cycle, i.e. how intelligence is 
constructed.  It confirms that intelligence is ‘something’ more than information; from Chapters 3, 5 
and this chapter – capstone military knowledge.  This is also stated in DODI30 (4-5) - “Employing 
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an intelligence technique known as "puzzle building", they may then use the information supplied 
by the [defence community] official(s) concerned to construct intelligence scenarios.”.  This is 
nothing else than knowledge acquisition and create. Strangely enough, DODI30 does not provide a 
definition for intelligence; only for information.  JWP8 (4-10) describes the intelligence 
process/cycle within the context of the intelligence system and IntOps -  
“As in all other military operations, a well-developed intelligence system is vital for the conduct 
of [IntOps] which will shape the conduct of PSO. The [Force Commander], in whom the 
command responsibility is vested, must drive and direct the conduct of intelligence gathering 
during PSO as in all military operations. The continuous cycle that includes the direction as 
provided by the [Force Commander’s] Intelligence Problem and the collection, evaluation, 
collation, integration, interpretation and dissemination of intelligence results, must be controlled 
by the Management Plan. The organisation of the intelligence staff (J2) must be task-orientated 
and flexible. It may require augmentation at times to include specialists for the input and analysis 
of a wider variety and/or specialist fields. The intelligence responsibility of any intelligence 
structure within a peace mission must also further provide for geopolitical and economic 
assessments and therefore cover the full spectrum of intelligence support and not just military 
intelligence. The SANDF [DI] will take a role in fulfilling this need. The flow of information to 
and from the JOA must thus be guaranteed and provided to ensure comprehensive situational 
awareness by the decision makers within the mission area and RSA.”. 
The above quote refers to some important KM related processes – directing (leadership), 
collection, gathering, evaluation, assessment, collation, integration, interpretation and dissemination 
(sharing or flow).  Another such process referred to above is ‘puzzle building’.  Due to the fact that 
intelligence is perceived as capstone military knowledge, these processes are considered 
fundamental to an SA DOD KMC.    
Collation is not only an important intelligence cycle process but important to the construction 
of a knowledge continuum.  JWP1 (2-12) states from the perspective of performance management - 
“The output of this process is a list of logically grouped items [or information]”.  This is important 
for ‘puzzle building’. 
Let us consider some other processes that are unique to certain policies of doctrine.  DODI28 
(A-1) offers a definition of what is considered to be engineering – “… process of conceiving, 
creating, planning and designing works, products, components, systems and processes for useful 
purposes. The process is based on scientific knowledge, requires synthesis of knowledge and takes 
into account wider issues.”.  This definition alludes to some knowledge processes required for 
engineering but also states that the base of engineering is knowledge, thus linking engineering 
processes to knowledge.  Chief Defence Matérial is responsible for a large portfolio of science, 
engineering and technology-related knowledge.  These processes are thus very relevant for KM 
within the Defence Matérial Division, Armscor and defence industries. 
Other KM related processes also referred to as knowledge flows are knowledge transfer or 
sharing.  There are several statements in the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine that preach the importance of data and information sharing.  As such, DODI39 (10) states 
the aim of the SA DOD intranet service (amongst others) - “… to remove information barriers and 
to enhance info/knowledge sharing.”.  It also acknowledges the fact that there might be barriers that 
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result in restricted flow and that these need removal.  The removal will have to be within the 
constraints of SA DOD security policy.   
JWP8 (4-9) states the criticality of data sharing for PSOs.  SANDFP3 (2-16) states that the 
sharing of information is essential to the success of Peace Mission Headquarters.  DODI39 (11) 
states that knowledge transfer is important for the training of ICT functionaries.  JDP12 (4) states 
within the context of Batho Phele principles about information –  
“[SA DOD] Officials must at all times give complete and accurate information to clients and/or 
stakeholders about the services the [SA DOD] renders. Officials must at all times ensure that 
those who need it receive the relevant information. It must be provided in a variety of media and 
languages to meet the differing needs of clients and/or stakeholders. [SA DOD] officials must 
comply with the provision of Promotion of Access to Information Act … when providing 
information. … Information should be shared and communicated on day-to-day basis between 
[SA DOD] Officials, clients and/or stakeholders. It should be done through the wide publication 
of reports, imbizos, internal and external fora etc.”. 
Thus, the sharing of knowledge continuum artefacts are important within the SA DOD as well 
as with SA DOD stakeholders; taking strong guidance from the discussion above on security 
requirement. 
DODI1 (1-2) states that the SA DOD supports a - “Two-way Symmetric Communication 
Model. Two-way symmetric communication promotes an equal and balanced flow of information 
between the [SA DOD] and its stakeholders where their needs, concerns, interests and values are 
considered when decisions are made.”.  Communication is inherent in the core process of 
knowledge sharing and fundamental to the knowledge creation process (SECI model as an example) 
to be successful.  
DODI26 (12) states that continuous knowledge transfer is important.  JDP4 (5-2) proposes 
that the SA DOD should strive towards being a learning organisation in which information and 
knowledge are shared freely (obviously within the bounds of the security regime).  This 
acknowledges the differences in information and knowledge and that sharing is applicable to both 
constructs. 
DODI1 (9A-4) links the requirement for training development to knowledge transfer. 
DODI25 separates the constructs of knowledge, education, training and skills development by 
stating that knowledge expansion is accomplished by means of education, training and skills 
development.  All of these are essentially knowledge transfer or sharing activities that will 
somehow have to be integrated into an SA DOD KMC.  These statements support knowledge 
sharing as a core KM process.  What is important is that the sharing should provide complete, 
accurate, relevant (requirement based) information and knowledge.  The calibrating factors 
contribute to the elimination of information and knowledge overload.   
IDODI1 (9) provide SA DOD Level 1 policy on the use of blogging and Facebook on social 
media which are essentially data, information and knowledge sharing instruments for specialists 
groups, user groups, scientist, technologist, lessons learnt groups, etc. to exchange knowledge 
continuum artefacts.  JWP1 (1-6) states some instruments of use within an operational setting – 
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“Corp Com assists in shielding and protecting own forces from enemy PsyOps by providing them 
with rapid, accurate information about the situation in operations, eg [sic] by the commander’s info 
briefings, info bulletins, etc”.  An SA DOD KMC should consider these as possible KM 
instruments within an integrated capability.  Further research should be undertaken to identify other 
instruments that are critical for knowledge sharing.  Another important instrument in knowledge 
sharing is the media. 
Information and knowledge sharing with the other role-players and stakeholders are 
fundamental to decisions, actions, effects and advantage.  JWP1 (1-4) states the role of information 
and the media -  
“Information about the activities of the SANDF, as revealed by various sources, but especially 
by the public mass media (including the “new” or social media such as blogging and social 
networking), has an effect on the level of support for such activities. It is accepted that, as a rule, 
there will often be a high level of public and media interest in SANDF activities in general and 
in military operations in particular. Therefore, satisfying the information needs of the public and 
the media is vital to sustained public support. It is important to note that, although the public 
mass media play a unique and powerful role in this regard, the use of other direct and indirect 
means of communication by the government (and the relevant regional or international body) 
and the SANDF is as important and should not be ignored”. 
An important process for information and knowledge sharing is mentoring.  As was 
previously stated, mentors are considered important coordinators for the sharing of knowledge and 
the establishment of a learning organisation.  JDP16 (A-6) states that mentoring is – 
 “… a process by means of which senior managers or specialists provide information, advice and 
support to develop junior members/employees. Mentoring focuses on the gathering of 
knowledge, skills and experience by junior members/employees to higher positions. Mentoring is 
the process of using specially selected and trained individuals to provide guidance and advice 
that will help to develop the careers of the protégés allocated to them”. 
Storage is a core KM process and possibly a sub-process of retention and a vital part of the 
SA DOD corporate memory.    DODI1 also makes mention in several places that data should be 
stored in digital repositories to ensure accessibility.  The selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 
policy and doctrine reiterates the storage of information, IM, records management and archiving.  
These are all closely associated.  Based on the definition of SA DOD information, this typically 
includes data and knowledge.  JDP9 (8) states that records management is a subset of IM and 
closely associated with decision-making and advantage as discussed earlier in this chapter -  
“In the [SA DOD] much of the information will be identified as a [SA DOD] record because it 
documents [SA DOD] activities or because of the value of the information it contains. Records 
are fundamental to policy formulation, decision-making, business operations and organisational 
accountability. The process of records management captures evidence of an organisation’s 
transactions, documents its activities and decisions and provides ready access to this evidence. 
… Corporate records thus form the stable core of [IM] – reliable, accurate, quality information –
taking in records from day-to-day operational systems, extracting and summarising to 
knowledge-based and briefing systems (and capturing the result), and publishing in different 
formats to websites, Intranets, publication schema, asset registers. Well-managed records and 
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archives are a vital part of the [SA DOD]’s information resources and must be managed within a 
wider [IM] system to guarantee accurate and up-to-date information, controlled versions, and 
sustainable corporate memory.”. 
Also –  
“[IM] describes the means by which an organisation efficiently plans, collects, creates, 
organises, uses, controls, disseminates and disposes of its structured and unstructured 
information (information resources) throughout the life cycle of the information, and through 
which it ensures that the value of that information is identified and exploited to the fullest extent, 
both in support of its internal operations and in adding value to its service delivery functions. IM 
fosters the effective use of information for specific business purposes and the maintenance of 
that information for sharing and recycling inside and outside the organisation.”. 
The researcher continues the discussion on storage within the context of SA DOD IP 
management.  SA DOD IP is managed as IA.  DODI1 (7D-1) states that IP rights are managed by 
ICA and are there to protect human creativity and ingenuity. DODI23 (7, 9, 15, 16 and 17), 
DODI24 (D-5), DODI28 (9) state that SA DOD IP must be managed by an IP management system 
and recorded in a central register (also DODI1: 7D-5 and DODI23: 16 and 17). DODI23 (C-1) 
describes the various data fields required to be completed in the SA DOD IA register.  The 
registering of SA DOD IP is an important KM process to ensure completeness and accuracy for 
audit purposes as required by Auditor General South Africa.  The SA DOD subscribes to several 
KM related processes in order to complete this IA register.   
DODI23 (7) separates defence matériel related IP and software related IP, primarily because 
there is a separate policy on SA DOD software management; i.e. DODI23 (ICA management) is 
DODI24 (software management).  DODI24 (B-4) defines SA DOD IP management as - “… , 
among other things, the identification, acquisition, procurement, registration, maintenance, use, 
transfer, disposal or discarding of defence [IP]”. These two DODIs were developed in parallel.  
DODI23 (10) states - “leveraging, … funding, maintenance, … registration, ownership and 
retention, … disposal and transfer, … archive”;  DODI23 (22) states - “ownership, management, 
use and disposal”; DODI23 (28) states “transfer” and DODI23 (10 and 33) states - “…protection” 
as processes for SA DOD IP management. DODI23 (33) highlights the importance of IP protection.  
Several of these processes can be considered as core KM processes.   
DODI61 (3) states that IP - “… generated in the process of engagements with consultants 
must as far as possible be contractually retained by the [SA DOD]. Deliverables provided by 
consultants are the property of the [SA DOD] unless stated otherwise in the contract.”.  JDP9 (22) 
states that - “All legal agreements entered into by the [SA DOD] for the purchase of services should 
clearly state the ownership (including intellectual property rights such as copyright) of any records 
resulting from the performance of the contract.”. These statements speak to knowledge acquisition 
as a core KM process.  DODI57 (B7 and B8) elaborates on various IM processes -    
 
“[ICS] also includes the organised collection, processing, transmission and dissemination of 
information in accordance with defined procedures, whether automated or manual, … protection 
afforded to information systems in order to preserve the availability, integrity and confidentiality 
of the systems and the information contained within the systems according to affordable security 
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practices … automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, 
display, switching, interchange, transmission or reception of vocal, pictorial, textual and 
numerical data or information ...”. 
Nothing of value is stated by the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine 
when considering leadership as a fundamental requirement for successful KM and KMC.  JDP4 
(D1-3) states that one of the qualities of leadership is intelligence.  In this context, it is intellect and 
aptitude. JWP (3A-9) groups intelligence and experience as part of leadership intuition.  These 
statements link the constructs of leadership and knowledge rather than leadership and information 
and/or IM. 
In order to conclude the discussion on KM processes, this dissertation proposes acquire, 
create, secure, integrate, use, retain, review and share as the core SA DOD KM processes.  From the 
KM processes table above and subsequent discussion and also informed by discussion in Chapters 2 
and 3 of the dissertation; ‘generate’ is not considered a core process because the process is more 
traditionally linked to data and information generation.  Because the researcher supports the ideas of 
several writers discussed in the literature review (dissertation Chapter 2) – ‘acquire’ and ‘create’ are 
processes linked to knowledge.  ‘Secure’ (or protect), distinctly from a counter-intelligence 
perspective, is a very important process in the SA DOD as discussed in chapters 3, 5, and earlier in 
this chapter.  ‘Integration’ is important for the SA DOD due to the different knowledge silos in 
existence, possibly resulting from attempts to ‘organise’ knowledge continuum artefacts.  
‘Integration’ is also discussed throughout this chapter and Chapters 3 and 5 of the dissertation an 
identified as important.  ‘Integration’ is also the driver behind the proposal by the researcher to 
expand KM into KCM as stated earlier.  ‘Integration’ includes all activities associated with 
‘organisation’.  The ‘use’ of knowledge is paramount for very obvious reasons but distinctly linked 
to enhancing decisions, actions, effects and advantage as proposed by the definitions of knowledge 
and KM in this dissertation.  ‘Use’ refers to the use of knowledge owned by the SA DOD due to 
knowledge acquisition and creation as well as the ‘use’ of published knowledge not owned by the 
SA DOD that is in the public domain.  ‘Leveraging’ knowledge is included in the ‘use’ as a core 
KM process.   Knowledge ‘retention’ addresses organisational requirements to 
archive/store/preserve knowledge for future generations.  It is closely linked to knowledge 
‘security’ from a corporate memory perspective.  ‘Review’ and ‘sharing’ are critical for learning 
organisations and organisations in a complex environment.  Within the limitations set by ‘security’ 
as a process; ‘sharing’ of knowledge is paramount for the SA DOD to gain sustainable advantage.  
Knowledge ‘disposal’ is not considered a core process because knowledge never really ceases to 
exist.  ‘Disposal’ in this sense would refer to a change of ownership, which could be managed as 
part of ‘retention’ as a core process. ‘Securely sharing’ knowledge is in line with entrepreneurial 
practices and innovation within collaborative ventures.  
These processes are not included in the definition for SA DOD KM in recognition of the 
complexity and fluidity of the defence environment that might require a portfolio of processes from 
which to choose rather than prescribed rigidity.  The proposal also does not represent a linear or 
sequenced interaction between these processes; but rather a dynamic interaction based on 
requirement and driven by the need to adapt and evolve. 
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6.2.4.6 Systems and Sensors  
Fundamental to an SA DOD KMC is a clear understanding of what technology and software 
used by the SA DOD and the integration requirements are.  SANDFP3 (6-6) raises the concern 
about the effect of IT innovation on SA DOD IM and its security.  This was discussed earlier in the 
dissertation and answered positively. Innovation and security dynamics are managed by means of 
(amongst others) information and business related architecture. 
Information architecture (JDP4: D2-12) and business architecture (DODI26: Appendix A -1) 
should provide the SA DOD with a clear picture of what knowledge continuum artefacts are 
available, where and the relationship with each other and how these will influence decisions, 
actions, effects and advantage. Such architecture typically constitutes IM and KM systems and 
sensors that are fundamental SA DOD IM and KM enablers (or as earlier introduced by the 
researcher – enablers for KCM).  DODERFM1 (6-1) states that SA DOD information systems are 
used to - “… capture, store, compute, disseminate and archive large volumes of data and 
information”.  This confirms the enabling role of information systems to the KM processes for the 
management of SA DOD knowledge continuum artefacts.  In order to do this effectively, efficiently 
and economically - as a stated requirement from the PFMA and SA DOD policy - the SA DOD IM 
and KM architecture must be known and integrated with other business processes and systems.  To 
accomplish this, expertise in these functional areas must be available. The integration of systems, 
sensor and software are fundamental to KM success, will be costly, time- consuming and will 
require a clear understanding of what knowledge is and how it relates to the KM leadership 
philosophy of ‘the art of knowing and the science of managing that knowledge to obtain and sustain 
advantage’.  
JDP9 (10) states that the SA DOD should effectively use IM and IT expertise (amongst 
others).   This assumes the availability of expertise.  JDP9 makes no mention of KM expertise or 
systems.  In fact, none of the selected samples of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine makes 
mention of such expertise.  This is probably a contributing factor to the fact that the SA DOD does 
not have dedicated KM systems, possibly a result of SA DOD disinterest in KM. 
DODI57 (B7) defines an information system as part of the ICS definition, alluding to the 
requirement for integration discussed throughout the dissertation, as follows -    
“… An inter-connected [sic] set of information resources under the same direct control that 
shares common functionality. A system normally includes hardware [IT], software, information, 
data, applications, communications and people. It also includes the organised collection, 
processing, transmission and dissemination of information in accordance with defined 
procedures, whether automated or manual,…”. 
The following information systems and sub-systems were identified from the selected sample 
of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine (a non-exhaustive list): Facility Register System, 
Management Information Facility, PERSOL, Operational Support Information System, CMIS, 
GCIS,   Distance Learning Support and Information Sub-system, Recognition of Prior Learning 
management system, HR Contract Management System, ETD Management Information Systems, 
Financial Management System, Debt Management System, Organisation Information System-, 
Structure Management Control System-, Defence Information Systems Network, Central Advance 
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System, Cash Receipt Voucher System, Computer Aided Logistic Management Information 
System,  ARMSCOR Contract Management System, Technical Standardisation System, 
Operational Support Information System. Defence Information & Communication Infrastructure, 
Equate System, Occupational Classification System, remuneration system, job evaluation system, 
Performance Management and Development System, SA DOD Policy Master Records Index, 
Consultants Management Information System, SA DOD Integrated Strategic Management Enabler 
(ISME), Safety Web Banking Services, Kaysbank sub-system, Cash Receipt Voucher sub-system , 
Invoice Administration sub-system, Safetynet, Health Information System, ETD management 
information system, Combat Information and Communication Systems.
87
  
Although the listed examples above are posited as information systems, they will manage 
data, information and knowledge.  It will require further research to correctly classify these systems 
in order to construct a coherent and integrated KMC that is enabled by these systems.  Such 
research could possibly be part of a future KM readiness audit. 
DODI43 (J4-4) states clearly that information systems are to be used to manage SA DOD 
knowledge within the context of the Senior Management System.  No mention is made of specific 
KM systems.  In another paragraph, the senior managers are too - “… create innovative knowledge 
management solutions …”, through the adaptation and integration of information from several 
sources.  This alludes to the requirement for specific KM system(s).   
JWP4 (6-1 and 2) and SANDFP3 (15-3) state that – “The basic elements of any Command 
and Control System, whether Strategic or Tactical, are as follows: Sensor subsystems which gather 
information about the location, movement and activities of enemy and friendly assets …”, amongst 
other elements.  For militaries, it is not just information systems based on IT that provide 
data/information/knowledge but also sensors of various kinds (e.g. radar, sonar, EW sensors, 
people, etc.) to inform decisions and action.  Furthermore - “Communications links between the 
Sensors and the Command Centres and between the Command Centres and the forces to permit the 
rapid transmission of information and commands [decisions]”.  Information and communication 
systems (ICT) thus provide the links between the various systems and sensor to enable decisions 
and actions. 
SANDFP1 provides policy on SA DOD Combat Net interoperability.  The policy provides 
much technical detail about the role data plays within the networked communication system (a 
concept stemming from RMA discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and earlier in this chapter).  The data 
referred to conform to the true meaning of data – referred to as “bit data” – that flows between 
networked ICT systems and applications.  The generation of information and knowledge will be at 
risk in the absence of unavailability of such data.   
JDP4 (D2-7) states the following about MIS – 
 “Accurate and accessible information is required to enable effective and accountable decision-
making for command, control and management. The [MIS] must improve communication within 
and between departments and between different agencies and levels of government. … 
Information requirements should therefore be evaluated, processes must be re-engineered and 
                                                 
87
 (DODI2, DODI1, DODI11, DODI14, DODI15, DODI16, DODI18, DODI21, DODI22, DODI24, DODI30, DODI32, 
DODI38, DODI40, DODI43, DODI47, DODI48, DODI51, DODI52, DODI53, DODI56, DODI59, DODI61, 
DODSPF1, FMDI1, JDP1, JDP2, JDP4, JDP16, SANDFO6) 
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systems redesigned on an ongoing basis to meet the constantly evolving requirements. However, 
information systems must be standardised and integrated to be economical and effective.”. 
This policy statement is extremely important from the perspective of systems support to 
decision-making and leadership (or C2), the requirement for continuous improvement driven by 
complexity and change and the requirement for integration.  It also ties in with the proposed 
definitions of knowledge and KM.  All of these matters have been addressed elsewhere from a 
variety of perspectives throughout this chapter.  JDP9 (3) states that there is a transition from paper-
based record keeping to digital record keeping of information.  Information and communication 
systems are the obvious enablers to accomplish this with.  This transition is also important to enable 
a variety of software-related functions that will assist with filtering data, information and 
knowledge to eliminate or reduce overload.  The distinct requirement for systems to evolve with 
knowledge cannot be overstated. 
The researcher continues the discussion the discussion on the requirement for integration.  
Standardised, integrated systems and algorithmic standards are requirements for synergy.  KM 
systems will have the same requirements.  As such, JDP4 (D2-13) states the requirement for a 
standardised SA DOD MIS.  This corresponds to the requirement for coherent and integrated IM 
and KM.  SANDFO6 (1) and SANDFP1 (1) state the criticality of information to achieve 
interoperability in joint operations and prescribe a specific standard to achieve this with –  
“Joint operations between the Services and Divisions in the [SANDF] require the ability to 
exchange relevant information with respect to the battle space. … This requirement implies the 
need for and adherence to a common standard … for information exchange between the various 
Services in order to optimise situational awareness in the theatre of operations. Therefore 
[Combat Net Interoperability Standard] will be a common standard that will ensure combat net 
communications interoperability amongst force elements required to operate in joint operations”. 
DODI39 (1) states that – “The [SA DOD] Intranet provides information that assists [SA 
DOD] officials to collaborate on business processes that create value for the [SA DOD].”.  The SA 
DOD intranet is an important system to a core KM process – i.e. sharing, indirectly supporting other 
core KM processes such as knowledge acquisition, creation, retention and use. 
Databases and data processing is central to an IM and KM systems approach.  DODI24 (B-5) 
states that there is a difference between a data processing system and an information processing 
system.  Both are core systems developed for the information era.  They are also core systems that 
should feed into a KM system.  These aspects are reflected in the Figure 6.14 below.   
DODI51 makes reference to several types of databases that must be maintained by the SA 
DOD with regard to financial management and reporting matters.  DODI48 (5) states that the SA 
DOD should maintain a database consisting of Auditor General South Africa reports and associated 
SA DOD action plans.  This database should contain information and knowledge about SA DOD 
financial and asset management performance and should be integrated with other IM systems that 
are dedicated to SA DOD performance management discussed above.   
DODI2 (3) states that there is a “[Management Information Facility] database”.  DODI53 (6) 
states that the SA DOD manages its policy documents with a Policy Publication Database. In fact, 
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the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine used for document analysis in this 
dissertation is supported by this database.  Thus, the database contains capstone military knowledge 
in the form of policy – and not data.  Some of these databases are accessible via the SA DOD 
intranet. 
DODI29 (9 and B-1) identify the SA DOD munition database.  This data is important for the 
control of munitions but also for research and development of munitions.  DODI40 (4) states the 
various information systems that are critical to SA DOD armament acquisition management.  
Amongst possible others; these are the Financial Management System, ARMSCOR Contract 
Management System, Technical Standardisation System – RSA Military Standardisation Steering 
Committee and the Logistic Accounting Systems (Computer Aided Logistic Management 
Information System and Operational Support Information System).   
Information technology is central to database management and data processing and a 
fundamental enabler to IM and KM.  SANDFP3 (xvii and 12-2 and 12-3) states that IT is an 
important enabler to provide the deployed forces with tactical, operational and strategic 
information.  This supports the idea that IT is a mere enabler to IM and KM and does not constitute 
IM or KM. SANDFP3 (xvii and 12-2 and 12-3) also confirms the criticality of IT to force 
adaptability and flexibility in response to change and to most of the IM and KM related processes. 
DODI22 (5) states the following with regard to macrostructure management –  
“The management of the macro structure [sic] is supported by the various organisational life 
cycle systems, currently the [Organisation Information System] and the [Structure Management 
Control System]. These information systems are corporately interactive with all the functional 
systems of the [SA DOD], as well as the data warehouse. The [SA DOD] management 
information capability (data warehouse) utilises the data of the organisation life cycle systems as 
their backbone (reference source) to structure management information reports for decision-
making by top management”.  
This quote mentions several types of information systems linked to IM and data management.  
It also mentions a - “… data warehouse”, which is a central repository for management information 
required for decision-making.  This confirms the notion of the interdependency between IT and data 
management and IM.  Again, and linked to the requirement for IM, a requirement is stated for 
‘management information reports for decision-making by top management’; relaying the impression 
that top management uses information to base their decisions on.  They should be using knowledge. 
The phrasing of the sentence is possibly a product of information era practices in combination with 
IM constructs.  These issues should be clarified in an authoritative SA DOD taxonomy which 
should be managed by the proposed SA DOD KMC. 
JDP9 (2) states that the SA DOD has an Information Management Governance Framework 
that lists comprehensively the acts applicable to the SA DOD.   This is essentially a database that is 
accessible by means of IT. 
Other information systems mentioned in the selected sample for SA DOD level policy and 
doctrine are in DODI47 (13) and DODI57 (B-11) and refer to a Logistics Information Management 
System being operated by the SA DOD and regarded as a product system; DODI56 (23 and 60) 
refers to the responsibility of Joint Training to make an ETD IM system available which must 
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integrate with PERSOL (personnel IM system of the SA DOD) and DODI43 (D-2) states that data 
is captured on the SA DOD PERSOL system (personnel information management system). 
DODI52 and DODI8 confirm the importance of PERSOL as personnel management software 
supported by an extensive database. JDP 3 states throughout the policy the importance of IT to 
distance learning in the SA DOD.  JDP3 (H-1) states that Military Qualification system is an 
important component of the PERSOL system discussed earlier.  These are SA DOD ICT systems 
that enable HR management and other functions. 
JDP9 (16) identifies record keeping as a sub-system of IM - “The [SA DOD]'s primary record 
system is a manual paper based [sic] record system. However, the DOD shall implement an 
electronic record system (integrated as part of an Enterprise Content Management System …”.  
JDP9 (2) states the SA DOD policy on record keeping –  
“10. It is [SA DOD] policy to 
a. create, maintain, and preserve information as records, in any medium, that document the 
transaction of business and mission in wartime and peacetime to provide evidence of [SA DOD] 
organisation, functions, policies, procedures, decisions, and activities; [establishing and 
maintaining the SA DOD corporate memory] 
b. establish and maintain a [SA DOD] records management system to manage all records, 
effectively and efficiently through the records life cycle in compliance with regulatory 
framework; and [based on sub-paragraph (a) above, this is a knowledge base] 
c. maintain a [SA DOD] Archives for the custody of [SA DOD] records identified for permanent 
preservation because of historical, legal, research or public interest value” [establishing and 
maintaining the SA DOD corporate memory]. 
In sub-paragraph (c) the value is calibrated. What is concerning is that doctrine and IP are not 
included in sub-paragraph (a) and that, military operations are not included in the calibration in sub-
paragraph (c). The value of these knowledge continuum artefacts does not increase over time, only 
a particular intrinsic value to a select audience/client.  These records do form a significant military 
knowledge continuum and corporate memory.  The record keeping system thus contributes through 
research to policy, doctrine, intelligence formulation and other initiatives.  What is not stated 
explicitly is the fact that these records also contain knowledge and not just information.  It leaves 
the question open – when does knowledge become information.  It is for this reason that the 
researcher supports a knowledge continuum rather than a hierarchy to allow the user of the artefacts 
room for interpretation. 
All these systems aim at IM and not KM because KM is not yet practised by the SA DOD.  
However, these are important building blocks towards an SA DOD KMC. JDP9 (8) states that - 
“Corporate records thus form the stable core of [IM] – reliable, accurate, quality information – 
taking in records from day-to-day operational systems, extracting and summarising to 
knowledge-based and briefing systems (and capturing the result), and publishing in different 
formats to websites, Intranets, publication schema, asset registers. Well-managed records and 
archives are a vital part of the [SA DOD]’s information resources and must be managed within a 
wider [IM] system to guarantee accurate and up-to-date information, controlled versions, and 
sustainable corporate memory.”. 
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JWP8 (5-9) states the requirements for intelligence systems to enable the intelligence cycle 
discussed earlier in the dissertation - “Warring factions may be located through the employment of 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems linked to command, control, communications 
and intelligence systems.”.  This refers to systems that enable C4I3SR.  The statement also creates 
the impression that intelligence is collected in the form of intelligence, which might be misleading.  
Intelligence systems (sensors, software and people) might collect data, information and/or 
knowledge (intelligence) which is then subjected to the intelligence process to create new 
intelligence or to add to the accuracy of existing intelligence.  The intelligence systems are enablers 
in the same manner as IT enables IM and KM.  Consider the following statement – “A variety of 
fixed-wing airborne sensors can see beyond a border without infringing it. [ELINT] can provide 
data on potential threat weapon systems and their compliance with agreements.” (JWP8: 5-16).  
ELINT systems thus provide data, not intelligence.  This data is subjected to the intelligence cycle 
to create intelligence that will support decisions, actions, effects and advantage.  ELINT makes use 
of sensors to collect the data.  Thus sensors are part of the systems used to create intelligence or 
capstone knowledge.  With all said, Figure 6.9 is a graphic representation of systems and sensor 
overlaid on the proposed knowledge continuum discussed earlier - 
 
Figure 6.9: Illustration of the Systems and Sensor Interaction with the Proposed Knowledge 
Continuum 
Source: Authors compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM. 
SANDFP1 (2) names the DEISM plan as a critical enabler to integration, providing an - “… 
integrated [ICS] Departmental view and a realistic single execution mechanism of all [ICS and 
Services] initiatives, programmes, projects and requirements in terms of both the investment and 
maintenance portfolios”.   
The SA DOD Strategic Planning Framework makes reference to – “Information/Knowledge 
Management Systems” (DODSPF1: 22) as a heading for two paragraphs and then proceed to detail 
the requirements for the SA DOD Integrated Strategic Management Enabler (ISME).  The ISME, 
however, is still under development, but once operational will enable SA DOD – 
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“… planning, budgeting, reporting and risk management functions thereby ensuring a 
strategically focused [SA DOD]. The [SA DOD] ISME will enable the alignment between 
departmental outputs, budgets and risks supported and enabled by a sound reporting system to 
ensure performance reporting/evaluation and identification of deviation to plan. The 
development of the [SA DOD] ISME during the MTEF period and beyond will see the phased-in 
implementation of key focused strategic elements of the planning, budgeting, reporting and risk 
management process with an initial primary focus on [SA DOD] performance information 
management, and reporting. … The [SA DOD] ISME will at it’s [sic] core, ensure the 
enhancement of Departmental information systems which will enable the effective and efficient 
utilisation of state resources in support of the [SA DOD] mandate and support to Government 
MTSF priorities. The continuing enhancement of the [SA DOD Performance Information 
Management] function, amongst others, through the development of the [SA DOD] ISME, will 
ensure the accuracy and auditability of Departmental performance information as a basis for the 
development of the Defence Chapter of the annual [Estimate of National Expenditure], and 
subsequent subordinate planning, budgeting, reporting and risk management functions within the 
[SA DOD].”. 
The manner in which the heading to these quoted paragraphs is constructed wants the reader 
to believe that IM is equal to KM and that the SA DOD actually does KM.  Furthermore, the policy-
user is to believe that there is a KM system in place in the SA DOD (or at least being constructed) – 
in the form of the ISME.  This implies that the various fundamentals discussed thus far are in place.  
However, the ISME is only going to focus on SA DOD performance IM and reporting, which are 
lagging indicators.  It does not give the researcher a sense of integration with other IM systems such 
as those in the list above and others mentioned throughout the chapter.  Also, it does not mention 
the integration of SA DOD policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP as examples of capstone military 
knowledge.  From the quote above it would seem that ISME is an IT system that would enable IM 
for performance reporting purposes.  The fact that it is labelled strategic just speaks to the nature 
and extent of the information it will process.   It could thus be considered a strategic enabler to the 
SA DOD.  The researcher is doubtful that intelligence systems will be integrated into the ISME (for 
example).  It is positioned to inform decision-making and action.  However, it is by no means an 
integrated SA DOD KM system that would provide a platform for coherent and integrated KM.  
The ISME will, however, provide a valuable platform for an SA DOD KMC once operational.   
DODI26 represents SA DOD policy on business process management.  The policy mentions a 
- “… core knowledge repository” (DODI26: 3), within the context of a proposed Integrated 
Enterprise Architecture Solution, with which to accomplish SA DOD business process 
management.  If this knowledge repository does not end up as an ‘information warehouse’ it might 
just be the beginning of ‘knowledge thinking’ in the SA DOD.  However, without being informed 
by an authoritative taxonomy on at least the constructs addressed in this dissertation, 
implementation will be difficult.  The proposed Integrated Enterprise Architecture Solution will 
also have to integrate with all the other SA DOD data management, IM and possible KM systems 
listed above, as well as other that, might not have been addressed in the selected sample of SA DOD 
Level 1 policy and doctrine.  As stated earlier, this will be a costly and time-consuming venture that 
will require clear leadership, dedicated funding, policy and doctrine as guidance for it to be 
successful.  As with the ISME, the Integrated Enterprise Architecture Solution will, however, 
provide a valuable platform for an SA DOD KMC once operational. A dynamic integrated 
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enterprise architecture is included in Figure 6.9 above to indicate the requirement for such 
architecture to be able to manage the SA DOD knowledge continuum. 
6.2.5 A Conceptual SA DOD Knowledge Management Model? 
Having considered KM theory, KM in the military and SA DOD related legislation, policy 
and doctrine the researcher recommends the establishment of an SA DOD KMC.  The researcher 
proposes the following broad descriptive and conceptual KM model, consolidating the fundamental 
aspects of military and related knowledge as identified by the dissertation in support of the 
establishment of the proposed SA DOD KMC.  The proposed model can graphically be presented as 
follows: 
Figure 6:10: Proposed SA DOD Knowledge Management Model 
Source: Authors compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM. 
The concept is based on a firm foundation and a number of spearheading triangles and 
pentagrams that simulate progress and leadership.  The foundational rectangle is solid in colour and 
texture indicating the requirement for structural and organisational strength.  The triangles and 
pentagrams are transparent and overlapping to indicate the requirement for coherence and 
integration.   
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The KMC vision is based on the mandate of the SA DOD and the ubiquitous requirement for 
decisions, actions, effects and advantage to serve the national interest. The KM objectives are to 
provide decision-makers and executers with decision-quality and actionable knowledge. 
The KMC should be led by a Chief Knowledge Officer influenced by the proposed KM 
philosophy of ‘the art of knowing and the science of managing that knowledge to obtain and sustain 
advantage’.   This philosophy should provide inspirational guidance as to the requirement of 
decision-makers ‘to know’ rather than just being ‘informed’.  It also dictates the use of scientific 
methods to manage the SA DOD knowledge continuum in order to achieve coherence and 
integration on an enterprise scale. 
Core processes and fundamental resources have been included in the model in order to 
provide a baseline from which flexible solutions can be crafted.  The model does not propose any 
lines of communication or action (i.e. C2 relationships) or feedback loops.  The researcher assumes 
that in a dynamic environment these relationships will change causing instability to the broad 
perspective of SA DOD KM.  These decision-making and process flows can be delineated in detail 
with future research once a thorough knowledge audit has been completed.  It is, however, 
important to understand from a broad perspective what impact SA DOD KM. 
The pentagrams contain descriptions of the SA DOD IC, which is considered SA DOD 
knowledge.  Internally, the SA DOD should lead, structure, fund and enable (IT) KM initiatives to 
facilitate decision-making and actions in support of national security and defence interests.  This is 
done through the DR 2015, policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP – implemented through various 
strategic planning and management processes and resources.  These elements of structural capital 
are developed and managed by people that contribute human capital to achieve this and facilitate 
the crafting of relational capital. 
Once these are in place and practised, it should be understood that the SA DOD IC is 
impacted by the external environment.  Key role-players are the SA government (national policy 
and legislation – e.g. the IPR act); SA Defence Industry (a key military knowledge developer and 
manager), ARMSCOR (the sole contractor for SA military matériel knowledge described by SA 
DOD policy), CSIR (the key research institute generating and managing military knowledge and 
SITA (the sole software development and management agent for the SA government and thus the 
SA military).  The external environment will have its own KM models with which it manages SA 
DOD relevant knowledge.  If not, the SA DOD can minimise its risk by taking cognisance of 
possible vacuums in the external environment and mitigating that risk by constructing mechanisms 
within its own organisational and structural IC to make sure SA DOD owned IC is managed 
accordingly. 
SA DOD IC is supported by the various and several types of data and information managed 
by the SA DOD with core KM processes but also more specific processes tailored to the 
requirements.  The proposed conceptual SA DOD KM model is supported by the proposed 
definitions for SA DOD knowledge and KM and a KM leadership philosophy.   
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6.3 CONCLUSION 
Coherent and integrated management of knowledge by an SA DOD KMC will not solve all 
the consequential SA DOD challenges resulting from a continuously changing future.  However, 
very few challenges will be solved without knowledge, thus, rendering the notion of not managing 
the SA DOD knowledge continuum unfathomable.   
The researcher’s assumption that the SA DOD is not interested in KM is thus based on the 
fact that the SA DOD still finds itself managing its resources and capabilities based on information 
era principles.  The SA DOD regards information as a strategic resource to base decisions on.    In 
the knowledge era, the SA DOD should regard knowledge as the strategic resource and asset.  In 
several instances, the SA DOD links information to decision-making, action and military advantage.  
The SA DOD does not afford this position to its knowledge and thus creating the perception that 
knowledge is not important. This predicament manifests itself at the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels, both within the corporate and operational environments.  These practices are 
possibly fuelled by construct dissonance saturating the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy 
and doctrine. 
The SA DOD does not have SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine on KM; a product of the 
dilemma outlined above.  The SA DOD thus has no strategic guidance and direction on KM.  
However, there is wide-ranging policy on several of the components of a KMC – with no clear 
mechanism to bring these together in an integrated KMC.  Compounding the situation further, wide-
spread construct dissonance is prevalent within the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine.  Starting with the definition for SA DOD information; the dissonance relates to the 
interchanged and incorrect usage of data, information and knowledge as constructs.  Construct 
dissonance severely hamper the coherent and integrated management of these resources.  This 
construct dissonance is probably also a large contributing factor to the SA DOD being entrenched in 
the information era and associated management practices.   The level of construct dissonance and 
the negative effects thereof strongly supports the researcher’s assumption that the SA DOD is not 
interested in KM.  It also supports the recommendation that the SA DOD should institutionalise 
coherent and integrated KM to align the SA DOD with the requirements for knowledge era thinking 
and practices and an authoritative SA DOD taxonomy on these (and possibly others) constructs. 
There is much evidence from the selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine that 
the SA DOD should consider having a KMC.  This need is based on the complexity of the SA DOD 
environment, both from a corporate perspective (Defence Secretariat) and an operational (SANDF) 
perspective.  There is substantial evidence that SA DOD capstone knowledge should drive 
decisions, actions, effects and advantage in every sphere of the organisation.  Fortunately for the SA 
DOD, the organisation owns a diverse portfolio of capstone military knowledge and defence related 
knowledge.  Unfortunately, the SA DOD does not have a KMC, a knowledge champion such as a 
CKO nor KM policy and doctrine with which to manage this portfolio of knowledge within the 
interest of decisions, actions, effects and advantage and ultimately the national interest.  
The SA DOD knowledge portfolio includes capstone military knowledge such as policy, 
doctrine, intelligence and IP.  Fundamental and foundational to SA DOD KM are coherence, 
integration, security, leadership, stakeholder and role-player management, processes, funding, 
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organisational structure, HRM and IT.  Databases, information- and knowledge-bases and their 
associated management systems and architectures are several and varied – providing substance to 
the recommendation for coherent and integrated SA DOD KM by means of a KMC.  
Based on the discussion thus far in the dissertation, the researcher proposes that KM as a 
construct be expanded to knowledge continuum management (KCM) which would support the 
continuous requirement for the integrated management of the various components that are 
considered part of the knowledge continuum.  It will also provide a platform for the integration of 
the various sets of processes involved in the management of the various components.  This proposal 
could be part of future research; for the SA DOD, however, establishing a KMC is the first step. 
In the next chapter, the researcher provides an analysis of the primary data collected by means 
of questionnaires.  Because of the seminal nature of this research, the questionnaires were aimed at 
the SA DOD senior management based on the C2 regime within the SA DOD that controls 
function, structure and resource allocation.  If no interest in KM is detected and supported at this 
level of management it will permeate the entire SA DOD.  Thus, the analysis of this data will focus 
on the level of interest and application of KM within the SA DOD.  Very little interest was detected. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ATTITUDES AND VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT   
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
A questionnaire research technique were chosen to collect data/information/knowledge in 
support of a deeper inquiry into the perceived disinterest in KM by the SA DOD.  A selected 
sample of SA DOD leadership was chosen to participate in the questionnaire research.  Since this 
research is seminal, it is paramount to start the research at the leadership level of the SA DOD. This 
is based on the, now established principle, that leadership is fundamental to KM success.  Thus, any 
interest shown by the leadership of the SA DOD is pivotal to its success.   
Respondents were selected based on the criteria set out in Chapter 4 (research methodology).   
Also, as discussed in Chapter 6 of the dissertation, DODI43 details the KM requirements for senior 
management in the SA DOD.  Therefore, based on the prescripts of SA DOD Level 1 policy, all 
senior managers should be able to actively engage in KM within their areas of responsibility and be 
in a position to provide opinions and answers on the questions raised in the questionnaire based on 
the KM definition used by DODI43 – “Obtains, analyses and promotes the generation and sharing 
of knowledge and learning in order to enhance the collective knowledge of the 
organisation“(DODI43: J4-4).   
The first round of questionnaires was issued to the respondents on 13 October 2016 to be 
returned by 28 February 2017.  The completed questionnaire was scanned and stored with the other 
material used for the writing of this dissertation.  A copy of the questionnaire and research 
agreement is attached as Appendix B to the dissertation. 
Due to the poor response rate from the first round of questionnaires the researcher was 
compelled to issue a second and third round of questionnaires to a broader sample (more detailed 
explanation is provided later in this chapter).  Whereas the first round focussed exclusively on the 
top layer of SA DOD SMS members (16 selected members based on discussion and findings in 
chapter 6);  the second round broaden that focus to all SA DOD members (a total of 275 possible 
respondents, with the lowest number of possible respondents, 202). 
The focus of the questionnaire research remains to extract SA DOD leadership perspectives 
on SA DOD interest in KM, understanding of KM importance and possible methods to execute KM 
within the SA DOD.  The first round of questionnaires could only marginally establish a disinterest 
in SA DOD KM.  The second and third round confirmed the results of the first round as well as the 
assumption made by the researcher that the SA DOD leadership, and hence the SA DOD, does not 
have interest in establishing coherent and integrated KM.  Furthermore, currently, the SA DOD 
leadership has a very limited understanding of KM.  This predicament is possibly the lead 
contributor to the SA DOD still being in the information era as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of the 
dissertation.  Also, the predicament will severely hamper the establishment of an SA DOD KMC in 
order for the SA DOD to benefit from coherent and integrated KM as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 
of the dissertation. 
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7.2 RESULTS FROM RESPONSES  
7.2.1 First Round of Questionnaires 
Leadership drives successful KM as was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation.  
The sample focussed on the on the executive management level of the SA DOD commonly referred 
to as the Senior Management System (SMS).  The sample thus included rank/appointment levels of 
Director General, Chief, Deputy Director Generals and one Chief Director.  This resulted in a 
sample of 16 SMS members.   
Leadership and direction of SA DOD resources are initiated and accounted for by this 
selected sample.  They are responsible for the management of SA DOD knowledge. Some 
expression on the requirement for KM in the SA DOD does exist within the selected sample of SA 
DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine (JDP20 and DODI43), which provides limited evidence that the 
SA DOD might be interested in adopting KM as a management practice. JDP20 makes mention of 
KM in a diagram that summarises the competencies required from personnel at various levels of the 
SA DOD.  Knowledge management is pitched at the executive management level or what is 
commonly referred to as the Senior Management System (SMS) (JDP20: 12).  DODI43 (J4-4) 
elaborates on the Generic Core Management Criteria, Standards and Criteria for SA DOD SMS and 
their responsibility towards KM.  
It was thus important to ascertain from this sample insight on their conceptualisation and 
management of the resource, whether this is done or not. The Chief Director is included in the 
sample due to the direct responsibility in the drafting of the Defence Review 2015 and its 
implementation.  Because the Defence Review 2015 is a primary source document analysed in 
Chapter 5 of the dissertation, the researcher thought it prudent to include this appointment in the 
sample.   
Supporting the researcher’s initial assumption, very limited interest was shown by the 
selected sample of SA DOD SMS members.  During this first round of questionnaires, the 
researcher purposefully did not engage the selected respondents on progress and intention to submit 
so as not to artificially raise interest or pressure.  The result was only one of the questionnaires 
returned to the researcher completed by an SMS member that is at the level of Deputy Service 
Chief, which was accepted as being endorsed by the invited participant and thus accepted as the 
opinion of the invited participant.  Two questionnaires were returned stating no interest in 
completing it.  Staff Officers of at least three Chiefs telephonically communicated with the 
researcher to clarify the requirements for the questionnaire and the intention thereoff, clearly tasked 
to complete the questionnaire as delegated.  None of these reached the researcher. Thirteen 
questionnaires were not returned with any level of comment.  The very weak response rate reflect 
any or combinations of the following scenarios – 
 The questionnaire assumes that the respondents have knowledge on KM, which might not 
be the case, thus leaving the respondents intimidated by the questions.   
 The work schedules of the SMS members not allowing time for participation in academic 
research on the SA DOD. 
 No interest by SMS members to get involved in academic research on the SA DOD. 
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 No interest by SMS members in the subject field.
 Possibly perceiving academic research of this kind as a waste of time.
 Personal Staff Officers to these positions managing the staff work for the SMS members not
being responsive enough to meet the deadline.
 Personal Staff Officers to these SMS members perceiving this kind of academic research as
a waste of time and thus not presenting it to their principles for consideration.
 At least one SMS member had family emergencies during the period which probably
complicated work and family responsibility even more.
The very limited response received obviously hampered the extraction of themes.  However, 
the one response received was recorded.  The following is a verbatim copy of the response received 
-  
Question 1:  To your knowledge, in which era is the world currently (e.g. agrarian era, industrial 
era, information era, knowledge era)? 
Respondent 1A: “The world is captured in all four the eras.  Certain areas in Africa are stuck 
more in the survival mode.  Some are in an agrarian era with failed industrial capability.  In 
South Africa, the Public Service is still in the information era and not really ready to embark in 
the knowledge era.” 
Question 2:  In your opinion, is the DOD a complex organisation? 
Respondent 1A: “Yes, the DOD is a complex organisation dependent on members from different 
Services and Divisions, all from different backgrounds, highly dependent on communication 
with each other.” 
Question 3:  In your opinion is information and/or knowledge strategic to the DOD?  If so, why? 
Respondent 1A: “Yes, both are extremely essential.  Information is derived from a myriad of acts 
and data, which floods the DOD daily.  Knowledge is derived from years of experience and 
learning.  The DOD is losing a lot of this knowledge basis, due to retirements and normal 
attrition.  A loss of knowledge and experience which is happening, will hamper the formulation 
of proper strategies.” 
Question 4:  Does your Performance Agreement have a distinct requirements statement for 
Knowledge Management? 
Respondent 1A: “No.” 
Question 5:  To your knowledge, are there any legislated requirement for Knowledge Management 
in the SA DOD? 
Respondent 1A: “I am not aware of any.” 
Question 6:  Is Knowledge Management addressed in the Defence Review 2015? 
Respondent 1A: “Not aware of it.  Possibly addressed indirectly in Chapter 11.” 
Question 7:  Are you aware of any SA DOD Level 1 policy and/or SA DOD doctrine or strategy 
that address Knowledge Management in the SA DOD? 
Respondent 1A: “No.” 
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Question 8a:  Do you have any opinions, based on personal experience and/or work experience that 
supports the view that the SA DOD is interested in doing Knowledge Management and/or are 
actively engaged in Knowledge Management? 
Respondent 1A: “No drive to implement it to my knowledge.” 
Alternatively, the following question was considered. 
Question 8b:  Why, in your opinion, is the SA DOD not interested in KM? Stated differently, why 
in your opinion has the SA DOD not adopted a coherent or integrated KM?  
Respondent 1A: No comment by Respondent A.  Respondent A opted to answer Question 8a 
above. 
Question 9:  In your opinion, should the SA DOD engage in Knowledge Management (if not 
already doing Knowledge Management)?  If so, why would this be important for the SA DOD? 
Respondent 1A: “It is essential to apply KM due to the ever-changing military environment with 
all its challenges and complexities.” 
Question 10:  How would you define knowledge? 
Respondent 1A: “The ability to analyse and interpret information in order to make the right 
decision in time.” 
Question 11:  How would you define knowledge management? 
Respondent 1A: “The collection of information, critically analysing the info and making the 
right decision at the right time.” 
Question 12:  What knowledge do you manage within your portfolio? 
Respondent 1A: “Managing of a number of health disciplines (+64) and supporting elements.” 
Question 13:  What is considered capstone SA DOD knowledge?  Is this described in SA DOD 
Level 1 policy or doctrine? 
Respondent 1A: “Not aware of such a policy or doctrine.  This can never be singular knowledge 
in this complex department.  Synergy will have to be found between the two Level 1 Entities, 
Sec Def and CSANDF.” 
Question 14:  What type of knowledge should the SA DOD be managing?  In your opinion, why 
this type of knowledge? 
Respondent 1A: “Embedded knowledge to face war-like challenges.  Tactical knowledge of 
roots level is also important to survive war-like situations.  This, with experience can lead to 
proper strategic decision making.” 
Question 15:  What approach should be used to manage SA DOD knowledge with (e.g. resource-
based approach or risk management based approach or competitive advantage based approach or 
etc, etc)? 
Respondent 1A: “Listen to, and share experience and knowledge of members who still remain in 
the DOD.” 
Question 16:  What should the aim/goal/objectives of KM be in the SA DOD? 
Respondent 1A: “To close the gaps that exist between role-players, communication and 
knowledge.  To exchange knowledge and share experiences.” 
Question 17:  In your opinion, what should be the critical components/elements of an SA DOD 
Knowledge Management model? 
Respondent 1A: “Knowledge audit and Peer reviews.” 
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Question 18:  What Knowledge Management processes exist in your domain? 
Respondent 1A: “Health and clinical information.  CPD-Clinical Professional Development 
opportunities.  MOU/MOAs with stakeholders such as Tertiary Institutions.” 
Question 19:  Based on your experience, is there a requirement for more knowledge integration? 
Respondent 1A: “Yes, providing the huge gap in communication between involved entities can 
be resolved.” 
Question 20:  What do you think should be key components of an SA DOD KM model? 
Respondent 1A: “Workshops/sessions. Video conferencing. Research.” 
The single response confirmed many themes that emerged from the other findings throughout 
the dissertation.  Respondent 1A clearly agree with the requirement for SA DOD KM, stating 
clearly that knowledge is of strategic value (i.e. “to face war-like challenges” and “to survive war–
like situations”) and essential to the organisation to cope with complexity and continuous changes 
in the environment.  Respondent 1A states unequivocally that integration is required to accomplish 
this.  This is consistent with perspectives identified throughout the dissertation.  However, 
Respondent 1A confirms that the SA DOD is not ready to embrace the knowledge era yet; 
acknowledging the data/information overload experienced by the SA DOD whilst slowly losing 
much of the IC inherent in experience when people retire.  If the SA DOD were managing its 
knowledge coherently and in an integrated manner, the organisation would have policy, strategy 
and plans formulated to harness the strategic value of knowledge and to secure knowledge whilst 
allowing for normal personnel management practices such as retirement.  This is not likely to occur 
soon as the DR 2015 does not prescribe any coherent and integrated KM or KMC for the SA DOD. 
Part of the management gap is locked up in the fact that KM is not included in performance 
agreements.  Respondent 1A states that he/she is not aware of this being a requirement.  In fact, 
Respondent 1A goes as far to state that there is no organisational effort to implement KM.  This is 
probably based on no legislative, SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine requirement to do so.  It 
could also be due to no leadership in establishing KM in the SA DOD.  Probably both.   
Respondent 1A defines knowledge as an ability rather than the product of processes and also 
link knowledge to decision-making and a time-value.  However, in defining KM, Respondent 1A 
reduce the phenomenon to the management of information with just two specific processes.  The 
same approach is evident in the literature review prescribing an assortment of processes to 
accomplish KM with.  The approach is endemic to the organisational proficiency in IM.  
Importantly, Respondent 1A include decision-making and timing as important variables in the 
definition of KM. 
Respondent 1A name a number of KM and associated processes of importance such as 
analyse, interpret, collect and share.  These have been discussed at length throughout the 
dissertation.  A specific goal of KM is articulated by Respondent 1A - “To close the gaps that exist 
between role-players, communication and knowledge.  To exchange knowledge and share 
experiences.” – thus, acknowledging critical components of KM and positioning KM to be the 
binding agent between them.  The researcher agrees with this perspective by describing it as 
‘facilitating’ in the proposed KM definition.   
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Respondent 1A name knowledge audits and peer reviews as critical components of a possible 
SA DOD KM model.  The researcher agrees with this view in the sense that these might be specific 
processes or tasks performed by an SA DOD KMC and possibly prescribed and elaborated on in 
Level 1 policy. 
7.2.2 Second Round of Questionnaires 
The second round of questionnaires was initiated based on the poor response rate from the 
first round.  Also, the poor results of the first round only marginally confirmed the researcher’s 
assumption that the SA DOD is not interested in KM.  
As was stated in the introduction of this chapter, the sample was broadened to include all SA 
DOD SMS members.  However, due to command and control restrictions in the SA DOD, the 
researcher still had to distribute the questionnaires via the command structures.  The questionnaire 
completion also remained voluntarily.  The targeted sample in the second round of questionnaire 
constitutes the entire SA DOD leadership cadre.  It includes –  
 Level 16 (Director General and General) – two (2). 
 Level 15 (Deputy Director General, Lieutenant General and Vice Admiral) – nineteen (19). 
 Level 14 (Chief Director, Major General and Rear Admiral) – fifty-two (52). 
 Level 13 (Directors, Brigadier General and Rear Admiral (JG)) – two hundred and two (202). 
This constitutes a total sample of 275 potential respondents.  If these respondents 
systematically delegated the task to lower levels it results in a total sample of potential respondents 
of 202.  In at least one instance the request for respondents to the questionnaire was discussed on a 
senior management forum
88
.   At least two other instances a staff officer was tasked to manage any 
responses for their respective Divisions (these were in the matériel and operations environment.  
These instances are known to the writer because these staff officers contacted the researcher to 
confirm the requirement and that the request is receiving attention.  Responses were received as 
follow –  
 Level 16 – zero (0). 
 Level 15 – zero (0). 
 Level 14 – one (1). 
 Level 13 – zero (0). 
This indicates that staff administration took place.  However, the level of interest in 
contributing to the research was virtually null.  It could also be construed as no interest in SA DOD 
KM.  The results support the results of the first round of questionnaires, pointing to at least the 
following: 
                                                 
88
 SA DOD Financial Management Board in 12 December 2017 – (File Ref. CFO/522/1/1 – Minutes of the Financial 
Management Board). 
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 The first and second layer of the SMS band has no/little interest in completing/participating in
the research and hence no interest in SA DOD KM.
 Due to the lack of interest in the research and SA DOD KM, the questionnaires were not
distributed to lower levels of the SMS band.
 The questionnaires were not distributed to lower levels of the SMS band due to the period of
the year that it was attempted in – being the festive period with associated vacation leave (10
December 2017 – 20 January 2018).
 The questionnaires were distributed to each level of the SMS band but attracted no interest in
participating.
Again, the very limited response received hampered the extraction of themes.  The one 
response received was recorded.  The respondent answered the questionnaire as follows (a verbatim 
copy of the response received) -  
Question 1:  Why is the SA DOD not interested in KM? 
1.1 In your opinion or to your knowledge is there interest KM and evidence thereof in the SA 
DOD in? 
Respondent 2A: “I am of the opinion that there is a definite interest in the DOD in this regard.  
The problem, however, is that all efforts are scattered, managed on requirement bases of 
individuals or smaller interest groups and not integrated what-so-ever.  A good example is that 
financial systems are not aligned and speaking to logistical systems.  Interest is therefore 
focused on individual requirements/preferences to ease problem-solving that are experienced 
during the execution of tasks.  Higher order systems were also developed to enhance 
productivity and output e.g. FMS and CALMIS.” 
1.2 Does your and/or your direct superior’s Performance Agreement have a distinct 
Performance Requirements Statement for KM? 
Respondent 2A: “None that I am knowledgeable about.” 
1.3 Are you aware of or to your knowledge is there any SA DOD policy, strategy or doctrine 
that express on or govern KM? 
Respondent 2A: “If there are, I am not knowledgeable about such documents or guidance.” 
1.4 Are you aware of or to your knowledge is KM an RSA legislated requirement? 
Respondent 2A: “No.” 
1.5 Are you aware of or to your knowledge is KM addressed in the DR 2015? 
Respondent 2A: “I cannot recall that I have seen anything in this regard.” 
Question 2:  Why should the SA DOD be interested? 
2.1 To the best of your knowledge, what do you understand knowledge to be? 
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Respondent 2A: “I define knowledge according to Bloom’s Taxonomy which ends at Level 6: 
Evaluation.” 
 
2.2 In which era is the world currently in your opinion or to your knowledge? 
Respondent 2A: “Knowledge era.” 
 
2.3 In your opinion or to your knowledge, is the DOD a complex organisation? 
Respondent 2A: “Definitely.” 
 
2.4 In your opinion or to your knowledge, will the quality of decision-making, action, effects 
achieved and advantage be affected if these activities are based on data vs information vs 
knowledge? 
Respondent 2A: “As soldiers, we have been taught to do appreciations.  During this process you 
first have to acquire the facts, then analyse each and every fact in isolation and then in relation 
to one another in order to come to real knowledge, understanding and finally to establish a new 
synthesis for the solving of the problem.  If this is not done, you will arrive at sub-standard 
solutions.  To my opinion – this is what KM is all about – contextual information that takes 
relationships with other environments into consideration to finally add value in order to make 
the best possible decisions.  So yes, effectiveness and efficiency should increase – if not the 
bases for planning is flawed.” 
 
2.5 In your opinion or to your knowledge, is data and/or information and/or knowledge strategic 
to the DOD? 
Respondent 2A: “Strategic in the military has its own meaning – I, therefore, would say that it is 
vital or critical to the DOD on all levels of functioning from the tactical, to operational to 
strategic level and from the day-to-day management environment to the operational 
environment, and finally from the ‘as is’ environment to the future environment.” 
 
2.6 In your opinion or to your knowledge, should the SA DOD engage in KM initiatives? 
Respondent 2A: “I am of the opinion, as mentioned above, that we have already engaged in KM 
activities in the past.  These may range from rudimentary debrief reports, to Accountability 
Management Conferences where ‘knowledge’ is managed on a monthly bases and compared 
with previous years, to PERSOL, CALMIS, and FMS systems.  Archiving, storing information 
on computer drives specifically developed for this purpose, etc are additional methods to 
manage info.  There is a constant drive in the DOD to ask the ‘So what?’ question – facts and 
data are just not enough to come to answers any longer.  Computer programmes are constantly 
enhanced to convert data and facts into meaning that is required.” 
 
3:  What type of knowledge should the SA DOD be managing? 
 
3.1 In your opinion or to your knowledge what type of knowledge should the SA DOD be 
managing? 
Respondent 2A: “One of the biggest lessons learned by information based forces of the First 
World is that too much info and info dissemination to the wrong levels is just as good as no info 
at all.  In the Knowledge Era, we can easily be overwhelmed by too much info/knowledge.  So 
the too simple answer to the question would be: Manage info that is required to plan, direct, 
orchestrate and control the objective achievement of the specific environment/level and have 
access to info/knowledge that has an impact/direct relation to that environment.  This is where 
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complexity will once more come to the fore as all the different level’s requirements and how 
they relate to one another should be integrated into the broader organisational KM system.  This 
principle will then give rise to the system of systems approach.” 
 
3.2 What knowledge do you manage specifically within your portfolio? 
Respondent 2A: “Day-to-day management knowledge that spans the POSTEDFITB (personnel, 
organisation/structure, sustainment, training, education, doctrine facilities, information 
technologies and budget/finance), as well as operations knowledge both internally and 
externally of the RSA.” 
 
4:  How should the SA DOD manage its knowledge?   
 
4.1 In your opinion or to your knowledge, what should the aim/goal/objective of KM be in the 
SA DOD? 
Respondent 2A: “To make quick, in time, informed decisions based on ‘correct’ available and 
tailored knowledge that will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the DOD at large, now 
and in future.” 
 
4.2 In your opinion or to your knowledge, what KM processes exist in your domain? 
Respondent 2A: “Mostly those aspects mentioned above.” 
 
4.3 In your opinion or to your knowledge, is there a requirement for more knowledge 
integration? 
Respondent 2A: “If you read the abovementioned – it is the main challenge we are experiencing 
at present – all is disjointed and managed in an ad hoc fashion.  In my opinion, therefore, 
protocols and policy should follow a top-down approach while populating the knowledge base 
should follow a bottom-up approach.” 
 
4.4 In your opinion or to your knowledge, what do you think should be key components be of 
an SA DOD KM model? 
Respondent 2A: “Governance, people, processes, technology, structure, culture and security.” 
The single response from round two confirmed many themes that emerged from the other 
findings throughout the dissertation.  The opinion of Respondent 2A that the SA DOD is interested 
in KM is contested by the dissertation from the perspective of no appointed KM leadership, 
governance, culture and structure to execute it with.  Respondent 2A provides some insight into the 
existence of KM activities and processes.  The researcher agrees with these, as discussed in chapter 
6 of the dissertation.   
Respondent 2A confirms the importance of integration amongst what is perceived as KM 
systems and practice.  This theme has surfaced continuously throughout the dissertation.  It is 
considered to be a critical variable if KM success is the goal.  The researcher is in agreement with 
this perspective and thus included this variable into proposed definitions and the SA DOD KM 
model.  
There is explicit recognition of the knowledge era by this SMS level respondent, which begs 
the question why the DR 2015 does not recognise this.  Respondent 2A also makes mention of the 
POSTEDFITB acronym within the context of the specific knowledge portfolio managed by him and 
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provide an explanation of what is understood by it.  Interestingly, Respondent 2A does not mention 
the anomaly of capstone knowledge missing from this acronym (i.e. policy, intelligence, IP – 
amongst possible others) and equate the ‘I’ and ‘T’ to information technology.  Respondent 2A 
briefly mentions Bloom’s Taxonomy within the context of the question on how knowledge can be 
defined.  Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning is depicted in the following graphic: 
 
Figure 7.1: Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning 
Source: Vanderbilt University. (2018). Retrieved from https://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-
pages/blooms-taxonomy/ on 31 January 2018. 
The original Bloom’s Taxonomy saw the light of day in 1956.  The Taxonomy was originally 
used by educators and consisted of six primary categories: “…Knowledge, Comprehension, 
Application, Analysis, Synthesis, and Evaluation”.  Knowledge was separated from the other 
categories with the classification of the other categories as skill and ability; clearly projecting 
knowledge to be the “…necessary precondition for putting these skills and abilities into practice.”  
(Vanderbilt University, 2018: online) 
In 2001 the Taxonomy was revised to be a tool for “…Teaching, Learning, and Assessment”.  
It was thus not intended to be a definition for knowledge but rather a framework to guide the 
development of knowledge, skill and ability.  The revised Bloom’s Taxonomy (2001) was rendered 
to be more dynamic and positioned to facilitate action.  It is understood that knowledge forms the 
bedrock of the six cognitive processes (i.e. remember, understand, apply, analyse, evaluate and 
create).  The categories are as follows:  
 “Remember: Recognizing and Recalling. 
 Understand: Interpreting, Exemplifying, Classifying, Summarizing, Inferring, Comparing and 
Explaining 
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 Apply: Executing and Implementing. 
 Analyze: Differentiating, Organizing and Attributing 
 Evaluate: Checking and Critiquing 
 Create: Generating, Planning and Producing” (Vanderbilt University, 2018: online) 
The revision of the Bloom’s Taxonomy also included a taxonomy detailing the knowledge 
types involved in the cognition process.  These knowledge types are as follows: 
 “Factual Knowledge: Knowledge of terminology and Knowledge of specific details and 
elements. 
 Conceptual Knowledge: Knowledge of classifications and categories, Knowledge of 
principles and generalizations, and Knowledge of theories, models, and structures. 
 Procedural Knowledge: Knowledge of subject-specific skills and algorithms, Knowledge of 
subject-specific techniques and methods, and Knowledge of criteria for determining when to 
use appropriate procedures. 
 Metacognitive Knowledge: Strategic Knowledge, Knowledge about cognitive tasks, including 
appropriate contextual and conditional knowledge, and Self-knowledge”. (Vanderbilt 
University, 2018: online) 
These types of knowledge fit into the IC concept.  Several of these types of knowledge are 
also recognised as such by other authors (see Chapter 2 of the dissertation; Table 2.2 and Figure 2.4 
as well as Table 2.1).  Understanding is a key step in the taxonomy to be able to create knowledge 
and facilitate further understanding to get to meaning.  Linkages with action and decision-making 
are also clearly visible in the processes of ‘apply’ and ‘evaluate’.  This is thus a very useful model 
with which to understand how knowledge is used in teaching.  It does, however, not define 
knowledge or KM specifically.  It does display some (if not most) of the elements inherent in this 
dissertations’ proposed definition of knowledge and KM. 
A critical process missed by most literature on KM is security.  Respondent 2A specifically 
mentions this process amongst a number of others.  This gap was identified and discussed by the 
researcher at length and confirmed by the respondent based on his extensive military experience.   
The other key components for a proposed SA DOD KM model are “Governance, people, processes, 
technology, structure, culture”.  These are reflected in the proposed conceptual SA DOD KM 
model. 
The general prognosis still prevails, after the second call for participation in the research that 
the SA DOD SMS band is not interested in participating in the research and/or is not interested in 
SA DOD KM.  Thus, with the SA DOD leadership not interested in KM it is highly unlikely that 
SA DOD KM takes place (at least not in an integrated manner).  The need for integrated SA DOD 
KM was, however, expressed explicitly by both the respondents above; thus admitting that it does 
not take place but remains a critical requirement for decision-making and action.   
A final round of questionnaires was initiated in order to verify this prognosis and to mitigate 
the effects of the festive period and vacation leave period during the response period (10 December 
2017 – 20 January 2018) provided. 
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7.2.3 Final Round of Questionnaires 
The final round of questionnaires was initiated based on the exceptionally poor results of the 
second round of questionnaires.  After receiving one (1) completed questionnaire and one (1) 
enquiry about the questionnaire during the second round the researcher proceeded with a final round 
of questionnaires.   
The final round of questionnaires was distributed to mitigate the risk that the period provided 
for completion of the second round of questionnaires (10 December 2017 – 20 January 2018) 
received little or no consideration by the command bodies listed in the distribution list.   
The sample remained the same as was used for the second round of questionnaires, i.e. SA 
DOD SMS members.  The researcher again distributed the questionnaires via the command 
structures as per the distribution list attached to the questionnaire.  Questionnaire completion also 
remained voluntarily.   
After distribution the researcher received enquiries about the preferred format of the 
completed questionnaire from the following environments; confirming the SA DOD communication 
distribution system function fairly effectively: 
 Senior Staff Officer from Chief of Joint Operations on 23 January 2018.
 Senior Staff Officer from SA Army Human Resource Management on 29 January 2018.
 Senior Staff Officer from the Chief Human Resource Management office on 29 January 2018.
 Director from the Chief Defence Matériel Division on 5 February 2018.
Responses were received as follow – 
 Level 16 – zero (0).
 Level 15 – zero (0).
 Level 14 – zero (0).
 Level 13 – zero (0).
This confirms no interest further interest by the sample (other than the two responses already 
recorded) in completing/contributing to the research and/or SA DOD KM.  The results support the 
results of the first and second round of questionnaires.  The final round also eliminates anomalies 
created by the festive and leave periods (10 December 2017 – 20 January 2018).  The result 
confirms that the SMS Level 16 and SMS Level 15 have no or unexpressed interest in 
completing/participating in the research and hence probably no interest in SA DOD KM.  Due to 
the lack of interest in the research and SA DOD KM, the questionnaires were possibly not 
distributed to other levels of the SMS band (Levels 14 and 13).  However, if the questionnaires 
were distributed to each SMS level, such distribution did not attract any interest in participating.  
This supports the assumption of the researcher that the SA DOD has no interest in coherent and 
integrated KM.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 338 
 
After three rounds of questionnaires and the very limited response received the assumption by 
the researcher that the SA DOD has no interest in coherent and integrated KM is supported.  This 
hampered the extraction of themes and other conclusions in support of the document analysis in the 
previous chapters.  This level of interest displayed will also hamper severely hamper any future 
attempt to implement KM initiatives in the SA DOD and will require considerable change 
management.  However, the researcher did make some inferences from the two questionnaires 
received and from 28 years’ experience as an employee in the SA DOD.   The following section is a 
discussion of the themes that could be extracted from the completed questionnaires of those 
respondents that voluntarily participated. 
7.3 THEMES 
The following is the views of the researcher, calibrated with the opinions expressed by the two 
respondents. 
7.3.1 Why is the SA DOD Perceived not to be interested in Knowledge Management? 
Leadership drives successful KM, both from a human capital (leaders) and structural capital 
(legislation, policy and doctrine) persepctive.  Based on the participation in the research by the SMS 
strata of the SA DOD and the two responses received, the researcher’s assumption that the SA DOD 
is not interested in KM is supported.  This predicament is further exacerbated by not having KM 
included in the legislation, DR 2015, SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine and/or performance 
criteria in SA DOD Senior Management performance agreements.  Yet, SA DOD Level 1 policy 
states that KM should be practised by senior management.  The extent of KM not being included in 
performance agreements can be ascertained with an SA DOD knowledge audit.   
Knowledge management theory and practice have been under development for more than 15 
years.  Yet, the SA DOD still finds itself in the information era expressed so in the DR 2015 -
contributing to the perception that the SA DOD is not interested in KM. 
Thus, by combining no performance requirement with being entrenched in the information era 
the perception of not being interested in KM is supported, albeit at the SA DOD Senior 
Management level.  Interest in KM should also be validated for every level in the SA DOD with 
more research.  However, without SA DOD Senior Management sponsorship and leadership, 
coherent and integrated KM will not be successfully implemented. 
7.3.2 Should the SA DOD Consider Knowledge Management Implementation and Why? 
The world is currently in the knowledge era.  This requires a more integrated approach to 
managing the conceptual knowledge continuum.  Because the SA DOD is exposed to (possibly 
severe) data/information overload, serious consideration should be given to the correct management 
approach that supports decision-making, action, effects and advantage.  This dissertation propose 
KM as one possible solution.   
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Both SA DOD information and knowledge are regarded as strategic to the SA DOD, driving 
the essential requirement of managing; stemming from requirements emanating from complex 
military environments and the fact that the SA DOD is considered a complex organisation.  
Complexity spawns dependence on communication, experience and learning to survive and thrive. 
Another reason for KM implementation is a requirement stated for “synergy’ between the two 
primary components of the embedded case study – i.e. the Sec Def and CSANDF.  Because of the 
emphasis placed on knowledge sharing as a KM process, KM will go a long way to provide 
coherence and integration between these organisational components. 
The ability of the SA DOD to craft strategic direction (e.g. policy, doctrine and strategy) is 
dependent on recognition by the SA DOD that knowledge is a strategic resource that should be 
managed accordingly.  Linked to the fact that knowledge is regarded as strategic - is the 
predicament of knowledge loss by the SA DOD, which is then linked with the ability of the SA 
DOD to craft strategic direction (e.g. policy, doctrine and strategy).  A clear requirement for 
knowledge integration was expressed.   
7.3.3 What Type of Knowledge should be managed by the SA DOD?  
Health and clinical related information and knowledge, as well as a Memoranda of 
Understanding with stakeholders (e.g. tertiary institutions), were identified.  Also, more generic, 
knowledge that is embedded in the SA DOD ensuring the survival of the organisation during a war.  
It, therefore, highlights previously discussed requirements for survival.  However, no mention was 
made of advantage.  
The very limited responses received made it difficult to add much detail to this question.  
However, the DR 2015 and a selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine provided 
comprehensive insight into the portfolio of knowledge to be managed.  A future knowledge audit 
will verify and augment this picture further.  No mention was made of intelligence, IP or contracts 
as capstone SA DOD knowledge. 
7.3.4 What are the Fundamentals that the SA DOD must understand about Managing 
Military and Related Knowledge?   
The respondents indicated that the definitions of knowledge and KM should at least make 
reference to process.  The definitions should also be linked to decision-making and the time-value 
of the knowledge continuum.  Another important factor to consider is knowledge sharing as a 
fundamental objective of KM.  Additional to this, knowledge audits and peer reviews were 
proposed as critical elements of SA DOD.  Knowledge management tools such as workshops, video 
conferencing and research were identified.  Mention was made of the requirement for knowledge 
security by one of the respondents, highlighting the fact that security is associated with knowledge. 
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
The chapter provides supporting evidence that the SA DOD is not interested in KM.  This is 
based on lack of interest in the subject field and lack of interest in leading KM initiatives by the 
selected sample of SMS members, and lack of legislative, policy and doctrinal KM imperatives.  
Most of this is probably driven by the fact that the SA DOD is still entrenched in the information 
era and associated management practices.  The lack of response to the questionnaire is attributed to 
lack of interests in the subject field and/or academic research related projects, congested work 
schedules, staffs filtering the requirement for the research out of the work schedule of their 
superiors, staffs not responsive enough and other personal reasons.  Without clear leadership and 
structural capital in place KM will not be allowed a foothold in the SA DOD, nor will it be 
successfully implemented.  This will negatively affect the SA DOD’s ability to survive and to 
secure an advantage. 
In the last chapter the researcher compares and discusses the research findings from the 
literature review (dissertation Chapter 2), military KM (dissertation Chapter 3); legislative 
framework and DR 2015 (dissertation Chapter 5), SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine 
(dissertation Chapter 6) and questionnaires and analysis (dissertation Chapter 7).  The comparative 
analysis and discussion lead to possible solutions to the research questions. Thus, Chapter 8 
finalises the dissertation with concluding remarks on implications for KM theory and practice as 
well as proposals for future research.   
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTION AND CLOSURE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge and KM, as constructs, are fiercely debated subject fields internationally and will 
remain so for the immediate future.  Knowledge management is still, and will remain for at least the 
short-term, a contentious management science due to the nature of the asset proposed to be 
managed and the divergent contexts it is managed in.   
Knowledge as a construct derives its configuration from context, mostly driven by 
individualised aspiration to know and/or organisational reach for advantage.  Context is interpreted 
by an infinite portfolio of human values, norms, culture, experience, skills, judgement, intuition, 
etc.  Every individual and organisation have a different portfolio endowment, reinforcing the notion 
that knowledge is in constant flux and hence the requirement to manage it. 
There is still no definitive definition for knowledge or KM, probably due to the dynamic 
nature of knowledge and contextual dynamics. Context, stemming from environmental complexity 
and change, and knowledge as well as what is required to manage it with are continuously evolving. 
Managers should thus construct the best contextual solutions to manage knowledge within their 
organisations in order to survive and attain and multiply advantage.  
The purpose of this research was to qualitatively explore, describe and assess the extent to 
which KM would be beneficial to the SA DOD and how this could be achieved.  The objectives of 
this research were structured according to four secondary research questions that explored the 
perception that the SA DOD is not interested in KM; provide possible arguments why the SA DOD 
should be interested in KM; suggest possible fundamentals to managing SA DOD knowledge as 
well as the identification of SA DOD knowledge that needs managing.  
Deductive reasoning was used, resulting in an extensive literature reviews with a broad scope 
including a small international case study on military KM as practiced in the USA military; 
document analysis based on relevant RSA legislation, the DR 2015 and a selected sample of SA 
DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine, and lastly a questionnaire aimed at the opinions of SA DOD 
Senior Management.   
During the research, the researcher moved from the generally accepted KM theory and 
concepts to specific applied thinking on the functioning of KM within the USA military, as a 
recognised world-class military organisation, followed by specifics regarding KM within the SA 
DOD. From the document analysis (primary research focus) and questionnaires (secondary research 
focus), the researcher concluded that the SA DOD is not interested in KM for various reasons.  
Amongst such reasons are the extremely poor interest in participation by the SA DOD SMS level in 
the questionnaire research; there are no legislative requirements for SA DOD KM, thus not 
necessitating any management action on the matter and probably fuelling the disinterest; no 
mention is made of KM as a requirement in the DR 2015 thus further reinforcing the disinterest in 
responding to the requirements for KM in the knowledge era;  no recognition that organisations 
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have transitioned into the knowledge era, starting as far back as the early 2000s with the transition.  
The afore mentioned reasons probably contribute or is the cause of the predicament that the SA 
DOD does not have Level 1 KM policy - yet there is at  least one Level 1 policy that states the 
requirement for KM to be formalised in SMS performance agreements. 
The researcher constructed robust arguments from published literature and organisational 
documents supporting the importance of KM in general as well as the importance of KM for 
militaries from a USA military perspective and for the SA DOD.  The USA military was used as a 
case study because of the availability of published material that could be analysed and assessed 
against other academic material. The findings of the dissertation could possibly be generalised to 
militaries of similar size and complexity as the SA DOD. 
In general, take note of proposals by the researcher regarding a knowledge continuum as a 
construct rather than a knowledge hierarchy as well as proposals regarding knowledge continuum 
management rather than just KM.  Military theorists can also take note of the proposed KM 
leadership philosophy which the researcher based on the definition of missions command. 
8.2 CONSOLIDATED REVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
8.2.1 Chapter 1 – Introduction, Background and Objectives of the Research 
The chapter introduced the context for the dissertation, describing the problem statement, 
purpose statement and objectives of the dissertation and outlined the research questions, limitations 
and ethical considerations for the research.  The primary research question for the research was - 
What is the extent of disinterest in, benefits and requirements for coherent and integrated KM in the 
SA DOD?  Answers to these questions will achieve the research objective.  Secondary research 
questions are as follows:  
 Question 1: Why is the SA DOD perceived not to be interested in KM? This question is based on
an assumption drawn from the lack of evidence of SA DOD KM.
 Question 2: Should the SA DOD consider KM implementation and why? Following from the first
question the researcher elaborates on the importance of SA DOD KM and why.
 Question 3: What categories and types of SA DOD knowledge should be managed?  It is
important to discover what categories and types (subject fields) of knowledge exist in the SA
DOD and which of these should form part of SA DOD KM in support of coherence and
integration.
 Question 4: What are the fundamentals that the SA DOD must understand about managing
military and related knowledge?  Important factors discussed relate to processes, security,
coherence and integration, leadership, enabling systems, etc.  These fundamentals informed the
construction of an SA DOD KM conceptual model.
8.2.2 Chapter 2 - Literature Review: Knowledge Management Theory and Practice 
A literature review of the primary KM theory relevant to the SRQs 2 to 4 was done; 
concluding with important factors for consideration in later chapters of the dissertation.  Secondary 
research question 2 to 4 was answered satisfactorily from a general theory and business perspective. 
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The chapter considered knowledge and the management thereof with a wide angled lens.  It 
was established that the world is in the knowledge era and that organisations institutionalise KM as 
a management enabler to manage organisational knowledge.  It was concluded that KM is not 
project management, operations management or IM, but that these are distinct processes that both 
utilise and generate knowledge which then needs coherent and integrated management to unlock 
advantage with. Business organisations lead the development of KM, both theoretically and 
practically.  Clear evidence was provided as to the requirement for KM in business, most of which 
is also relevant to military organisations due to the generic impact of decision-making, actions, 
effects and advantage on both business and militaries. This evidence mostly relates to the strategic 
nature of knowledge as an organisational asset and the competitive advantage it offers.  What makes 
the management of knowledge ambiguous is the fact that there is no universally accepted definition 
for the construct.  This makes defining KM as a construct very difficult.   
Organisations that seek to manage knowledge will have to define the construct for their 
environment and then define what KM means and must achieve for their organisation.   This will 
assist organisations to ponder questions on what knowledge to manage, how to manage these and to 
what end.  This dissertation provides insight into these generic aspects in Chapter 2 and expanding 
the arguments in Chapter 3 with a conclusion on the importance of KM for militaries and 
definitions for SA DOD knowledge and KM. 
8.2.3 Chapter 3 – Literature Review: Military Knowledge Management 
There is unambiguous recognition of the value proposition of KM for militaries in some 
foreign countries, particularly the USA.  Chapter 3 focused on KM in the military, mostly from the 
perspective of the USA military KM experience.  This chapter can be considered as part 2 of the 
literature review, albeit with a document analysis character because the research material mostly 
constituted USA military-related documents and some published articles.   
A literature and document review of the primary military KM theory relevant to the SRQs 2, 3 
and 4 was done; concluding with important factors for consideration in later chapters of the 
dissertation.  Secondary research question 2 about the reasons why the SA DOD should consider 
implementing KM was answered satisfactorily from a USA military KM perspective. Secondary 
research question 3 about the categories and types of knowledge should be managed by the SA 
DOD was answered satisfactorily from a USA military KM perspective.  Secondary research 
question 4 about the fundamentals that the SA DOD must understand about managing military and 
related knowledge was answered satisfactorily from a USA military KM perspective.  The chapter 
stated without argument the importance of KM to militaries.   The chapter identified some 
fundamentals for KM in the military, mostly corresponding with findings from the literature review 
(dissertation Chapter 2).   
The USA military clearly positions themselves in the knowledge era and have 
institutionalised (probably with varying levels of success) KM as a strategic management enabler.  
Identified as critically important are leadership, funding, organisational structure, taxonomy, KM 
policy and strategy, integration, etc.  Furthermore, policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP are 
identified as capstone military knowledge, actively managed by the USA military.  The USA 
military clearly links knowledge and the management thereof to decision-making, actions, effects 
and advantage.   
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The chapter also identified a definition for KM as used by the USA military as well as several 
knowledge processes that were considered for a proposed SA DOD KM model.  These and 
theoretical aspects identified in Chapter 2 of the dissertation were used by the researcher to propose 
working definitions for SA DOD knowledge and KM as a basis for the SA DOD document analysis 
in Chapters 5 and 6.  This should lay the foundation for a future SA DOD KMC and provide the 
starting point for coherent and integrated SA DOD KM.  With a clear understanding of what the SA 
DOD should regard as knowledge and KM, the researcher embarked on an embedded case study on 
the SA DOD, focussing on related legislation, policy and doctrine and senior management opinion.  
8.2.4 Chapter 4 - Research Design and Methodology 
A qualitative research methodology was selected as the most suitable method due to the 
seminal nature of the dissertation and due to the requirements for deep enquiry.   The researcher 
took a relativist worldview (ontological assumption), calibrated with a constructivist paradigm 
(epistemological assumption), favouring a qualitative research methodology and case study research 
approach/design that rendered the rich description of the phenomenon using techniques such as 
document analysis and a questionnaire.  The foundation for the discussion about SA DOD KM was 
laid with descriptive and exploratory literature reviews (dissertation Chapters 2 and 3).   Chapter 3 
constituted a limited (open source documents) case study on military KM focussing on the USA 
perspective.  
Based on the composition of the SA DOD, an embedded single case study approach was used 
for document analysis of selected and relevant legislation, the DR 2015 and a sample of SA DOD 
Level 1 policy and doctrine.  The SA DOD embedded case study explored several layers of 
management direction and imperatives.  This allowed for consideration of research material from 
both the Secretariat for Defence and the SANDF.     
The document analysis (chapter 5 and 6) was supplemented with a questionnaire research 
(chapter 7), directed at the SA DOD SMS to extract more insight about SA DOD interest in KM 
and other perspectives on KM fundamentals.  This approach was based on the fact that KM will not 
be instituted nor be successful without support from the organisational leadership.  Deeper insight 
into the interest in and/or actual SA DOD KM initiatives was accomplished with both document 
analysis and questionnaires.  However, the very limited response received from the questionnaires 
only provided evidence that supports the assumption that the SA DOD is not interested in KM from 
a leadership perspective.   
8.2.5 Chapter 5 - Legislative Framework and DR 2015 
The chapter focused on the document analysis of relevant legislation and the DR 2015 to 
determine the manifestation of KM theory and practice in the SA DOD that would shed light on all 
the research questions;  concluding with important factors for consideration in Chapters 6 and 7 of 
the dissertation. Secondary research question 1 about the SA DOD interest in KM was answered 
partially from the perspectives expressed in various legislation and the DR 2015.  Secondary 
research question 2 about the reasons why the SA DOD should consider implementing KM was 
answered partially. Secondary research question 3 about the categories and types of knowledge 
should be managed by the SA DOD was answered partially.  Secondary research question 4 about 
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the fundamentals that the SA DOD must understand about managing military and related 
knowledge was answered partially. 
The legislative framework relevant to the SA DOD and the SA DOD DR 2015 is silent on the 
requirement for KM.  In fact, the documents are relatively quiet on all matters concerning 
knowledge. The legislation and DR 2015 are still entrenched in the information era.  The regulatory 
and policy perspectives expressed by the documents promote information as the strategic resource 
to be managed and secured.  The absence of legislation regarding the requirement for KM is 
probably the driving force behind the perceived SA DOD disinterest in KM.  This is further 
exacerbated by the DR 2015 that endorses the information era entrenchment and IM focus for the 
foreseeable future.  The documents analysed did, however, provide much insight into why KM is 
important for the SA DOD and why the SA DOD should consider establishing a dedicated KMC.   
The documents also rendered evidence that supported the proposed definitions for SA DOD 
knowledge and KM.  The identified gap in the literature about knowledge security is addressed in 
the documents with great emphasis, albeit from an information security perspective.  Several 
fundamental requirements for KM have been identified in the documents as well as categories and 
types of knowledge to be managed by a proposed SA DOD KMC.  Fundamental requirements 
identified early in the dissertation already were also present in the documents, expressed within 
various contexts, but all supporting the requirement for coherent and integrated KM.   
8.2.6 Chapter 6 - SA DOD Level 1 Policy & Doctrine 
Chapter 6 focused on the analysis of a selected sample of SA DOD Level 1 policy and 
doctrine that shed light on all the research questions and contributed in the crafting of the 
questionnaire and the findings of the dissertation.   
Chapter 6 is a document analysis of the manifestation of KM theory and practice in the SA 
DOD from the perspective of a selection of Level 1 policy and doctrine documents.   Chapter 6 
aimed at providing answers to SRQs 1, 2, 3 and 4.  Secondary research question 1 about the SA 
DOD interest in KM was answered satisfactorily.  Secondary research question 2 about the reasons 
why the SA DOD should consider implementing KM was answered satisfactorily. Secondary 
research question 3 about the categories and types of knowledge should be managed by the SA 
DOD was answered satisfactorily.  Secondary research question 4 about the fundamentals that the 
SA DOD must understand about managing military and related knowledge was answered 
satisfactorily. 
The researcher found that the selected sample SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine is 
paralysed by construct dissonance, specifically the constructs data, information, knowledge 
(including policy, intelligence, doctrine and IP as forms of capstone military knowledge).  Critical 
to this dissonance is the acceptance by the SA DOD that information is defined as being inclusive 
of data and knowledge.  This, combined with no legislative requirement for KM is probably the 
backbone of the perceived SA DOD disinterest in KM.   
The SA DOD has extensive Level 1 policy and doctrine on IM.  None is available for KM.  
Very limited policy expression on what knowledge and KM is, is present in the selected sample.  
The expressions that are present are of very little use.    It is probably this dissonance (a possible 
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product of ignorance of the subject matter and poor attention to detail in policy writing) that 
conceals the requirement for KM.  Arguments could also be tabled, based on the evidence provided 
by the dissertation, that the SA DOD is not disinterested in KM but just ignorant of the differences 
between IM and KM.  In order to emerge from the information era trenches, the SA DOD requires a 
comprehensive taxonomy of the various constructs discussed in the dissertation as a starting point, 
followed by a review of all Level 1 policy and doctrine to correct the dissonance.  This will 
probably result in a realisation as to the importance of KM and that the SA DOD require a KMC 
and Level 1 KM policy and doctrine to guide the development of the capability.  
Much support for the importance of SA DOD KM was expressed in the chapter.  Several and 
varied fundamentals to SA DOD KM was identified in the chapter.  Capstone SA DOD knowledge 
is at least policy, doctrine, intelligence, IP and contracts.  A comprehensive knowledge audit may 
reveal other categories.  Other SA DOD knowledge is characterised by the construct of IC; 
integrating both tacit and explicit knowledge.  The time-value of knowledge was identified critical 
to decisions, actions, effects and advantage.   
An SA DOD KM leadership philosophy was proposed and based on the definition of mission 
command.  Knowledge management leadership was identified as the key to a future SA DOD KMC 
and gave credence to the KM leadership philosophy.   Thus, for those that survived and strive to 
win, they have mastered the art of knowing.  To sustain survival and winning; the science of 
managing that knowledge is paramount.  Chapter 6 discussed the adversarial relationship between 
knowledge continuum security and knowledge sharing and transparency. Fundamental to an SA 
DOD KMC is knowledge continuum security and the reversal of an adversarial nexus between 
freedom to share and legislation/policy/doctrine aimed at restricting knowledge flow and usage. 
Other dilemmas discussed relate to the cost of securing the knowledge continuum and how to 
embrace technological change without negatively affecting knowledge continuum security.  Chapter 
6 also suggested the change of SA DOD capability acronyms to reflect the knowledge era 
constructs – i.e. POSTEFKTB and C4IKRS, amongst possibly several others.
With the establishment of an SA DOD KMC, the SA DOD should consider developing KW 
doctrine.  This will better facilitate the art of knowing and the science of managing that knowledge 
to obtain and sustain advantage.  Fundamental to an SA DOD KMC is to construct coherence and 
integration.   The level of integration that can be achieved within the SA DOD and between the 
proposed SA DOD KMC, government agencies such as SITA and Armscor and other RSA 
governmental departments will have a significant impact on the success of SA DOD KM.   
The researcher proposed that the construct of KM be expanded to KCM which would support 
the continuous requirement for the integrated management of the various components that is 
considered part of the knowledge continuum.  It will also provide a platform for the integration of 
the various sets of processes involved in the management of the various components. 
8.2.7 Chapter 7 - Questionnaire and Analysis 
Chapter 7 discuss the findings about the questionnaire on aspects relating to the possible 
manifestation of KM theory and practice in the SA DOD.  The chapter presented an analysis of the 
questionnaire data and response rate that were distributed to senior SA DOD managers.  Critical 
answers about the assumption that the SA DOD is not interested in KM were sought.  The 
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questionnaire aimed at providing possible answers to all the questions.  Sixteen senior management 
positions were approached for insight in the first round.  This sample was extended to include all 
Senior Management position in the SA DOD (a sample of 275 possible respondents).  The sample 
was expanded for a number of reasons but primarily due to the poor response rate by the initial 16 
respondents.  Even though the sample was extended significantly, only one additional response was 
obtained after two rounds of distribution.  Chapter 7 aimed at providing answers to SRQs 1, 2, 3 
and 4.  Secondary research question 1 about the SA DOD interest in KM was answered 
unsatisfactorily.  However, the low rate of response indicates disinterest in KM.  Secondary 
research question 2, 3 and 4 were answered unsatisfactorily due to the low rate of response.   
Only two questionnaires were returned, showing a distinct lack of interest in the subject 
matter and contribution to knowledge development in general and KM in particular.  The 
respondents that did provide some insight confirmed the SA DOD’s disinterest in KM.  The 
respondents confirmed the importance of institutionalised SA DOD KM.  Because of the limited 
responses received not much detail can be added to the findings of Chapters 5 and 6 of the 
dissertation.  The chapter was included in the dissertation because of the unambiguous confirmation 
of the assumption made in SRQ 1, thus also supporting findings of Chapters 5 and 6 of the 
dissertation.  Other than this the questionnaires provided very little robust insight.       
8.2.8 Chapter 8 - Conclusions, Contribution and Closure  
The final chapter crystallises the findings stemming from Chapters 2-3 and 5-7, as set out in 
the research methodology (dissertation Chapter 4), concluding the research report with a statement 
on the contribution of the research and possible related questions for future research.    
8.3 CONCLUSIONS 
8.3.1 The SA DOD’s Perceived Disinterest in Knowledge Management 
The opening quote by Naisbitt (1984: 17) - “Drowning in information, but starved for 
knowledge”, is true for the SA DOD and thus the requirement for coherent and integrated KM.  The 
researcher found that some of the primary drivers of the perception of disinterest in KM are based 
on the SA DOD still being in the information era; manage information as strategic rather than 
knowledge; capability/resource misunderstanding; KM leadership vacuum; KM policy and doctrine 
vacuum, and suffering from construct dissonance.  Other possible reasons for the perceived 
disinterest are linked to the SA DOD organisational complexity; making KM from a single point in 
the organisation extremely difficult taking C2 relationships into consideration.  Yet another reason 
might be linked to security considerations. Possibly the simplest reason for the perceived disinterest 
is the contentiousness and difficulty of defining knowledge and KM.   
Theorists seem to be reasoning mostly that KM is an add-on process to core organisational 
business strategy.  This might be central to the problem of managing organisational knowledge.  
Questions should be raised regarding the position of knowledge in business/organisational strategy 
and design.  Should knowledge not be the centrepiece around which organisations are constructed, 
in other words, moving towards a knowledge-based theory of the organisation?  In some businesses, 
notably those that deal with innovation, this is certainly the case.  However, in the public domain, 
the focus will be on service delivery, facilities, hardware and process – not primarily on knowledge 
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held by the organisation.  It is mostly ignored that all these service/product delivery enablers exist 
due to the knowledge held by the organisation and not the other way around.  In militaries, this is 
certainly the case.   
Military organisations are mostly designed around force structures, which are based on threat 
perceptions and resource-based strategies.  Because hindsight is usually considerably clearer and 
better informed; military organisations will probably look very different from its current design 
when placing knowledge as the central driver for the delivery of its mandate – rather than hardware.  
For this to happen, military leadership will have to accept that knowledge is the only strategic asset 
the military organisation owns; the rest being tactical, operational and strategic consumables.  There 
should thus be a realisation that it is knowledge that is the central driving force for military 
capability requirements, capability design, capability deployment, capability 
regeneration/development and advantage.  These are normally driven by excellence in intelligence.  
Others are driven by policy, doctrine and IP – all capstone military knowledge.   
In general - hardware, software and humans are placed as the central assets fuelled by 
financial resources.  Knowledge is considered central to development and growth but not as the 
central strategic asset from which a military capability should be grown.   
8.3.2 The Importance of SA DOD Knowledge Management   
The researcher found extensive support for the importance of KM for both public and 
business organisations.  The literature review identified several important aspects informing 
decisions regarding the importance of knowledge and the management thereof for the SA DOD.  
Knowledge is probably the most important asset organisations own or manage. Knowledge 
management enhances trust in government and by implication the SA DOD as part of government.  
Knowledge management enhances military effectiveness, efficiency and economy as well as 
broader governmental objects such as national competitiveness from an economic perspective.  The 
management of available knowledge is positively correlated to sustainable competitive 
advantage/military advantage. Knowledge is fundamental to enhanced decision-making, action and 
effects; thus making the management of knowledge of paramount importance.  Knowledge 
management is positively correlated to innovation and organisational performance (yet difficult to 
prove).  These are both critical success factors for the SA DOD to cope with complexity as well as 
its legislated responsibility to use fiscal resources optimally.  Knowledge management provides the 
vehicle for organisations to remain relevant, adaptive and to cope with complexity.  Knowledge 
management can be perceived as a military advantage multiplier.   
8.3.3 What is Fundamental to SA DOD Knowledge Management 
The de-construction of contemporary KM theory and practice in Chapter 2 and 3 of the 
dissertation and understanding gained from the document analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 of the 
dissertation provides the grounding for the proposed SA DOD KM leadership philosophy - The art 
of knowing and the science of managing knowledge to obtain and sustain advantage – see Figure 
8.1 for a graphic representation (also reflected as part of Figure 6.10.).   
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Figure 8.1: Leadership Philosophies 
Source: Author’s compilation of information. 
To survive and win leaders must master the art of knowing.  When assuming that just merely 
surviving is not an option, then fundamental to obtaining and sustaining advantage is the science of 
managing knowledge.  This philosophy incorporates the critical elements present in knowledge and 
KM.  This encompasses people (human- and relational capital), organisation (culture and structural 
capital), process (business and KM), tools (IT and social constructs) and the objective of survival 
and advantage.   
From the systematic exploration of the body of knowledge about KM and practical 
application, thereof the researcher proposed SA DOD knowledge and KM definition as follows – 
Knowledge is evolving meaning in the form of intellectual capital that capacitate understanding, 
decision-making, action effect and advantage (also reflected in Figure 3.12.).   The definition for 
SA DOD KM (below) is closely aligned with the definition above and could thus be associated with 
an interpretivist approach to knowledge and KM.   This positions the future SA DOD KM in third 
generation KM and aligns it with knowledge era requirements. The researcher did not construct a 
process-based KM definition because it limits its applicability.  The only prescript is for process 
integration.  The proposed definition is as follows – Knowledge Management is the integrated 
process transforming organisational intellectual capital into evolving meaning to capacitate 
understanding, decision-making, action effect and advantage (also reflected in Figure 3.13.). Figure 
8.2 graphically combines the proposed KM definition with the knowledge continuum.  The 
researcher proposes the adoption of a knowledge continuum as the most optimum and possibly 
most realistic representation of the SA DOD IC.  A knowledge continuum enables understanding 
that knowledge is a dynamic phenomenon that requires flexible, adaptable and responsive 
approaches to SA DOD IC integration.  The importance of system and sensor interaction with the 
knowledge continuum should not be underestimated. 
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Figure 8.2: Proposed Knowledge Continuum 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM.  Also reflected in 
Figure 3.17. 
Although IT and IM are not KM; these systems and management approaches provide critical 
material and stability to KM as a capability.  Figure 8.3 expresses this graphically.   
Figure 8.3: Illustration of the Systems and Sensor Interaction with the Proposed Knowledge 
Continuum 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM.  Also reflected in 
Figure 6.9. 
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Knowledge is thé ‘war-winning factor’ for militaries, i.e. the use of superior IC to dominate 
the adversary’s OODA loop.  Data and information are the building blocks (who, what, why, where, 
when, how, which effects and what thereafter) required for processing to generate capstone military 
knowledge (policy, doctrine, strategy, intelligence, IP, etc.) that will shape the SA DOD operational 
environment(s).  Figure 8.4 illustrates that the SA DOD decision-making and action cycles should 
be based on knowledge rather than on data and information for the simple reason that situational 
awareness and operational action are best based on IC (e.g. intelligence and doctrine) for 
advantageous decisions, actions and effects. Figure 8.4 (below) for a graphic representation that 
integrates the various constructs, conceptually. 
 
Figure 8.4: Information- and Knowledge-based OODA Loop Superimposed on a Three Axis 
Time-Granularity-Knowledge Continuum Graphic 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM.  Also 
reflected in Figure 6.4b. 
The SA DOD is a process driven organisation.  As such, KM processes can be applied in all 
knowledge-intensive components/functions of the SA DOD (e.g. HRM, operations, intelligence, 
force preparation, force provision, logistics, finance, policy and strategy, acquisition and 
procurement, etc.).  The KM processes chosen are inclusive of several of the processes listed by 
various authors included in the dissertation.  For example, ‘use’ is inclusive of processes such as 
creation, utilisation, exploit, conversion, generating, experimenting, integrate, collaborate, sharing, 
develop, distribute, combine etc.  Similarly, ‘storage’ is inclusive of processes such as hold and 
assembles.  Codification is inclusive of processes such a capture, generating, embedding and 
measuring. 
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However, as ‘meaning’ change due to environmental changes, new processes might be 
constructed and/or adopted to cope with this change; processes that might not be described in the 
proposed definition or that might totally alter the manner in which the organisation function.  No 
matter how the organisation and/or its external environment change, the individuals that constitute 
the organisation will always require knowledge or ‘evolving meaning’ to understand shifts in 
contexts in order to make decisions supporting actions and effects.  For this certain processes will 
be relevant and/or new processes will be designed to cope with these changes.  Ultimately, the 
‘evolving meaning’ or knowledge will be managed in accordance with strategy that will in all 
probability be directed to achieve competitive advantage or military advantage.  
The proposed definition of knowledge supports the construct of knowledge as meaning – i.e. 
knowledge is more than its collective components (data and information) to the point that it 
facilitates understanding of the context (who, what, where, when, why, how, which effect and what 
thereafter) in order to take decisions, actions and gain advantage.  The types of knowledge to be 
managed by the SA DOD are approached from an interpretative approach to facilitate sense-making 
rather than the commoditisation of knowledge as a commercial artefact. 
A critical gap in the literature is the importance of knowledge security.  This is a subject that 
does not attract much academic attention and debate.  However, the military environment project a 
clear requirement for data, information and knowledge (intelligence primarily) security.  Protection 
should occur at the level of data and information because these are the building blocks for 
knowledge.  If the SA DOD can assure adequate protection of the building blocks the integrity of 
the derived knowledge will be of a much higher quality.  SA DOD knowledge should then be 
afforded higher order protection because this knowledge should provide decision-makers and 
operational commanders the competitive edge/advantage to control the adversary OODA loop. This 
requirement is based on the fact that knowledge is derived from data and information that has been 
subjected to knowledge processes such as understanding, skill, interpretation, insight (amongst 
others), evolving with the dynamics of the operating environment to capacitate enhanced decisions, 
actions and effects. 
The researcher proposes a broad descriptive KM model consolidating the fundamental aspects 
of military and related knowledge as identified by the dissertation.  The concept is based on a firm 
foundation and a number of spearheading triangles and pentagrams that simulate progress and 
leadership.  The foundational rectangle is solid in colour and texture indicating the requirement for 
structural and organisational strength.  The triangles and pentagrams are transparent and 
overlapping to indicate the requirement for coherence and integration.   
The KMC vision is based on the mandate of the SA DOD and the ubiquitous requirement for 
decisions, actions, effects and advantage to serve the national interest. The KM objectives are to 
provide decision-makers and executers with decision-quality and actionable knowledge. 
The KMC should be led by a Chief Knowledge Officer influenced by the proposed KM 
philosophy of ‘the art of knowing and the science of managing that knowledge to obtain and sustain 
advantage’.   This philosophy should provide inspirational guidance as to the requirement of 
decision-makers ‘to know’ rather than just being ‘informed’.  It also dictates the use of scientific 
methods to manage the SA DOD knowledge continuum in order to achieve coherence and 
integration on an enterprise scale. 
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Core processes and fundamental resources have been included in the model in order to 
provide a baseline from which flexible solutions can be crafted.  The model does not propose any 
lines of communication or action (i.e. C2 relationships) or feedback loops.  The researcher assumes 
that in a dynamic environment these relationships will change causing instability to the broad 
perspective of SA DOD KM.  These decision-making and process flows can be delineated in detail 
with future research once a thorough knowledge audit has been completed.  It is, however, 
important to understand from a broad perspective what impact SA DOD KM.  The proposed model 
is graphically presented in Figure 8.5 - 
 
Figure 8.5: Proposed SA DOD Knowledge Management Model 
Source: Author’s compilation of information and proposed for SA DOD KMC and KM.  Also reflected in 
Figure 6.10. 
The pentagrams contain descriptions of the SA DOD IC, which is considered SA DOD 
knowledge.  Internally, the SA DOD should lead, structure, fund and enable (IT) KM initiatives to 
facilitate decision-making and actions in support of national security and defence interests.  This is 
done through the DR 2015, policy, doctrine, intelligence and IP – implemented through various 
strategic planning and management processes and resources.  These elements of structural capital 
are developed and managed by people that contribute human capital to achieve this and facilitate 
the crafting of relational capital. 
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Once these are in place and practised, it should be understood that the SA DOD IC is 
impacted by the external environment.  Key role-players are the SA government (national policy 
and legislation – e.g. the IPR act); SA Defence Industry (a key military knowledge developer and 
manager), ARMSCOR (the sole contractor for SA military matériel knowledge described by SA 
DOD policy), CSIR (the key research institute generating and managing military knowledge and 
SITA (the sole software development and management agent for the SA government and thus the 
SA military).  The external environment will have its own KM models with which it manages SA 
DOD relevant knowledge.  If not, the SA DOD can minimise its risk by taking cognisance of 
possible vacuums in the external environment and mitigating that risk by constructing mechanisms 
within its own organisational and structural IC to make sure SA DOD owned IC is managed 
accordingly. 
SA DOD IC is supported by the various and several types of data and information managed 
by the SA DOD with core KM processes but also more specific processes tailored to the 
requirements.  The proposed conceptual SA DOD KM model is supported by the proposed 
definitions for SA DOD knowledge and KM and a KM leadership philosophy. 
Thus, based on the various elements and proposals above, the SA DOD will be able to 
formulate SA DOD policy and craft strategy with which to manage knowledge as a strategic asset.  
SA DOD policy and doctrine should guide and elaborate on the external and internal environments, 
management principles, operational and warfare thinking, responsibilities, methods, resources and 
CSFs (amongst other things), in order to approach KM in a structured and process-driven manner.   
8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS 
8.4.1 Implications for Theory 
Published military KM academic research is very limited.  Most documents are research on 
applied organisational documentation, e.g. those published by the USA military.  SA DOD KM and 
KMC do not exist, resulting in the continued entrenchment of information era practices and 
associated thinking.  The dissertation reiterates that the SA DOD should adopt knowledge era 
practices and associated thinking in order to cope with complexity and to enhance the ability to 
extract dynamic meaning from the knowledge continuum in order to enhance understanding and 
positively augment the SA DOD decision-making capacity, actions, accuracy of effects and 
propensity to gain and sustain advantage.  The dissertation proposes that these elements are the 
primary purpose of a KMC and KM.  This can be rolled out to virtually any organisation because of 
the universality of the constructs.     
The dissertation provides insight into issues that drives disinterest in KM by the SA DOD; 
which might be the case for other governmental organisations in the RSA and further afield. The 
dissertation provides arguments supporting the importance of the establishment of an SA DOD 
KMC and institutionalising coherent and integrated KM.  This dissertation represents seminal 
research on what should constitute SA DOD knowledge, the SA DOD knowledge continuum; and 
what can be considered fundamental to the establishment of an SA DOD KMC as well as coherent, 
integrated KM.   
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The dissertation expands on the construct of a knowledge continuum rather than a knowledge 
hierarchy.  This paradigm shift is extended into the construct of KCM as the next step of integration 
required to manage the proposed SA DOD knowledge continuum and once an SA DOD KMC has 
been established.  These proposals are broadly applicable for organisations that seek to maximise 
advantages inherent in the organisational knowledge continuum.  
The dissertation proposes a KM leadership philosophy to parallel and reinforce the 
requirements of the mission command construct, extending the thinking to the longstanding OODA 
loop construct.  The dissertation highlights a specific void in the body of knowledge on knowledge 
security or security as a CSF for KM (and not just focus on information security or IT systems 
related security); whilst highlighting the importance thereof for the SA DOD and militaries in 
general.   
The dissertation highlights the requirement for new applied thinking regarding constructs 
such as KW, the continental staff system in the knowledge era and military capability expressions 
such as C
4
IKRS and for the SA DOD, POSTEFKTB.   The dissertation also constitutes a method 
for KM research in all RSA governmental departments.  The fact that there is an RSA legislative 
requirement for a CIO in each governmental department makes further consideration of this 
dissertation by other government departments very relevant in order to introduce the importance of 
coherent and integrated KM into extant legislation and align it with knowledge era thinking and 
practices. 
8.4.2 Implications for Practice 
The proposed SA DOD KM leadership philosophy, definition for knowledge, KM definition 
and KM model could be used to inform the appointment of SA DOD KM champion as well as the 
development of an SA DOD KMC, policy, doctrine, structure, strategy and implementation plan.  
This should be done at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the SA DOD.  The research 
calls for the development of a detailed and authoritative taxonomy on the constructs involved in 
KM to ensure total clarity and integration of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine on these 
constructs.   
SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine are capstone knowledge documents.  This level of 
policy provides an opportunity to capture and manage lessons learned (a primary source of 
organisational knowledge) for each of the SA DOD knowledge portfolios (e.g. HRM, defence 
materiel, intelligence, finance, operations, doctrine, etc.).  Lessons learnt can be included in the first 
part of SA DOD Level 1 policy and doctrine, before or after Changes to Existing Policy.  This 
would then not only provide context to the changes required but also provide an expanding 
historical growth path for institutional learning.  The same can be achieved with a lessons learnt 
chapter in each of the various SANDF doctrine documents.  Both these proposals will fill the gap on 
Lessons Learnt management within the SA DOD and SANDF by means of institutionalising the 
management thereof within policy and doctrine documents.  It enables better coherence and 
integration with other knowledge sources due to cross-referencing between various policies and 
doctrines.  It also reinforces the idea of a ‘learning organisation’ which is central to KM. 
The research should significantly inform the next iteration of the SA DOD Defence Review, 
and with interactive consultation between various role-players could possibly have an impact on the 
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implementation and review cycle of the extant DR 2015.  The findings and proposals made by this 
dissertation could be empirically tested for strategic fit by other government departments because of 
the proposed definitions alignment with survival, performance and advantage.  The KM model 
proposed can be adapted and extended to suit most organisational environments.  Because of the 
similarities among militaries worldwide, the findings and proposals made by this dissertation could 
be empirically tested for fit by other militaries. 
8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research is recommended for the establishment of an SA DOD KMC and 
institutionalisation of KM.  Empirical validation of the proposed definitions and SA DOD KM 
model could follow.   
Further research on the portfolios of knowledge in the SA DOD; possibly within the context 
of the IC framework and how these relate to each other in terms of content; IT enablers involved 
and from a C2 perspective.  Such research should provide valuable insight as to the readiness of the 
SA DOD for KM.  Such research could be based on the approach followed by Bartczak and 
England (2005) used by USA Air Force Material Command.  Benchmarking could also provide 
considerable insight into planning and implementation issues.  These issues will inform further 
research about the operationalisations of an SA DOD KMC.  Other research that will enhance more 
comprehensive KM could include research about the integration of the Military Veterans KM with 
that of the SA DOD.  This could be separate or combined with research on SA DOD KMC 
operationalisation. 
Interesting future research might be conducted on the complexities and modalities of 
differentiating between SA DOD databases, information-bases and knowledge-bases in order to 
better manage the content that would support decisions, actions, effects and advantage.  This could 
be included in the research about SA DOD knowledge portfolios suggested above, or could be a 
separate initiative. 
In terms of general military theory development, research is recommended on what the 
principles of war would be in the knowledge era; will these remain the same?  If not, what should 
be adapted and/or added?  More research could be undertaken, based on discussions in Chapter 5 
and 6 of the dissertation, about introducing a KM staff component in the continental staff system.   
Future researchers might consider investigating military concepts that require review for 
applicability in the knowledge era, for example, C
4
I
3
RS and how this would impact for example the 
continental staff system and other operational concepts and organisational architecture.  
The researcher proposes that the construct of KM be expanded to KCM, which would support 
the continuous requirement for the integrated management of the various components that are 
considered part of the knowledge continuum.  The construct of KCM is posited to provide a 
platform for the integration of the various sets of processes involved in the management of the 
various components.  Future research may involve the exact nature of the proposed construct of 
KCM.  Just from these possible future research areas, it is quite clear that the SA DOD has only 
noticed the tip of the ‘KM’ iceberg.  The next step would be to get close enough to start scratching. 
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8.6 CLOSURE 
Knowledge is real, it is ubiquitous, it is continuously evolving and it is here to stay.  
Knowledge will shape the future land-, sea-, air- and cyberscapes of every social sphere and battles 
to come.  Knowledge should be managed as a matter of survival, firstly, and then to obtain and 
sustain advantage. Knowledge should be managed by militaries with the next war or peace 
operation in mind, whilst learning from the past and adapting the current. Knowledge left 
unmanaged will render investment in IC and other resources inefficient, wasteful and without 
advantage. With winning as the ultimate objective, knowledge should be leveraged by designing 
and implementing specific policies, capabilities and processes within specific organisational 
parameters.  The SA DOD can now embark on this journey by stepping through this opened door 
into the knowledge era. 
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SELECTED SAMPLE OF SA DOD LEVEL 1 POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
The following documents were filtered from the 9519 policy documents contained in the docs-
folder of the pp_static dated 17 May 2016.  The selection is based on the sample criteria discussed 
in chapter 6 of the dissertation.  The first column provide a unique configuration number used in 
chapter 6 to simplify referencing.  The differences amongst these documents and there relative 
status is elaborated on in the introduction of Chapter 6 of the dissertation. 
Table R1: Selected Sample of SA DOD Level 1 Department of Defence Instructions and 
Doctrine 
Study 
Configuration 
No 
Policy Name Type of 
Document 
SA DOD File 
Reference 
DODD1 Parking Facilities Policy (Excluding Vessels 
and Aircraft) in the Department of Defence  
LOG/00004/2005 
DODD DS/CLOG/D 
FAC/R/401/1/3/P 
DODD2 
 
South African Military Health Service’s 
Health Care Delivery  
SG/00001/2004  01 OCTOBER 2011 
DODD 
 
DS/SG/R/104/10/2/
P 
DODD3 Transformation Management in the DOD 
PERS/00008/2006 NOVEMBER 2008 
DODD CHR/CDTM/106/3
0/1/P 
DODD4 Management of Records in the Department of 
Defence DODD/CMI/00008/2008 
DODD DS/CMIS/R/514/2/
P 
DODD5 Promotion and Implementation of Batho 
Phele Principles in the Department of 
Defence  
POL&PLAN/00015/2005 MARCH 2006 
DODD DS/POL&PLAN/R
/501/13/P 
DODD6 Official Donations and Sponsorships To and 
by the Department of Defence POL & PLAN/ 
00005/2003 
MARCH 2006 
DODD DS/CPP/R/403/3/P 
DODD7 The Inclusion of Qualifying Legal  
Dependants on the Medical Strength of a 
Member of the Department of Defence  
POL&PLAN/00019/2005 JUNE 2007 
DODD DS/CHR/CDHRSD
&P/DHRSS/R/104/
16/1/P 
DODD8 Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mines 
Prohibition Act  (Act No 36 of 2003)  
DODD/POL&PLAN/ 00013/2004 01 
JANUARY 2006 
DODD DS/CPP/R/331/2/3/
P 
DODD9 Financial Misconduct Management in the 
DOD DODD/FIN/00005/2003 (EDITION 1)  
DECEMBER 2006 
DODD DS/CFO/R/505/17/
6/P 
DODD10 Information and Communications Systems 
Security in the DOD 
DODD/CMIS/00003/2006 
DODD CMIS/R/516/4/7/P 
DODD11 Distance Learning in the Department of 
Defence TRG/00002/2005 
DODD DS/TRG/R/103/1/P 
DODD12 The Management of the Separation of 
Officials From the Department of Defence 
POL & PLAN/00025/2005 
DODD DS/CDHRSD&P/D
HRSS/R/107/2/P 
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DODD13 on the Health Classification and Deployability 
of SANDF Members With HIV and Aids 
DODD/SG/00006/2009 
DODD SG/R/104/11/6/9/P 
DODD14 Management of Public Service Act Personnel 
(PSAP) Probationers in the Department of 
Defence DODD/POL&PLAN/00030/2008 
DODD DS/HR/R/102/19/P 
DODD15 Electronic Mail in the Department of Defence 
CMI/00010/2008 
DODD DS/CMI/R/516/12/
P 
DODD16 Acting Allowance for Members/Employees in 
the Department of Defence  
POL&PLAN/00026/2005  APRIL 2008 
DODD DS/CDHRSD&P/D
HRSS/R/104/5/P 
 
DODD17 Department of Defence Labour and Service 
Relations Policy  
PERS/00005/2005 OCTOBER 2007 
DODD DS/PERS/R/104/29
/P 
DODD18 Management of Recognition of Prior 
Learning in the Department of Defence  
DODD/TRG/00004/2005 AUGUST 2005 
DODD DS/TRG/R/103/1/P 
DODD19 Use of Cellular Telephones within the 
Department of Defence  
CMI/00011/2008 
DODD DS/CMIS/R/318/1/
P 
DODSPF1 Department of Defence Strategic Planning 
Framework 8 APRIL 2012 
  
DODI1 Policy on Corporate Communication in the 
Department of Defence  
CCS NO 00003/2008 (OLD) 
DODI/00167 (EDITION 1) (NEW) 
DODI CCS/DCC/R/511/4
/P 
DODI2 Policy on Parking Facilities (Excluding 
Vessels and Aircraft) in the Department of 
Defence  
LOG NO 00054/2005 (EDITION 1)   
DODI DS/CLOG/DFAC/
R/401/1/3/P 
DODI3 Policy on Distance Learning (DL) in the 
Department of Defence  
TRG NO 00012/2005 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/HR/R/103/1/P 
DODI4 Policy on Transformation Management in the 
DOD  
PERS NO 00038/2006 (EDITION NO 1) 
DODI CHR/CDTM/R/106
/30/1/P 
DODI5 Policy for the Use of Cellular Telephones 
within  the Department of Defence 
CMI/00005/2000 (EDITION 2) 
DODI CMIS 
DIV/R/318/1/P 
DODI6 Policy on Management of Public Service Act 
Personnel (PSAP) Probationers in the 
Department of Defence 
POL&PLAN/00051/2001  
(EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/HR/R/102/19/P 
DODI7 Policy on Acting Allowance for 
Members/Employees in the Department of 
Defence 
 POL&PLAN 00100/2005 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/CDHRSD&P/D
HRSS/R/104/5/P 
DODI8 Policy on  the Middle Management Service 
Remuneration System 
in the Department of Defence  
POL&PLAN 00098/2005 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/CDHRSD&P/D
HRSS/R/104/1/P 
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DODI9 Policy on the Management of Records in the 
Department of Defence  
DODI/CMI/00013/2002 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/CMIS/R/514/2/
P 
DODI10 Policy for the Management of Incapacity 
(Poor Work Performance) of Public Service 
Act Personnel (PSAP) (Including Senior 
Management Service (SMS) Members in the 
Department of Defence  
PERS/00041/2007(EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/PERS/R/104/29
/P 
DODI11 Policy on Leave of Absence for Public 
Service Act Personnel (PSAP) in the 
Department of Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00036/2001 (EDITION 
2) 
DODI DS/CDHRPP/DHR
SS/R/104/14/P 
DODI12 Policy on Promotion and Implementation of 
Batho Pele Principles in the Department of 
Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00092/2005 (EDITION 
1) 
DODI DS/CPP/R/501/13/
P 
DODI13 The Management of Career Development of 
Personnel Appointed in Terms of the Public 
Service Act within the Department of 
Defence  
PERS NO 00031/2004 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/C HR/CD 
HRM/DCD 
(PSAP)/R/501/15/P 
DODI14 Policy on the Management of Recognition of 
Prior Learning (RPL) by Education, Training 
and Development (ETD) Providers in the 
Department of Defence  
TRG NO 00013/2005 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/TRG/R/103/1/P 
DODI15 Policy on Contract Management and 
Administration for Obtaining Qualifications 
and Attending Education, Training and 
Development (ETD) Opportunities at State 
Expense 
POL AND PLAN NO 00030/2000 (EDITION 
2) 
DODI DS/CPP/R/103/10/
P 
DS/CPP/R/103/11/
P 
DODI16 Department of Defence Instruction on the 
Overarching Policy for Education, Training 
and Development (ETD) in the Department of 
Defence  
TRG/00004/2001 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/TRG/R/103/1/P 
DODI17 Department of Defence Policy on Official 
Donations and Sponsorships To and by the 
DOD  
POL AND PLAN NO 00081/2003 (EDITION 
1) 
DODI DS/CPP/R/403/3/P 
DODI18 Policy on Transfer Payments by the 
Department of Defence  
FIN NO 00023/2002 (EDITION 2) 
DODI DS/CFO/DIR 
BUD/R/504/4/5/P 
DODI19 Department of Defence Policy on General 
Education and Training (GET), Inclusive of 
Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET), 
DODI DS/CHR/HRD/R/1
03/1/58/P 
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and Further Education and Training (FET)  
TRG/00009/2003 (EDITION 2) 
DODI20 Department of Defence Policy on Education, 
Training and Development (ETD) of Public 
Service Act Personnel (PSAP) 
TRG/00001/1999 (EDITION 3) 
DODI DS/CHR/HRD/R/1
03/1/P 
DODI21 Policy on the Management of Debtor 
Accounts within the Department of Defence 
FIN NO 00020/2000 (OLD) 
DODI/00042 (EDITION 2) (NEW) 
DODI DS/CFO/R/505/13/
13/P 
DODI22 Policy, Process and Procedures for Macro 
Structure Management  
POL AND PLAN NO 00089/2004 (EDITION 
1) 
DODI DS/DPSP/R/502/1/
P 
DODI23 Policy on the Management of Defence 
Intangible Capital Assets  
DODI/00027/2014 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/DMD/R/518/3/
1 
DODI24 Policy, Process and Procedures for Software 
Asset Management 
DODI/00162/2013 (EDITION 1) 
DODI CMIS 
DIV/R/516/1/P 
DODI25 Religious Policy of the Department of 
Defence  
CPLN GEN NO 00001/1999 (EDITION 2) 
DODI CPLN 
GEN/R/104/15/P 
DODI26 Policy, Process and Procedures for Business 
Process Management in the Department of 
Defence  
DODI/POL & PLAN/00096/2005 (EDITION 
1) 
DODI DS/DPSP/CDSM/
DIMS/R/503/6/P 
DODI27 Policy on Internal Audit, Inspection and 
Antifraud in the Department of Defence  
IG/00002/2001 (EDITION 2) 
DODI DS/IG/R/503/2/15/
P 
DODI28 Policy, Process and Procedures for the 
Management of Ergonomics in the 
Department of Defence  
SG/00014/2002 (OLD) 
DODI/00092 (EDITION 1) (NEW) 
DODI DS/SG/R/402/10/P 
DODI29 Policy, Process and Procedures for the 
Implementation of Defence Policy on 
Insensitive Munitions  
LOG NO 00018/2005 (OLD) 
DODI/00147 (EDITION 2) (NEW) 
DODI DS/LOG/R/402/1/3
6/P 
DODI30 Policy on the Conduct of Counter Intelligence 
INT NO/00012/2004 (OLD  
DODI/00132 (EDITION 1) (NEW) 
DODI DS/DI/R/202/1/P 
DODI31 Policy on Defence Against Chemical and 
Biological Weapons and Radioactive 
Materials  
SG NO 00002/1999 (OLD) 
DODI/00018 (EDITION 4) (NEW) 
DODI DS/SG/R/306/3/P 
DODI32 Policy on the Management of Supplier 
Payroll Deductions in the Department of 
Defence  
DODI DS/CFO/R/104/2/3
/P 
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FIN NO 00027/2003 (OLD) 
DODI/00124 (EDITION 1) (NEW) 
DODI33 Establishment of South African Military 
Assistance and Training 
Teams (SAMATT) STRAT PLAN NO 
00003/2007 
(EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/CPSP/R/103/1/
P 
DODI34 Policy on the Management of Separation of 
Officials from the Department of Defence  
POL & PLAN NO 00099/2005 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/CDHRSD&P/D
HRSS/R/107/2/P 
DODI35 Policy on the Inclusion of Qualifying Legal 
Dependants on the Medical Strength of a 
Member of the Department of Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00094/2005 (EDITION 
1) 
DODI DS/CHR/CDHRSD
&P/DHRSS/R/104/
16/1/P 
DODI36 Policy on Training Assistance to/from Other 
State Departments, Public and Private 
Organisations in the RSA TRG/00011/2005 
(EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/J 
TRG/R/103/7/P 
DODI37 Department of Defence Policy on the 
Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mines 
Prohibition Act (Act No 36 of 2003)  
POL AND PLAN NO 00090/2004 (EDITION 
1) 
DODI DS/CPP/R/331/2/3/
P 
DODI38 Policy, Process and Procedures for Cash 
Management in the Department of Defence  
FIN NO 00030/2004 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/CFO/R/505/17/
7/P 
DODI39 Policy on the Regulation of the Department of 
Defence Intranet Service  
DODI/00122/2013 (EDITION 2) 
DODI DS/DDS/CMISD/R
/516/4/7/P 
DODI40 Policy, Process and Procedure for the 
Acquisition of Armaments in the Department  
ACQ NO 00005/2003 (EDITION 3) 
DODI DS/ACQ/R/302/6/
P 
DODI41 Policy on Financial Misconduct Management 
in the Department of Defence  
FIN/00024/2002 (EDITION 2) 
DODI DS/CFO/R/505/17/
6/P 
DODI42 Policy, Process and Procedures for Risk 
Management in the Department of Defence  
DODI/00099/2013 (EDITION 2) 
DODI DOD/DPSP/R/501/
18/P 
DODI43 Senior Management Service in the 
Department of Defence POL AND PLAN NO 
00065/2002 (EDITION 2) 
DODI DS/CPP/R/104/1/P 
DODI44 Policy, Process and Procedures for 
Promotional, Commemorative and 
Motivational Items in the Department of 
Defence  
DODI/POL & PLAN/00032/2000 (EDITION 
2) 
DODI CCS/DCC/R/511/1
/P 
DODI45 Policy on Alternative Service Delivery in the 
Department of Defence  
ACQ/00003/2000 (EDITION 4) 
DODI DS/HDSCI/R/401/
16/P 
DODI46 Policy on Aerial Photography  DODI DS/DI/R/202/1/7/P 
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INT NO/00005/2000 (OLD) 
DODI/00052 (EDITION 2) (NEW) 
DODI47 Policy, Process and Procedures on the 
Requisition, Issuing, Handling and 
Safeguarding of Face Value Documents in the 
Department of Defence 
FIN NO 00005/2000 (OLD)  
DODI/00036 (EDITION 2) (NEW) 
DODI DS/CFO/DFSS/R/5
05/7/P 
DODI48 Policy on the DOD’s Interaction With 
Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA) and 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
(SCOPA) 
FIN NO 00004/2000 (OLD) 
DODI/00035 (EDITION 3) (NEW) 
DODI DS/CFO/R/505/1/3
/2/P 
DODI49 Policy, Process and Procedures for the 
Management of Guest Speakers 
TRG NO 00002/2000 (EDITION 2) 
DODI CHR/CD 
HRD/R/103/6/P 
DODI50 Policy on the Disclosure of Defence 
Information  
POL & PLAN NO/00022/1999 (EDITION 2) 
DODI DS/DI/R/202/1/7/1/
P 
DODI51 Policy, Processes and Procedures for Budget 
Control in the Department of Defence  
DODI/00017/2013 (EDITION 5) 
DODI DOD/CFO/DBC/R/
505/17/P 
DODI52 Policy on Domestic Subsistence and Travel 
Dispensation for Officials in the Department 
of Defence  
PERS NO 00006/1999 (EDITION 2) 
DODI CHR/CDHRSD&P
/DHRSS/R/104/6/P 
DODI53 Policy, Process and Procedures for the 
Development, Promulgation and Maintenance 
of Departmental Level Policy in the 
Department of Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00008/1999 (EDITION 
3) 
DODI DS/CDPSP/R/501/
15/P 
DODI54 Policy on the Reporting of Incidents in the 
Department of Defence  
FIN/00026/2003 (EDITION 1) 
DODI DS/CFO/R/501/8/6
/P 
DODI55 Department of Defence Policy on Foreign 
Relations Gifts  
POL AND PLAN NO 00061/2001 (EDITION 
1) 
DODI DS/CPP/R/403/3/P 
DODI56 Management of Learner Assessment by 
Providers in the DOD  
TRG NO 00006/2003 (EDITION 2) 
DODI DS/CJ 
TRG/R/103/1/P 
DODI57 Policy, Process and Procedures on 
Information and Communications Systems 
Security in the Department of Defence  
DODI/CMI/00008/2001 (EDITION 4) 
DODI CMIS/R/516/4/7/P 
DODI58 Policy on South African Military Health 
Service’s Health Care Delivery 
SG NO 00018/2003 (OLD) 
DODI/00116 (EDITION 1) (NEW) 
DODI  
DODI59 Policy on Resettlement within  the Borders of  DODI CHR/CDHRSD&P
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the Republic of South Africa For Officials of  
the Department of Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00070/2002 
(OLD) 
DODI/00097 (EDITION 1) (NEW) 
/DHRSS/R/104/6/P 
DODI60 Policy on Electronic Mail in the Department 
of Defence CMIS/00011/2001 (Old)  
DODI/00071 (New) (EDITION 3) 
DODI DOD/C 
CMIS/R/516/12/P 
DODI61 Policy on the Utilisation and Regulation of 
Consultants within the Department of 
Defence POL & PLAN/00046/2001 (Old)  
DODI/00068 (New)  (EDITION 2) 
DODI DS/DSCI/R/401/16
/P 
ERMF1 Enterprise Risk Management Framework 
DRM/FRW/01/09 
 CDPSP/CDSM/R/5
01/18/P 
FMDI1 Policy on the Management of the Bank 
Account of the Department of Defence (the 
Paymaster-General Sub-Account) and 
Registration of Suppliers Banking Details 
(Level 2) Instruction  
FMDI NO 0002/2007 (EDITION 2)  
FMDI DS/CFO/R/505/13/
13/P 
IDODI1 Interim Department of Defence Instruction on 
the Use of Social Media in the Department of 
Defence CCS NO/00001/2011 (EDITION 1) 
IDODI CCS/DCC/R/511/4
/P 
IDODI2 
 
Policy on the Reporting of Performance 
Information Against Plan  
POL&PLAN/00001/2011 (EDITION 1) 
IDODI 
 
DS/CDPSP/R/501/
8/P 
JDP1 Process and Procedures on South African 
Military Health Service’s Health Care 
Delivery  
SG NO 00002/2003 (EDITION 1) 
JDP DS/SG/R/104/10/2/
P 
JDP2 Process and Procedures Regarding 
Resettlement within  the Borders of  the 
Republic of South Africa For Officials of  the 
Department of Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00020/2004 
(EDITION 1) 
JDP CHR/CDHRSD&P
/DHRSS/R/104/6/P 
JDP3 Processes and Procedures for the Practice of 
Distance Learning (DL) in the Department of 
Defence  
TRG NO 0006/2005 (EDITION 1) 
JDP DS/TRG/R/103/1/P 
JDP4 Process and Procedures For Transformation 
Management in the DOD  
PERS NO 00026/2006 (EDITION 1) 
JDP CHR/CDTM/106/3
0/1/P 
JDP5 Process and Procedures for the Use of 
Cellular Telephones within Department of 
Defence  
CMI/00010/2008 (EDITION 1) 
JDP CMIS/R/318/1/P 
JDP6 Process and Procedures on  the Management 
of Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP) 
Probationers in the Department of Defence  
POL&PLAN/00035/2006 (EDITION 1) 
JDP DS/HR/R/102/19/P 
JDP7 Process and Procedures for the Management JDP DS/CDHRSD&P/D
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of  the Acting Allowance in the Department 
of Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00033/2005 (EDITION 
1) 
HRSS/R/104/5/P 
JDP8 Process and Procedures for the Middle 
Management Service Remuneration System  
in the Department of Defence 
POL&PLAN/00031/2005 (EDITION 1) 
JDP DS/CDHRSD&P/D
HRSS/R/104/1/P 
JDP9 Principles, Processes and Procedures for the 
Management of Records in the Department of 
Defence JDP/CMI/00004/2004 (EDITION 1) 
JDP DS/CMIS/R/514/2/
P 
JDP10 Process and Procedures for the Management 
of Incapacity (Poor Work Performance) of 
Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP) 
Including Senior Management Service (SMA) 
Members in the Department of Defence  
PERS/00024/2006 (EDITION 1) 
JDP DS/PERS/R/104/29
/P 
JDP11 Process and Procedures for Leave of Absence 
for Public Service Act Personnel in the 
Department of Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00013/2004 (EDITION 
1) 
JDP DS/CDHRPP/DHR
SS/R/104/14/P 
JDP12 Process and Procedures for the Promotion and 
Implementation of Batho Pele Principles in 
the Department of Defence  
POL AND PLAN NO 00029/2005 (EDITION 
1) 
JDP DS/CPP/R/501/13/
P 
JDP13 Process and Procedures for the Management 
of Career Development for Personnel 
Appointed in Terms of the Public Service Act 
within the Department of Defence PERS NO 
00002/2004 (EDITION 1)  
JDP DS/C HR/CD 
HRM/DCD 
(PSAP)/R/501/15/P 
JDP14 Process and Procedures for the 
Implementation of Recognition of Prior 
Learning (RPL) by Education, Training and 
Development (ETD) Providers in the 
Department of Defence  
TRG NO 00004/2004 (EDITION 1) 
JDP DS/TRG/R/103/1/P 
JDP15 Process and Procedures for Contract 
Management and Administration for 
Obtaining Qualifications and Attending 
Education, Training and Development (ETD) 
Opportunities at State Expense 
POL AND PLAN NO 00007/2003 (EDITION 
1) 
JDP DS/CPP/R/103/10/
P 
DS/CPP/R/103/11/
P 
JDP16 Overarching Process and Procedures for 
Education, Training and Development (ETD) 
in the Department of Defence  
TRG/00003/2004 (EDITION 1) 
JDP DS/TRG/R/103/1/P 
JDP17 Process and Procedures for the Management 
of Official Donations and Sponsorships To 
and by the  
JDP DS/CPP/R/403/3/P 
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DOD POL AND PLAN 00004/2003 
(EDITION 1) 
JDP18 Process and Procedures for Transfer 
Payments by the Department of Defence 
FIN NO 00008/2003 (EDITION 2) 
JDP DS/CFO/DIR 
BUD/R/504/4/5/P 
JDP19 Department of Defence Process and 
Procedures for General Education and 
Training (GET), Inclusive of Adult Basic 
Education and Training (ABET), and Further 
Education and Training (FET)  
TRG/00002/2003 (EDITION 2) 
JDP DS/CHR/HRD/R/1
03/1/58/P 
JDP20 Department of Defence Process and 
Procedures for Education, Training and 
Development (ETD) of Public Service Act 
Personnel (PSAP)  
TRG/00001/2003 (EDITION 2) 
JDP DS/C 
HR/HRD/R/103/1/
P 
JWM1 Joint Maritime Helicopter Operations 
417 
JWM DS/OPS/DIV 
HQ/R/305/1/P 
JWP1 Doctrine for Corporate Communication in 
Operations JWP 116 
JWP CCS/DCC/R/305/1
/P 
JWP2 Process and Procedures for  the Parking 
Facilities (Excluding Vessels and Aircraft) in 
the Department of Defence  
LOG NO 00019/2005 (EDITION 1) 
JWP CLOG/DFAC/R/40
1/1/3/P 
JWP3 Process and Procedures for the Management 
of the Separation of Officials From  
POL AND PLAN NO 00032/2005 (EDITION 
1) 
JWP DS/CDHRSD&P/D
HRSS/R/107/2/P 
JWP4 Defence Doctrine (Issue 2) 
JWP 137 
JWP DS/OPS/DIV 
HQ/R/305/1/P 
JWP5 African Battlespace 
JWP 139 
JWP DS/OPS/DIV 
HQ/R/305/1/P 
JWP6 Planning at the Military Strategic Level 
JWP 132 
JWP DS/OPS/DIV 
HQ/R/305/1/P 
JWP7 Fire Support Coordination During 
Conventional Operations  
JWP 105 (PART 8) 
JWP DS/OPS/DIV 
HQ/R/305/1/P 
JWP8 Peace Support Operations 
JWP 106 PART 2 
JWP None 
SANDFD1 Development, Promulgation and Maintenance 
of Level 1 Policy in the South African 
National Defence Force 
STRAT & PLAN/00001/2007 
MARCH 2007 
SANDFD CDSP/R/501/15/P 
SANDFD2 Development, Promulgation and Maintenance 
of Joint Doctrine in the SANDF  
SANDFD/OPS/00001/2007 
SANDFD DS/OPS/DIVHQ/R
/305/1/P 
SANDFD3 The South African National Defence Force 
Military Strategy  
STRAT & PLAN/00002/2007 September 
2008 
SANDFD CDSP/R/303/1/P 
SANDFO1 Policy on  the South African National SANDFO CDSP/R/303/1/P 
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 Defence Force Military Strategy 
 STRAT & PLAN NO 00002/2007 
(EDITION 1) 
 
SANDFO2 Policy, Process and Procedures for the Fire 
and Rescue Service System in the South 
African National Defence Force  
LOG/00001/2010 (EDITION 1) 
SANDFO C LOG/DESS/ 
R/401/8/P 
SANDFO3 Policy on Frequency Spectrum Management 
in the South African National Defence Force  
CMIS/00002/2010 (EDITION 1) 
SANDFO DS/CMIS/R/516/4/
7/P 
SANDFO4 Development, Promulgation and Maintenance 
of Joint Doctrine in the SANDF SANDF 
ORDER/OPS/00001/2007 
SANDFO JOPS 
DIV/R/305/1/P 
SANDFO5 Policy, Process and Procedures on  the 
Development, Promulgation and Maintenance 
of Level 1 Policy in the South African 
National Defence Force  
STRAT & PLAN NO 00001/2007 (EDITION 
2) 
SANDFO CDSP/R/501/15/P 
SANDFO6 Policy on Combat Net Interoperability 
Standard for the South African National 
Defence Force 
 CMIS 00001/2008 (EDITION 1) 
SANDFO CMIS/R/318/13/P 
SANDFP1 
 
Process and Procedures for the 
Implementation of the Combat Net 
Interoperability Standard in the South African 
National Defence Force 
CMIS NO 00001/2008 (EDITION 1) 
SANDFP 
 
CMIS/R/318/13/P 
SANDFP2 
 
Development, Promulgation and Maintenance 
of Joint Doctrine in the 
SANDF  
OPS NO/0001/2007 (EDITION 1) 
SANDFP 
 
CJOPS/R/305/1 
SANDFP3 
 
The South African National Defence Force 
Military Strategy  
STRAT & PLAN NO 00002/2007 (EDITION 
1) 
SANDFP 
 
CDSP/R/303/1/P 
SANDFP4 
 
Process and Procedures for the Development, 
Promulgation and Maintenance of Level 1 
Policy Publications in  the South African 
National Defence Force 
 STRAT & PLAN NO 00001/2007 
(EDITION 1) 
SANDFP 
 
CDSP/R/501/15/P 
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APPENDIX A: KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS 
 
The following tables have been adapted from Al-Hakin & Hassan (2011: 953-954); Al-Hakin & Hassan (2011: 953-954) and Črnjar & Dlačić (2014: 
979) and expanded with support and views of other academics. Collectively they provide evidence from literature on the core KM infrastructure 
components and processes for successful KM.  It provides academic support to the proposed SA DOD KM model and core processes.  These 
infrastructure components are also closely associated with KM CSF.  Both KM infrastructure and CSF are discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation 
and referred to in context throughout the dissertation. 
Table A: KM Infrastructure Critical Success Factors 
Influence Dimension/Infrastructure Supported 
Managerial Organizational strategy (mostly related to the 
balancing of organisational capability, time and 
goals for the future) 
Probst, 1998; Uit Beijerse, 1999; Skyrme, 2000; Grover & Davenport, 2001; 
Chourides, et al., 2003; Wong & Aspinwall, 2005; Yeh, et al., 2006; La 
Grange, 2006; Al-Mabrouk, 2006; Zaim, Tatoglu, Zaim, 2007; Riempp & 
Smolnik, 2007; Wei, et al., 2006, 2009; Zheng, et al., 2010; Hassan & AL-
Hakim, 2011; Zieba & Zieba, 2014 
 
Leadership (mostly related to the long term 
vision and style of management) 
Probst, 1998; Uit Beijerse, 1999; Seemann, et al., 2000; Choi, 2000; Skyrme, 
2000; Nonaka, et al. , 2000; Stankosky & Baldanza, 2001; Baldanza, 2001; 
Nemati, 2002; Girard, 2004; Hung, 2005; Wong & Aspinwall, 2005; Yeh, et 
al., 2006; La Grange, 2006; Asoh, et al., 2007; Slagter, 2007; Riempp & 
Smolnik, 2007; Hassan & AL-Hakim, 2011; Anand & Singh, 2011; Berraies, 
et al., 2014; Zieba & Zieba, 2014 
 
Coordination and control 
Organisational adjustments 
Holsapple & Joshi, 2000; La Grange, 2006; Črnjar & Dlačić, 2014 
Anand & Singh, 2011 
 
Organizational learning  Holsapple & Joshi, 2000; Skyrme, 2000; Stankosky & Baldanza, 2001; Lee & 
Choi, 2003; Slagter, 2007; Lin & Kuo, 2007; Rhodes, et al., 2008; Berraies, et 
al., 2014; Zieba & Zieba, 2014 
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Organizational structure (mostly related to 
organization type and design) 
Probst, 1998; Baldanza, 2001; Stankosky & Baldanza, 2001; Grover & 
Davenport, 2001; Gold, et al., 2001; Nemati, 2002; Chuang, 2004; Hung, 
2005; Chong, 2006; Wei, et al., 2006, Zaim, Tatoglu, Zaim, 2007; Lee & Lee, 
2007; Slagter, 2007; 2009; Akhavan, et al., 2009; Zheng, et al., 2010; Hassan 
& AL-Hakim, 2011; Yadav & Singh, 2013; Zieba & Zieba, 2014 
 
Organizational culture  
(mostly related to the method of knowledge 
creation, sharing as affected by trust, 
leadership, collaboration, learning and 
incentives or rewards)  
 
Grant, 1996a and b; Probst, 1998; Uit Beijerse, 1999; Chait, 2000; Skyrme, 
2000; Grover & Davenport, 2001; Gold, et al., 2001; Nemati, 2002; Hung, et 
al., 2003; Girard (2004); Chuang, 2004; Hung, 2005; Wong & Aspinwall, 
2005; Chong, 2006; Al-Mabrouk, 2006; Yeh, et al., 2006; Zaim, Tatoglu, 
Zaim 2007;Lee & Lee, 2007;  Slagter, 2007; Asoh, et al., 2007; Riempp & 
Smolnik, 2007; Rhodes, et al., 2008; Zheng, et al., 2010; Ling & Shan, 2010.; 
Hassan & AL-Hakim, 2011; Anand & Singh, 2011; Yadav & Singh, 2013; 
Berraies, et al., 2014; Zieba & Zieba, 2014 
Security (the protection of knowledge and KM 
infrastructure) 
La Grange, 2006; Zaim, Taloglu & Zaim, 2007; Darby, 2013, Yadav & Singh, 
2013; Shajera & Ahmed, 2015 
 Measurement (related to the impact of 
knowledge on the performance of the 
organisations) 
Probst, 1998; Holsapple & Joshi, 2000; 
Resource Human Resource/ 
IC Management  
Akhavan , et al., 2009; Al-Mabrouk, 2006; Seemann, et al., 2000; Choi, 2000; 
Chourides, et al., 2003, Chuang, 2004; Hung, 2005; Wong & Aspinwall, 
2005; La Grange, 2006; Chong, 2006; Zaim, Tatoglu, Zaim, 2007; Lee & Lee, 
2007; Lin & Kuo, 2007; Ling & Shan, 2010; Yadav & Singh, 2013; Zieba & 
Zieba, 2014 
 
Information Technology implementation (also 
referred to as systems in other literature and is 
mostly related to technology) 
Uit Beijerse, 1999; Skyrme, 2000; Choi, 2000; Tiwana, 2000; Carneiro, 2000; 
Grover & Davenport, 2001; Gold, et al., 2001; Stankosky & Baldanza, 2001; 
Nemati, 2002; Chourides, et al., 2003; Lee & Choi, 2003; Kakabadse, et al., 
2003; Girard, 2004; Chuang, 2004; Hung, 2005; Wong & Aspinwall, 2005; 
Al- Mabrouk, 2006; Yeh, et al., 2006; La Grange, 2006; Chong, 2006; Zaim, 
Tatoglu, Zaim, 2007; Lee & Lee, 2007; Riempp & Smolnik, 2007; Asoh, et 
al., 2007; Rhodes, et al., 2008; Ling & Shan, 2010; Anand & Singh, 2011; 
Yadav & Singh, 2013; Berraies, et al., 2014; Zieba & Zieba, 2014 
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Finance Črnjar & Dlačić, 2014; Zieba & Zieba, 2014 
 
Environmental Culture, government La Grange, 2006; Črnjar & Dlačić, 2014 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology for the dissertation.  A primary research tool is 
questionnaires with open-ended questions.  The following is an example of the consent agreement 
completed by each respondent:  
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by CAPT (SAN) A. P. PUTTER, from the 
FACULTY OF MILITARY SCIENCE (MILITARY ACADEMY) at Stellenbosch University.  THE 
RESULTS OF THIS RESEARCH WILL BE CONTRIBUTED TO A RESEARCH PAPER.  You were 
selected as a possible participant in this study because OF THE DEPARTMENTAL POSITION HELD, 
INFLUENCE ON DECISION-MAKING AND EXPERT KNOWLEDGE ON DEPARTMENTAL 
MATTERS. 
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION IS TO -  
 DETERMINE THE STATE AND IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (KM) 
FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (SA DOD). 
 TO FILL THE KNOWLEDGE GAP ON KM WITHIN/RELEVANT TOO THE SA DOD. 
THE RESEARCH SHOULD ENABLE THE CONSTRUCTION OF KM THEORY AND/OR A MODEL 
(NEW OR HYBRID) TAILORED FOR SA DOD KM REQUIREMENTS TOO MAXIMISING THE 
OUTPUT OF A FUTURE STRATEGICALLY DIRECTED KM PROGRAMME WITHIN THE AMBIT 
OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW 2014.  
 
2. PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following things: 
PARTICIPATE IN A PERSONAL INTERVIEW THAT WILL USE OPEN ENDED (DISCUSSION) TYPE 
QUESTIONS ENQUIRING ABOUT YOUR ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND AND KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT RELATED QUESTIONS. 
 
3. POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
THERE ARE NO FORESEEN RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS ATTACHED TO THIS RESEARCH. 
 
4. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
THIS RESEARCH IS NOT CURRENTLY ATTEMPTED IN THE SA DOD THUS LEAVING THE SA 
DOD WITH A STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT GAP – KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT.  DUE TO THE 
VAST PORTFOLIO OF KNOWLEDGE HELD WITHIN THE SA DOD AND GENERATED 
ANNUALLY IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SA DOD TO START UNDERSTANDING WHY AND HOW 
KNOWLEDGE COULD BE MANAGED.  
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5. PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
THERE IS NO PAYMENT ATTACHED TO THIS INTERVIEW. 
6. CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will 
remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. Confidentiality 
will be maintained by means of PASSWORD PROTECTED ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS. 
THE INTERVIEW WILL BE RECORDED TO ENSURE ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTION.  THE 
INTERVIEWEE HAS THE RIGHT TO REVIEW THE RECORDING, EDIT THE RECORDING.  THE 
RECORDING WILL BE ERASED ONCE THE INTERVIEW HAS BEEN TRANSCRIBED AND 
MEMBER-CHECKED.  PUBLISHED FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS ARE ANONYMOUS OR 
QUOTED WITH PERMISSION OF THE INTERVIEWEE. 
7. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at 
any time without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to 
answer and still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances 
arise which warrant doing so.   
8. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact CAPT (SAN) A. P. 
PUTTER at 0842074558. 
9. RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  You are 
not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.  If you 
have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact Ms Maléne Fouché 
[mfouche@sun.ac.za; 021 808 4622] at the Division for Research Development. 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
The information above was described to __________________________________ by CAPT (SAN) A. P. 
PUTTER in ENGLISH and _________________________________ in command of this language.  
_________________________________ were given the opportunity to ask questions and these questions 
were answered to his/her satisfaction.  
___________________________________________ hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this study/I 
hereby consent that the subject/participant may participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this 
form. 
________________________________________ 
Name of Subject/Participant 
NOT APPLICABLE 
Name of Legal Representative (if applicable) 
________________________________________ ______________ 
Signature of Participant        Date 
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SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR  
 
I declare that I explained the information given in this document to __________________. 
____________________________ was encouraged and given ample time to ask me any questions. This 
conversation was conducted in ENGLISH and no translator was used. 
 
 
________________________________________ ______________ 
Signature of Investigator                                                  Date 
 
The following are an outlay of the questionnaire:  
 
QUESTIONS 
 
Secondary Research Question 1:  Why is the SA DOD not interested in KM? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge is there interest KM and evidence thereof in the SA DOD in?  
 Do you and/or your direct superior’s Performance Agreement have a distinct Performance Requirements 
Statement for KM? 
 Are you aware of or to your knowledge is there any SA DOD policy, strategy or doctrine that express on 
or govern KM? 
 Are you aware of or to your knowledge is KM a RSA legislated requirement? 
 Are you aware of or to your knowledge is KM addressed in the DR 2015? 
 
Secondary Research Question 2:  Why should the SA DOD be interested? 
 To the best of your knowledge what do you understand knowledge to be? 
 In which era is the world currently in your opinion or to your knowledge? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge, is the DOD a complex organisation? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge, will the quality of decision-making, action, effects achieved and 
advantage be affected if these activities are based on data vs information vs knowledge? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge, is data and/or information and/or knowledge strategic to the 
DOD? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge, should the SA DOD engage in KM initiatives? 
 
Secondary Research Question 3:  What type of knowledge should the SA DOD be managing? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge what type of knowledge should the SA DOD be managing? 
 What knowledge do you manage specifically within your portfolio? 
 
Secondary Research Question 4:  How should the SA DOD manage its knowledge?   
 In your opinion or to your knowledge, what should the aim/goal/objective of KM be in the SA DOD? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge, what KM processes exists in your domain? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge, is there a requirement for more knowledge integration? 
 In your opinion or to your knowledge, what do you think should be key components be of an SA DOD 
KM model? 
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